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CHA.PrER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Foreign policy, before the nineteenth century, was formed along 
traditional lines, with the aristocracy playing the leading role. The 
lack of popular educational opportunities, the difficulties or dissemi-
nating information, and the limited participation of the masses in politi-
cal affairs meant that public opinion was not able to affect seriously 
the conduct of international relations. 
The growing importance of English public opinion became evident 
early in the nineteenth century. :!dmulld Burke, while observing the de-
cline of the three mediev-al estates, noted the rise of public opinion, 
terming this "The F.ourth Estate.•l 'lith the rapid extension of demo-
cratic ideas and institutions, the broadening of the suffrage, the accel-
eration of mass education, am the developnent of the modern press, public 
opinion came to have an important impact on the formation of domestic and 
foreign policy. Spencer Walpole, writing in 1882, observed that there was 
a •growing tendency in the people of this country to assert its control 
over the foreign policy of the State.•2 In Bngland, according to another 
contemporary, •the force ot public opinion ultimately inspires, directs, 
and in all respects governs. It quickly makes its impress apparent in 
lsidney B. Fay, "The Influence of the Pre-War Press in Europe,• 
Jassachu&etts Historical Societ:r Proceedipgs, IXIV (March, 1931), 120. 
2spencer Walpole, Foreim Relations (London: Jlacmj]]an & Co., 
1882), p. 161. 
1 
2 
the conduct of all departments.•.3 William !anger, who has made a detailed 
study of this period of history, contends that international decisions, 
which had once been the work of a selective inner circle, •now became the 
affair of the literate and articulate part of the population.•4 
Popular feelings and sentiments, as expressed through the mediUDl 
of pamphlets, journals, newspapers, and books, could no longer be ignored 
by the heads of government. llore and more often they found it neces eary 
to consult public opinion, and, if possible, to influence it. Although 
British statesmen and publicists maintained that there was no official 
press and that newspapers were not subservient to party discipline, 
there is some evidence of such co-operation. A writer in Fraser's 
Magazine remarked: 
When Mr. Gladstone and his friends were in power they made much 
of their journalists, and it is a touching proof of the homage 
which a great party leader like Lord Granville is gracious enough 
to bestow upon his servitors in the press, that when the Countess 
Granville gives an assembly you will generally see the names of 
a Liberal editor or two, and perhaps a leading article writer, 
introduced in the best company at the tail of the Foreign Of-
fice clerks. 5 
later on, in the same article, the author declared: 
It may be said that at the present time there are only two 
London journals -- the Standard .~d the Daily Te1egraph --
which have not gentlemen personaU,. interested in their in-
fluence gnd success accommodated with seats in the Bouse of 
Commons. · 
.3npocracy in the Old. World and the New (London: Keegan Paul, 
Trench & Co., 1884), pp. 94-95. 
4wi11iam Ianger, European Alliances and AUepmants, 1S'Zl·l89o 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19.31), P• .3. 
5•Politics and the Press,• Frase;r1s Magazine, XII (July, 1875), 4.3. 
6 ~., p. 49. 
France was well aware that English public opinion was a useful factor in 
producing desired effects in Anglo-French relations. Charles Gavard, the 
, 
charge d'affaires in London, maintained:. 
I was and I am convinced that, it one wants to manage any business 
properly in England, he must, at the same time that he addresses 
the gover.ament, negotiate directly with public opinion through the 
press and members of the Parliament or ot the Chambers of Coi!Dilerce, 
it there be at issue any question which concerns them. I have 
never neglected this device, and have always found the good ot it, 
both in 1872 and later in 1875, with the Conservative Cabinet,? 
In spite of the important influence of public opinion on inter• 
national relations in European history prior to the First World War, 
historians have tailed to make sufficient use ot this material. 8 As a re-
sult, many historical studies place a disproportionate emphasis on diplo-
matic records. Such an incomplete utilization of source materials needs 
to be balanced by an investigation of public opinion. 
A study based solely upon diplomatic documents, while it may be 
absolutely accurate, gives only the skeleton of the story, ••• 
A careful examination of news and editor~l columns is as essen-
tial as a stmy ot diplomatic documents. 
The lack of attention by historians to this phase of history can be ex-
plained not only by the attraction of traditional and orthodox methods of 
7Charles Gavard, A Diplomat in L9ndon: Letters and Hotes. ~71-
w:J., translator's name not given (New York: Henry Holt & Co., JJ397, p. 
125. 
9oron James Hale, Gerptpy and the Diplomatic Revolution 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), p. 3. 
research, but by the multiplicity of opinions and the difficulties of 
determining the reasons tor these opinions. 
A study of public opinion involves the investigation of diaries, 
letters, biographies, autobiographies, monthly reviews, newspapers, and 
secondary accounts. In working over such a formidable amount of mater-
ial, there is the task of selecting and cataloguing the various notices 
and indications of attitudes in order to determine not only the general 
reaction, but important secondary views. Only by relating any single 
examples, by piecing together bits of information from multiple sources, 
and then cnaluating these tentatiTe results on the basis of larger and 
deeper attitu:ies, can a comprehensive and realistic view be arrived at. 
One cannot obtain an accurate picture of public opinion merely by look-
ing at all the possible examples and then assuming that public opinion 
represents the view that appears the greater number of times. Instead, 
one has to know the significance of the particular source, especially 
the political affiliation of the author. To string along examples with-
out pausing to view the entire setting, or without making meaningful 
interpretations, presents to the reader a superficial and fragmented 
work.10 Ultimate success in the study of public opinion depends, more-
over, upon the ability to recognize those sources which are important 
and essential, to select the relevant material out of a mass of data, 
and to examine these selections in relation to national characteristics. 
Indeed, the farce of individual views can hardly be approximated without 
a knowledge or the people' both their character and their history. 
lOAn example is Dora Raymond, British Pollex and Op1p1on DuriM 
the Franco-Pru8sian War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921). 
4 
Consequently, with a view towards presenting a meaningful and objective 
study, the author bas determined, when possible, the historical setting, 
the nature of the source, and its importance in shaping public opinion. 
Actually, for the greater part of recorded history, little is 
5 
known about anybody1 s reaction to historical situations, and even when 
newspapers, diaries, autobiographies, letters, and periodicals are gener-
ally available, they record only the opinion of a small, articulate group. 
On most issues, the majority of the people are uninformed and uninterested, 
and to demand an opinion of the masses creates a false impression. One 
may assume that except in cases of grave importance most Englishmen were 
generally indifferent to problems of foreign policy. The term "public 
opinion," in common usage, refers to the over-all reactions of' the general 
public, but, tor all practical purposes, the influential leaders provide 
the only tangible evidence for public tendencies. As this small elite 
shapes the attitudes of the masses and overrides their lukewarm, loosely-
held opinions, the emphasis of' this research will be aimed at discovering 
the opinions of' the leaders. This is not to say that the opinion of the 
general public does not have any :t.ntluence; their attitudes set limits 
within which the relatively small circle of' inf'luential people have to 
operate. 
Research such as the author has contemplated makes a knowledge of' 
the English press, which constitutes a major source of' the investigation, 
a prime necessity. Naturally a classification of the whole English press 
is not within the limits of' this study. Yet the author, seeking to under-
stand the political connections as well as the relative importance of' the 
individual journals, has made an effort to mention any relevant :l.ntormation 
concerning the source materials. lluch of this information can be toUJJd 
in the few general treatments of the English press,11 monographs on in-
dividual organs,12 and in the more numerous biographical and autobio-
graphical accounts ot newsmen.l3 
Aside troa the particular attUiation ot the organs ot public 
opinion, there are a number or observations which contribute to an under-
standing or the formation or English press opinion. First, Englishmen 
were guided in their judgment on Continental topics by the leading jour-
nals. Oron Hale, in his study or the English press, found: 
J.l..r. H. S. Escott, Masters or hglis' Journalism: A St~ of 
Personal Forces (London: Fisher Unwin, 1911 ; Char.les Peabody, ijliilish 
Journalism and the lien Who Haye lfade It (London: Langmans, Green & Co., 
1882). 
6 
In the field of foreign affairs, as contrasted with domestic, 
the press more frequently leads than follows. This arises 
from the fact that it is practically the only medium to transmit 
news of other nations. Moreover the average individual is not 
directly affected by foreign affairs and is inclined to accept 
the obiter dicta of the correspondents.14 
Secondly, the London press, as compared with the press throughout the 
7 
rest of England, exercised a disproportionate pressure on foreign policy.l5 
Thirdly, the Times, frequently called "The Tlnmderer," was a preponderant· 
influence in molding opinion. The Times had the reputation for being free 
of party favoritism, even to the political group in power.16 Yet its 
close relationship with leading statesmen led to the belief on the Conti-
nent that it was an official mouthpiece of the government.l7 It not only 
circulated all over England, but it possessed the power practically to 
make and unmake ministries and nearly to dictate public opinion in foreign 
affairs.18 Ramsay, commenting on its importance, wrote: 
No study that pretends to give an account of opinion and policy 
in England during the Victorian period can ignore what was per-
haps a greater force in the national life than any party or any 
individual leader -- the daily paper known as the Times and the 
man whoi from 1840 to 1877, was its editor -- Jolm Thaddeus 
Delane. 9 
14Hale, Gennany and the Dip1omatic Revolution, p. 1. 
l5Ibid.' p. 3. 
16"Politics and the Press," Fraser's Magazine, XII, 43.-42. 
17Ibid. 
18Bowman, p. 116. 
l9A. A. W. Ramsay, Idealism and Forei:nPoli~: A Study of the 
Relations of Greaj Britain with Gffl"!!!Any and Flillce, 1S60-l1fis (London: 
John llarray, 1925 , p. 13. 
It was not until the resignation of Delane in 187/ that the influence of 
the Times began to wane.20 
It is the intention of the author to trace and to explain the 
British reaction to the Third Republic from 1870 to 1882, a period which 
constitutes a significant epoch in French history. The dramatic events 
of 1870 and 171 heralded important changes in Europe. These included the 
advent of a united Italy and a united Germany, the adoption of a new 
8 
papal policy, and a new era of colonization. France, which was faced with 
the transfer of the center of power in Europe from Paris to Berlin, was 
compelled to undertake a fundamental rethinking and restatement of its 
domestic, foreign, colonial, and ecclesiastical policies. The history 
of France during the succeeding years, 1871 to 1882, was the record of 
an earnest and successful attempt to extricate itself from defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War, to restore confidence in the destiny of France, and 
to achieve a powerful, prosperous, and democratic state. The establish-
ment of republican institutions, and their defence against enemies within, 
constituted the connecting thread in this phase of French developnent. By 
1882 France had achieved an unusual degree of domestic tranquilll ty, and 
it had embarked on an ambitious imperialistic program, which was to mark 
a turning point in Anglo-French relations. 
The foreign problems which attracted the greatest attention in 
England from 1870 to 1875 were for the most part European; colonial ri"Val-
ries were still secondary. Outside of the traditional preoccupation of 
the powers to attain their proper position and prestige and to reach an 
equilibrium among themselves, which centered in the Continental policy of 
20aowman, p. 19. 
Bismarck, there was an avid interest in the struggle of liberalism and 
nationalism against the forces of conservatism. Beginning with the re-
turn of Disraeli and of the Conservatives in 1874, and the purchase of 
the Suez shares in the next year, there was a noticeable attempt to seek 
an outlet for British energy in imperialistic enterprises. While unable 
to disengage itself completely from affairs in Europe, especially the 
"Eastern Question,• England re-embarked on fUrther colonial expansion in 
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Meanwhile, France, unable to break 
through the Bismarckian system of alliances, found itself turning toward 
Asia and Africa for compensation for its loss of' Alsace and Lorraine. 
Thus we perceive that France and England, pursuing conflicting colonial 
policies, were destined to collide. 
9 
The investigation of this significant period in Anglo-French inter-
course has been neglected by historians. While some work has been done in 
certain limited areas of Anglo-French relations, little attention has been 
given to the role of English public opinion in regard to France 1 s foreign 
and domestic policies. In the category of historical studies that place 
an undue emphasis on traditional source material, there is Lowell Ragatz 1 a 
book, The Question of Egypt in Anglo-French Relations: 1875 to 1904· 21 
Ragatz 1 s study is a useful survey of' the Egyptian problem, but it fails to 
utilize the many biographies and diaries which appeared in the decade 
after World War I. Another characteristic monograph is Tunis and the Great 
Powers by M. M. Safwat. 22 His research deals exclusively with the 
21(Edinburgh: Fletcher Pembroke, 1922). 
22(London: Chapman & Hall, 194.3) • 
diplomatic issues arising out or the French occupation or Tunis, Arthur 
L. Dunham has written an excellent study or the negotiations leading to 
the Treaty or Commerce or 1860, but he does not include more than a sum-
mary or treaty negotiations between 18'70 and 1882.2.3 The book, The Paris 
Embassy, 1814-1920, written by Beckles Willson, 24 is not based on care-
ful research, It amotmts to a popular and superficial accotmt or the 
chief political and social events of ambassadors to France, A more use-
10 
tul. book is Studies in Anglo-French Riston: During the Eighteenth, Nine-
teenth, and Twentieth Centuries, 25 This collection of articles written 
by English and French historians ranges tar and wide over the field or 
Anglo-French relations, but these scholars generally neglected to discuss 
relations from 1870 to 1SS2, Also, there are several general surveys of 
the diplomatic relations between England and France that were written 
seemingly for political purposes •. 26 On the other hand, Lea Relations 
entre la France et la Grande-Bretape, 18'71-187s27 is a careful monograph 
2.3 Arthur L. DW'lham, The Anglo-French Treaty ot Commerce ot 1860 
d the ro ss or the Industrial Revolution in France (Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
University of llichigan Press, 19.30 • 
24:eeckles Willson, The Paris Bmbassy, 1814-1920 (New York: 
Frederick A. Stokes Co,, 1927), 
11 
covering some of the major problems touched on in my research. This book, 
which is based primarily on diplomatic sources, slights the English re-
action to France in favor of the French reaction to Britain, and it con-
centrates primarily upon the French diplomatic position during the Eastern 
Crisis of 1875 to 1878. As for publications relating to English opinion 
in regard to France, Dora Raymond bas made the only thorough study. Her 
work, British Policy and Opinion During the Franco-Prussian War, however, 
covers only a very limited phase of Anglo-French history, and it fails 
to draw carefUl conclusions. 
Now that we have set forth the nature and the scope of this under-
taking and have established that this research will be breald.ng new grolmd, 
we must ask ourselves whether such research will make a significant con-
tribution to knowledge. To become really familiar with an age or a 
people, it is necessary to know something of its second-rate and obscure 
men. A knowledge of the sentiments of the people on French affairs pro-
vides considerable insight into the basic beliefs of the English people. 
Since France was a harbinger of modern trends, accustomed to experiment 
with the latest political theories, this study will mirror English opinion 
on several important historical developments. In addition, it will estab-
lish the significance of English interest in French affairs and uncover 
supplemental information concerning the Bismarckian era and the roots of 
World lfar I. 
The rapid diffusion of education throughout the world in our day 
gives birth to group opinions, many of which will exercise a significant 
influence on international affairs. It is not too much to say that the 
opinions held by one nation about another may create severe tensions or 
support peaceful attitudes. Therefore, it is of interest to know more 
about the way in which people arrive at their views regarding foreign 
countries. The answers to these problems are necessarily complex, even 
with the modern techniques of sampling and poll-taking. In the case of 
public opinion in the nineteenth century, many obstacles present them-
selves, but, accepting these limitations, an effort has been made to 
penetrate surface opinions in order to determine those factors which 
account far the interest of one country in another and to explain the 
role played by' public opinion in international relations. 
12 
CHAPTER n 
ENGLISH mERBST IN FRANCE 
The English, by tradition complacent and nationalistic, cannot be 
accused of unwillingness to learn from the French. During the aeTenteenth 
and eighteenth centUries, the English took a lively interest in the in-
ternal affairs of their neighbors, borrowing freely many political con-
cepts, scientific theories, and artistic modes. With the outbreak of the 
French Revolution in 1789, howeTer, and the propagation of doctrines of 
freedom and equall ty, violent repercussions appeared in England, as in 
all Europe. Both the discontented working class and the privileged felt 
the impact of the new democratic forces and were compelled to direct 
their attention to _events across the Channel. 
The last years of the eighteenth century and the early decades of 
the nineteenth were characterized b.r a reaction against the revolutionary 
thought of the preceding century. The ideas of French philosophy, which 
were thought b.r many to have led to the Revolution, ceased to generate 
enthusiasm. The excesses of Robes pierre and England's long war with 
France destroyed confidence in the ideas of democracy and liberty. 1 
Under the influences of Carly-le, famous for his diatribes against 
Jacobinism, and Cardinal Newman, 'irho led a movement back to medieval 
faith, and the romantic literature of Scott, many Englishmen turned their 
laeorge M. Trevelyan, British. History ~ the Nineteenth Century 
and Atte.r (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1958 , P• 73. 
13 
backs on the Age of Reason. "To the eighteen thirties and forties it 
might have seemed that the eighteenth century was dead and that Carlyle 
2 had buried it." Yet the eighteenth century remained very much alive in 
14 
the small group of Benthamites, especiall.7 in the work of John Stuart Mill. 
Englishmen who believed in the power of human energy and in the need for 
change continued to be drawn towards the study of French civilization. 
Indeed, the news of the French Revolution of 1.830 did much to bring about 
an atmosphere leading to the Reform Bill of 1832. The upheaval in Paris 
in 1848 renewed discussion on the Revolution, led to a revival of Chartism, 
and caused agitation to erupt in Ireland. Although the English stopped 
short of carrying through a revolution of their own, they reviewed again 
French methods of government. 
Thus, by 1870, the British long bad been preoccupied with a study 
of the French Revolution, and whether it had, on the whole, accomplished 
more good or more evil for France and for mankind was a question upon 
which few thoughtful minds completely agreed. Judgment depended much upon 
the temperament, religious feeling, and social ideals of the observer. 
Patient men, men who believed in discussion and in the slow play of par-
liamentary forces or who adhered to special privilege, studied it as they 
might a flood, regarding it as an interesting case, but withholding their 
cordial admiration. They held that representative institutions were ill-
adapted to the French people, and that a parliamentary system e~ not 
long flourish side by side with the centralized machinery created by 
2Frances Knickerbocker, Free Minds: John Mprlex and His Friends 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), p. 130. 
15 
Napoleon I. On the other hand, men who were impatient, who longed for 
quick solutions, and who wished for an end to •privilege," felt an attrac-
tion for the cataclysmal developments of the French Revolution. To them, 
French history was the gradual unfolding of the principles of the Revolu-
tion of 1789, which, in time, would become as popular as autocracy had 
been. 
The triumph of Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, which trans-
ferred the center of European power to Berlin, did not lessen British 
interest in France. In spite of the sufferings in 1870 and '71, which 
threatened to reduce France to a second-rate power, the French continued 
to attract the attention of England. In the twelve years after the war, 
as be.f'ore, the English took an avid interest in the affairs o.f' France. 
Though its prestige had dimmed and its influence had lessened, its example 
still carried great weight with the nations of Europe. France, as ever, 
stood out from neighboring states in Inglish public opinion because its 
internal affairs were of commanding interest. The Times, in a leading 
editorial, declared: 
France, even under a cloud, is still foremost in the world's inter-
est •••• The welfare of almost all other countries may engage our 
sympathies, but it can only in a slight degree affect our inter-
e$ts. • • • The cot.mtry is still a prey to disorder, the Govern-
ment distracted by irresolution, the foreigner encamped in the 
terri tory and proclaiming mill tary law in the occupied Provinces. 
Yet that. Versailles Assembly is the focus of the world's eyes. 
The very fact that France fioats in a sea of mcertainty, that 
all there is demolished, all awaiting reconstruction, makes 
whatever concerns her the world 1 s concern. We must all lmow 
whither France is tending or whither dritting.3 
I James Macdonell, correspondent for the Dailv Telegraph and later an 
.3Editorial in Times (London), December 6, 18'71. 
16 
editorial writer for the Times, asserted that although the blows inflicted 
upon France "made the scepter of political power pass beyond the Rhine, 
yet none the less did the English people continue to think and read a 
hundred times more about France than Paris.•4 Lord Dunsany, a Germano-
phile, reluctantly agreeing with the Francophile, James Macdonell, ad-
mitted that England had an obvious sentimental preference for France. 
France is far more popular in England than is Germany, or tban 
England is in France. Few Englishmen are without agreeable recol-
lections of that pleasant land of France, its gay and amiable 
people. Prussia, on the other hand, is not a pleasing country, 
and its inhabitants seem desirous of distinguishing themselves 
from other Germans by less of courtesy and amenity; in fact, by 
an offensive arrogance of manner. • • • Indeed, to judge fairly 
between France and Prussia, most Englishmen must put some con-
straint upon their feelings and preferences.5 
British periodicals frequently observed that France attracted English 
attention. For emmple, the Dublin Review, an organ of English Catholics, 
testifying to the continued interest in France, observed that "France is 
still the capital and cynosure of nations, whose thoughts and acts most 
intimately affect all others. n6 The lfestmipsj,;er RevieJr noted that, re-
gardless of the shift in the center of European gravity from the latins 
to the Teutons and the Kulturkampf', "it is France not Germany in whose 
politics the British people are most profoundly interested.n7 This 
4James Macdonell, France Since the First Empire (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 18'79), p. 2. 
5.&iward Dunsany, Gaul or Teuton? Considerations as to Our Allies 
of the Future (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1873), p. 7. 
611The Pope and Europe in 1872,• J!Ubl'p Review, LXX (January, 1872), 
711France and Its Government,• Westminster Reviq, C {July, 18'73), 
174. 
17 
estimation of English interest in France was confirmed by the S&t'tll"dax 
Rerlp and the SpectatQr.8 During these same years, before France reas-
sumed a major role in European affairs, the nmu openly aclmowledged that 
the English public was well-informed about France. 
Most people must have been struck by the phenomenon that during the 
last four years France, the beaten, the invaded, the vanquished, 
bas been more talked about and written about than during any other 
recent period of her history, while the Germans, who overthrew 
her and filled· the world with the fame of their achievement during 
the six months of the war have appeared to march back to obscurity. 9 
Even during the "!'astern Crisis,• which agitated England from 1S75 to 1878, 
France continued to have its share of English attention. According to 
James Macdonell, the English periodicals reported the contest between 
Gambetta and MacMahon in 1877 with as much interest as English affairs. 
Even the danger and excitement of the war between Russia and 
Turkey failed to draw away from the battle between parliamentary 
and personal forces in France. M. Thiers, Marshal MacMahon, Due 
de Broglie, M. de Fourtou, M. Buffet, and 11. Gambetta are at 
least as vivid figures to Englishmen as the secondary personages 
of our own Parliament.lO 
The Fortnight~y Review, going even further, indicated that England bad been 
regarding France's domestic discord with as much interest as the Franco-
Prussian War.ll So extraordinary was England's preoccupation with French 
affairs that the Times, recognizing the value of exploiting this curious 
interest in events across the Channel, established in 1872 a special wire 
8•The Neighbours of France, a Saturd8y Reyiew, XXXV (June 21, 1873), 
801-2; IIFrance and the Eastern Question,• Spectator, Ll'XVI (October 14, 
1876), 1272-3. 
9:!ditorial in Times (London), December 22, 1874. 
l~cdonell, p. 3. 
11
•Home and Foreign Affairs, • FortnightlY Rertew, XXVIII (November 
1, 1877)' 728. 
to spread intelligence trom Paris to the Times office.l2 
There are many reasons to explain why England followed French 
political affairs with so much care. One of the basic reasons for this 
phenomenon was that England's political agitations, like its dramas, 
generally were translated from the French. Mr. Cobden once said that 
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the English were the "only people in the world that ever make a foreign 
topic a matter of passionate, earnest, and internal politics.•1.3 In this 
period the impact of French developments on English poll tics is no less 
noteworthy than in former years. During the Franco-Prussian War, Jolm 
Morley remarked that events in France often stirred up a discordant and 
confused agitation in England, quite as eager and, in some quarters, as 
violent as if an important domestic controversy were at issue.14 The 
Satyrdav Review contended that the Paris Commune contributed to the growth 
of conservatism in England during Gladstone t s ministry, l5 and at the time _ 
of the overthrow of Thiers, which raised the specter of the barricades and 
a possible coup, this same organ observed:; 
Nothing could be more unfortunate for Liberal candidates in England 
than any sudden change of things in France which should bring the 
ax:treme section of Radical poll ticians into power. • • • On the 
other hand, if during the next twelve months the French conserva-
tives abuse their power, and are guilty of glaring acts of tyranny, 
or copy the worst acts of the old Imperial Government, the effect 
may be to produce a reaction in England and awaken a s~pathy tor 
French Liberals which will aid the Liberal party here. 
12nasent, II, 292. 
1.3John Morley, "England and the War,• FortnightlY Reyiew, XIV 
(September, 1870), 479. · . 
14~. 
15•The Neighbours of France,• Saturdp.y Review, XXXV, 802. 
161QjS. 
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Frederic Harrison, writing during the constitutional crisis or 1877, main-
tained that it was not only trom the point of view of French history, but 
from a more general view that the struggle should be understood. Peace, 
liberty, justice, and progress would be more easily attainable for all 
of Europe with a victory for the Republic, while political intrigue, 
Jesuitism, and brute force would attain a new propriety with the defeat 
or Gambetta. In sllDllllarY', he warned: 
We shall be more willing to submit to force, and more tolerant 
or forcefUl methods; we shall grow more doubtful of morality and 
the moral forces as destined to mold the future of states. And 
many of us will come to accept the accomplished; and some of us 
will come to make the best or i£ll"ruption; and the world will be 
the worse both there and here. 'l 
Regarding political repercussions in Britain to French affairs, 
it is noteworthy that English politicians were not above using events 
across the Channel to discredit their opposition. English liberals, who 
traditionally looked with favor on the Republic, were criticized by 
English conserw.tives because of certain failures of the Republic. On 
the other band, English liberals found pleasure in accusing the opposition 
of sympathizing with unpopular causes in France. 
An important reason for England's exceptional interest in France 
was the belief that France was the first to catch and focus the influences 
of the modern world through which England was destined to pass. By ob-
serving the evolution of the French state, it was believed that one could 
catch a glimpse or the stages which Britain would experience before long. 
It is not too much to say that the English regarded France as the most 
sensitive organ of the European body politic, and that they were aware 
17Frederic Harrison, ttThe Republic and tbe :.Z.shal, • Fortnightly 
Rertg, XXVIII (December, 1877), 743. 
that its dangers would be, sooner or later, England's dangers. Eustace 
Murray, the Paris correspondent for the Dailx News, wrote in 1877 tbat 
a study of French politics was necessary in order to anticipate all 
eventualities. 
Their ups and downs constitute experiments in the science of 
government which no nation can afford to disregard; and from which, 
indeed, very valuable lessons can be learned. In some respects the 
French are poll tically behind the English, in others considerably 
ahead of them. They are at all events in a transition state, grop-
ing for their right way, and lngllsbmen can hardly make up their 
minds as to the practicability o.t Republican theories until they 
have seen whether a Republic is really capable of being implanted 
into a soil so encumbered with Monarchical growth as the French is. 
It Republicanism in France gets the better of the obstacles strewn 
around it, so as to strike deep and lasting roots, the consequences 
to other nations may be portentous and therefore British journal• 
ists only discharge a duty in keeping their countrymen intormed as 
to every phase in political operations.lS 
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The belief' that France led the way in political developnent is attested to 
by any other publicists. Frederick llarshall, a keen student of French 
af'f'airs, expressed the conviction that the dangers which loomed over France 
would soon be appearing in some degree in other nations. Since the future 
of' all countries belonged to democracy, French experience was of' special 
sigidf'icance - a political crystal ball.19 Thomas May, a political 
theorist and historian, in introducing his profound study of' European 
democracy, wrote that France "illustrates, above all other examples, the 
social and political causes of' democracy, its forces, and its dangers.•20 
l~stace Murray, Round About France (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1878), p. ]37. 
l<Jrrederick Marshall, "The Reign of' the 1Nouvelles Couches• in 
France," Nineteenth Century, XXIV (October, 1888), 479. 
20sir Thomas Erskine May, Democracy in Eu;ope: A History (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1877), II, 85. 
Another competent observer, Walter Bagehot, the editor and manager of the 
Economist, a .free trade organ, in 1872 wrote that "France has always been 
trying political experiments .from which others may profit much. • 21 The 
comments of the Paris correspondent of the Dail.x Telegraph were no less 
instructive: "She has also foreshadowed, perhaps, the dangers which we 
may have to meet in no distance tuture. Her history is a magnif"ying 
mirror in which we JBaY' see a lesson and a prophecy. • 22 The West.m1 nster 
Review, observing the strange fascination with which France was viewed by 
the other powers, explained this curious watchfulness as follows: 
It is because the abstract principles of philosophers become in 
French hands practical and well def'ined, and therefore find an 
echo among the peoples of other lands that statesmen find it neces-
sary to keep such strict ·watch on France. France has ever stood 
alone. She has ever fearlessly gone ahead in P"Ursuit of some great 
principle. As it has been before, so it is no1r.23 
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The lncm;lf""'t'a Britannica summed up the special role of France: "Each 
race bas its own special function in the general polity of nations; France 
seems called to lead in the propagation of wholesome political ideas.•24 
In addition to the foregoing explanations, there is little doubt 
that Englishmen were drawn to follow French politics because they were 
dramatic compared with the relative calm and dullness of home affairs in 
22Macdonell, p. 5. 
2~ernard c. De Lisle, "The Genius of France,• Westminste; 
Review, cmnr {July, 1890), 259. 
2~eorge William Kitchin, WFrance, a lucyc1opae4ia Britannica, 
9th ed., Vol. IX. 
Political excitement must be sought elsewhere when domestic affairs 
ot England do not rise above the sedate responsibility o£ a select 
vestry. Hence we naturally look to the more troubled field of 
France because she is still a country o£ unsolved political prob-
lems, which go down to the roots o£ government, religious convic-
tions ~5and society. She bas more open questions than any other land. 
The Times seconded this reason tor English interest in France, observing 
that 
France has been kept before the world by the animosity or her fac-
tions' the intrigues or pretending dynasties' the jealousy or in-
dividual public men, the timid~y o£ the middle class and the con-
stant menace of the multitude. 
Philip Hamerton, who made a practice o£ interpreting France to England, 
agreed with these comments. 
The history of France has been, tor the last hundred years, the most 
exciting drama that the world has ever beheld. It is simply im-
possible to avoid taking an interest in contemporary French history. 
The dullest and most sluggish Englishman or Dutchman is roused when 
he hears or such events as the battle or Sedan, the tall or t~ 
Empire, the siege of Paris, and the burning of the Tuileries. 
Aside from these political reasons, it is apparent that French 
civilization continued to captivate the English mind. Paris, which was 
the cultural center o£ the world in the nineteenth century, was a magnet 
to those who found pleasure in philosophy, literature, and art. French 
intellecturals, with their strong belief in the unique mission or France 
22 
to educate, to cultivate, and to humanize the world, found great popularity 
in England. The Times, in a revealing editorial, noted that •to all 
25r.faedonell, p. 4. 
26amrray, Roypd About ¥ranee, pp. 130-31. 
27Philip G. Hamerton, Rgund lly lfouse: Notes of Rural Life in 
Frap.ce in Peace and War (Boston: Roberts Bros., 1876), P• 319. 
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cultivated Englishmen the literature or France has an interest second onq 
to their own.•28 A little later, it gave a more thorough assessment or 
Bngland1s preoccupation with French civilization. 
France interests us more than an7 other nation. We ma7 not admire 
her political instabilitY', or her co111nercial blindness, or her ideas 
or what true Republican libert7 means; but we cannot resist the at-
traction or her manners, her literature, her art, the beaut7 of her 
cities, the geniallt7 of her views of life. Educated Englishmen and 
Englishwomen read almost as much French as English, and are as much 
interested in the Salon and the receptions at the French Academy as 
in anything that happens in the world of letters and art in Lcmdon.29 
Another reason for England1s preoccupation with French affairs was 
that all educated Englishmen regarded the French language as their second 
language. It was part of the English educational establishment, and, in 
spite of the shirt in the balance of power, the stud7 of the German language 
lagged behind. Like the cultural link, this lmowledge or its neighbor's 
language permitted England to deepen its understanding of France. 
A cause, however, or our interest in her which is more powertul. 
even than her proximit7 is the general ignorance or &n7 foreign lan-
guage except French which prevails among l'llglishmen. There is more 
German spoken and read in England than there once was; but the fact 
that it is far less spoken and read than French influences Ter7 
seriously the view or continental poll tics taken in this countrT, 
and blinds Englishmen (and bas been !mown to blind the English 
Foreign office when under particular guidance) to the great dis-
arrangement or the former balance or power which has taken place 
since 187o.30 
An article in the Times substantiates this observation that the abilit7 to 
speak the French language facilitated the study or French arrairs.31 
~itorial in Times (London), Jfa7 7, 1878. 
29:r.ditorial in Times (London), llarch 23, 1882. 
30nrrench Politics and English Criticism,• p,u Mall Gazette, XXVI 
(November 14, 1877), 2-3. 
3lr.ditorial in Times (London), lla7 7, 1878. 
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Yet another cause of this curious interest in France was its geo-
graphical proximity, which, together with the develoJ~Dent of the modern 
railroad system and the long peace after 1815, allowed more and more 
Englishmen to become acquainted with France. According to the Uma, many 
travelers were more familiar with Paris than with the rural regions of 
their own country.:32 The Pall Mall Gazette fcnmd that the accessibility 
of France to English vacationers permitted the English to be better in-
formed about France than any other country.:3:3 Miss Betbam•Edwards, a life-
long student of French lif'e, reported: 
English cyclists bowl past us as we drive along the splendid roads 
of George Sud's country. That wild and sombre region known as 
' Les Causses.,' in other words, the plateaux of the Cevennes, has 
become familiar to the Anglo-saxon tourist •••• Nol the real 
phenomena of French travel • • • would be the discovery of any 
place without its English tourists.:34 
llr. Hamerton could hardly have foUJld a less accessible spot to reside 
than the Morvan. Yet so disturbed was the author of R9Und My House by 
:Inglish intruders that ~ found it necessary to place the following notice 
in his entrance .hill: "English guests not invited to sleep at Pre'-charmoy 
are requested to leave by six o1clock.•:35 
Matthew Arnold offered an interesting interpretation tor the uni-
versal attraction of France to its neighbors. He asserted that other 
states acquired an affinity for France because, more than any other nation, 
:32Ibid • 
.3:3"French Politics and English Criticism," Pall Ma:U Gazette, XXVI, 
.3~tilda Betbam-Edwards, "A Publicist's View of France,• National 
Rerlew, XIII (May, 1898), 42:3. 
:35Hamerton, Round K:y House, p. 422. 
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it gratified the worship of the flesh, or the self of man, with such modera-
tion as to «Ecite general esteem. 
It is not enough perceived what it is which gives to France her at-
tractions for everybody. • • • France is 1• h9me sensuel moxep, 
the average sensual man; Paris is the city of 11homme sensuel mo;yep. 
This has an attraction for all of us. We all have in us this hppe 
sensuel, • • • but we develop him under checks and doubts, and un-
systematically and often grossly. France, on the other hand, de-
velops him confidently and harmoniously. • • • She does not develop 
him with madness, into a monstrosity, as the Italy of the Renascence 
did; she develops him equally and systematically. And hence she 
does not shock people with him but attracts them, she names herself' 
the France of fact and measure, good sense, logic •••• As she de-
velops the senses, the apparent self', all round, in good faith, with-
out misgivings, without violence, she bas much reasonableness and 
clearness in all her notions and arrangements; a sort of balance 
even in conduct, as much art and science, and it~is not a little, 
as goes with the ideal of l 1h9me aep.suel J!l0li!P•30 
Moreover, the French gospel of liberty met the requirements of the average 
sensual man. 
France takes 'the wishes of the flesh and of the current thoughts' 
for man1s rights; and human happiness, and the perfection of society, 
she places in everybody's being enabled to gratify these wishes, to 
get these rights, as equally as possible and as much as possible •••• 
All of us feel, at some time or another in our lives, a hankering 
after the French ideal, a disposition to try it. ?lore particularly 
is this true of the latin nations; and therefore everywhere, among 
these nations, you see the old indigenous type of city disappearing, 
and the type of modern Paris, the city of 11homme sensuel morep, re-
placing it. La Boheme, the ideal, free, pleasurable life of Paris, 
is a kind of Paradise of Ishmaels. .And all this assent from every 
quarter, and the clearness and apparent reasonableness of their ideal 
besides, fill the French with a kind of ecstatic faith in it, a zeal 
almost fanatical for propagating what they call French civilization 
everywhere, for establishing its predominance, and their own predomi-
nance along with 1;, as of the people entrusted with an oracle so 
showy and taking. 3 
There are, of course, more specific reasons for the interest gener-
ated in French affairs during this period. Certainly England watched France 
36rlatthew Arnold, Literature and Dorm {New York: Macmillan Co., 
1895), p. 322. 
37Ibid.' p. 323. 
following the war because the latter's recovery was a prerequisite to 
European equilibrium and English security. Until France had recovered 
her economic and political status, the peace or Europe could not be as-
sured. As it was necessary to prevent the further weakening of France 
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and, at the same time, to discourage a Franco-Russian alliance, English 
journalists had to keep their public well-informed about French policy. 
Even after the Gambettists came into power in lJ377, which led to a rap-
prochement between Germany and France, the English, embarking on colonial 
adventures, found it necessary to inform themselves of the French position. 
Again, there was the economic interest. The size of the trade be-
tween the two powers, together with the possible effects of France's 
threatened departure from free trade, caused considerable attention. 
Eustace Murray summed up England's concern for seeing France well-governed. 
Englishmen, to begin with, invest pretty largely in French securi-
ties, and a great part of the wine trade or Bordeaux and Burgundy is 
in their hands. The British colony in France is very big; the num-
ber of English people who resort to the French watering-places in-
creases yearly, and the exports of manufacturers between the two 
countries have grown so considerable -- that any perturbatiou ... in 
French affairs is immediately felt upon the English markets.~ 
John Morley, in analyzing the depression of the cotton industry in lancashire 
and the accompanying strikes and riots in 1878, asserted that the reaction-
ary intrigues in France had contributed to the wave of unrest. Marshal 
~ Macllahon' s coup li • etat had 11pe.ral.ysed French trade and stopped up an im-
portant conduit for the consumption of goods.•39 
38r.urray, Rqgnd Ab9ut France, p. 131 • 
.39rrances w. Hirst, Early wre and Letters of John Morley (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1927), II, 50. 
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Interest in France, which was generated by the unruly character of 
French politics and the English anxiety for peace, was sustained by the 
efforts of individual men. In addition to the normal press reports and 
journals, there was a small group of Englishmen who made a special effort 
to interpret France to their people and who promoted friendship and under-
standing between the two countries. John Morley, statesman and man of 
letters, devoted much of his time to a study of eighteenth centU17 France. 
A.s a scholar and as a dedicated liberal, he wrote monographs on Voltaire, 
Roue seau, and pider_s)t and the Encyc1opaed,ists. These so-called "French 
Studies,• written from an ultra-liberal point of view, helped to dispel 
prejudice against the liberal ideals of the French Republic. lleanwhile, 
as editor of the FortnightlY Review from 1867-1883, Morley, together with 
his associates, did for England in the nineteenth century what the EnCYClo-
paedia did for eighteenth-century France.4° This organ, able to attract 
the crusading zeal of Frederic Harrison, the radical convictions of E. s. 
Beesly, Goldwin Smith, and Henry Fawcet, economists like J. s. Mill, and 
men of letters like Meredith, Pater, SJ'DIOllds, Rosetti, Swinburne, and 
Morriss, 8 paid every deference to French rationalism.•41 A.s a matter of 
fact, the entire ultra-liberal camp shared Morley's affinity for the 
Republic./;2. 
Another author who was active in publicizing French life and in 
40John B. Bury, The Idea of ?rogress (London: Jlaemillan & Co., 
1920), pp. 163-64. 
~erett, p. 327. 
42tlaria Catherine Bishop, A Memoir of' Jl:t:s. Augustus Craven (London: 
Richard Bentley & Son, 1894), II, 49. 
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arousing support for the Republic was Miss Matilda Betbam-Edwards. 43 Her 
love for France and French institutions was both sincere and keenly per-
ceptive. Her prejudices were quite as strong as her affections, and her 
views of French life, society, and religion were confined within the 
grooves of a certain middle class republicanism and a stern Protestantism. 
Frederic Harrison, the high priest of English Positivism during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, took a special interest in the land 
of his master, Auguste Comte. A republican and a free-thinker, he parti-
cipated in anti-German demonstrations during the Franco-Prussian War, as-
sisted the Communards fleeing to English shores in 18'71, wrote articles 
during the crisis of 1877 for the Times from France exposing the tyrannical 
policy of the Right, collaborated closely with Morley in writing on France 
for the Fortnightly Review, and, in general, fostered co-operation and 
understanding between the two countries. 44 
One of the most talked-about "Anglo-Frenchmen" was the famous cor-
respondent of the Times, Henri Blowitz. Although of Jewish extraction and 
born in Bohemia, Blowi tz 1 s superior nuency and remarkable memory permitted 
him to write as an authority on all subjects of the day. He began his long 
connection with the Times in July, 1871, when, with the help of Thiers, he 
became an assistant to laurence Oliphant. Two years later he became chief 
Paris correspondent. His most famous journalistic coups were his interven-
tion at the time of the "War Scare of 1875" and his capture of the text of 
4~tilda Betham-Edwards, .An~1o-Frenc:Q Rp1 piscences. 1875-1899 
(London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1900 • 
~rederic Harrison, Autobiograpb.ical Memoirs (London: •cmj]Jan 
& Co., Ltd., 19ll), n, 3.35-45. 
the Berlin Treaty. So thorough was his knowledge of French domestic af-
fairs, that lord Acton, in the original plan or the Cambridge Modern 
History, assigned to Blowi tz the chapters. on the Third Republic. 45 Ac-
cording to Sir Thomas Barclay, who was a correspondent for the Times in 
Paris and who later became famous for his effective work on behalf of 
Anglo-French friendship prior to the rapprochement or 1904, Blowitz was 
le wince des joprnalistes, whose "opinions were discussed as original 
sources of knowledge.n46 
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The previously mentioned Philip G. Hamerton, the noted art critic, 
tried to make English readers as equally interested in everything French 
as was he. His works, Roun<i MY Hoy;@fiJ llodern FrenchmmlJ and Frepch !Ild 
Inglish were all effective in publicizing French society. lliss Betham-
Edwards, commenting on the usefulness of his efforts as an individual on 
behalf of Anglo-French relations, wrote: "In our own time perhaps his 
value as an Anglo-Frenchman, an intermediary between social and literary 
France and England, is higher than that of the art-critic and essayist.•47 
The number of men and women who found inspiration in French civili-
zation and who communicated their sentiments to their countrymen also in-
cludes the names of many secondary publicists, among whom the following de-
serve mention: George Augusta Sala, one-tiJD.e Paris correspondent of the 
Dailv Telegraph and author or Paris Herself Aqip; Captain Denis Bingham, 
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~---~ (New York: 
46sir Thomas Barclay, Thirty Years: Ape:Jn-French Reminiscences. 
J$76-1906 (london: Constable & Co., Ltd., 191.4), p. 1.4. 
47Betham-Edwards, Apglo-French Reminiscences, p. 277. 
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Paris representative of the Daily News and the Pall Mall Gazette, who wrote 
i'he Siege of Paris, The Marriage of the Bonapartes, The I,etters and Des-
patch¥ of the First Napoleon, The Bistor;r of the Bastille, and The Mrn:r:J.age 
of the Bourbons; F. Adolphus, the Paris correspondent of Blaclarood.' s and 
the author of Some Memories of Paris; the aforementioned Eustace G. Murray, 
novelist and representative of the pailx Neys in Paris and author of Men of 
the ThiN Republic and Ro1md Ab9ut France; James Macdonnel, who worked in 
Paris for the Pailv Telegraph and later served on the editorial staff of 
the Times; Ernest Vizetelly, who reported from Paris for the London Ngs 
and wrote My Days of Ad'Jentuz:e, The Fall of France. l870-J.87l, MY Adyentures 
in the Commme, and Rewblican France, l87Q-l9J.2; and finally, Albert Vandam, 
author of len and Jkmners of the Thlrd Republic, JLy faris Note Boo1c, and !11 
Jnglis'hnym in Paris. 
Of course, there were other Englishmen whose contacts with France 
in a non-literary capacity were significant. No one worked harder to pop-
ularize France in Great Britain than the Prince of Wales. In spite of his 
mistrust of the Republic, he visited France frequent:Q", communicated with 
its leaders, encouraged English support of France against Germany, worked 
to preserve the condominium in Egypt, and found time to promote the Paris 
khibition of 1878. 
Despite their unusual interest in France, Englishmen were quite 
liable to misjudge the affairs of that country. Like most foreign critics, 
they were guided by home experiences. A common cause of misunderstanding 
was to be found in the ideas of religion and class. For example, Mrs. 
Augustus Craven declared: 
Among the English Catholics it is the rule to say that, because 
France is a Catholic country, therefore it must not be admitted 
that a Protestant country, such as is England, can be better orr.48 
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English Catholics were not the only ones accused of an umrilling-
ness to view honestly the state ot affairs in France. Liberals and con-
servatives frequently reflected similar prejudices. Mrs. Craven charged 
that the liberals were •voluntarily blind and absolutely ignorant of the 
true state of affairs in France, and of what certain names mean.•49 On 
the other hand, Bamerton, seeing that conservative Englishmen were blinded 
by their partisan eval'US.tion of French politics, contended: 
The class of gentlemen has a tendency to give its sympathy, without 
question, to gentlemen, and to refuse it to those who are not, in 
its opinion, of that caste •••• Anybody who would put down French 
popular aspirations was sure of class sympathy in England. A French 
republican is simply a Frenchman who desires representative govern-
ment, that is what he is; but class antipathy set English gentle• 
folks against him, though they themselves had been the first to 
profit by representative institutions in their own country. So 
with regard to French conflicts between Church and State, the 
English upper classes always side instinctively with the Church, 
although they themselves accepted Church property after the great 
spoilation. 50 
Englishmen, lacking the Continental tradition, often made too much 
ot unfavorable symptoms. For instance, laurence Jerrold, commenting on 
English confusion in regard to the ministerial instability of the Republic, 
remarked: 
For the Englishman, France is ever going to the dogs, and the puzzle 
is why she never gets there. The spectacle of French politics only 
adds to the bewilderment. How can a CO'Illltry represented in the 
Chamber by so many vehement parliamentarians survive in the European 
struggle.51 
48aishop, p. 46. 
49.nu.g. 
50aamerton, French and EMlish, p. 200. 
51r.aurence Jerrold, The Real. Frapce {London: John Lane, 1911), p. 23. 
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Other circumstances also contributed to these difficulties. Philip 
Hamerton declared in one of his several st'Wiiea that French institutions 
and ideas were made to appear more different than they- actually were 
through the use by the English of misleading laDguage. He gave two 
ammplea: 
When we are told, for the sake of' contrast, that England is a mon-
archy and France a Republic, it is impossible, of course, to deny 
that the statement is nomjnall.y accurate, but it conveys and is dis-
ingenuousl.)r intended to convey an idea of opposition that does not 
correspond with reality. The truth is that both countries have es-
sentially the same system of' Government. Again, in the matter of 
religion, to say that France is •catholic' and England 'Protestant' 
conveys a f'ar stronger idea of difference than that which would 
answer to the true state of' the case.52 
In addition, he speaks of an instance leading to misunderstanding through 
mistranslation. 
The English newspapers speak of' Parisian Communists when they ought 
to say Communards. A Communist is a socialist of' a particular kind •. 
• • • A Communard is a person who wishes for an extreme developnent 
of' local government. He tMnJcs that the Commune (something like a 
township) ought to have more autono1117 -- be more independent of' the 
state •••• I do not accuse English journalists of intentional dis-
honesty in this case; there is no English equivalent for Communard, 
the nearest English rendering would be to!JlShip home-ru1e mp.53 
That the English avidly followed French affairs and that English 
domestic politics frequently were affected by matters across the Channel, 
there can be no doubt. On the other hand, leas well known, but of consider-
able interest, is the French reaction to England's unusual curiosity in 
their domestic and foreign affairs. Regardless of this inclination of the 
English to misjudge affairs in France, the French were sensitive to English 
opinion. Philip Hamerton wrote in 1876, that though France was ever present 
52Hamerton, French And English, pp. :x:i-xii. 
531J2!g., pp. xii-xiii. 
in English interest, England was •as remote from France as some province 
in the heart of China.w54 While the French apparently refused to recipro-
cate the English interest in France, nevertheless, they were concerned 
about English public opinion of French affairs. It is known that in the 
. Napoleonic period English public opinion had considerable force in France. 
Nothing illustrates this phenomenon more than the Emperor's rigid censor-
ship of English newspapers :mailed to France. 
We remember the Imperial days, when to receive one •Daily News' out 
of three was a good proportion, and when divers other free-spoken 
journals were never admitted at all. 1n those times the French 
Government kept an agent in London whose business it was to skim 
the English Press and telegraph to Paris what papers it was desir-
able to stop.55 
1n the period under consideration, there is also evidence that the 
French were am:ious to be well thought of' by the English. While French 
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sources would be more likely to reveal France's concern for English opinion, 
English sources did not ignore this matter. The §.aturday Rmew, for in-
stance, asserted: 
The judgment of England, far more than that of any nation, gains in 
a manner which cannot be traced or explained a hold over the minds of 
the rulers of France •••• Although an am:iety about English opinion 
is principally manifested by6 the Orleamsts, yet it is shared in some strange way by all parties."51 
During the crisis between personal government and parliamentary government 
in ~77, Eustace Murray remarked: 
The French are beginning to discover that the Press of' the English-
speaking races is not without its influence in controlling their home 
54Bamerton, Round My HoY§e, p. viii. 
55r.furray, Round About lrance, p. 133. 
56saturday Review, XXXV, 801. 
policy. Hence an outcry which ha~ been raised by French Conserva-
tives against London news}:8pers.5 
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llrs. Augustus Craven, who made her home in France, believed that the English 
press, by misrepresenting the crisis of JS77, was guilty of a great dis-
service to the Jlarshal' s cause. •No one can imagine how much wrong mischief 
has been done to us by the tone of the English press. So thorough a misunder-
standing I don1t remember ever to have witnessea..•58 French political 
parties were well aware of English influence, and they frequently buttressed 
their positions with arguments from the Bnglish press. "The Paris telegrams 
in the J8per, reprinted in the French papers, carried great weight. This 
weight depended on their having appeared in the Iim!l•n59 Frederic Harrison, 
who served as a special correspondent in France for the Times in JJ377, tele-
graphed letters to London which were translated and reappeared in the French 
press. In this liay the English press, which was sym}:8thetic to Gambetta1s 
party, was able to affect the outcome of the French crisis. 60 Murray, sur-
veying the position of the English press in France, declared: 
English newspapers have now a recognized status in France; their names 
are known to the millions; their opinions are curiously', and often 
anxiously looked for, and it is becoming more and more impossible to 
keep them out of the comtry or to ignore their disinterested judge-
ments when quoted in French. 61 
Tlms, in a sense, English public opinion towards the Republic became a part 
of the domestic history of France as well as England. 
p. 462. 
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CHAP.ri:R III 
On JuJ.y 5, 1870, Mr. Hammond, the Permanent Under-secretary at the 
British Foreign Office, informed Lord Granville, the new Foreign Secretary, 
that in all his long experience he had never lmown so great a lull in for-
eign affairs and that he lmew of no impending question requiring Granville • s 
immed~te attention.1 Within a few hours of their encouraging conversation, 
Granville received notice that the Provisional Government of Spain had of-
fered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern the Spanish throne and that the 
Prince had accepted the o.f'.f'er. Ten days later France and Prussia were at 
war. 
The f1ohenzollern Candidature ansi the Outbreak of War 
Several European princes had refused to become the constitutional 
sovereign of Spain when the crown was offered to Prince Leopold, the cousin 
of King William of Prussia. Prince Leopold declined the offer at first, but 
Bismarck, lmowing the .f'uror it would cause in France, engineered a renewal 
of the invitation and its acceptance by the Prince. As a result, Napoleon, 
already alarmed by the new power of Prussia, addressed strong protests to 
Berlin and Madrid. 
In this crisis over the Hohenzollern candidature, the English govern-
ment tried to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The French 
lLord Edmund Fitzmaurice, LifA of Lord Granville (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1906), II, 33. 
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Emperor appealed to England to use its in£luence to secure the withdrawal o£ 
Prince Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish crown. Both Gladstone and Granville, 
who believed that Spain was entitled to choose its own monarch without outside 
interference, came forth in the interest of peace to find a face-saving solu-
tion of' the Spanish imbroglio. They urged the provisional government at 
Madrid to withdraw its offer and tried at the same time to persuade Prussia 
to discourage the project.2 
English opinion, during this first phase of the crisis, held that 
French fears of' the Hohenzollern candidature were exaggerated but, nonethe-
less, capable of' leading to war. Under the circumstances, then, Prussia 
should use its influence to conciliate French suspicions. Thus, anxious lest 
war erupt in Europe, the British joined in the universal cry for peace. The 
Times, tor example, refusing to allow that France had any real grievance a-
gainst Prussia, declared: lt'fe do not pretend that their jealousies are founded 
on reason -- far from it; and we are, moreover, confident that a King o£ Spain 
would govern Spain herself, and not with a view to £oreign interests.u3 In a 
review ot public feeling, however, the Times admitted that in this stage pf the 
crisis France's contention had the sympatb7 of the English people,4 but the 
§pect.ator, surveying press opinion, reached a more sharply' phrased conclusion 
than the Times. 
Th& attitude of the British Govenunent· in the affair is still unknownt 
and that of the British press is so tar discreditable. It appears to 
have exactly three ideas--firstly, that the whole moral duty of Marshal 
2Jobn Morley, Life of Gladstone (New York: Macmillan Co., 1903), II, 
325-26. 
· -'Bditorial in Times (London}, July 6, 1870. 
4Bditorial in Times (London), July 14, 1870. 
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Prim is to let England get rich in peace; secondly, that Napoleon's will 
ought to be the law of every country except England; and thirdly, that 
for Spain to choose her own d~sty without the consent of the British 
Press is a gross impertinence.5 
Unwilling to accept the consequences of war, the British found themselves 
calling for a French solution of the problem. 
England's sympatb7 for France was soon forgotten when it was learned 
that Napoleon was not satisfied with Leopold • s wi thlrawal. Gramont, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, desiring to humiliate Prussia in a more de-
termined fashion, on July 13 instructed Benedetti to demand of King William, 
who was vacationing at Ems, a formal guarantee that the Hohenzollern candi• 
dac:r would never be renewed. The King, feeling that the demand was 
unreasonable and needless, rejected the proposal with some abruptness. He 
then sent to Bismarck a summation of the negotiations between Benedetti and 
himself; the "Ems Dispatch," after Bismarck's skillful editing, was released 
to the world in such a way as to imply that the Prussian King had been in-
sulted b7 the French Ambassador and that the latter had been slighted by the 
King. France, already aroused over the question of the Spanish throne, was 
thrown into a frenzy. After consultation with his ministry, the Emperor 
acquiesced in the popular demand for war. 
The British goVernment and the rest of Europe looked with relief upon 
the news that the Prince had rei'used the Spanish throne, and the English 
believed that any further French demands would be of an aggressive nature. 
Gladstone had been quick to see the folly in such a course, and, in a note 
to Lord Granville on Julyl2, the day before Gramont1s demands, he maintained 
that •it is our duty to represent the immense responsibility which will rest 
5•News of the Week,• Spectator, VIIL (July 9, 1870), 825. 
upon France, if she does not at once accept as satisfactory and conclusive 
the witbirawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold.•6 On learning of 
Gram.ont1s demands, Gladstone told the German Ambassador to England, 
Bernstorff, that Germany had gone to the uttermost verge of conciliation and 
that French insistence on further guarantees was a flagrant provocation. 7 
Lord Granville, like Gladstone, was deeply concerned with the prospect of 
war. He urged the Franch Ambassador,· laftlette, 
•to impress upon his government that they ought not to take upon 
themselves the responsibility of pursuing that quarrel on a matter 
of· form, when the;y had obtained what Gramont had assured Lord Lyons 
would put an end to the dispute.•S 
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Also, in a note trom Lord Granville to Queen Victoria_ on Jul;y 13, the Foreign 
Secretary related that he had instructed Lord Ly-ons to press upon France the 
•responsibility of not accepting the renunciation by the Prince, and 
constituting themselves the aggressors in this war.•9 Evidently the Queen 
approved of his attitude in the matter, as she wrote to Granville on Jul;y 
14, that •the Queen, having interfered as requested, feels that this 
persistence of the French in seeking for further grounds of quarrel places 
her in a bam111ating position.•lO 
The whole matter came before the cabinet on Jul;y 14. Gramont• s 
request that England use its good offices to secure German approval of 
6uorley, Life of Gladstone, II, 328. 
7Ibid.' p. 330. 
8~., p. 329. 
9:he I.etters of Queen Victoria: A S.lestion from Her lfajestx's 
Corres,ndepce tpd Joprnals Between t'e Yare 1866 and 1885, ed. George 
Buckle London: John Murray, 1926-31 , II, 30. 
10~., pp. 32-33. 
France's prohibition of any future candidature was rejected.ll At the same 
meeting, in order to avert a war, the cabinet agreed to send notes to 
France and Prussia, requesting Bismarck to give his consent to Prince 
Leopold 1 s renunciation, providing France waive its demand for a commitment 
covering the future. Bismarck rejected this proposal on July' 15)2 Follow• 
ing Prussia's rejection of Granville's suggested compromise, the Foreign 
Minister made a last minute effort to urge the powers to have recourse to 
mediation. This, too, failed to receive approval.l3 
It is obvious that in these few days prior to the outbreak of war, 
in spite of the change in Foreign Minister, the British government was able 
to play an active role in the negotiations. Disraeli, the leader of the 
Conservatives, afterwards charged that the British remonstrances lacked 
vigor, but Gladstone's biographer disagreed, stating: •there is no reason 
to suppose that Lord Lyons was wanting either in directness or emphasis.•l4 
English public opinion both in the House of Commons and in the press 
supported governmental leaders in their position towards France. There can 
be little doubt as to the attitude of the Parliament. Gladstone, in a note 
to the Queen on July 15, wrote: •It is evident that the sentiment of the 
House on both sides generally condemns the conduct of France.•l5 The 
Times, on learning of the negotiations at Ems, accused France of undermining 
further negotiations by unnecessary demands. 
llt4orley, L;ife of Gladstone, II, 330. 
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No dispassionate person will now doubt that France has carried her 
fancied ad'ftntage too far, and she will find it extremely difficult 
to screen herself · trom the suspicion that the aim of her policy bas 
all along been to force a quarrel upon Prussia, with a settled 
purpose either to tight or to humble her, if' she perseveres in ma.k1ng 
demands upon her after the resignation of the Hohenzolle~ Prince 
has removed the .last shadow of a pretext tor hostility.l6 
The T~es went on to say that if Benedetti had set forth demands, then 
France must not only expect to see the tide of' opinion setting in 
· against her, but she will also torfei t the sympathy which has been 
bestowed upon her on the first announcement of' her alleged grievances. 
She will stand forth as the disturber of' the public peace, and justify 
those changes of' which we were to the last desirous to acquit her.l7 · 
When the morning newspapers of July 16 spread across England the 
news of' France 1 s decision to go to war, the English press took the oppor-
tunity to declare their reaction more fully on· the recent French diplomac)". 
As f'or Benedetti's demand at Ems, it 
was a slap in the face given with the left hand, while the right is 
already on the hilt of' the sword.... Whatever may have been on 
former occasions the offences of' Prussia, she will in this instance 
have on her side all the moral support !ftlch is seldom denied to 
those who take up arms in self-defense. 
The Times, in a leading article that was t;ypical of' English press opinion, 
stigmatized the French decision to go to war as 
the greatest national crime that we have ever had the pain of' recording 
in these columns since the days of' the First French Empire. War is 
declared -- an unjust premeditated war. This dire calamity, which over-
whelms Europe with dismay, is, it is now too clear, the1~ct of' one man in France. It is the ultimate result of' personal rule. 
There can be no doubt as to the editorial position of' the~. It was most 
decidedly on the side of' Germany. Mr. Walter, the owner, went down to 
l~itorial in Times (London), July 15, 1870. 
17~. 
~itorial in Times (London), July 16, 1870. 
l9ll21Q. 
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Printing House Square at the beginning of the war and peDlled a few lines 
denouncing French conduct. 20 The leading organ of the Liberal party held 
a similar position, labeling the war a crime against the progress of civili-
zation.21 The liberal !§nchester Gu&rdi•p saw in the declaration of war 
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the climax of a premeditated scheme to draw Prussia into war, 22 and Reynold 1 s 
Newspe.P£, an organ of the radical working man, supported this view. 2.3 The 
rest of the English press editorialized in the same vein. 24 
These views of the daily press are supported by individual testimony 
of many outstanding men and women. Gathorne Hardy, who served in several 
Conservative ministries, noted in his diary on July 16: ll'far was proclaimed 
yesterday. • • • France appears to me, as at present informed, a wanton 
aggressor.•25 On August ll, 1870, the famous historian, William Lecq, wrote 
to the same effect: ltNo war was ever more wantonly originated by a French 
ruler or more enthusiastically acclaimed by the French people or prefaced by 
more insolent and vainglorious boasting.•26 Dean Stanley's comments bear a 
close resemblance to Lecq1 s. In regard to the origin of the war, he ob-
served: "None bas been waged so causelessly and wantonly in the full light 
20charles Lowe, j'he Tale of a 'Times' Correspondent (London: 
Hutchinson&: Co., Ltd., 1927), p. 87. 
~itorial in Daily Ngs (London), July 16, 1870. 
22xditor1al in Mapchester Guard1ap, July 16, 1870. 
23~u torial in lpnold • s Newspaper (London), July 17, 1870. 
~itorial in Sgotsman, July 16, 1870; Editorial in Standard (London), 
Jul7 16, 1870; Editorial in Dtilx Telegraph (London), July' 16, 1870. 
2%atho~e HArdy,J~ F.ar1 of Cranbr9o1t: A Memgir, ed. Alfred E. 
Gathorne Bard;L0ndon: LonP&ils, Green &: Co., 1910), p. 2Cf'/. 
26Lecky, Elizabeth, A Memoir of the Right Bon. YUJHam ldp.rd lfartpo1e 
LeW (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910), p. 73. 
and security of civilized ages; and for this I regard the French as alone 
responsible.1127 Sir William Harcourt, a leading member of the Liberal party, 
declared on October 18, 1870: 
The Liberal party are of the opinion that the war commenced by France 
is entirely unjust; that France forced upon an unwilling people, upon 
a pretext which bardl7 intended to be serious, ~8war that had no object but that of ambition and aggrandizement. 
The British Ambassador to Prussia, Lord Augustus Loftus, accused France of 
embarking on a war of aggression. 29 .Alfred Austin, who became poet laureate 
or England, dashed off a poem, The Challsmse Ap•ureg, in which he accused 
France of precipitating the contlict.3° It is clear that Gladstone regarded 
France as the instigator of the war. In September he wrote: 
Wonder rises to its climax when we remember that this feverish determina-
tion to force a quarrel was associated with a firm belief in the high 
preparation and military superiority of the French forces, the compara-
tive interiority of the Germans, the indisposition of the smaller states 
to give aid to Prussia, and even the :readiness of Austria ••• to 
appear in arms as the all7 of France • .3~ 
Gladstone's opponent, Disraeli, shared his disapproval or French reckless-
ness..32 The foregoing evidence, together with much that is to follow, easil)r 
28A. G. Gardiner, The Lite of Sir WilliAm Harcourt (New York: 
George H. Doran Co., 1906) , I, 222. 
29Augustus Loftus, Diploptic Rem1pis,ences of Lord Augustus Ipttg, 
1.862-1879 (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 1894 , I, .3.31 • 
.3°AJ.tred Austin, The AutobiomphT of Al.fred Austin (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 19ll), II, 22 • 
.3l[William Gladstone]~ "Germany, France, and England", Jdinburgh 
Review, IDXII (October, 1870 J, 555 • 
.32wfilliam Monypenny and George Buckle, The ~fe of BepJemip DisraeU, 
Earl of Beaconsfield (New York: Macmillan Co., 1929, II, 465-66. 
establishes the point that English public opinion, which was ignorant of 
Bismarck's manipulation of the Ems telegram, put the blame on France. So 
apparent was the English abuse of France that the German residents in 
London summoned a public meeting on Jul.y 20 in which they- accorded the 
English press a vote of approval for their s,mpathetic treatment of 
Prussia.33 
Most of the testimony against France was particularly- harsh towards 
Napoleon. It asserted that he wantonly precipitated the conflict and that 
the basic cause for his hostile action was to establish French hegemony- on 
the Continent and thus preserve his dynasty-. Unable to check the unifica-
tion of Germany and to accomplish the restoration of France's prestige b,y 
diplomatic means, and faced with domestic unrest, he had pursued a policy 
which led directq to war. The Times, for example, charged that the 
Emperor had been led by wounded vanity- to initiate a war of self-
preservation. 34 The Spect&tor maintained that the Emperor had been driven 
to this act in order to prolong his lease of power and to ensure his son's 
succession. 
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Europe must pass through a year, perhaps years, of misery, in order that 
one single man may secure the career and the position of one single 
child. This war has no cause, no motive, no justification, save the 
tear ot Napoleon Bonaparte that his boy's succession would not be clear)5 
On the other hand, the more radical Remold's Nmmper found the Emperor 
guilty- of throwing Europe into war in order to satisfy the 8l'Dl7. 
On the head of Louis Napoleon rests the tremendous crime of embroiJ.illg 
Europe in bloodshed. The war is pureq one of a personal kind, in 
33rditorial in Timep (London), July- 21, 1870. 
3~itorial in Timers (London), July- 16, 1870. 
35"News of the WeU: Spect&tor, VIIL (July 16, 1870), 853. 
order to conciliate the tiger-like blOod-thirstiness of the French 
soldiers who at the last plebiscitum made signs or disarrection.36 
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Thus, Englishmen, in casting their opinion on the contest, :frequently differ-
entiated between France and the Emperor. This tendency to disassociate the 
act of the Emperor :f'rom the French people was frankly stated by the Times, 
which declared that there was no hostility to France, but only a great in-
dignation towards the Emperor.37 That some Englishmen felt that the fault 
lay less with France than with Napoleon is clear from Swinburne's letter 
of August 6. •It is horrible,• he wrote, "to be unable to disengage France 
and Bonaparte -- that she should play the succubus to so infernal an 
incubus.• John Stuart Mill looked on Germany as a defender not only or 
her own country but or European liberty and thought the Germans were right 
in saying that it was Napoleon they were fighting and not France. 
I think the points of most importance are, that the English public 
shoUld know, and show that it lmon, that this has been brought on 
wholly by Napoleon • • • • At the same time it is wrong to attri-
bute this war to France. Neither. in justice nor in prudence ought 
we to do so.39 · 
Yet, there were some observers who realized that the Emperor had 
moved reluctantly to the decision to declare war, and, that in the last 
analysis, the war was imposed upon him by the French people. For instance, 
Sir Francis Head agreed with John Murray, a leading editor, in condemning 
the attitudes or the English press towards the Emperor, 4° while Lord 
3~i torial in Remold 1 s Npsmpe; (London), July 17, 1870. 
37:1ditorial in Times (London), July 18, 1870. 
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Augustus Loftus, the English Ambassador to GerJJI&l17, contended that Napoleon 
was pushed into the war. 
The Emperor had long striven against this adventurous policy of his 
entourage and mill taey advisers, and only y.ielded to the pressure 
of the ruthless Parisian mob and of the army. The public opinion 
of the nation was avowedlr_ for peace, but that impetuous population 
of Paris yearned .for war.~ 
On the other hand, the British Ambassador to France, Lord Lyons, saw it less 
as the work of the army and the Parisian mobs than as the work of the 
Bonapartists .faction.42 Finally, the British novelist and poet, George 
Meredith, maintained that the Emperor did not have to manufacture an inci-
dent to draw b4-s nation into war, as hostility to Prussia was deep within 
the breast of every Frenchman. 
On the whole, I side with France, or so incline. The instinct of the 
people in seizing an opportunity to dispute the aggrandizement of 
Prussia is right: it is not a Vanity war nor a King's, but a 
people • s war - a war of Germans and Frenchmen; a trial of actual 
strength .for supremacy; and it was nonsense to think of postponing 
it, ruinous delay. The tone of our Press is sickening.4.3 
There were a considerable number of Englishmen who refused to con-
done the public condemnation of France. The mill tarism of Prussia's past, 
the wars against Denmark and Austria, and the shameless diplomatic craft 
of Bismarck, led many either to withhold their judgment, to condemn both 
powers, or, as in the case of many· aristocrats, to applaud the French. 
Robert Browning, for example, maintained: •I don1t doubt that Prussia 
is just as bent on it, and has been scheming for it as much as France -
and that the precipitation of France was simply caused by the wish to be 
41Lortus, I, 354. 
42Lord Newton, Iprd Lyons (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), I, 301. 
43The Letters of Geg;'e Meredith, ed. Artlmr Meredith (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912 , I, 208-9. 
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beforehand with Prussia.•44 Benjamin Jowett from the beginning believed 
that Prussia shared with France the responsibilit;y for starting the war. 
He wrote concerning Pruseia that •it is nonsense to sa;y she had given no 
causes for suspicion, and having done so she ought to have been willing 
completel;y to remove them.•45 Lord Ellenborough, the famous Governor-
General to India, realized that Bismarck was the aggressor, and he contended 
that the cause of France was •the cause ot Europe.•46 The Tor;y statesman, 
George Hamilton, admitted that most people believed France was the aggressor, 
•but there were a good man;y men in Parliament, including m;yselt, to whom a 
perusal of the papers published b;y the German government suggested doubts 
as to who was the real aggressor and originator of this war.•47 Dean 
Church, an outstanding scholar and divine, believed that both powers bore 
responsibilit;y for the war, and that it was too eas;y to condemn France. 
This ver;y war with France, of which undoubtedl;y French foll;y and 
wickedness gave the signal, is the ver;y thing to serve the Prussian 
statesmen's end -- the welding together, b;y a blood;y and successful 
struggle, North and South German;y. With all m;y wishes for a grand 
and united Vaterland, the means which, it seems to me, have been 
deliberatel;y chosen to bring it about are simpl;y hateful; as hateful 
as Napoleon's _gmm 9,. 1 ,&i and demoralizing despotism. • • • I believe 
that the law of retributive justice is for German;y as well as for ~~ce, 
and that from one, as from the other, it will wait to claim its due,41S 
4ftn I ; , ed. 
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Even Gladstone observed that •as to personal trustworthiness, the two moving 
spirits on the respective sides, Napoleon and Bismarck, are nearly on a par.•49 
In addition to these individual notices, a number of newspapers, 
motivated by similar reasons, held a sympathetic attitude towards France. 
Unlike the majority of the press, they maintained that Prussia was unworthy 
of British sympathy, and, recollecting the recent history of Prussia, they 
observed that if Prussia should suffer loss of territory, it would be a 
retribution. For instance, the Morning Post argued that France had a good 
case and that Prussia had given the last affront.5° Although the Emperor 
had wanted war, in view of Prussia's imperialistic policy, the Scotsman 
refused to express sympathy for Prussia. 51 Obviously the war presented a 
difficult choice for many people. When faced with France's apparent attack 
on Prussia, a minority of Englishmen could not but be suspicious, especially 
when they recalled how a few years ago France had been willing to uphold 
the sovereignty of Denmark against Prussia. And, when the well-to-do 
recalled their many pleasant experiences in Paris, the fact that many did 
not join in condemning the French is perfectly understandable. 
Regardless of the unfriendliness of English majority opinion towards 
France and the Emperor, the British were determined not to go to war. 
Under the Gladstone ministry, with Lord Granville the Foreign Secretary and 
Mr. Bright still a member of the cabinet, the principles of non-intervention, 
free trade, and peace were well represented. In trying to preserve a strict 
neutral! ty towards the belligerents and in seeking to localize the conflict, 
49Morley, Life of G1adstone, II, 338. 
50r.ditorial in Morning Post (London), July 16, 1870. 
51Editorial in Scotsman, July 16, 1870. 
the cabinet induced Austria, Russia, and Italy to agree that none would 
depart from neutrality without a previous understanding with the other 
neutral members. To clarify England's role to the belligerents, it issued 
a declaration of neutrality. Englishmen of the middle class, who were 
preoccupied with making money, accepted without protest Gladstone's neutral 
policy.52 
A week after n.r had been declared, Bismarck made a bid to complete 
the diplomatic isolation of France. By publishing the draft of the Treaty 
of 1867, in which France enunciated its desire to annex Belgium in order 
to offset the contemplated enlargement of Prussia, Bismarck hoped to make 
Europe aware of the consequences of a French victory and to make Napoleon 
appear as a sort of international bandit. 
' ., 
This projet de traite was communicated to Granville by Bernstorff, 
but it did not become public knowledge until Baron Krause of the German 
Bmbas sy in London delivered the document to Delane, editor of the Times, 
who published it on July 25, believing that it would win much sympath1' in 
England for Prussia. Accompanying this timely revelation was an editorial 
t 
> purporting that France had renewed the projet de traiie at the recent inter• 
view at Ems. 
Unless we are misinformed, and speaking with all reserve on a subject 
of such importance, we are satisfied that our information is correct --
the Treaty has been again offered as a condition of peace. The 
suggestion has not been favorably received.53 
53:F.ditorial in Times (London), July 25, 1870. 
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The people of Great Britain were especially sensitive on the subject 
of Belgian neutrality. Not only was Britain pledged to defend the neutrality 
of Belgium, but it regarded its annexation by either France or Germany as a 
threat to British security. Obviously Bismarck, by selecting the Times, 
intended to assure England 1 s hearty enthusia8Dl for Germany. The disclosure 
of the Treaty, however, met at first with considerable disbelief by the 
English public. Until more proof was forthcoming, it was unwilling to 
accept the judgment of the Times. Indeed, some of the press declared that 
the Treaty was a forgery concocted by the Times not only to punish Napoleon 
for his refusal to receive a correspondent but also to drum up sympathy for 
Prussia. For example, the Tablet, the leading Catholic weekly, boldly 
pronounced: "The whole thing is a ::w!! on the part of Prussia, seconded by 
the Times for its own ends, to exasperate England and Belgium against France.n54 
The St,and.ard :frankl.7 disbelieved that any French diplomat could have drawn 
up the document, suggesting that its style indicated an ignorance of the 
French language. It went on to accuse the Times of wishing to draw England 
into war against France. 55 As for the pro-French Morning Post, it refused 
to believe that France could have initiated such a scheme, charging that, 
if it was not a forgery, it was clearly the work of Prussia.56 Gladstone 
informed Queen Victoria that a large proportion of the public regarded the 
proposed Treaty between France and Prussia as a hoa::z:.57 Former ambassador 
to France, Lord Cowley, noted that even at the Foreign Office there was 
54nchronicle of the Week,• Jab1et, IV (July 30, 1870), 127. 
55Editorial in Standard (London), July 26, 1870. 
56rditorial in Morning Post (London), July 26, 1870. 
57The Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 46. 
doubt as to the authenticity of the document.58 
France quickly denied having initiated the original proposal. On 
the day following this disclosure, Lord Granville appeared in Parliament 
and revealed to his audience the explanations of' French Ambassador 
lavalette. The latter did not deny that Benedetti had written the document, 
but he insisted that Bismarck had fathered the suggestion, and, as if to 
check all criticism, he recalled France's promise to respect Belgian neu-
trality before beginning the war. This took some of the curse off the 
untimely revelation, but there can be little doubt that in the eyes of the 
undiscriminating public this startling event damaged any latent sympathy 
for France. Lord Fitzmaurice wrote of the hostility towards France: "rhe 
publication of the draft treaty, the whole blame of which was unjustly 
thrown on the Emperor personally and alone, had accentuated the f'eeling.n59 
On the other hand, this news did not alter in any way the position 
of Great Britain, nor did it strengthen English sentiments towards Prussia 
to any great degree. While the English were surprised by the news that 
Napoleon had entertained the scheme to annex Belgium, they simultaneously 
showered much criticism on Bismarck. The statements and explanations con-
cerning the Treaty indicated that Prussia was as guilty as France and that 
Bismarck, by his manner of receiving the proposals, had led the French to 
believe that he was not reluctant to allow them to be repeated. The 
Mapchester Jpminer, for example, could not admit that Bismarck had done his 
cause any good by the publication of the document, stating that both parties 
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were less than moral. 60 As both parties were obviously quite wrong, the 
Daily News refused to pronounce on the significance of the Treaty. 61 The 
consistently pro-French Standard, readily accepted the French explanations 
that Germany had initiated the scheme and that France had regarded it as 
of little importance.62 The remarks which the Manchester Guardian attri-
buted to John Bull seemed to typify the British reaction. 
Well, I'm sure I don't know. Napoleon says he wrote that letter at 
your dictation. I will tell you there has been queer dealings be-
tween you two fellows of which I do not halt blow yet. It seems to 
me you are two big thieving blackguards; not a pin to choose between 
you, and that the best thing for me to do is to look after my own 
goods and ohattel.63 
Sir Robert Morier, a close observer of events in the Franco-Prussian war, 
concluded that this maneuver had actually hurt German prestige. 
For it is undoubtedly true that his great ,P.mm S! theatre with the 
secret treaties does him, and through him, Prussia, and through 
Prussia, Germany, more harm than it did France. It seemed somehow 
quite natural that a French sovereign should go in for that sort 
of thing, but it was a great shock to public confidence ~hat a 
German statesman should have been the other conspirator. 4 
On the other hand, Lord Cowley was scorntul of the obvious spitefulness of 
Bismarck's action: •But what can one say of a Power that must have had that 
information to give for the last four ;rears, and only tenders it nop in 
order to spite France and from no horror at the proposal itselt.•65 As for 
60za.itorial in Manchester '§gm1per, July 27, 1870. 
61Editorial in Daily Ngs (London), July 30, 1870. 
62Editorial in Standard. (Landon), July 27, 1870. 
63r.ditorial in Manchester Guardiap, August 3, 1870. 
64Rosslyn Wemyss, Memoirs and Letter; of the Right Bon. Sir Roberi; 
Morier (London: Edward Arnold, 1911), II, 167. 
65A Great Laey1s Friend.ships, p. 266. 
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the British government, it contented itself with a proposal that the two 
powers pledge their friendship far Belgium. 
France or Prussia? 
Following the outbreak of the war, the English public, while eagerly 
awaiting the news of the first battle, occupied itself with the relative 
chances of victory for the two combatants. Since, with very few exceptions, 
Englishmen had been accustomed to believe in French military superiority, 
they accepted the French estimate of their forces and awaited the news of 
a French invasion into German terri tory. The basic reason for this high 
esteem of the French army apparently stemmed from the Crimean war. 
Before the Franco-German War we had rather modeled ourselves upon the 
French army. In the Crimea we had found our military system in all 
its methods and phases to be hopelessly out of tune with modern ideas, 
and were astonished when we realized what it was compared ltth the 
army which the Emperor Louis Napoleon sent into the field. 
One of the clearest indications of the value placed on the French army was 
in the placing of war correspondents by the Times. Delane, the editor, who 
was making arrangements before the final outbreak, wrote on July 12: "It 
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war should break out, France, would, I have no doubt, attack Prussia on three 
points, Mayence from Strassburg, Colblentz from Nancy, and on the Elbe by an 
army on board her iron clad fleet.•67 In view of this prospect, he wanted 
"to have one or two men who from the Rhine Province could feed Abel with news 
and who could retire into Prussian territory as the French advanced.•68 In 
a letter to Sir William Russell, the famous Times correspondent of the 
66Garnet Wolseley, The Story of a So1dier1s Life (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), II, 235-36. 
67The History of 'The Times': The Trlditiop Established. 184J.-
l,§M, II, 419. 
68~. 
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Crimean War, Delane clearly indicated his belief in French readiness: 
"Nothing shall ever persuade me except the event -- that the Prussians will 
withstand the French and I would lay my last shilling upon Casquette against 
Pumpernickel.•69 The famed exponent or Egyptian independence, Wilfrid Blunt, 
wrote that "none or us, not even those who ought to have known it, had a 
suspicion or the unreadiness or France for a serious campaign.•70 Dean 
Church expected the French to begin with an impetuous rush to the Rhine tbat 
would put the Germans at a disadvantage, 71 while Alf'red Austin observed that 
most l$nglishmen said in 1870: •or course the French will go to Berlin.•72 
Obviously.Bngland was unaware or the deliberate preparation of 
Prussia for the conflict. They had little knowledge or the careful mapping 
or the frontier or how even the breadth or the rivers had been calculated. 
"There is little doubt," wrote Morier, "that the Prussians are not yet ready, 
and that a great portion of Germany will be occupied ••• before the 
decisive battle is fought, which will be somewhere in the interior or 
Germany.n73 Again, A. G. c. Liddell wrote: 
Few persons in English society bad any idea that the Germans would win. 
Indeed, I remember Colonel Reilly, who had accompanied the Austrian 
army as Military Attachl in the disastrous campaign of 1.866, and wbo 
ought, therefore, to have known something of Prussian erric.ienoy, 
declaring that the French would be in Berlin in six weeks. 7 4 
69cook, p. 230. 
70wiltrid Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Seeker, 1920), I, 476. 
7lcburch, p. 231. 
72Austin, II, 23. 
73wemyss, II, 54. 
74A. ·G. c. Liddell, Noi}s from the Life of' an Ordinary MortaJ. (New 
York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1916 , 118. 
The British government was as ill-informed as to the actual state of 
military efficiency in Prussia as was the British public. For example, 
shortly before the fighting, the Queen expressed fear that Germany would be 
defeated.75 The Cabinet likewise expected a French victory. Mr. Gladstone, 
on hearing a fellow cabinet minister express his belief that Prussia would 
win, became almost angry, so convinced was he of French military superi-
ority. 76 Lord Granville, in a communication to Lord Lyons, commented on the 
early advantage which France would have in a contest.77 After a thorough 
study of the attitude of the Cabinet, Lord Acton wrote: 
Cardwell, at the War Office, estimated that they would get there 
Q3erlin) in about six weeks. All agreed that the Germans had no 
chance, and ~~,it would be doing them a service to get them out 
of the scrape. 
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Even the military seemed to be unaware of the true state of Prussian military 
potential. Viscount Wolseley, who in 1882 was to command the Egyptian 
campaign, declared that all Europe was shaken by this "unlooked for upheaval 
of nature,n79 and the British Field Marshal, the Duke of Cambridge, admitted 
that he was startled by the rapid succession of defeats by the French army.80 
Such opinions on the relative military merits of the rival armies do not seem 
75sir Sidney Lee, King Edward VII (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), 
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76sir Wilfrid La~son: A Memgir, ed. George w. E. Russell (London: 
Smith, Elder & Co., 19l0 , p. 400. 
77Newton, I, 298. 
78Jobn E. D. Acton, Historical Essays (London: Macmillan & Co., 
1908), p. 218. 
79Wolseley, II, 232. 
80George Duke of Cambridge, ed. Edgar Sheppard (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1906), I, 287. 
unusual when one remembers that the English army had modeled itself on the 
French army. 
Not all Englishmen were convinced that the French possessed a mili-
tary advantage. A minority realized that France, although beginning with 
a rush, would find it difficult to persevere against the staying qualities 
of Prussia. Military expert, Sir Charles Dilke, wrote a letter to the DaiJ,;y 
H!!! in which he foretold the complete destruction of the French armies.81 
He noted that •everybody believed (except myself and Moltke and Bismarck, 
not including, I think, the King of Prussia) that the French Army was 
superior to the armies of all Germany. n82 The Standard 1 s war correspondent, 
Alfred Austin, was another exception. He had no doubt that France would be 
beaten and that the Prussians would conquer Paris. 83 Another Englishman who 
could foresee the failure of Napoleon •·s thrust into Germany was Benjamin 
Jowett, who wrote: "My impression is that the French must be beaten in the 
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. 84 long run -- they go off too easily and have not the stamina of the Germans.• 
Even Morier, who believed in the rapid penetration of Germany by Napoleon's 
armies, never doubted that Prussia would emerge victorious.85 
English Opiniop b8fore Sed&n 
The majority of Englishmen were clearly sympathetic towards Germany 
81charles Dilke, "Recollections of the War of 1870 and the Commune,• 
The Nineteenth eenturr, LXXV (January, 1914), 45. 
82stephen Gw,nn and Gertrude Tuckwell, The Life of the Right 
Honorable Sir Charles Dilke (London: John Murray, 1917), I, 102. 
83Austin, II, 23. 
84Abbott and Campbell, 1etters of Bgnjamip Joyg~, p. 97 
85wem;rss, II, 153. 
up to the Battle of Sedan. Evidence of views approving Germany and attacking 
the French abound in daily newspapers, memoirs and biographies. Typical of 
English feeling was the position of the Queen, who was so anti-French as to 
speak of that nation as 8 devoid of truth," and living upon •vanity, deception, 
amusement, and self-glorification.n86 In a letter to the Crown Princess of 
Prussia, the Queen assured her of British sympathy. 
No one here conceals their opinion as to the extreme iniquity of the 
war, and the unjustifiable conduct of the French! , • , The feeling 
of the peQple and country. here iJ &Jl with you, My heart bleeds for 
~u~!~ . 
Charles Kingsley, the novelist and famous Christian Socialist, wrote to Max 
Muller on August 8, 1870: "Accept my loving congratulations to you and your 
people, , , , I am ~urs, f'ull of delight and hope for Germany,n88 Jobn 
Stuart Mill and George Eliot fully sympathized with the Germans, 89 other 
literary men shared these views, For example, Thomas Carlyle, considering 
France 1 s "polluted" 1i terature, acceptance of papal infallibility and its 
"abominable" Emperor, bad long anticipated the decay of France, The course 
of the conflict promised to fulfill his prophecy, and he exulted: "No war 
was so wonderful did I ever read of, and the results of it I reckon to be 
salutory, grand and hopeful, beyond any which have occurred in my time.•90 
86philip Guedalla, The 9Mf: and lr. Gladstone (New York: 
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Lord Lytton, the novelist and professional diplomat, echoed these sentiments 
when he wrote: "With France it is a war for prestige, with Germany a war 
for existence.n91 
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The radical republican faction in England, with some misgivings, 
allowed itself to side with Prussia at the war's beginning. In spite of a 
certain mistrust of Bismarck, they foresaw that a German victory would ensure 
the spread of liberalism, both in Berlin and in Paris. For example, John 
Morle7, editor of the Fortnightly and an outspoken republican, denounced the 
Emperor as a knave and accused the French of trying to prevent the unifies• 
tion of Germany, which was a desirable end for Europe.92 Even Frederic 
Harrison, who was a Francophile all his life, hesitated to endorse France. 
Like nearly all English politicians, certainly all liberals to a man, 
I had been a hearty opponent of' the French pretext for commencing 
war •••• We did not know then .how long Bismarck and his soldiers 
bad been preparing for the war, how utterly unprepared France was, 
and how dextrously the great chancellor had f'or"ced France to be the 
technical aggressor • • • • And all through the summer and autumn, 
along with all my Liberal friends, I had warmly hoped for German 
victories.93 . 
As France appeared to Sir Charles Dilke as the aggressor, he attached him-
self to the ambulances of' Prussia's army.94 Bradlaugh felt that a German 
victory would result in a setback for German liberalism, while a French 
success would only further enhance the role of' Napoleon. Nevertheless, he 
sided with German,.. 
9l~p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Betty Balfour 
92Morley, Fortnightly Review, XIV, 479. 
93Harrison, Autobiographical Memoir!!!, II, 2-3. 
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While Louis Napoleon reigned at the Tuileries the memoirs of December 
were too bloody, nineteen-year-old hatreds too bitter, to let me be 
just to any cause he led. A perjured liar, a cold-blooded murderer, 
a heartless coward, a paltry trickster, a dishonourable cheat, all 
this was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. I was, therefore, well inclined 
to Germany from roy bitter hatred of the imperial demoralization of 
France.95 
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With the crumbling of the Napoleonic regime and the German conquest of French 
territory, however, English republicans transferred their sympathies to the 
French. 
English opinion, which had clearly branded Napoleon as the aggressor 
and charged that he had been making preparations to avenge Sadowa and annex: 
Belgium, found, as time went on, many more reasons for embracing the German 
cause and for wishing for a French defeat. As one looks at the numerous 
references to English Sytllpathy for Prussia, as well as the mistrust of France, 
it is apparent that reasons beyond the circumstances surrounding the 
declaration of war explain the British reaction. 
In the first place, by 1870 there was a growing antagonism in 
England towards France. Ango-French co-operation in the Crimean War, and 
the Commercial Treaty should not obscure the deep-rooted distrust of French 
policy. Many Englishmen, remembering Napoleon 1 s seizure of power and his 
ambitious foreign policy, regarded France as a troublesome military power, 
bent on pursning a policy of pin-pricks. 
In the eyes of most British statesmen, the whole European system should 
be arranged as if France were a sort of mad bull • • • • France was re-
garded as a firebrand, always ready to pick quarrels and always on the 
lookout to attack her neighbors at a favorable moment. The French were 
said to be vail')., fickle, superficial, touchy, intoxicated with the idea 
of k gloire. 96 · 
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Hence, •hen one considers England's attitude towards France prior to the war, 
its wartime hostility is not surprising. 
In addition to these strong feelings in regard to France's position 
in Europe, the British approved of the consolidation .of the German nation. 
The majority of Englishmen welcomed the appearance of a united Germany as a 
vindication of the principle of nationalism. For instance, the professional 
diplomat, Morier, regarded the consolidation of Germany as the natural 
fulfillment of the law of nations.97 The Fortnightly's John Morley also 
endorsed the view that German unification was inevitable. 
Whatever disturbs the gradual consolidation of a strong power in Central 
EUrope, is retrograde, hinders the accomplishment of a task which must 
sooner or later be accomplished, tnd undoes work which men will have 
instantly to commence over again.98 
In an editorial berating the enthusiasm of the Irish for their vigorous 
endorsement of France, the Times asserted that English opinion was with 
Germany's drive to achieve unification, as it represented "the cause of 
freedom and progress. "99 The British, unaware of the full significance of 
the appearance of a united Germany, did not see the necessity of restraining 
the Bismarckian policy of force. They felt, rather, that Bismarckism was 
only a passing phenomenon which shortly would be abandoned with the defeat 
of the Chancellor. Admittedly, the Germany of the moment was aggressive, 
militaristic and frequently barbarous; however, there were signs of change. 
A transition was likely to occur towards greater liberalism. 
There is no reason to doubt that the same splendid activity which has 
made her foremost in literary and scientific achievements will also, 
97Memoirs of Sir Robert Morier, ed. Wemyss, Rosslyn, II, 165. 
98Jolm Morley, "France and Germany,• Fortnightly Review, XIV 
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when other conditions are ready, identify her with a rational philosophy 
and civilized politics.lOO 
Ramsay, commenting on this factor, declared: 
All Germany's British friends wanted and expected a liberal solution of 
the problem. They hated Bismarck's methods; but, then, he was doing 
the work they wanted done; and so they influenced Great Britain, so far 
as they could, in favor of Bismarck's policy. Thus even the more en-
lightened friends of Germany must be blamed for blindness and for 
ignorance of reality. They were absorbed and misled, partly by the 
romantic idea of Germany, partly by Liberal tendencies, and partly, 
also, by the fear of France .101 
Moreover, it was believed that a strong and united Germany in Central Europe 
would restrain the convulsive and aggressive plans of France and Russia. 
"At the bottom we find that all these considerations were subordinated to 
the great idea that the new Germany should act as a counterpoise to, and 
support Great Britain against, France and Russia.•l02 John Morley noted that 
as long as Germany was divided that Europe would face an overbearing Russia, 
whereas the consolidation of Central Europe would provide a buffer between 
East and West. 
What can be more desirable in the interests of the highest civilization 
than the interposition in the heart of the European state-system, of a 
powerful, industrious, intelligent and progressive people, between the 
western nations and the half-barbarous Russian swarms.l03 
Yet another reason for English acceptance of a united Germany was the belief 
that German interests did not compete with the economic and colonial interests 
of Great Britain. As the Germans had no navy, a relatively negligible manu-
facturing establishment, a moderate protective tariff, and a supposedly 
peace-loving disposition, in spite of two recent wars, British statesmen, as 
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well as public opinion, followed her progress with benevolent understanding.l04 
In addition to these political and economic factors, there is the 
religious one. There is some indication that Englishmen identified a Prussian 
victory with the triumph of' Protestantism over Catholicism. For e'X:ample, Lord 
Shaf'tesbury, the highly respected philanthropist, who devoted his lif'e to 
ef'f'orts to assist the poor and to educational reform, wrote to Count 
Bernstorf'f' on July 16, 1870: 11As an Englishman, as a Protestant, and as a 
Christian, allow me to express my deep detestation of' this Anti-German, 
Popish, and unholy war:i05 Although acknowledging Bismarck's role in the 
origin of' the war, Reverend Benjamin Jowett admitted that his sympathies 
were with the Protestant power.1o6 According to the Catholic Tablet, the 
reasons f'or English sympathy with Prussia were English hatred f'or Catholi-
cism and the expectation that a French defeat would allow Italy to attack 
the papacy. 
Protestant journals have said that the Irish side with the French because 
they are Catholics; they have not added that the English side with the 
Prussians because they are Lutherans, f'reemasons, and infidels. The 
Mazzinians and Garibaldians f'rom one end of' Italy to the other are as 
Prussian as the Times or the Spectator; and Mazzini and Garibaldi have 
long since been the heroes of' English worship.l07 
Again, this journal charged: 
In nearly every English paper one opens there is an indication of' opinion 
to the effect that one happy result of' the war will in all events, be 
that, as soon as France is seriously engaged, King Victor Emanuel will 
lO~ay, PP• 40-41. 
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be able to take possession of Rome.108 
Not everybody was content to take this pro-German view. Some, 
looking at Bismarck's past record of expansion, could find little to applaud 
in a Prussian victory. If France was guilty of initiating the conflict, 
Germany's record was far from clean. There was no assurance that Bismarcldsm 
would not be a worse curse to peace than Napoleonism. For example, Edward 
Lear, the popular humorist, wrote: •The war is a bore. But if France wants 
to devour others, I cannot but recollect that Prussia did devour some of 
Denmark and other places: so I do not see that one is worse t 1other."l09 
John Blackwood, editor of Blackwood's, found it difficult to applaud Bismarck 
after the way he had pursued a military policy over the last few years. 
I like the Germans, and cannot help wishing that they should win, 
but the Prussians 1 conduct in the last war was intolerable, and 
Bismarck seems as bold a liar as the French Emperor • • • • In 
fact it is impossible to sympathize with either of the robbers.llO 
This attitude was echoed by Frederick Denison Maurice, the noted divine, who 
wrote to his son on August 29, 1870: 
All one hears of German doings hitherto is very encouraging; everything 
of French seems to show that the country needs a purification such as 
it is receiving. But my horror of empires is so great and general that 
I dread the thought of a revived German Empire, whilst I contemplate 
with satisfaction the downfall of the French. I wish heartily that 
Germany should be German and not merely Prussian.lll 
On the other hand, one section of public opinion was openly 
10~ 11The Benedetti-Bismarck Treaty, n Tablet, IV (July 30, 1870), 126. 
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sympathetic towards France. The well-to-do of English society long had 
enjoyed French hospitality; they looked upon the defeat of France with dis-
favor. Lady William Russell observed on August 6, 1870: "The fashionables 
here are Gallic, but cannot say why -- except that they do not like the 
Prussians socially.•ll2 Likewise, Lord Boughton remarked on August 1, 1870, 
that "what is called society here is wholly French on account of the 
Cumberlands and other dispossessed relatives.•ll3 Lord Salisbury, who was 
in opposition to the Gladstone government, was with France from the first. 
According to his biographer, this sympathy for France stemmed from his love 
of French literature and art and his remembrance of Bismarck's attack on 
Schleswig-Bolstein.ll4 Moreover, these views were shared by the leading 
organ of the Conservative Party-- the Standard, which editorialized in a 
hostile spirit toward Prussia from the beginning.ll5 The views of English 
society were shared by the leading weekly of English Catholics, although 
for different reasons. Extremely sensitive to the fate of the papacy, the 
Tablet openly stated that its reason for sympathizing with the French was 
the support they had rendered to the Pope when faced with Italian 
unification.ll6 
The Franco-German hostilities placed the Prince of Wales, who was 
a friend of both the Emperor Napoleon and King William, in a conflict. 
112A Great lady's Frien4ships, p. 272. 
llJr.r. Wemyss Reid, .:.Tat:he~~~~~~~~:LA.;~~~~~~~~*-» 
Monckton Milnes. First I.,prd Houghtop 
1891), II, 130. 
114Gwendolyn Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of SalisburY (Landon: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1921), II, 32-33. 
115Austin, II, p. 219. 
ll6;ablet, IV, 161. 
6.3 
Although he made efforts to respect England's neutrality, in private his 
feelings were pro-French.ll7 Count von Bernstorff, the Prussian Ambassador 
to London, reported to the Prussian court a story to the effect that at a 
party at the French Embassy in London, shortly after the declaration of war, 
the Prince expressed the desire for a French victory.ll8 Indeed, Bismarck 
boldly asserted that Pruss_ian aspirations had an enemy in the Prince.ll9 
Consequently, Gladstone spoke to the Prince of Wales on the necessity of 
using the strictest care in expressing his opinion on the causes of the war 
during his projected visit to Denmark.l20 Queen Victoria agreed t~t his 
stay at Copenhagen should be •as short as possible. He is very imprudent, 
alas! The Princess very violent in her anti-Prussian feelings and the Queen 
of Denmark -- very intriguing.ttl21 
On the other hand, if one were to judge the English reaction to the 
war by Prussian or French reports, it would be a difficult task, as both 
belligerents were quick to accuse Great Britain of favoritism. However much 
Britain attempted to maintain an impartial· position, it found that both 
parties were dissatisfied. No sooner had fighting begun than an intense 
hatred of England settled over Germany. The Germans declared that prompt 
action by the English on the side of Prussia in the beginning would have 
avoided war, and they accused the British of partiality towards France in 
respect to trade. It was commonly felt in Germany that France was deriving 
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great material benefits from British merchants through the sale of ammunition 
and horses •122 As early as July 18, Lord Augustus Loftus, British Ambassador 
to Prussia, wrote that "there is already a feeling that Her Majesty's 
Government have a partial leaning toward France.nl23 Sir Robert Morier, an-
other British diplomat in Germany, expressed considerable alarm: 
The copper capsule of chassepot cartridge engraved with the trade-mark 
of a Birmingham firm -- should such, which God forbid, chance to be 
extracted in a German hospital-- might, in the present temper of men1s 
minds, raise a storm of.national vindictiveness in the German people 
which it may take generations to allay.124 
In addition, the Queen received a number of letters from the King of Prussia 
criticizing England's supposed sympathy with France.l25 
It was to be expected that France would attribute to England a large 
share of its misfortunes. After the outbreak of hostilities, Lyons wrote: 
It will be a miracle if we are as good friends with France six months 
after the beginning of this wretched war as we are now, and it will 
require the utmost tact, prudence, and consideration for French suscepti-
bilities to prevent all the improvement in feeling between the two 
nations, whiQh has grown up -in the last twenty years, being entirely 
destroyed.l2° 
In line with Lyons' prophetic statement, the French began to recriminate 
against their ally of the Crimean War. This feeling arose partly because the 
long alliance between the two countries had made the French expect more from 
England than from others; partly because other powers had ingeniously 
represented that their inertness had been caused by the unwillingness of 
l22wemyss, II, 156. 
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England to come forward.l27 These recriminations of Prussia and France, 
however, could not stir the English government from its policy of non-
intervention. Instead, in order to safeguard the interests of other powers, 
England contented itself with forming a league of neutrals. 
The Third Republic 
English opinion was, by the end of August, over-awed by the turn 
of events. When the contemplated invasion of Germany was forestalled by the 
invasion of France, it soon became apparent that the schemes of the 
Fatherland were as aggressive as those of its opponent. The British public, 
which acclaimed the unification of Germany, did not envisage the permanent 
weakening of France through the surrender of Alsace and Lorraine or a long 
siege of Paris. Men who had acclaimed the victories of Gemany in early 
August were, by the end of the month, sympathizing with the French. The 
terrible disasters which overwhelmed France awakened in historian John 
Richard Green sympathy for the 1.m.derdog. In a letter to Edward Freeman on 
August Jl, he wrotes 
I am German to the core, but like Joan of Arc I have pity for that 
bel roxaume de France •••• France remains vain, ignorant, in-
sufferable if you will, but still with an infinite attraction in 
her, at least to me. There is a spring, an elasticity about her, 
a 'light" heart' that has its good as well as its bad sidei2~ gaiety, 
a power of enjoyment, which Europe cannot afford to miss. 
He believed that the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine surely would lead to 
another round of wars. 
It is of the lowest and vulgarest ambition to initiate the expansive 
policy of Louis XIV •••• Moreover, the people of Alsace are French 
127william Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1S71-1§20 
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to the core in sympathy, none are more· bound to France, and the treaty 
that bands them over to a Grand Duke of Baden is simply a declaration 
of slaveryj.,2_9Men are not cattle ...... even if they have the ill-luck to be Frenchmen. 
Sir Robert Morier, who had never doubted that the Germans would emerge vic-
torious, feared the consequences of such a result, for, undoubtedly, German 
vengeance would demand Alsace and Lorraine. 
I do not mean that I object to a Grenz-Reguliervng, but the taking of 
two large provinces, the inhabitant~ of which are more Gallic than the 
Gauls, because being Germans they can be more obstinately French than 
the French themselves, is something I do not like as the debut of a 
German Empire in the nineteenth century. This is the sentimental side 
of the question, but the practical side is this: a hostile occupation 
of this kind means more or less the continuance of armed peace and the 
impossibility or disarmament.l30 
Again, . on August 31 the Duke of Argyll expressed the uncertainty which con-
fronted the friends of Germany. ltWhat a wart but I am thoroughly German. 
Still, I think the Germans would make a mistake if they took Alsace.•l3l 
With rumor about that Bismarck intended to annex Alsace, the British news-
papers added their protestation. The Time.s, which had been considered 
friendly to the Prussians, declared that the alienation of Alsace and 
Lorraine would weaken international law. 
The transfer of Alsace from France to Germany, were it possible, 
would violate the essential principle of respect for national 
sovereignty now universally acknowledged, and would be incom-
patible with the permanent maintenance of peace.l32 
The DAily News refused to contemplate the effects of such a transfer of terri-
tory. It, nevertheless, warned Bismarck that there would be future 
Memories, 
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complications.133 The Dailv Tglegraph assured its readers that it embraced 
the whole idea of German unification, but it fore~aw that the annexation of 
Alsace and Lorraine would endanger the peace.134 These feelings did not go 
unnoticed by the English government. Lord Granville was aware that the 
English public was opposed to the prospect of a bombardment of Paris and 
asked Odo Russell, the Assistant Undersecretary of State in the Foreign 
Office, to find a diplomatic means to deter Bismarck.l35, 
The Empire, which rested upon the army, collapsed when Paris re-
ceived the news of the disaster at Sedan. With the Germans prepared to march 
on Paris and with Napoleon in captivity, a mob invaded the French Chamber on 
September 4 and procla,imed the deposition of the Emperor. Thereafter, at the 
Hotel de Ville, Gambetta and Jules Favre proclaimed the Republic and 
constituted a provisional government called the Government of National Defense. 
Long before the battle of Sedan many Englishmen looked forward to 
the overthrow of Napoleon. As they attributed the war to the Emperor's 
ambition, his abdication could not fail to meet with approval. Most old 
Chartists and the young Radicals like DUke, Harrison, Morley, and Chamberlain 
had eagerly awaited the co+Japse of the Second Empire and the creation of a 
Republic.l36 Morley specifically declared that France should adopt a Republic 
as soon as possible in order to overcome the evils of the Empire and to bring 
to the service of the nation the most intelligent element of the state.l37 
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Henry Labouch~re went about giving speeches on. the need for a revolution in 
France .1.38 Even Robert Lowe, the Chancellor of the Elcchequer, shared these 
sentiments: "I always bated the Emperor who seemed to me the incarnation of 
the worst ends sought by the worst means and shall regard his ~all as a 
clearing of the moral atmosphere.nl.39 Thomas HUxley called for the defeat 
of "that crowned swindler, whose fall I have been looking for ever since the 
coup d 1 ;tat. •140 The Times, in an unguarded comment, indicated that a change 
in government would remove any further reason for the continuance of the war 
and that the extinguishing of imperial fame would lead to a brighter future 
for France.141 
The proclamation of the French Republic met with a varied response 
in England. Since most people were disposed to bold Napoleon responsible for 
the war, the establishment of a new regime was welcomed. With the exception 
of the English working class, however, the British reaction was hardly 
enthusiastic. Indeed, there was a sizeable minority, both friends and foes 
of the Emperor, that accepted the news with misgiving. 
To begin with, many Englishmen realized that the political develop• 
ment of France had been uneven and that republican experiments on the 
Continent had inevitably proved futile; thus they were unable to believe in 
the success of the Republic. John Richard- Green, for instance, began his 
"-- 1.38Hesketh Pearson, Lab by: The Life and Character of Henrx 
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letter to Edward Freeman on September 5 with the words, -Yive la Republigue,• 
but he despaired for its success. In the first place the "Napoleonic Legend• 
was still very much alive, as was the religious hatred of French peasants for 
the Republic. Also, the Republic was handicapped by the lack of time to pre-
pare for the defense of their land. And, finally, the Republic, which bad no 
prospect but defeat and surrender, was fixed with the fatal responsibility of 
ceding French teiTi tory to the enemy. Under these circumstances, Green was 
forced to say: .Yive 1a Re'publfguel but will the Republic live?•l42 The 
Times, commenting on English opinion, declared: •It is diff'icult for our 
English mind, with the last eighty years before us, to regard republicanism 
as more than a fleeting stage in European politics.•143 The realization that 
the French peasant had looked with hostility toward the proclamation of a 
republican government in 1848 and that the Third Republic would care little 
for the fate of the Pope or clerical education caused the Saturd&y Review to 
predict a brief life expectancy for the Government of September 4.144 The 
Economist doubted that the conditions requisi~ for a stable government 
existed in France. It predicted that the Republic. would soon follow the path 
of its predecessors. The French were a handicapped race, irreconcilably di-
vided between city and village, Right and Left, lacking the proper preparation 
for parliamentary government. Its collapse would be only a matter of time.l45 
The Times realized that only submission awaited the Republic in its unequal 
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conflict over France. 
We find in the honesty and ability of the new Government no safeguard for 
its permanent authority. The very mumimi ty of the Revolution proves the 
universal determination to resist the enemy, and in the course of con-
vulsions that must precede the last effort of resistance, many ministries 
must ri§t ... and fall, appear and disappear, before the fall of the 
nation • .J.4b 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Pall Mall Gazette gave a good 
explanation of the British tendency to laugh at the feeble attempts at de-
mocracy on the Continent. 
We explain to ourselves with much complacency that the French people are 
totally unfitted for a rational system of government. They are only 
capable of oscillating between slavery and anarchy. Either they must 
bow humbly before the pretensions of personal government or they must 
abandon themselves to the violent experiments of revolutionary theorists. 
Temperate allegiance to a reasonable Government is altogether beyond their 
power. If they break their chains for a time it is only to plunge into 
wild excesses; and so we recommend them to make themselves as comfortable 
as may be under the circumstances, and to trust implicitly to the sur-
passipg wisdom and foresight of the ruler whom Providence has sent 
them.:U..7 
The conservative press was nearly unanimous in looking on the French 
Republic as an ephemeral stage of European development. For example, the 
Standard admitted that the prospects of longevity were dim for the Government 
of National Defense, but it backed the Republic, believing that it stood the 
best chance of repelling the invasion.U.S The Morning Post argued that since 
the rural population did not share the views of the Parisian mobs, the con-
fiding of the reins of government to inexperienced theorists would bring on 
civil war.l49 The G1obt felt that a republic was impossible in France, not 
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only because republics in general were warring against nature, but because 
the French were not fit for self-government.l50 According to the Tablet the 
only optimism in the whole affair was the expectation that the Republic would 
not be lasting. Since the Republic would be forced to make an ignominious 
surrender to Prussia, it was unlikely that the nation, especially the 
Catholic provinces, would tolerate such a regime.l51 The Cosmopolitan, which 
reflected the views of monarchy, asserted that the Republic 
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will collapse like a bubble of fetid gas, and the red ring of Jacobites, 
by which M. Favre is surrounded will 'make themselves air' like Macbeth's 
friends and vanish into enveloping night •• into the contempt of history.l52 
The lack of enthusiasm for the Republic was due not only to the 
prevailing attitude towards the inevitable failure of continental republi-
canism, but also to the timing of the revolution. Many friends of the French 
were anxious to see them push out the Germans, but they regarded the revolu-
tion as inexpedient. For France to change governments in the midst of war, 
even though it might be just, was to assist the enemy. F. Adolphus, a 
correspondent in Paris for Blackwood's, saw in the revolution the further 
weakening of France. 
That the Empire should have been turned out with dishonor was inevitable, 
necessary, and just; but not while fighting was going on, not on the 
morrow of a past defeat. The sentence on it should have been pronounced 
at another and a fitter moment. The stream that France was wading 
through was too wide, and too muddy, and too flooded for her to swap 
horses in the middle of it. I could not forgive the half-dozen deputies 
who on such a day thought fit to seize the Government for their own use. 
I cared nothing for the Empire, but that it should be kicked out by the 
French themselves under the blows and before the eyes of the victorious 
150!ditorial in Globe (London), September 9, 1870. 
15lncbronicle of the Week," Tablet, IV (September 17, 1870), 351. 
152Editorial in Cosmopolitan (London), September 19, 1870. 
enemy, appeared to me to constitute a still further fall for France. The 
demerits of the Empire did not exculpate those who made the unpatriotic 
revolution of the 4th of September. The arraignment of the Empire should 
have been reserved until the last German had left the soil. How infinite-
ly more solemn it would have become. And assuredly there is no reason 
for supposing that the war would have been continued either less vigor-
ously or more unsuccesstully.l53 
The Tablet stated: 
To have made a Revolution at all at such a moment would seem to be the 
act of madmen: to introduce the elements of civil conflict at a crisis 
when greater and wiser communities have alwa~ taken the exactly oppo-
site course looks like judicial infatuation. 54 
Paris, according to Blaclgroo<i's, had betrayed the true interests of France. 
By overthrowing its Emperor and proclaiming the .Republic, which was bound to 
continue a tutile war, it only added to its afflictions. 
It was not a time for rousing political passions, for unhinging the whole 
machinery of the state, for inviting the destruction of a capital city. 
France in her extremity showed neither resignation nor wisdom, not ~ 
common sense. The imbecility had been found in her citizens, also.J.55 
The Saturday Review could justify the Republic's existence only as long as it 
confined itself to national survival. Any attempt to recast the government 
before the enemy would be a dastardly transgression.156 The pro-French 
Morning Post contended that a government composed of extreme republicans could 
not win the assistance of friendly powers or inspire Germany with respect for 
its foe.l57 
While there were many who looked on the overthrow of the dynasty 
153F. Adolphus, Some Memories of Paris (London: William 
Blackwood & Sons, 1895), pp. 68-69. 
154nchronicle of the Week," Tablet, IV (September 10, 1870), 318. 
15511The European Hurricane, • Blaclgrood. 1 s Magazine, CVII (SEaptember 
10, 1870)' 318. 
156"The New Republic, • Saturday Review, XXX (September 10, 1870), 
320-21. 
l57Editorial in Morping Post (London), September 5, 1870. 
73 
74 
as a move likely to weaken France, to bind the nation to a lost cause, and to 
alienate potential allies, a considerable portion of the criticism stemmed 
from outright hostility to republicanism. It. was realized by some, especially 
conservatives, that any enthusiasm for the Republic might encourage a similar 
agitation in England. For example, Lord Carnarvon, who had been a member of 
several Tory cabinets, was clearly sympathetic towards France, but he 
cautioned Lord Salisbury that any support of France could lead to an outburst 
of republicanism in England.l58 It is to be expected that the Queen would be 
hostile to the regime. 
It is much to be wished that a good and stable Government and not a republic 
should soon be established in France. There is certainly a great diffi-
culty for the Prussians in treating for peace to have no real Government 
to treat with.~59 
Dean Church wrote on September 6: -well -- 1848 if not 1792 is back again, 
and in a very ugly form.•l60 Blackwood's bad prided itself on its imparti-
ality as long as France was defended by Napoleon, but now hoped for a apeedy 
German victory in order to avert the greater evil -- the reign of a Marat or 
of a Robespierre. "The alternative is a victorious French revolution, and 
we know what that means -- it means a scourge for the human race.al61 
Catholic abhorrence of French republicanism, with its tradition of anti-
clericalism, was even more frank than Blacgood 1 s. The· Dublin Revier, for 
example,. declared: "Of all the scandalous and incapable tyrannies that ever 
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was imposed upon France, assuredly the one most disgraceful to her was the 
Republic which sprang from the scuffle of the 4th of September.nl62 
Not only were leading conservative organs hostile towards French 
republicanism, but they found time to recall Napoleon's friendship towards 
England and the orderly and progressive development of France under his 
dynasty. John Delane of the Times, in a letter to his newspaper on September 
8, 1870, while still uintaining Napoleon's responsibility for the war, re-
called Napoleon's embellishment of Paris and scorned the gross insults of the 
city in his hour of tribulation.l63 Queen Victoria, remembering Napoleon's 
friendship, lamented the overthrow of the French Emperor. "Not one voice was 
raised in favor of the unfortunate Emperorl How ungratefull nl64 The British 
people, according to Vizetelly, had few sympathies for the Republic. They 
had long approved the autocratic rule of Napoleon, especially as he kept 
Paris free from revolutions. Consequently, when France overthrew the most 
corrupt government of the century, instead of the act meeting with general 
approval, it weaned from her the support of every former friend.l65 Fraser's 
Magazine, observing English opinion towards the ex-Emperor, stated: 
A tolerably numerous section of Engl!sh society ably represented by a 
leading Review cling to their Imperial proclivities talk of the 
sympathy due to the best friend of Eng~ in his misfortunes, and 
resolutely assert that he fell with dignity after conferring unnumbered 
benefits on France.l66 
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Blackwood 1 s Magazine, fearing that France had made a rash change, welcomed 
the nescape of the Empress and her son from the treason and peril that 
threatened them in France.•l67 Overwhelmed by the course of events, the 
Daib Telegraph recalled the Emperor's friendship with England. 
For us Englishmen, we simply follow the fall of an illustrious man with 
regrets -- human and natural enough; nor can we forget that his liking 
for England and Englishmen, and his firm political alliance with o~ 
country, have preserved for him.@incere and personal sympathy' in this 
hour of his direct misfortune.l08 
Not all people took the Republic so calmly and with so little en-
thusiasm. To a large section of the English public the declaration of a 
Republic was welcomed because it meant a blow against tyranny. Within 
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liberal circles the overthrow of the Empire was greeted with definite applause. 
This was natural as Napoleon had been represented as a disturber of the peace 
and as an ambitious despot. George Trevelyn, a Liberal M. P., declared in a 
speech on October ll that •we who are all ~iberals have a right to say that 
we perfectly congratulate the French. in having got rid-- and we hope for-
ever - of personal Government. nl69 Swinburne was opposed to all forms of 
tyranny but hoped that the blessing of Rabshakeh would be upon the fallen 
despot, and that the words of Dante, Non ragionam di lui. ma spata e pe.ssa, 
would guide him to the cesspools of history.l70 John Richard Green, exer-
cising his characteristic sympathy' for republicanism, began his letter to 
Edward Freeman on September ; with the words: ttvive la Rerpublique.n171 One 
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friend of Continental liberalism, Philip Hamerton, on hearing of the overthrow 
of the Empire, shouted "Vi ve la Republique 1 • and sang with gusto, "Domine 
salyam Rewblicam. et ex:audie nos in die qua vocaverimu.s te!•172 The substi-
tution of a Republic for the Bonaparte dynasty met with general acceptance 
from the liberal press. The Times believed the leaders of the new government 
were worthy or respect and wished it well with its many problems. Without 
showing great enthusiasm for the events or September 4, it noted that conti-
nental republicanism was no longer an alarming phenomenon and that France was 
free to make its own decision,l73 The MAnchester Examiner did not hesitate 
to justify Napoleon's departure and to acclaim the Republic.174 The MOrning 
Adyertise~ frankly welcomed the news that France had cleansed itself ,175 
The sentiments of the liberal press were reinforced by the noisy 
applause or the working classes and their radical leaders. Men and women 
with little prospect for bettering themselves, seeing in the revolution a 
move towards freedom and equality, could not but be moved by the news from 
France. Many Englishmen realized that the success of the French Republic 
would stimulate English radicalism; although previously indifferent or 
opposed to France, they were led to sympathize with it as the best means of 
helping the Republic. The success of such a government in France gave hope 
for an era or freedom and justice, not only in France, but for England. 
Following Napoleon• s overthrow, Chamberlain, the radical agitator of 
Birmingham, at a meeting on September 12, supported a resolution: "That we 
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rejoice that the irrepressible instinct of the French people for the divine 
right of self-government has re-established their republic after a century of 
sacrifices.nl76 The Fgrtnightlz editor, John Morley, welcomed the proclama-
tion of the Republic not only because it justified his hatred of Napoleon's 
regime, but because he foresaw the beneficial influence which it would have 
upon England. He compared the triumph of the North in the Civil War, the 
force which bad made English liberalism powerful enough to enfranchise the 
laboring classes, with the beneficial effect which would emanate from the 
establishment of a strong republic in France. 
The triumph of freedom in the United States did much for us. The triumph 
of freedom in France would do more. Nothing would tend more powerfully 
to de-aristocratise our government, to force attention to new social 
ideas, to spread the conflagration which has consumed the empire to some 
of our own superabounding ru.bbish.l77 
Meanwhile, Swinburne was stirring the hopes of the radical section of English 
public opinion with his "Ode on the Proclamation of the French Republic,• and 
by his defiant •songs before Sunrise.• In a letter to William Rossetti on 
September 7, he declared: 
I am nine-tenths out of my mind with joy and pride in Paris. Now, it 
may be razed to the ground and sown with salt and the last child killed 
in the last Frenchwoman 1 s womb, but shame cannot touch it. If the 
Republic die tomorrow choked in blood and ridden down by brute force of 
horsehoofs, it bas lived this divine hour, worth aeons of empires. I 
do think the rejoicing and salutations, tears and embraces, of the 
people at such a time in the jaws of ruin and in the sig~1s of the 
Republic, the most glorious thing in democratic history. 
Sir Charles Dilke, M. P., who was a forceful republican leader, while in 
Paris on September 4 with Labouchere, observed ~ith interest the overthrow of 
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the Second Empire. He talked with Jules Favre, Naquet and Blanqui and expressed 
great respect for their achievements.l79 Also, Edward Burne-Jones, editor of 
the radical EXaminer, exulted over the dec~ration of the Republic: WVive 1a 
Rlpublique, if talk could make that go right, how would it swiml Still, Im 
that Republique and down with an immense number of things.•lSO Charles 
Bradlaugh, who had withheld his support from either participant in the 
struggle, maintained "that there may be no mistake, I throw in my lot with 
France -- Republican France.•lSl 
The rank and file of the working class demonstrated enthusiasti-
cally for the French Republic. With republican sentiments already prevalent 
among the distressed classes of England, the changes in France quickly fanned 
the flames. Republican clubs multiplied across England, and a series of 
meetings were held throughout the country calling for recognition of the 
Republic. Though it had been proclaimed only on September 4, a large working 
class meeting in support of it was held in Hyde Park on September 10. The 
throng cheered the expressions of sympathy offered to their brethren in France 
by Mr. Odger and Professor Beesly, two professional union organizers. In an 
address, which Odger intended to send to France, he hailed the deposition of 
the Napoleon tyranny and promised to agitate on behalf of the Republic.l82 
Reynold's, a radical organ, predicted that the establishment of the Republic 
in France would bring down monarchy throughout Europe and inaugurate an era 
of hope. 
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Then the oldest thrones or the earth will tal ter and fall to the ground; 
crowns will be thrown into the place best. adapted to receive them -- the 
gutter; peace and plenty will prevail; people will obtain their rights; 
and even nations that now seem wedded and welded to the monarchial system, 
may be s~t"ed the shame and scandal of being ruled by drunken de-
bauchers.l83 
The International Workingmen's Association of England, which was then guided 
by Karl Marx, welcomed the advent of the French Republic, but it expressed 
misgivings as to the composition of the new government. 
That Republic has not subverted the throne, but only taken its place 
become vacant. It has been proclaimed, not as a social conquest but 
as a national measure of defense. It is in the hands of a Provisional , 
Government composed partly of notorious Orleanists, partly of middle-
class Republicans .184 
so 
As in the previous revolutions in France in 1789, 1830, and 1848, 
the revolution of September 4 led to repercussions in British domestic affairs. 
The working class agitation on behalf of France and the Republic was the 
occasion for a similar movement in tavor of republicanism in England. Justin 
McCarthy, a contemporary politician and author, indicated that English re-
publicanism gradually crystallized into a formidable creed during the early 
18701 s. After a time of vague sentiments and isolated instances of radical 
opposition, the republican cause had been strengthened by the success of the 
North in the Civil War and the growing importance and degradation of the 
Empire. So formidable did this agitation become that in the early 18701 s 
"men were already discussing the possibility or a declared republican party 
being formed in and out of Parliament. n185 Frederic Harrison, who stood 
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shoulder to shoulder with the cause of the Parisian workingmen, claimed that 
the laborers in Britain were "watching their own rulers with ill-restrained 
impertinence and indignation. To them the cause of labor and the Republic is 
one and the same all over the world.n186 On November 19, 1870, the republican 
demonstrations, which frequently indulged in criticism of British royalty, 
such as their opposition to the dowry and an annuity to Princess Louise, 
called forth a request from Queen Victoria to the Prime Minister. 
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At present, and now for many days, these Revolutionary Theories are allowed 
to produce what effect they may in the minds of the Working Classes. Gross 
misstatements and fabrications injurious to the credit of the Queen and 
injurious to the Monarchy remain unnoticed and uncontradicted.l87 
It is also clear that Englishmen with conservative opinions withheld full-scale 
support of France out of fear of giving assistance to English republicanism.l88 
This agitation increased throughout 1870 and continued through much 
of 1871. Interest in the affairs of France, torchlight parades, and radical 
demonstrations held popular attention in spite of the shock of the Paris 
Commune. The ccy raised tor a republic by advanced political thinkers in 
England did not subside until the illness of the Prince of Wales evoked the 
popular sympathy in late 1871. Indeed, monarchical sentiment appeared 
strengthened.l89 
English Opinion after Sedan 
While Englishmen generally were acquiescing in the news of the 
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Paris revolution, they took this occasion to withdraw their sympathy from 
Germany. The victorious march of the Germans, following the crushing of 
French arms at Sedan, was accompanied in England by a feeling of distrust of 
the victors and sympathy for the defeated. The indignation towards France 
abated with the surrender of Bonaparte and practically disappeared as Bismarck 
made lmown his peace demands. 
This change in the reaction of Englishmen toward the combattants 
is attested to by many leading observers. While on a peace mission to London, 
Thiers wrote to Jules Favre on September 1.3: "Yet public opinion is awaken-
ing little by little, the old English pride is murmuring, and would break out 
if Parliament was assembled,nl90 Count Andreas Bernstorff, son of the German 
Ambassador, who was in England at the time, confirmed this opinion. •Arter 
Sedan public opinion changed completely. nl91 Louis Blanc, long an exiie in 
Great Britain, maintained upon returning to France that "within the last few 
days, even before the Republic had been proclaimed, a change of opinion among 
Englishmen, and in our favor, became obvious,nl92 
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If one looks at the biographical literature the same picture 
emerges. Leaders of public opinion readily admitted in their letters, diaries, 
and conversations that they had changed their views towards the belligerents, 
Edward Burne-Jones had at first sided with Germany, but by autumn declared 
that the French now commanded his sympathy •19.3 Dean Church believed that 
France deserved much of its punishment, but he lamented the blows to its 
l9<\1lf,irs of J, Thiers, trans. F. M. Atkinson (New York: James 
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civilization. In his opinion, the armies of Germany had gone beyond the goal 
of national unification.l94 Similarly, George Eliot wrote: "In the beginning 
I could feel entirely with the Germans, and could say of that calamity called 
1victory1 1 -- I am glad. But now I can be glad of nothing.nl95 Robert 
Browning, agreeing with this view, wrote that his concern for France began 
"when Paris renounced the wretched imposter and all his works.•l96 
In addition to the above references, the newspapers and journals 
indicate a definite move towards the French. For example, the Times declared: 
ttThe heart must be hard indeed which refUses its sympathy for France in her 
great reverses.nl97 Again, on October 3, it editorialized in a similar vein, 
noting that the sympathy of England was bound to be drawn towards France once 
its ambitious and dangerous spirit had been subdued.l98 The Daily News, the 
most popular newspaper during the war, warned Germany that 
any attempt to inflict on France needless humiliation, or to extort from 
her vindictive terms of peace would outrage enlightened opinion, and 
entail on Germany a moral loss that would more than outweigh any t~po­
rary material gain secured by a policy of retaliation and revenge.l~ 
English sympathy for France turned on a number of reasons. Most 
obviously, they were moved by their natural sentiment for a losing cause. 
When people realized that Bismarck was determined to continue the war after 
Sedan, in spite. of his earlier promises that he had no quarrels with the 
French people, their sympathy became warmer toward France. Englishmen, who 
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at first had rejoiced in the triumph of Bismarck's armies over the hated 
Napoleon, gradually realized that the Germans had passed from the task of de• 
fense into the field of conquest and military glory. Prussia had a perfect 
right to defend its lands from conquest, but the invasion into the very heart 
of France was pure conquest with the unenlightened goal of reducing France to 
the level of a second-rate power. Sir Wemyss Reid in an editorial in Leed's 
Mercury remarked: "That wholesale human sentiment which leads men to take 
sides with the weak against the strong acted upon us, and drew our sympathies 
to unhappy France.•200 James Froud$ ~ote that the growing feeling for France 
was caused by the British disposition to help the weaker side and the German 
demand for Alsace and Lorraine.20l Lo~ Newton explained the change in 
British opinion during the war on the same be.sis.202 Mrs. M. o. W. Oliphant, 
a British novelist, declared that she w~s unable to sympathize with either 
party, but she admitted that "right or wrong, one's heart goes with the losing 
side.•203 
-
A more important factor in determining England 1 s growing sympathy' 
for France was the fear that the war would undermine the balance of power and 
leave Bismarck master of Europe. With France at the mercy of Germany, there 
could be no real security for England. Spencer Walpole discerned that the 
masses were attracted by the misfortunes of its nearest neighbor, and that 
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the fears of English leadership were excited by Pruss ian ascendency. 204 Sir 
Charles Dille believed that the Prussians were determined "to push their 
success to a point at which France would have been made impotent in Europe.n205 
Frederic Harrison, speaking of English opinion, wrote: 
We saw the aim of Bismarckism was to make France impotent, to leave her 
for a generation an inferior power groaning under a weight of debt. • • • 
Germany was to be the military dictator in EuroPE} -- an issue injurious 
to Britain and menacing to peace and progress.200 
The disappearance of Napoleon from power effectively dispelled the fears of 
aggression, but the creation of a united Germany presented a new aspect. 
These new misgivings, which were dawning in men's minds, were ably expressed 
in the statement that "Europe had lost a mistress and got a master. n207 
These fears of Germany's military ascendancy, which help to explain English 
opinion following Sedan, became more and more prevalent as the fate of France 
grew more and more uncertain. 
In addition to these realistic considerations, rumors were rife of 
German cruelty towards French peasants. That segment of the population which 
was most sympathetic to France represented the Germans as inflicting cruel-
ties unprecedented in modern civilization. The shooting of civilians taken 
with arms, the imprisonment of French officials, and the burning of villages 
were declared to go beyond anything known in the modern era. Referring to 
German terrorism, Frederic Harrison accused the soldiery of •savage attacks 
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upon civilians and the burning and plundering of French villages.•208 In the 
Fortnightly Review, he asserted: 
I have spoken plainly my opinion about German cruelty. I say it most 
deliberately that Germans are now carrying on war with inhuman cruelty. 
War so savage, torture so steadily inflicted on a civil community, has 
never been seen within two generations in Euro~ -- save once. That 
was the Russian wa~ of extermination in Poland.209 
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.Arthur Russell, the brother of- Odo Russell, who became an ambassador to 
Germany, contended that "the massacre of French peasants, the increasing cruel-
ty of the Germans, and the destruction of French property and capital have 
completely turned the s,ympathies of the great majority of Englishmen.n210 
. . 
Many others were moved by these rumors. George Eliot, Ouida, and Lady 
Georgiana Bloomfield were struck by the severity of German brutality towards 
German prisoners.211 Sir Bulwer Lytton, in a letter to the Times, urged 
British interference in order to hinder the uncivilized horrors.212 As the 
war neared its completion, reports of German brutality became more and more 
frequent. The bombardment of Paris, which was begun on January 4, 1871, was 
particularly effective in causing Englishmen to further distrust Prussia. The 
Manchester Guard:Um found that the shameless butchery of civilians was further 
proof of barbarity at Strassburg. 
It is part of the Prussian system of warfare to fire on streets and public 
buildings, and to slaughter the civilian population •••• They have 
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acted ~onsistently on this principle all the way from Strasbourg to 
Paris. 13 
Sir Spencer Walpole recalled the effect of the bombardment on English opinion. 
The news of the impending bombardment was circulated throughout Europe, 
and, perhaps, aroused a truer sympathy for the French in their mis-
fortune than had been excited by the defeats and hardships to which she 
had been already exposed. The risks, to which the pictures of the 
Louvre were subject came home to men who were incapable of appreciating 
the sufferings ~t_a million of human beings slowly starving in a be-
leaguered city. 14 
Queen Victoria was well aware of the English reaction to this bombardment and 
called upon the Crowri Princess to use her influence to restrain Bismarck's 
intentions. 215 Realizing that English opinion was veering towards France, 
especially with the threatened attack of Paris, Lord Granville urged Bismarck 
to use restraint and moderation, as a prolongation of the struggle would in-
evitably lead to the tragic death of thousands of non-combattants and the 
destruction of priceless objects of art, science, and history.216 
The workingmen of England, and especially their London leaders, 
saw in the possible defeat of France a check to the cause of republicanism; 
hence, with the Empire dead and gone, English radicals were free to call for 
intervention on behalf of France. Strenuous efforts were made to persuade 
the Government to undertake an authoritative mediation that would bring a 
prompt peace in which Bismarck would not be permitted to annex Alsace and 
Lorraine from a government innocent of Napoleon's follies. The French were 
well aware of the importance of influencing this section of English public 
opinion. Charles Bradlaugh, editor of the National Reformer, received a 
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visit on September 17 from Madame la Vicontesse de Brimont-Brassac, a lady 
well-known in English and French political circles, who encouraged him to 
mold the opinion of the English masses in favor of France. As a consequence 
of this interview, Bradlaugh, together with Dr. Congreve, Professor Beesly, 
Sir Henry Hoare, M. P., Mr. George Odger and others participated in a series 
of public meetings throughout England. 217 On September 19, Trafalgar Square 
was the scene of a gathering which expressed sympathy with France and urged 
the government to mediate the Franco-Prussian conflict.218 Six days later, 
• 
these leaders staged another demonstration, which voiced their opposition to 
German annexation of French territory and demanded full recognition of the 
Republic.219 Two days later, Gladstone was approached on this subject by a 
delegation from the trade unions. He replied that he was willing to do what 
he could to effect an end to hostilities, and that his Government was pre-
pared to recognize the Republic once it had been approved by the vote of the 
French people.220 
The question of extending official recognition to the Government 
of National Defense, raised by the friends of the Republic, led to consider-
able controversy. Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, declared that 
recognition would be contrary to precedent as the government was without 
legal sanction. On the other hand, he was carefUl to point out that he 
harbored no unfriendly feelings toward the Republic.221 To the radical 
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circles, who favored an active foreign policy in favor of France, his 
declaration was evidence not only of weakness but of hostility towards 
the Republic. As early as September 10, at a meeting in Hyde Park, 
Professor Beesley criticized the English government for its failure to 
extend recognition to the Republic, noting that America bad speedily ex-
tended this diplomatic courtesy. 222 The Manchester Guardian and the 
Times denied that the Government withheld recognition because it disliked 
the political institutions of France. For all practical purposes it was 
in constant communication with the Republic. The failure to advocate full 
recognition to a government without legal sanction, which in those days 
was a mere formality, carrying no moral approval or disapproval, should 
not be interpreted as a sign of unfriendliness towards France or the 
Republic.22.3 
While German armies advanced on Paris, Jules Favre, the new 
French Foreign Minister, promptly received an interview with Bismarck. 
The latter, hoping to safeguard Germany against future French wars, in-
sisted on the cession of Alsace. Favre maintained that the Republic was 
not responsible for the decision of the Emperor and replied that France 
would never yield "an inch of French soil or a stone of French fortresses.• 
Since England, after Sedan, was Particularly interested in preventing the 
further weakening of France and in restoring an equilibrium on the 
Continent, one might expect that it would endorse Favre' a policy of making 
' war a outrance rather than ceding the sacred soil of France. 
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Yet the English regarded Favre 1 s action quite differently, con-
tending that the despotism of Napoleon did not release the Republic from 
assuming the obligations and risks of its predecessor. Republican France 
should acknowledge its readiness to pay for the mistakes of Imperial 
France. Since France had accepted and had maintained his rule, it inherited 
the penalties which accrued in consequence of his actions. The Times, for 
example, commenting on Favre's assertion that the Emperor and not the nation 
was responsible for the war, declared that unless the Republic acknowledged 
in principle the debt owed to Germany from the acts of the Emperor, it was 
inevitable that the bloody course of the war should continue.224 The 
Standard., notorious for its friendship for France, agreed with Bismarck 
that France could not pretend that the war was entirely of Napoleon's 
making. Although the members of the Government of National Defense were 
free from complicity in starting the war, the French, by accepting and main-
taining his rule, forfeited all claim to special treatment. The Dailv 
Telegraph, with frank outspokenness, called on France to recognize the truth 
and labeled Favre's circular as deplorable.225 The pro-French Morping Post 
regarded Favre's circular as a piece of verbal ingenuity, worthy of poets, 
but not sane statesmen. Fran9e would do well to accept peace at a reason-
able price.226 Favre's circular, according to the Daily News, assumed that 
France was the exception to international law, that France could win terri-
tory, but never forfeit it. Such boldness destroyed all hope of peace.227 
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The effort of the young Republic to place the responsibility for the war on 
the Emperor in order to get Germany to withdraw was dismissed by the 
Illustrated London News, which reminded its readers that the declaration of 
war was a popular measure.228 Furthermore, the evidence of these contempo-
rary organs can be substantiated with the testimony of such statesmen as 
Gladstone, Lord Lyons, and Lord Lytton.229 
It is clear that the major reason for England 1 s disapproval of the 
., 
French decision to make war 1 outrance was the belief that the continuation 
of the war would heap further burdens on France. With little or no hope of 
victory, an early peace was desirable. A continuation of the struggle 
would only give Germany the opportunity to demand more. funch, speaking of 
France's unwillingness to accept Bismarck's offer, wisely remarked: 
He, who refused such Armistyce 
As hardly would be offered twice, 
Took (though no fool) a fool's advice.23° 
The Daily Telegraph said that those who yearn for peace must pray that 
France would see the £utility of continuing the war. 231 The Times, be-
lieving that further resistance was hopeless, counseled surrender to the 
Germans. To continue the struggle would only bring greater evils. The 
French government should courageously accept the dictates of necessity and 
lay down its arms.232 The Morning Post agreed that further resistance was 
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useless and predicted that any continuation of the war would cause untold 
misery and harsher terms.233 The Qunrterll Reyiew, speaking as a friend of 
France, called upon the Government of National Defense to give up the 
futile struggle. "Let France accept the Prussian terms, if' for no other 
reason than for the very good one that a beaten man should agree with his 
adversary as quickly as he can, lest he get worse terms."234 
While Englishmen counseled peace to the French and ridiculed 
Favre's efforts to cast the burden of continuing the war on Bismarck, they 
continued to sympathize with them and to applaud their war efforts. 
Following a French victory in November at Orl6ans, the English were unable 
to hide their elation. The Standa;rd, for instance, hoped that the victory 
at Orl~ans would give the French confidence to throw off' the invader.235 
The Morntng Post, increasingly anxious for the French, cheered the triumph 
as a harbinger of' the renewed French vigor.236 Matthew Arnold noted: 11It 
is curious how here everyone seems pleased with the French success at 
Orl~ans. n237 
As the war proceeded, English opinion became more and more 
concerned with the sufferings of' France. The intensity of' popular feelings 
can be gauged by the increasing number of' radical meetings, the growth of 
charitable undertakings to relieve the distressed populations of' France and 
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9.3 
in the growing criticism of Gladstone's policy of neutrality. As an example, 
William Bell Scott, a poet employed by Mr. Appleton, the editor of the 
Academz, told how his employer sent out a circular to his collaborators 
calling on them to sacrifice a certain amount of pay for French war expenses.238 
The President of the Royal Agricultural Society, Lord Vernon, initiated a 
plan to assist small farmers in France suffering as a consequence of the war. 
This plan called for sending money to purchase seed corn. 2.39 In order to 
assist homeless refugees, there was organized a French Refugee Committee. 
William Vernon, one of the workers, said of this effort: Rfe were able to 
relieve a good deal of very real distress, but we were ruthlessly severe to 
any able-bodied Frenchmen who sought relief in England when they ought to 
have been fighting in France.•24° Charles Gavard warmly acknowledged the 
sympathy excited in England and recorded the fact that over 14,000,000 
francs were collected in Landon.241 
The attitude of the workingmen bas already been surveyed. Led by 
Mr. Odger, Professor Beesly, Mr. Cangreve, and Mr. Bradlaugh, who affected 
to represent the working class through numerous combinations like the 
International Workingman's Association, the Democratic Association, the 
Labor Representation League, the Land and Labor League, and the Republican 
Association, there arose an agitation calling for English intervention. 
Forty-nine meetings were held in all and each time the buildings were filled 
2
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to capacity. 242 Contemporary evidence reveals, however, that the majority 
of workingmen, though sympathetic with France, did not ~pprove of military 
intervention. According to Charles P. Villiers, M. P., the provincial 
workmen were not in sympathy with the metropolitan workmen in desiring to 
intervene forcibly in the war.243 Sir William Cremer, English pacifist 
and founder of the Interparliamentary Union, in 1870-71 gathered about him-
self a workingmen's committee consisting of fifty men for the advocacy of 
neutrality in the Franco-Prussian War. While British democrats were pre-
pared to plunge England into war, Cremer's Committee continued to urge 
neutrality.244 The major news organs, moreover, claimed that_ even the 
London workingman did not share the aggressive sentiments of the noisy 
minority.245 
In addition to the demands of the London workingmen, many critics, 
keenly incensed by the territorial demands of Bismarck, joined in denouncing 
the neutral policy of Britain, and, as the war neared its conclusion, raised 
a cry for military involvement. This sentiment linked up classes not usu-
ally found together; it was both popular and aristocratic; it found spokes-
men in high society and in the champions of the artisans. On March 25, the 
Times recalled that there had been a very strong pressure on the Government 
to interfere in the late war. 
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The usual declamation about the miserable policy of England, the con-
tempt in which she is held abroad, and the necessity of regaining the 
old position which she held in the days of Pitt and ~§tlereagh, was 
poured forth in larger floods than we ever remember.~ 
Justin McCarthy, commenting on English criticism of the Government after 
Sedan, stated: 
Many persons everywhere thought the Government ought to do something 
to assist the French Republic. Some were of the opinion that the 
glory of England would_suffer if she did not get into a fight with 
some power or another.247 
Frederic Harrison, Frederick Maxse, J. Cotter Morrison, and Professor 
Beesly, endeavoring to bring public opinion around to the point of inter-
vention, signed a remonstrance to Mr. Gladstone in which they demanded 
that he uphold British prestige • 
.More immediately we urge that the English Government should call upon 
that of Prussia to make peace on reasonable terms not involving the 
seizure or French territory. Feeling this, in our opinion, without 
further delay, England should join France in resuming that Po.sition 
among the Western Powers to which she is rightly entitled.Z48 
The Morning Advertiser, after attributing to Prussia the horrors of bar-
barian invasion and unlimited expansion, called on England to intervene 
against the new Napoleon I, Willia:m of Germany.249 The SPectator, fearing 
the consequences of excessive territorial demands, supported the policy of 
intervention with guarantees to Germany that it would not allow any French 
annexation of German territory.250 However, the most eloquent plea for an 
active policy was by Frederic Harrison in the Fortnightly Rerlg. His 
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enthusiasm for the young Republic led him to demand war against Germany, to 
support meetings of protest, and to howl down the peace party.251 The es-
pecially pro-French Conservative opinion did not hesitate to condemn 
Gladstone's passive policy. Although Harrison was not inclined to credit 
the opposition with many virtues, he admitted that "the best opinion of the 
Conservative party was inclined to take action; the army and navy were 
keenly aroused.•252 So potent was the attack upon English neutralism that 
he predicted: 
It the war could have been continued for a few months longer, the set 
of military and Conservative opinion, combined with that of the working 
man in the mass, would have forced the Liberal Ministers from their 
policy of hesitating impotence to take action or resign.253 
While English sentiments toward France became more and more favor-
able to intervention with the progress of the war, one should realize that 
the majority approved of Gladstone's neutralism. The Saturday Review, for 
example, applauded Lord Granville's policy during the war and complimented 
him on his refusal to be drawn into it on behalf of France. 254 The 
Spectator was even more ou~spoken. 
It would be childish to deny, that however strong may be the feeling 
of a very small party in England, to which we are not ashamed to be-
long, in favor of a policy of earnest and active resistance to the 
permanent subjugation of unwilling European populations, there has 
been and is no public opinion in England that would have warranted 
Mr. Gladstone's Government in risking forcible intervention for such 
a pu.rpose.255 . 
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The Annual Register, remarkable for its accurate reflection of English 
opinion, observed that "there could be no doubt that the general verdict 
still steadily approved the Government's wise and resolute policy of neu-
trality.•256 Lord Derby was always sensitive to public opinion and told 
the Queen that only a very small number desired active intervention.257 
Aside from these restrictions upon the depth of general sentiment 
towards France, a minority of Englishmen continued to openly sympathize 
with Germany. Accepting the arguments of Bismarck on the necessity of se-
curing the frontier against future invasion, and berating the fickleness 
and corruptness of Paris, they saw in the ascendency of Germany a benefi-
cent development in the struggle for peace and progress. Thomas Carlyle 
was one of the most outspoken advocates of the German position. 
That noble, patient, deep, pious and solid Germany should be at length 
welded into a Nation, and become Queen of the Continent, instead of a 
vapouring, vainglorious, gesticulating, quarrelsome, restless and 
over-sensitive France8seems to me the hopefullest public fact that has occured in my time.25 . 
In regard to the provinces, he charged the newspapers with "a very idle, 
dangerous, and misguided feeling.n259 If one looked at history, one would 
see that France had plundered the provinces from Germany. Thus, when 
Bismarck received these provinces, he would be taking back what had once 
belonged to the German people. Moreover, this would be a good lesson to 
France, a reminder that piracy would not go unpunished.26o Froude 
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believed that Carlyle's letter to the Times upholding Germany had "at once 
cooled the water which might otherwise have boiled over,n261 Edward Freeman, 
who is remembered primarily for his celebrated History of the Norman 
Conquest, contended in a letter to the Pall Ma1l Gazette on November 25 that 
a sound appraisal of the war could be formed only by an historical per-
spective. Hence, he rejoiced in the German victory not only because 
it bumbled the pride and crippled the power of the French nation, which 
had for ages been the principal disturber of the peace of Europe, and 
because it restored to the Germans towns and territories which the 
French had at various times stolen from them by force or fraud •••• 
The present war has largely arisen out of a misconception of history, 
out of the French dream of a frontier of the Rhine which never existed. 
The war on the part of Germany, is, in truth, a vigorous setting forth 
of the historical truth that the Rhine is, and always has been, a 
German river,262 
He was particularly distressed by the pro-French public opinion. He wrote 
on January 12, 1871: "I am Dutch (German] to the backbone, as notwith-
standing the apostasy of the multitude and of the newspapers, nearly every-
one whose opinion I care a rap for abides still. 11263 
These ideas and others like them aroused the bitter indignation 
of Frederic Harrison, who wrote a letter to the Pall Mall Gazette con-
demning those English writers and professors who defended the prolongation 
of the war and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine on Germany's need for 
a strategic barrier to French invasion,264 In an instructive article 
entitled, 1twhy Good People Do Not Sympathize With France," the Spect§tor 
lamented that 
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some of the best men and women resolutely refuse to look beyond the 
proposition that Germany is a nation of purity, and France a nation 
of license. They cannot bring themselves to hold with a firm grip 
the equally manifest proposition, that Prussia may now be going as 
certainly down the ~g5ss of poll tical immorality, as France did on 
the eve of the war. 
Even some republicans protested against the disparagment of Germany. For 
example, Sir Sidney Colvin, who was to become a noted literary critic, 
issued his first published work, A Word for Germany, from an English 
Republican, in which he vigorously opposed English interference against 
Germany.266 The liberal Morley mentioned this in January 1871 in the 
Fgrtnightly Review. 
I stick fast by a certain 1word for Germany' and do not see that any-
thing has happened that ought to make one wish ill to the side to 
which you then gave us such good reasons for wishing well. French 
republicanism is hollow, wordy, intolerant, and I at least have no 
faith in its stability, nor in its virtue,·if it be stable.267 
Peace Terms 
The English press, although unwilling to accept Favre's thesis 
concerning the inviolability of France, opposed the annexation of Alsace 
and Lorraine as a retrograde step, worthy of the ruthless procedure of 
Vienna in 1815. Not only would it establish a precedent dangerous to the 
peace of Europe, but it would be a source of weakness to Germany, and, 
since France would never cease to agitate for the recovery of the two 
provinces, it would necessitate another war. The fear that France would 
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be forced to seek a war of revenge led the Daily TelegrAph to call on Bismarck 
to maintain a high moral tone and not to descend to the level of conquerors. 
If Count Bismarck insists on the cession of the two provinces, then, 
so surely as night follows day, Europe will, in a few years, again r~ 
with the sounds of battle between the two greatest of military states. 68 
According to the Daily News, the cause of international peace would receive 
a fatal blow the day that Germany annexed Aisace and Lorraine. 269 The 
9uarterlr could foresee only trouble. The Germans had a right to punish 
France and to secure material guarantees, such as: an indemnity and/or the 
limitation of armaments, but not the right to interfere with a border popula-
tion. Not only would such a seizure be unfair to the people involved in the 
transfer, but it would make any peace settlement an interlude until France 
was ready to begin again. 
Every Frenchman would not rest till the disgrace of Sedan was retrieved 
by the recapture of Metz and Strasbourg. She would seize the first 
opportunity of disunion in Germany, or the engagement of Prussia in 
some foreign broil, to pour her troQPs across the Vosges, and again 
float the tricolor over the Rhine.270 
The Stand,ard, agreeing with the latter, declared: 
There can be no durable peace between France and Germany which does not 
respect the present frontiers of the two countries. The Prussians may,. 
indeed, impose such a peace, but it will not be observed, and in im-
posing it they will undertake to maintain the armaments which, well as 
they have served in this wa~,1have already been felt ruinous to the best interest of the state. 
A sampling of individual testimony substantiates the press 
opinion. For instance, Edward Blount, an influential English banker in Paris, 
1870)' 494. 
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stated that "no peace would be lasting if France cedes territory, for no 
time would make either the present generation or the future accept the cession. 
It would be perpetual danger of war.•272 Benjamin Jowett was convinced that 
the crushing of France would necessitate another war.273 In a letter to 
Henry Ponsonby, private secretary of the Queen, Admiral Maxse held "Bismarck's 
attitude to be criminal: he had the effrontery to demand as terms of peace, 
terms of ,Dt.n274 Gladstone, writing to Granville, lamented: "I have an 
apprehension that this violent laceration and transfer is to lead us from bad 
to worse, and to be the beginning of a new series of European complioations.•275 
Closely allied with the notion that the annexation of Alsace and 
Lorraine would lead to another war was the realization that the inclusion of 
Alsace and Lorraine in a united Germany, together with the weakening of France, 
would upset the European equilibrium, and~ hence, endanger English security. 
For example, the Quarterly Review felt that Bismarck was intent on destroying 
the balance of power on the Continent and that Prussia, in order to obtain 
ports for a naval race with England, would cast her eyes upon Holland.276 
Equally alarmed, the Morning Post warned that the abandonment of France would 
destroy the balance of power and that England would lose France's support in 
Eastern affairs. 277 Thus, as France's fate became more and more uncertain, 
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England began to seriously consider the prospects of a German invasion. It 
Bismarck could get away with Alsace and Lorraine without any effective 
challenge from the other powers, Europe would be guilty of encouraging an 
aggressor. 
In addition to opposing the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine on 
grounds that France would seek the first opportunity to regain the lost 
provinces, and that their cession would undermine the equilibrium on the 
Continent, there was considerable feeling that such a transfer of peoples 
constituted a retrograde step in the march towards a more liberal and en-
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lightened diplomacy. English opinion had long espoused the cause of European 
nationalism and, to allow the alienation of Alsace and Lorraine with their 
national and historical relation to France, would have been unworthy of this 
ideal. In any new adjustment of boundaries it was necessary to consider not 
only the relative position of the combattants, but the liberties of upwards 
of three million people. Thus, Jolm Richard Green, a defender of national 
self-determination, took to task his friend and fellow historian, Edward A. 
Freeman, for approving the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. 
It is not a question of loving France or loving Germany. It is a 
question of falling back on the platform of the Treaty of Vienna and 
dealing with peoples as if they were ciphers. Your indifference to 
the will of the people themselves is of the old Tory and Metter.nich 
order •••• The truth is you care a good deal for freedom in the 
past -- ~~ in the present you hate France more than you love 
liberty. 
No one felt the force of this moral argument more than the spokesman of the 
Liberal party. Believing that it was unethical to transfer people in this 
fashion, and that the terms would not promote peace and tranquillity in 
Europe, Gladstone desired to protest the annexation, to mobilize the opinion 
27SLetters of John Richarci Green, pp. 262-6~. 
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of Europe, and to insist on a plebiscite. England, together with the neutral 
powers, should express a decided opinion in regard to the transfer of Alsace 
and Lorraine to Germany. 279 ·The Edinbu.rgh Revier carried an anonymous article 
which, as most people guessed from its style, was written by the Prime 
Minister. This article admitted that Germany had a right to secure her fron-
tier from French invasion by the neutralization of French frontier areas, but 
the rumor that Bismarck intended to annex .Alsace and Lorraine was considered 
to be a brutal action, contrary to the doctrine of popular sovereignty and 
nineteenth century civilization. In order to bring the world closer to peace, 
Germany and Bismarck shoUld accept the higher principle that the desires of 
the people were sacred and inviolable. 
To wrench a million and a quarter of a people from the country to which 
they had belonged for some two centuries, and carry them over to an-
other country of which they have been almost hereditary ~Hames, is a 
proceeding not to be justified in the eyes of the world. -
The proposal by Gladstone that such a cession would neglect the feelings of 
the inhabitants and lead to future wars, and that Britain should insist on 
a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine was the subject of lengthy' and heated 
debate in the Cabinet. Lord Granville wrote to Lady Granville on September 
30: •Quite exhausted after the longest fight I ever had against Gladstone. 
The losses were great; the killed and wounded innumerable; but I remained in 
possession of the field and the Cabinet.•281 Gladstone recorded on the same 
day his unsuccessful "effort to speak with other neutral Powers against the 
transfer of .Alsace and Lorraine without reference to the populations.•282 
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The reluctance of the other members of the Cabinet to uphold Gladstone's 
proposal did not mean that they approved the cession of the provinces. Rather, 
they felt that British interference, which would prove futile, would un-
necessarily prolong the struggle and lead to ill-feeling towards England on 
the part of Germany. Granville explained: 
My objection to doing at present what you propose is, that it is im-
possible according to my view to do so without being considered to 
throw our weight into the French scale against Germany, with conse-
quent encouragement on one side and irritation on the other.283 
Lord Kimberly, the Colonial Secretary, agreed with Granville that meddling in 
affairs "when you do not mean to interfere with anything beyond words, is the 
height of folly.•284 
British concern for the fate of Alsace and Lorraine led to consider-
able discussion, mainly academic, on a substitute means to avert the alienation 
of the provinces. The leaders of public opinion were ready with several alter-
native schemes. The Times, for example, in a leading editorial, suggested 
that instead of annexation that the Germans accept the neutralization of the 
provinces.285 Gladstone favored a plan to dismantle the fortifications in 
Alsace and Lorraine while leaving the inhabitants under French contro1.286 
John Stuart Mill suggested that "the disputed territory should be made into an 
independent self-governing state, with power to annex itself after a long 
period (say fifty- years) either to France or to Germany.•287 
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By the time that an armistice was concluded and Bismarck made lmown 
his demand that French elections were necessary in order to ratify the peace 
terms, Englishmen bad arrived at the opinion that the continuation of the war 
was hopeless. In spite of the consequences to the European equilibrium, 
France 1 s course was to negotiate a settlement. The Daily News asserted that 
a humiliating peace is better than a hopeless war. The provinces are 
lost; it would be madness to throw the whole nation after them into the 
abyss. In voting peace, the Assembly may, therefore, be assured not 
only or the sympathy of the world, but or the justifying verdict of 
history.288 
The Times was much displeased with the terms or peace put forth by Bismarck 
but advised the French to accept the terms.289 Further resistance, declared 
the Manchester Guardian, would only make recovery more difficult.290 
Already disturbed by the rumors of war crimes, the threatened 
alienation or Alsace and ~rraine, and the obvious blows at the balance of 
power, the English could not but express considerable alarm when they learned 
the peace terms. Not only did the terms seem very severe after a series of 
military defeats, but, judging from the press reaction, the British doubted 
that the French could fulfill the obligations. As a consequence, English 
opinion became increasingly outspoken in its criticism of Germany. On re-
ceiving the news of Bismarck's terms, the Times, for example, observed that 
the reparations and the territorial demands exceeded the most gloomy expecta-
tions.291 On February 28, the Times predicted that the peace settlement 
would prove but a truce during which France would prepare for revenge. The 
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terms were so vindictive that a new war, on a much vaster scale, was fore-
seen.292 The Daily Telegraph refused to mince words: 
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What the conquerors are planning is the bitterest insult that can be in-
flicted upon a prostrate foe. The apparent determination to make the 
French people drink the cup of humiliation to the dregs, displays a lack 
of generosity which excites in neutral bystanders mingled feelings of 
indignation and contempt.293 
The Standard was the most outspoken of all the large news organs. It contended 
that no French representative body could accept such terms and said that it 
was the duty of England to intervene.294 On March 1, it compared the latest 
peace demands with the Vienna settlement, concluding that the former lacked the 
slightest trace of moderation which characterized the treaties of 1814-1815.295 
The Pall Mall Gazette bluntly declared: "The German terms of peace are the 
most tremendous expression of vae victis which has been recorded in history. tt296 
The Tablet, not to be outdone, objected strenuously to the terms of peace 
offered by Bismarck, calling them "absolutely savage.u297 
Similar appraisals of the conditions of peace were made by the indi-
vidual leaders of public opinion. Disraeli regarded the terms of peace as a 
threat to the balance of power on the Continent, and he voiced the notion that 
England was the real loser in the war. In a speech delivered in Parliament on 
February 9, he remarked: 
You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and 
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dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity inci-
dent to novelty in such affairs. We used to have discussions about the 
balance of power. Lord Palmerston, eminently a practical man, trimmed 
the Ship or State and shaped its policy with a view to preserve the 
equilibrium in Europe •••• But what has really come to pass? The 
balance or power has been entirely destroyed, and the country which 
suffers mQ~t, and feels the effects of this great change most, is 
England. 29t5 
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Lord Salisbury, in an article in the Quarterly Review, entitled "Terms of 
Peace," made clear his opposition to Bismarck's proposed annexation of Alsace 
and Lorraine by urging his country to intervene to protect the future equi-
librium and security of Europe.299 Mr. Auberon Herbert brought a resolution 
in the Commons to the effect that 
this House is of the opinion that it is the duty of Her Majesty's 
Government to act in concert with other neutra~powers to obtain moder-
ate terms or peace, and to withhold all acquiescence in terms which 
might impair the independence of France or threaten the fu't;ure tran-
quility or Europe.300 
When this motion was overwhelmingly voted down, the Spectator compared un-
f~vorably the soft reproofs of the present government with Lord John Russell's 
bold declaration of sympathy with Victor Emmanuel's unification policy in 
186o.30l Charles Gavard, speaking of the English reaction to the transfer of 
territory, wrote: 
The feeling of disapproval is universal here; it is waiting till the 
thing shall have been accomplished and till nothing can be done, to 
break out with violence. For four months now public opinion has been 
veering every day more and more to our side, by reason even of the 
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madness of our resistance and of the terror our enemies inspire.J02 
Sir Robert Morier went much further in his description of public opinion. 
My tull conviction is that ninety-nine Englishmen out of one hl.Uldred 
would infinitely prefer another year or two of war with all its horror, 
on condition of the Germans at last getting the worst of it, though 
both France and Germany were destrom by it, to a peace concluded now 
which gave Bismarck what he desired.303 
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While Parliament was concealing its thoughts in order to keep out of the war, 
the Due de Broglie, representing the French Government, asked Granville to 
intervene in order to reduce the amount of indemnity demanded by Bismarck. 
Despite Granville's resolution to remain impartial throughout the negotia-
tiona on the conditions of peace, he did urge the reduction of the indemnity 
demanded from France from six to five billion francs.304 
English opinion in relation to the war may properly be viewed 
from the point of view of English class structure. While there seemed to be 
considerable over lapping of opinion, contemporary accounts clearly reveal 
that the different views held toward the combattants seemed to fall into 
class lines. 
The aristocracy, for example, was wholeheartedly with France from 
the beginning. In addition to the Standard and the QuarterlY Review, the 
leading organs of aristocratic and conservative views, which, as we have pre-
viously noted, showed sympathy for France long before Sedan, there is testi-
mony from other sources. The~' for instance, observed that the Tories 
"frankly defend the declaration of war as a justifiable, though unfortunate, 
3°2aavard, p. 9. 
act of the Emperor, rendered necessary by the aggressive policy of the un-
scrupulous Bismarck."305 Again, on November 18, the same organ stated that 
"the high Conservatives as a body incline toward France.n3o6 So widespread 
was the feeling that even those at the Queen's court were inclined towards 
France. Dr. J. William Legg recalled the attitude of the royal court in a 
note to the Yorkshire Post on September 7, 1918: 
As to the sympathies of the Royal Family, I may mention the following 
circumstances. Toward the end of the year 1870 I was asked to 
Buckingham Palace to dine with Prince Leopold, afterwards Duke of 
Albany. The conversation was upon the war. At that time, I was pro-
German, and adverse to the French. But the Prince said, 'You will 
find no one in this house, not one of us, that shares your opinion. 
We are all for the French. 1307 
109 
The feeling favorable to France became so intense that conservatives 
were accused of encouraging the working class in favor of intervention in the 
war)OS On the other hand, many conservatives were deterred from taking 
action on behalf of France because of their dislike of being associated with 
radicals. Speaking of English sympathy with the French Republic, the Standard 
contended that 
many of all classes of society would take part in the agitation in favor 
of mediation, were it not that they were afraid of giving their counte-
nance to the handful of obscure fanatics who have, with their accustomed 
immodesty, taken possession of the question. There is scarcely any 
Englishmen who would not preserve France; but when we are asked to shout 
for the French Republic, to carry torches at a ~blic meeting • • • we 
naturally hold aloof from the popular feelings .309 
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Lord Carnavon, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, which exhibited an understanding 
and s,mpathy' for France in its defeat, agreed with the Stand.ard, fearing "how 
easily in supporting France we may be drawn into a support of Republicanism, 
for which the mob is already clamouring.n310 
As for the Queen, she remained s,mpathetic with Prussia throughout 
the war. Her friendship for the German dynasty was so apparent that there 
was an inclination on the part of English friends of France to attribute 
Victoria's Teutonic feelings to the entire family. The Pall Mall Gazette, 
for example, accused the Queen, as well as the rest of her relatives of con-
gratulating the Germans on their victory.311 In addition, Sir Charles Dilke 
and Sir Henry Hoare brought the alleged German leanings of the royal family 
to the attention of the House.312 The Prince of Wales was irritated by the 
allegations of his pro-German leanings, and wrote that his s,mpathy always 
had been with the French ~nd that he had disapproved of the German conditions 
of peace.313 It should be noted, moreover, that Queen Victoria telegraphed 
the King of Prussia on September 21: 
In the name of our friendship and in the interests of humanity, I express 
the hope that you may be able to shape your conditions of peace for the 
vanquished, that they may be able to accept them. Your name will stand 
yet higher if at the head of_your victorious army you now resolve to make 
peace in a generous spirit.3~ 
The middle class, under the influence of the Manchester School, 
sympathized at first with the national aspirations of Germany and looked with 
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hatred towards Napoleon. With the removal of the Emperor, and the appearance 
of Bismarck's formidable military machine, the peace-loving liberals found 
occasion to transfer their friendship from Germany to the young Republic. 
Their fervor, however, was somewhat less than that of the conservatives. John 
Morley recollected: 
When the war between France and Germany came to a head at Sedan, it 
divided our small Liberal Company. The Positivist followers of Comte 
were some of them, like Harrison and Beesly, ardent for France, Morison 
an ardent German, Maxse, who was not a Positivist, out and out French.315 
Beesly and Harrison called for British intervention to save Republican France; 
Morley and Meredith tried to preserve harmony and peace in the circle.316 
George Meredith, writing to Maxse in 1S71, observed: 
- -· It is better to bend the knee to Wisdom than to march in the chorus ranks 
of partisans. Morley is not German. He agrees with me that it would 
have been downright madness to create a terrible and justly wrath:f'ul enemy 
for ourselves (looking to the origin1~f this war) on the chance of securing a frenzied fantastic ally.3 
Morley realized that France must pay the price for her flirtation with the 
French Empire and steadily opposed intervention. The establishment of a 
Republic was considered a progressive and hopeful development worthy of the 
applause and aid of the British; however, intervention and agitation against 
the Germans would be a disservice to the French Republic. France in the long 
run would have to chart its own course.318 Concerning Harrison's desire for 
intervention, in a letter to the latter, Morley remarked: 
The idea of your sending our poor besotted George of Cambridge and 
20,000 Britons against Moltke and 500,000 Prooshians recalls to me 
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nothing so much as Innocent III blessing the Children's Crusade in the 
13th Century.319 
John Stuart Mill supported Morley in his refusal to urge British intervention 
in the war. In a letter in November 1870, he wrote: 
I am glad to see you have not yielded to the utterly false and mistaken 
sympathy with France •••• Stern justice is on the side of the Germans, 
and it is in the best interest of France itself that a bitter lesson 
should now be inflicted upon it.320 
In another letter of January 6, 1871, Mill made clear his view that England 
must avoid intervention, and, at the same time, he censored the republican 
agitations.321 Matthew Arnold, who noted the betrayal of middle class 
liberals of the French revolutionary tradition, wrote many letters on this 
subject during the war to the Pall Mall Gazette.322 
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From the foregoing, it is easy to see that public opinion shifted 
a good deal during the war. More than most other Europeans, the English were 
unable to escape the impact of the war. The economic, political, and 
religious consequences of such a war were too important to be ignored. With 
the center of gravity of Europe passing from Paris to Berlin, with France in 
the hands of Gambetta, with Ru~sia denouncing the Treaty of Paris, and with 
Italy occupying Rome, real and sentimental interests were at stake. The 
British press, seeking to satisfy the growing demand for war news, gave great 
attention to the problems raised by the war. When the balance of power was 
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under attack and three million inhabitants were to be taken by the victor from 
the vanquished, many of the English transferred their sympathy from Germany to 
France. Even so, the majority remained unwilling to risk war. The temper of 
. the English nation had changed since 1860 when it expressed itself with rash 
generosity. Standing in the shadow of the German Empire, the English spoke with 
bated breath. Yet the efforts of the English did not escape the attention of 
the combatants. As a result of the British attitude towards Bismarckism, and 
its corresponding sympathy towards France, Bismarck was deterred from demanding 
even greater concessions.323 In fact, as we have already noted, he scaled down 
the indemnity following Lord Granville's intervention. While the French ceased 
to regard England as a possible ally, the efforts of the radical agitators on 
behalf of the Republic and France did not go unnoticed by the English or un-
recognized by the French. No English government could afford to ignore the 
noisy throngs of workingmen attacking the sums spent for royal weddings and 
pensions. With the monarchy already suffering from the prolonged mourning of 
the Queen, the royalists could not allow this agitation to go on unchecked. On 
the other hand, the reaction of the advanced radicals gave pleasure to the 
French. For example, M. Guizot and Jules Michelet both extended their apprecia-
tion for Harrison's heroic literary efforts in the Fortnightly Reyier,324 while 
Bradlaugh1 s efforts to serve France brought forth from Monseiur Charles Tissot, 
the charge-d 1 affaires of France in England, a note of thanks. "You have given 
your time, your energy, your eloquence, your mind -- in a word, the best part 
of yourself. France, whom you alone have defended, will never forget it.n325 
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In February, 1871, in appreciation for his services on behalf or the Republic, 
Paris nominated him for the National Assembly.326 Thus Englisl:nnen, aroused to 
a high pitch by the struggle, found that their opinions were closely observed 
by both the English and French governments, and that their position was 
instrumental in influencing French feelings. That England remained neutral 
during these hectic months should not obscure the vital role of public opinion 
in regard to domestic and foreign affairs. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PARIS CODUNE 
On March 18, 1871, the Commune repudiated the authority of the 
National Assembly and declared Paris a self-governing and sovereign city. 
After ten weeks, during which time Paris underwent a second siege, the 
country rallied behind Thiers and tb.e National Assembly to crush the 
insurrection. Short-lived though the Commune was, it provided the lurid 
background against which France created the institutions of the Third 
Republic. Its violence and audacity, coming so soon after the national 
humiliation at Sedan, after the Kaiser's troops had marched into Paris, 
and while Germans were still encamped on French soil, caused all Europe 
to look with bewilderment upon the laceration of France. 
England, like the rest of Europe, took a keen interest in the 
struggle between Paris and the National Assembly and showed real concern 
over the fate of France and the effect the struggle was producing in 
English domestic politics. As long as the work of reconstruction was 
unfinished and as long as the Germans remained in occupation of French 
territory, France should postpone political and social questions. The 
permanent political disunity and economic dislocation of France, which 
was a threat to the balance of power, was clearly not in the best 
interests of English security. 
The Parisian insurrection was bowd to lead to partisanship in 
foreign countries, especially England, which looked to France for 
political lessons. Matthew Arnold rightly anticipated the effect of the 
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Commune. "There is no way by which France can make the rest of Europe 
so alarmed and uneasy as by a socialist and red republic.n1 Thus, some 
Englishmen predicted with dread the eruption of similar chaos in 
116 
Britain; others, of a different school, looked with anticipation and hope 
to the growth of radicalism. 
Origin and Aims of the CQmmune 
The Commune was the outcome of a long succession of events rather 
than the work of any particular group or the expression of any one idea. 
It was the forlorn climax of the French revolutionary tradition, ex• 
pressing the ideals of Proudhon and Blanqui. The insurrectionaries, 
while not a homogenous body, were united by their sufferings during the 
long siege and their resentment towards the National Assembly. Like most 
revolts, it was the product of the complex interaction of political, 
economic and ideological aspirations. 
English opinion, outraged by the events of March 18, failed to 
show much understanding of the origins of the Commune. Most writers 
simply overlooked the fact that the revolt arose from forces deep within 
the political and economic realms. That France had not profited suf-
ficiently from liberal capitalism and that the Commune represented a 
reaction against the centralization of the French government were facts 
ignored by contemporary observers. According to the Tfus, the chief 
causes of the insurrection were the fears that the National Assembly 
meant to restore a monarchy, and that the Parisians would have to meet 
financial obligations arising out of the war,2 The 5atur4ay Revier 
ltetters of Matthew Arnold. )§4.8-188§, n, 60. 
2Ed1torial in Times (London), April 18, 1871. 
explained the uprising as stemming from the refusal of the National 
Assembly to postpone indefinitely the payment of rents and the feeling 
that the National Assembly was composed of conservative provincials.3 
Fraser• s MagaZin§, however, contended that the Commune was simply the 
fruit of the turbulent and vicious elements of the town population, 
which, with its tendency to become frenzied and excitable over nebulous 
ideas or general political principles, again had transformed a reform 
movement into a revolution.4 Even'the Fortnightly, which represented 
the advanced liberal view, could offer no better explanation than that 
the Commune was provoked by a conspiracy of priests.' 
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English opinion likewise refused to believe that the insur-
rectionaries would be true to their avowed goals. Although the original 
objectives of the revolution called for the maintenance of the Republic 
and the recognition of the municipal sovereignty of Paris, the English 
press maintained that the Communards would never be satisfied until they 
imposed their will on the whole nation and threw Franee into a chaotic 
social conflict. For example, the Saturday Revig, doubting that the 
insurgents would be content with ,municipal rights, asserted that Paris 
intended to bend France to its will. 6 The I.im§§ argued that the demands 
of the Communards were medieval and that the realization of their aims 
3nFrance,• Saturday Rertew, XXII (March 25, 1871), 355. 
4Gregg, Fraser• s Maga:zin§, rmrv' ll6. 
'rrederic Harrison, "The Fall of the Commune," FortnightlY 
Reyiew, XVI (August 1, 1871), 129. 
611The Civil War in France," Saturd&y Review, XXXI (April 8, 
1871), 419. 
would precipitate feudal anarcby.7 Fraser's com~red the scheme of the 
Communards of 1871 with those who threatened the national unity of 
France in resisting the Bourbon King, Henry IV. 8 According to the 
Mgrning Post, the government in Paris was less interested in munici~l 
liberty than in the social reorganization of France. 9 The Standaz:g 
likewise refused to accept the stated aims of th~ Communards, insisting 
that the leaders in Paris were aiming to achieve socialism rather than 
the securing of self-government for the cities.lO 
llS 
On the other hand, there was a small group of men, which included 
a combination of trade-unionists and liberals, that felt considerable 
sympathy for the stated objectives of the Paris Commune. After all, if 
one accepts its avowed aims, the workingmen of Paris were fighting for 
municipal liberties, something which English towns had long enjoyed. If 
one accepts the doctrine of federalism, which would guarantee municipal 
rights for the towns or France, which would satisfy the vague instinct 
for decentralizing and for ridding France of Parisian tyranny, and, if 
one embraces the idea that urban influences should triumph over rural 
influences, clearly it is not surprising that a few Englishmen could see 
justification for the revolt and could endorse its aims. John R. Green, 
who held this view, wrote to Mrs. Creighton: 
I hope you are "Red" in your French sympathies and don't follow the 
Times and the English papers in their rabid attacks on Paris. 
Things have gone a long way beyond its original demands, but it is 
7Editor of Times (London), March .30, 1871. 
8"Paris: 1588-94, Commune Versus King,• Fraser's M&gazine, 
UIXIII (May, 1871) , 669. 
9Editorial in Morning Post, April 10, 1871. 
lOJditorial in Standard, April 12, 1871. 
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well to remember that they were simply for the self-government which 
every English town has •••• Had. these demands been frankly granted 
instead of being played with and evaded, all would have been well. 
As it is, the city is driven to far larger demands. It seems un-
reasonable -- it is perhaps -- to demand urban independence. But 
for a quarter of a century the great French cities have been trodden 
underfoot by the vast uneducated rural masses. Ought there not to 
be some security against this?ll 
A little later, in a letter to Edward Freeman, he declared: 
The mun'-cipal demands of Paris are undoubtedly just; but Thiers, 
who is and always has been the ruin of France, hates municipal 
freedom ••• • As to the Communal demands of Paris, their fault 
is not, as the Times says, that they are medieval and obsolete, 
but that they are before their day.l2 
Frederic Harrison, a leading English Positivist, maintained that the 
Commune was the manifestation of the principle of municipal self-
government, the reaction of the urban centers and the workingmen to the 
domination of the provinces, and the fUlfillment of Comte 1 s prophecy re-
garding the division pf society into smaller units. As the social, 
political, and religious ideals of Paris and the other great cities of 
France were very different from those of the countryside, the Parisians, 
in announcing their intention of making their city a self-governing 
community, were striving to advance the liberty and peace or Frenchmen. 
In summary, he declared: 
The idea of the Commune, the idea of the gradual dissolution of 
nations into more similar aggregates and truer political unity, is 
the idea of the future. It lives deep in the instincts of every 
people of Europe and now that 200,000 workmen in Paris have taken 
up arms to conquer it, its ultimate triumph is assured.l:3 
llr.etters of John Richard Green, p. 288; see also The t!tters of 
Gerard Man].ex Hopkins to Robert Bridges, ed. Claude C. AbbottLondon: 
Oxford University Press, 19:35), I, 27-28. 
12 ' ~., p. 298. 
1:3Frederic Harrison, •The Revolution of the Commune,• FortnightlY 
Review, XV (May 1, 1871), 569. 
Charles Dilke, who made two visits to Paris during the Commune, saw in 
the Paris revolt a determination to achieve municipal rights and to 
preserve the Republic rather than an attempt to establish a communist 
government. 
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Some joined it from ambition, but the majority of the men who later 
on died on the walls or in the streets in the Federalist ranks died, 
as they believed, for the Republic, and had no idea of the plunder 
of the rich.14 
Also, John Morley, editor of Fgrtnightlx, rejected the common notion 
that the Commune was communistic. Like Dilke, he maintained that the 
Communards aimed to defend the Republic and to free Paris from the 
reactionary provinces.15 
In addition to the sympathetic understanding of these liberal 
observers, a number of liberal organs made clear their belief that the 
Commune was essentially a determination to achieve municipal rights. 
The Daib News, expressing liberal views, and the SR§ctator, a liberal 
weekly, agreed with the general position of the Fortnightly that, 
considering the domination exercised over France by the rural areas 
under Napoleon III, the main demands of the Co:mmu.nards were quite intelli-
gent. The Paris insurrection was misunderstood. Its fundamental 
character was not socialist but republican. The movement for revolt was 
not determined by socialist ideas, but by the conviction that the 
Assembly at Bordeaux aimed to overthrow the Republic.l6 
l.4Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 128·29. 
15Hirst, I, l.Sl. 
16&ii torial in Daily News (Imuion )_, March 27, 1871; "The Future 
of France," Spectator, VI IL (April 15, 1871) , 436. 
Thi,ers and the Bourgeoisie 
The English hatred of the Commune did not preclude a profound 
condemnation of the Government's policy of retreat and hesitation. It 
was believed that Thiers 1 decision to quit Paris had permitted a hand-
fUl of radicals to gain control over the city and had prevented any 
effective assistance to the foes of the insurrection. Furthermore, it 
was difficult to understand why the Government was so slow to move in 
against the revolutionaries. The truth of the matter was that Thiers, 
for propaganda purposes, had exaggerated the strength and organization 
of his army. English opinion, accepting his inflated estimates, was 
perplexed by his temporizing policy. The impression was that he lacked 
the courage and determination to restore order to France. Until be 
completed the reorganization of his army and increased its manpower by 
the prisoners of war whom the Germans released, the English press 
remained critical. The Daily Telegraph, commenting on his policy, 
observed that it was difficult to believe that so astounding a disaster 
would have befallen Paris and France, if Thiers bad from the first 
121 
acted with vigor, and it went on to accuse him of a lamentable want of 
firmness and energy.l7 The Standard, which was no less perturbed, 
bluntly stated t.liat Thiers 1 treatment of the Commune was calculated to 
inspire the Communards with hope of victory.lS The Morning Post claimed 
that the insurrection should have been stamped out immediately and that 
it would have been if there had not been a sham government.19 The 
17Editorial in Daily Telegraph (London), March 20, 1871. 
lSJditorial in Standard (London), March 20, 1871. 
19r.ditorial in Morning Post (London), March 24, 1871. 
Scoteyman, believing that a firm hand was needed against the men of 
Belleville, editorialized; 
The administration of M. Thiers is condemned by what has happened 
and the sooner there is a new head at the state helm whether as 
Emperor~ King or wise Dictator, the better both for Paris and 
France. 0 
As Thiers postponed the decision to re-enter Paris, English 
opinion became increasingly critical. Charles Gavard, a keen observer 
of English public opinion towards France, maintained that the govern-
ment's hesitant policy caused a general outcry in London against the 
leadership of Thiers.21 The Mo;ning Post was at a loss how to explain 
his cautious and defensive policy.22 The Scotsman, seeking a reason 
for Thiers' delay in restoring order, accused him of prolonging the 
struggle until he made himself necessary for the salvation of France.23 
The Jconopdst believed that Thiers, while anxious to extend his time in 
power, was delaying action in the hope of thwarting a royalist restora-
tion.24 
The English, perplexed by Thiers 1 seeming weakness, also were 
disturbed by the inactivity of the middle class of Paris. Aside from a 
few feeble demonstrations, there was a general collapse of internal 
opposition in the Commune. To the English it seemed incredible that the 
rabble of Belleville could succeed in controlling the propertied class. 
The Times, for example, charged that the apathy of the middle class in 
2C>mitorial in Scotsm,an, March 20, 1871. 
2laavard, p. 30. 
22Editorial in Morning Posf. (London), April 5, 1871. 
2.3Editorial in Scotsman, April 17, 1871. 
24nThe Commune, n Economist, XXXII (April 8, 1871), 262-3. 
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Paris encouraged the insurgents and labeled such weakness as "criminal. n25 
.. -
William Russell, the famous war correspondent for the Times, wrote: 
"Courage seemed to have departed from councils and hearts, and the pa• 
ralysis of cowardice was on the rulers and the people.n26 So wretched 
and timid were the Communards that a handful of London police could have 
dispersed the insurgents.27 The DailY Telegraph declared that it ex-
pected ignoble and base acts from the refuse of Belleville, but it was 
not accustomed to view the apathy and cowardice of the well-to-do.2S The 
Standard maintained that the fact that such an insurrection was possible 
gave proof of the demoralization of the propertied classes.29 As for the 
conservative Morning Post, it asserted that the well-disposed section of 
inhabitants of Paris were only worthy of contempt in view of their timidi-
ty, and it insinuated that such men were not only unworthy of political 
rights, but that it would almost serve them right if they were forced to 
divide their wealth • .30 The belief that demoralization was widespread in 
1871 is reminiscent of those who explained the defeat of France in 1940 
, 
as the result of an inadequate supply of elan vital, that precious elixir 
which generated French self-confidence. 
25m:litorial in Times (London), March 24, 1871. 
26willlam Russell, My Dian During the Last Great War (London: 
George Routledge & Sons, 1874), p. ;so. 
27Ibid. 
2~itorial in Daily Telegraph (London), March 24, 1871. 
2~itorial in Standard (London), March 22, 1871 • 
.3DEditorial in Morning Post (London), March 24, 1871. 
Paris During the Col!ll!lU.M 
With the English public suspicious of the aims of the Commune, 
it is not surprising that, even before the "Bloody Week,• the majority 
of the press accepted indiscriminately the adverse reports concerning 
Parisian lawlessness, drunkenness, sacrilegiousness, and theft. 
According to several contemporary critics, the press was more interested 
in serving the cause of blind partisans, and in selling newspapers than 
in accurate and fair reporting. Fraser's, while claiming that newspaper 
opinion reflected the attitude and feelings of the people of the nation, 
observed: 
Anyone taking the general tone of English public opinion from the 
1 organs' which are popularly supposed to embody it would have been 
led to the conclusion that horror and reprobation were the uni-
versal feelings in regard to ~he Commune.31 
According to Frederic Harrison, the chief news organs resounded with 
denunciations of the sacking of churches, murders, and theft and were 
guilty of distorting the news. 
One of the great dangers which await the wealthy and middle classes 
is their dependence on the statements of those who are simply con• 
cocting matter to sell. The tales about 'pillage' and 1rabble1 and 
'massacres' are mere ribald caricatures, got up for the market. • • • 
They are simply coarse inventions, snatched from the lower French 
prints, or the melodrama of the inferior state.32 
Later in the same article, he was even more specific. 
Words cannot describe the insane injustice with which every feature 
of this movement has been related and judged~ Everyone knows how 
much blacker the case of the Commune appears in our newspapers than 
it does to the well-informed persons. It is impossible to acquit 
the journals of suppressing the truth ••• in deference to the 
3l"The En~lish Working Classes and the Paris Commune," Fraser's 
Magazine, LXXXIV (July, J.S71), 65. 
32Harrison, Fortnightly Review, XV, 558. 
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prejudices or a majority or their readers.33 
Humphrey Sandwith, an ardent opponent or Turkish and British imperialism, 
did not hesitate to condemn the British papers for their falsified re-
porting or the Paris uprising. He declared •that the public was fed with 
garbage from first to last, as far as Parisian news was concerned. But 
the newspapers are made to sell.•34 The ultra-radical, Professor Beesly, 
noted as early as March 25, the tendency of the press to denounce the 
Commune. 
If our newspapers are to be believed, Paris is in the hands or a 
small body or bloodthirsty, cowardly roughs, bent only on murder 
and plunder. But the newspapers are not to be believed •••• 
When it is a question between rich and poor, between genuine 
Republicanism and the manifold forms or privilege, they all sing 
the same song, which they know will please the upper classes. 
As for the cheap weekly papers, they just transfer to their 
columns with scissors and paste pots, the sensational telegrams, 
the highly flavored correspondence and the perfidious comments 
or the dailies and do, from pure ignorance and carelessness, 
propagate falsehood and bewilder the working class.35 
Furthermore, the Spectator, hesitant to leap to uncalled for conclusions, 
was very distrustf\11 or bombastic newspaper accounts and complained or 
the poor reporting • .36 
That the above comments on the attitude or the English press were 
not exaggerated can be substantiated b.Y a review or the press organs and 
the views or individual Englishmen. The S!turday Review accused the 
Communards of seizing the property of wealthy persons, of rifling churches, 
33~., pp. 575. 
34Humphrey Sandwi th, "Ear 1 Russell, the Commune and Christianity, • 
Fortnightly Review, XVI (July 1, 1871), 37. 
3~ccoby, pp. 169-70. 
36nNews of the Week," Spectator, VIIL (April 15, 1871), 251. 
and of reducing Parisian society to a state of anarchy. "Scarcely any-
thing is wanting to the Reign of Terror exc.ept the guillotine. • • • 
There is no trade in Paris, no police, no administration of justice.n37 
Lord Lytton wrote to his son in May that some wanted to depose God and 
get rid of all religion, some wanted their neighbor's shops, 
some wanted one thing or another which the good of society would 
no more allow than I hope in England it will ever allow Mr. Mill's 
wild projects against private property in land to do more than in-
crease the number of fools and rogues in the cesspool of great 
towns.38 
Queen Victoria was so outraged by' the news from Paris that she wrote in 
her journal on April S: "They have, however, thrown priests into 
prison, etc. They have burnt the guillotine and shot people instead. 
I am so glad I saw Paris once more, though I should not care to do so 
again.n39 
The denunciation of the practices of the Commune led also to a 
condemnation or its rulers. English public opinion concluded that the 
Communards were unruly and depraved wretches, the very rogues or 
Belleville. The Morning Post did not hesitate to charge that the 
Communards were recruited from the gutters or Paris. 
There are in Paris, with its vast organization or depravity, no 
less than twenty-five thousand wretches, who live on the prosti-
tution or women. These ignoble scoundrels with the pick-pockets 
and other scum or a great city, are the men who fired on the un-
armed demonstrations of the Rue de 1a Paix.40 
37ttThe Civil War in France,• Saturd.ay Review, XXXI (April S, 
1871), 420. 
~obert Lytton, The Life of r:ward Bu1wer. First L9rd Lytton 
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1913~II, 479. 
39The Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 126. 
40r.ditorial in Morning Post (London), March 24, 1871. 
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Henry Reeve, editor of the Edinburgh Revin and a student of French 
affairs, regarded the rank and file as unprincipled fanatics and thieves. 
According to Reeve, the inner strength of the Commune consisted of 
"fugitives, adventurers, and criminals from every sink and every jail in 
Europe. Their courage was inflamed by liquor and rewarded by debauchery. n4l 
Fraser's conceived that the blind mania of the Paris populace stemmed from 
the growing vice of drunkenness and what Victor Hugo called madness.42 
The Weekly Budget sneered: "Paris is in the hands not of philosophers, 
but of roughs, with the garbage of the more advanced schools on their 
lips.n4.3 Thomas Chenery, the future editor of the Times, reported in a 
letter on April 9 to Delane, the editor, that the Commune was the work of 
a very low type of Parisian. 
Red scorbutic faces, villainous features and expressions abound on 
every side; I feel sure all the worst characters in Paris are 
under arms •••• I have seen more drunkenness within the last two 
days than in all the time I have spent in Paris.44 
Colonel Ponsonby, the secretary of Queen Victoria, wrote to Earl Granville 
on April 14 that the Communards were "such as would repel all desire for 
association on the part of honest men. n45 Sir Henry Brackenbury, who had 
been a Paris correspondent for the Standard and later became a military 
.,# 
attache in Paris, wrote a letter to the Times on April 17 characterizing 
41Henry Reeve, Rozal and Republican France (London: Chapman 
& Hall, 1872), II, .321. 
42Gregg, Fraser's Magazine, LXXXIV, 126. 
4.3Edi torial in Weekly Bydget (London) , May 1.3, 1871. 
44oasent, II, 28,3. 
45The Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 128. 
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the Commnnards as "a handful of ruffians terrorizing a whole population.•46 
The Paris Commune, like the revolutions before it, saw in the 
Roman Church, with its avowed hostility towards the doctrines of liberty, 
a formidable antagonist. And, remembering farmer grievances, it is not 
surprising that the radicals, imitating the anti-clericalism of 1793, 
were agreed upon limiting the Church's authority, separating church and 
state, and secularizing church property. Not content with these pro-
cedures, the Communards showed great interest in the organization of 
laical schools, appropriated churches for the use of radical meetings, 
and arrested a considerable number of the clergy as counter-
revolutionaries. The Communards, who were maddened by reports of the 
shooting of Duval and other captured Communards by the Versailles 
government, called for the seizure of clerics as hostages. Following 
the news of further atrocities, the Communards decided to repay violence 
with violence. The height of anti-clericalism came with the execution 
of Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, along with several other priests. 
English opinion, in spite of its traditional unfriendliness to 
Catholicism, took a sympathetic interest in the fate of the Catholic 
clergy and, following the massacre of the clerical hostages, expressed 
great disapproval. Indeed, many Englishmen asserted that it was the 
lack of religion which led to the UPrising. The Commune was nothing more 
than the logical outcome of religious ~belief, the fruits of Voltaire's 
satire •. Earl Russell claimed, in effect, that the horrible deeds of Paris 
stemmed from the denial of Christianity.47 Lord Salisbury, in a speech to 
46Henry Brackenbury, Some Memories of My Spare Time (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood & Sons, 1909), p. 204. 
47sandwith, Fortnightly Review;, XVI, 39. 
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to the National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor held at 
Liverpool on April 5, 1872, maintained that the cause of the insurrection 
was "the decadence of the religious spirit in that nation.•48 Another 
leading Conservative, Henry Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, declared 
on May 25 that Paris was paying the pe~lty of sin.49 The Dublin Review, 
the leading Catholic monthly, explained that the Commune was not strictly 
political, but was intrinsically irreligious; Paris, which tried to 
shine without God, had to atone for her pseudocivilization and her pre-
occupation with sensuality and Vice.5° 
No doubt influenced by the known irreligion of the advanced 
revolutionary element in Europe, the English press condemned the 
Commune's behavior toward the Church. The London Quarterly Review 
accused the Commune of outright atheism, the desecration of churches, 
the prohibition of religious instruction, and attacks on the sanctity 
of marriage. "Sacramental vessels were plundered; altars were turned 
to the vilest uses; the holiest personages were made the subjects of 
vile ribaldry and of gross caricature.n51 The Weekly Budget, speaking 
of the Communards, observed: "They have voted God out of the. universe, 
and, of course, have hunted the priests like vermin, while they have 
4B•'Education, Secularism and Nonconformity," London QuarterlY 
Review, LXXXII (April, 1872), 271. 
49Arthur Hardinge, The Life of Henry Howard Herbert. Fgurth Earl 
of Carnarvon, 1831-1890 (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), III, 38. 
50"The Fall of Paris," Dublin Review, LXIX (July, 1871), 112. 
5l"The Commune and the International," London Quarterly Re]iew, 
CXXXI (October, 1871), 560. 
altered the Churches into discussion halls."52 
Henry Reeve, editor of the Edinburgh R~view, considered the Commune 
particularly abhorrent from the religious point of view. "They 
polluted the Churches, they trampled on the Cross, they cast down the 
Column; they defied alike their Country and their God.a53 The Dublin 
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Review, confronted with the hostility of the regime towards Catholicism, 
accused the regime of association with atheism, anarchy, and the 
Devil.54 Archbishop Manning of England was aroused by the seizure of 
ecclesiastical hostages by the Communards, and he used every possible 
recourse to deliver Monseigneur Darboy from his jailers. He asked 
Bismarck, Gladstone, and Granville to intervene, but although efforts 
were made, the Conmrunards refused to free him unless Thiers agreed to 
release Blanqui.55 
While most Englishmen were hostile to the Commune and accepted 
the reports of the Versailles government, nonpartisan and contradictory 
accounts were published. The Spectator, noting that the British public 
generally felt that Paris was being terrorized, was itself reluctant to 
accept such statements as were commonly put forth in the press.56 
Striving to do justice to the Commune, the Daily News asserted: 
52Editorial in Weekly Budget (London), May 13, 1871. 
53Reeve, II, 321. 
54"Paris and France," Dublin Review, LXVIII (April, 1871), 1.47. 
5~ward Purcell, Life of Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of 
Westminster (New York: Macmillan Co., 1896), II, 467-68. 
56nA Clergyman in Paris," Spectator, XLIII (May 20, 1871), 
607. 
Among all the men who have come and gone as the directors of this 
wild escapade in favor of Socialism and Democracy, there has not 
been one to advocate pillage. Private property has been respected 
in a singular and admirable fashion by the professed disciples of 
Proudhon and Saint-Simon.57 
1.31 
Although the illustrated London News was clearly shocked by the Commune, 
it reminded its readers that the insurgents had avoided the hideous 
excesses and the wholesale butcheries of the "Reign of Terror.n58 Even 
the Times as late as May 21 took note of the fact that, with the ex-
caption of the execution of General Thomas and General.Lecomte, there 
had been very little bloodshed.59 
Englishmen who actually visited Paris wrote accounts that 
differed decidedly from the press releases. A vicar of the Anglican 
Church, who had spent time in Paris during the second siege, reported 
that the city was not governed by bands of desperados. According to 
his observations, Paris was not only unusually free from immorality 
and excess ot all kinds, but managed with considerable skill its 
schools, hospitals, and police.60 In fact, he believed the Parisians 
conducted themselves with restraint and displayed more taste than the 
crowds at Versailles.61 The Spectator, in a dispatch from another 
English clergyman in Paris, gave its readers a very similar view. This 
correspondent denied the stories that Paris was ruled by godless 
anarchists, who thought nothing of pillage, prostitution, and 
57Editorial in Daily New.s (London), May 18, 1871. 
58"Editorials,• Illustrated London News, LVIII (May 1.3, 1871), 466. 
59Jditorial in Times (London}, May 21, 1871. 
60"At Paris, Just Before the End,• Fraser's Magazine, LXXXIV 
(August, 1871), 248. 
61 ~., p. 240. 
incendiarism. He maintained the Parisians had placed no limits on 
freedom of debate, had allowed church services, and had made sincere 
efforts to put down prostitution and drunkenness. 
As to anarchy, never was Paris more quiet and orderly, never were 
persons or property so safe; you may walk at all hours in any 
quarter witgout fear of insult, nay, with the certainty of being 
unmolested. 2 
In the course of the Commune period, Edward Bowen, a famous teacher at 
Harrow, paid a visit to Paris. He £ound the condition of Paris quite 
different from the prevailing conception of it in England. In a letter 
to his mother, he wrote: 
Paris is perfectly tranquil, well governed, orderly. There is no 
crime, no pillage, except one or two forcible confiscations of 
semi-public property by central authority. Everybody was perfectly 
civil. Even the roughest sentry was good-humored and polite •••• 
In fact, Paris is absolutely in the hands of. its lower classes, who 
govern it with perfect order and without half as much violence or 
crime as went an before, though not a single policeman
6
exists in 
the city and not a single court of justice is sitting. 3 
1:32 
The Paris correspondent of Blackpood1 s, who had no sympathy with the 
Commune, testi£ied that very few people were molested and that with the 
exception of the Bank of France, there was no pillaging.64 Captain Denis 
Bingham, Paris correspondent of the Daib News, was struck by the disci-
pline and self-restraint of the Communards and he observed that they 
took the incorruptible Robespierre as their model. 65 H. M. Hyndman 
reported that during the siege E. B. Michel, an English barrister, and 
62"A Clergyman in Paris, 11 Spectator, XLIII, 607. 
63rf. E. Bowen, Edward Bowen: A Memo~ (London: Longmans, Green & 
Co., 1902), p. 132. 
64Adolphus, p. 141. 
65Dennis Bingham, Recollections of Pari.§ (London: Chapman & 
Hall, Ltd., 1896), II, 41. 
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Hugh Hyndman, his brother, "coming straight to my house from Paris, gave 
me a favorable account of the administration of municipal Paris, es-
pecially at the time when Cluseret held command. 1166 An English gentle-
man, who was pressed into the service of the National Guard, much against 
his will, described in great detail his experiences as a soldier of the 
Commune and as a prisoner of the Assembly. After weighing all the factors, 
he concluded: 
The crimes and excesses laid to the charge of the Commune seem to 
me to have been greatly exaggerated; that they were greatly to 
blame is indisputable, but the old proverb is a true one, -- 1The 
Devil is never so black as he is painted, 1 and it certainly holds 
good in this case. 67 
Although no friend of the Commune, Frances Cashel Hoey, while visiting 
Paris, discovered that much of the news regarding the condition of Paris 
was exaggerated. The reports of disorder had no relation to actuality. 
Indeed, there was very little noise anywhere, and even where the 
National Guards were collected in great numbers -- in such great 
numbers that it simply amounted to the whole male population 
being armed .... there was no disorder.68 
Moreover, the Parisians in their agony had not turned to drunkenness. 
Although he bad heard reports of clerical persecution and pillaging of 
churches, his visits to various churches and nunneries, as well as 
conversations with Parisians, convinced him that religion, although re-
garded with hostility, was still free to perform its functions.69 Sir 
66H. M. Hyndman, Clemep.ceau (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 
1919), p. 43. 
67ttA Victim of Paris,• Macmillap.' s Magazine, XXIV (October, 
1871), 496. 
68Frances c. Hoey '"Red Paris' on Easter Sunday, 11 Saint Pau1 1 s 
Magazine, VIII {May, 1871), 17o-71. 
69 ~., p. 173. 
Edward Malet, who was in charge of the Paris Embassy during the siege, 
was likewise impressed by the restraint of the Communards. 
As a matter of fact, most of the dwellers in Paris suffered little 
inconvenience beyond such as arose from a very natural anxiety as 
to what might happen nax:t •••• It was a noteworthy and singular 
fact that though there was not a single policeman in Paris, the 
streets were as safe as those of London.70 
1.34 
The views of these relatively impartial critics were seconded by 
those people in England who regarded the Commune with considerable 
enthusiasm. A few advanced liberals and trade-unionists made great efforts 
not only to counteract the prevailing opinion regarding the origin and aims 
of the Commune, but to offset the prevailing view that the Communards were 
inflicting a policy of terror upon the people of Paris. John R. Green, 
who was a liberal in his political philosophy, wrote to Mrs. Creighton: 
At any rate, is not this Paris a wonderful spectacle of a govern-
ment of artisans, governing ably, preserving order and with property 
and life as safe as in Regent Street? And yet we howl day after day 
'anarchy and pillage' at it.71 
Frederic Harrison, a leader of the Positivist Society, took a keen 
interest in the events of the Commune and made a determined effort to 
obtain the true facts. From his colleagues in France, Pierre Laffitte 
and Dr. Robinet, as well as from his friend, J. Cotter Morrison, who 
was living in Paris, Harrison received first hand information.72 Thus, 
he found that the actions of the Commune compared favorably with those 
of similar revolutionary governments. Their arbitrary acts were justi-
fiable, considering the organized treason of Napoleon III. If the 
71Letters of John Richard Greep, p. 288. 
72Harrison, Aptobiographical Memoirs, II, 2.3. 
Communards held hostages, it should not be forgotten that the government 
at Versailles had executed prisoners. Nor was the ill-treatment of the 
clergy to be outrightly condemned, remembering that 
the Church for a generation has left its spiritual function to be• 
come the tool of a cruel and infamous tyranny; and the priests who 
have consented to be the spiritual, as the gendarmes have been the 
political, police for merciless oppre's,aion, can hardly escape 
being objects of the bitterest hatred.73 
Humphrey Sandwith, another republican, while admitting that he had some 
misgivings about the methods used by the "Red Republicans" could not 
accept the explanations of men like Earl Russell, who described the 
Commune as the work of atheism. Instead, he described with stark reali-
ty the crimes applauded by orthodox Christianity, such as the un-
restrained torture and slaughter of defenseless Jamaicans in 1865.74 
Edward Bowen elaborated this view in a speech in 1887 at the Harrow 
Liberal Club. In this discourse, he contended that the seizure of the 
hostages was necessary, that their aims and rule were more heroic than 
base, that the outrages of Paris paled before the atrocities of the · 
govel"mnent, that the burning of the historic monuments were excusable, 
and that he would rather have fallen on the barricades with Delescluze 
than to haTe marched with Marquis Galliffet, who slayed women and 
children. William Morris, the noted enthusiast for Gothic architecture, 
and Henry HYndman, a scholar and man of leisure, both of whom collabo-
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rated in 1881 to form the "Social Democratic Federation," an organization 
to propagate Marxian Socialism, supported the view that the Commune was 
73Harrison, Fortnigh~ly Review, XV, 574. 
7 4sandwi th, Fortnightly Review, XVI, 39-40. 
75Bowen, p. 336. 
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the harbinger of the great proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie.76 
Indeed, the former wrote a poem commemorating the hope:f'ul events across 
the Channel. 
Yet here we beheld all joyous the folk 
they had made forlorn; 
So at last from a grey stone building 
we saw a great flag fly, 
One color, red and solemn 'gainst the 
blue of the Springtide sky, 
And we stopped and turned to each 
other and as each did we gaze, 
The City's hope enwrapped us with 
joy and great amaze ••• 
We heard, and our were saying, "In 
a little while all the earthn 
And that day at last of all days I 
knew what life was worth; 
For I saw what few have beheld, a folk 
with all hearts gay. · 
Then at last I knew indeed that our 
word of the coming day, 
That so oft in grief and in sorrow I 
had preached and scarcely knew 
If it was despair of the present or 77 the hope of the day that was due. 
During the first years of the 1870's, there was considerable 
republican activity in England. The overthrow of the Emperor and the 
proclamation of the Third Republic gave rise to an outburst of working-
class radicalism. Torchlight parades, delegations to Gambetta, and 
anti-monarchial speeches abounded with London workingmen in the fall of 
1870 and into 1871. In England this movement took the form of an attack 
upon social injustices, organized religion, and the royal family. The 
outbreak of the Commune during the height of this agitation had a signifi-
cant impact on the movement~ To the radical wing of the agitation it 
76rrank Jellinek, The Paris Commune of 187J. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1937), p. 412. 
77william Morris: Selected Writings, ed. G. D. H. Cole 
(Bloomsbury: Nonesuch Press, 1944), pp. 398-99. 
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appeared to be the struggle of hard working artisans for better wages and 
for democracy. For instance, Reynold's Newspaper, the favorite organ of 
this extreme section of English labor, attacked the English press for its 
misrepresentation of the Commune and, rather hopefully, asserted that 
the sympathies of the English workingclass should be, and doubtless 
are already, strongly enlisted on the side of their brethren in 
France, now struggling to emancipate themselves from the odious and 
tyrannous fangs of royalty, aristocracy and capital.78 
The SaturdaY Review, particularly concerned with English radicalism, 
quoted from Remold's a characteristic article, entitled "A Happy 
Release." This special organ of the radical element offered the follow-
ing condolence: 
We have much satisfaction in announcing that the newly born child of 
the Prince and Princess of Wales died shortly after birth, thus re-
lieving the working classes of England from having to support here-
after another addition to the long roll of state beggars they at 
present maintain. 79 
On the other hand, the events in Paris alienated many of those 
advanced liberals who had sympathized with the early Republic. Charles 
Bradlaugh, who lent his time and -energy to the French Republic during 
the war with Prussia, was placed in a difficult position by the Revolution 
of March 18. He felt deeply for the harsh suffering which had prompted 
the Commune, and he had many friends who served in its government; how-
ever, he could not approve of its wild excesses. While he rejected the 
exaggerated accounts of its enemies, asserting that the assassination of 
General Lecomte and Clement Thomas were not sufficient grounds to condemn 
the Commune, and held that Paris had been free from pillage and crime, he, 
7~itorial in Reynold 1 S Newspaper (London), April 2, 1871. 
79Remold 1 s Newspaper, quoted in "A Pennyworth of English 
Radicalism," Saturday Revip, XXII (April 22, 1871), 495. 
nevertheless, refused to endorse the Commune, calling it "a sad blow to 
the prospects of Republicanism.n80 His daughter wrote: 
My father's whole being throbbed in sympathy with these men; but 
sympathize as he might, his reason could not condemn and he re-
mained sadly silent, unable to approve, but refusing to condemn.81 
Yet, when requested to act as an intermediary between Thiers and the 
Commune, he eagerly set forth for France, hoping to help effect a peace. 
However, he was arrested in the provinces.82 The Chamberlain circle at 
Birmingham and the Joseph Cowen group at Tyneside, which had been drawn 
I 
toward the Republic in September of 1870, likewise abandoned the Commune 
for fear that it would weaken the republican agitation.83 
As a matter of fact, the overall effect of the Commune was to 
dampen the republican movement in England.84 There is no doubt that the 
working classes of England were unreservedly and emphatically in general 
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sympathy with the Paris Commune to the extent that the Parisians were up-
holding the general cause of republicanism and the cause of the working-
man's struggle for better wages.85 But, with the exception of the 
"International," the leaders of the laboring classes believed the Commune 
to be an unworkable system. 86 Justin McCarthy, a close observer of English 
80aonner, p. 326. 
81Ibid.' p. 322. 
82Ibid 
-· 
83Maccoby, II, 169. 
84Herman Ausubel, In Hard Times: Reformers Among the Late 
Victorians (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 147. 
85"The En~lish Working Classes and the Paris Commune," Eraser's 
Magazine, LXXXIV (July, 1871), 63. 
86.,WS. 
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radicalism, declared: 
France, which had given the impulse, gave also the shock that brought 
reaction. The wild theories, the monstrous excesses, the preposter-
ous theatricism of the Paris Co~e had a very chilling effect on 
the ardor of English republicans. 
As for the outward signs of working-class republicanism in 1871, such as 
demonstrations, strikes, riots, and anti-royalist assemblies, the agi-
tation on behalf of the Commune was "singularly weak and even laughable.n88 
On April 16, those radical elements who sympathized with the 
Commune gathered at Hyde Park. The leaders tended approval of the Commune, 
denounced Thiers, the English press, and English republicans, especially 
Bradlaugh, for his failure to lend them sympathy. It was voted to send 
a letter to Paris, which in part read: 
And although our unscrupulous and moribund 1 Government' may seek 
and no doubt are seeking, in collusion with the rebels at 
Versailles, to precipitate foreign intervention in order to an-
nihilate your rights, we, the people of London, believing you to 
be fighting for the liberty of the world and the regeneration of 
mankind, hereby express our profound admiration for the grandeur 
of your enterprise and tender you the honest uncompromising hand 
of friendship and fellowship.89 
The English press, however, did not regard these demonstrations 
as representative of English working-class opinion. The Morning Post 
observed: 
The whole demonstration was composed of from four to five hundred 
ill-favoured and unwashed Republicans of an appearance quite con• 
clusive against any cause they might sUpport. • •• It exposed more 
completely than could have been done in any other way the entire 
absence of sympathy felt by the masses in England either with the 
principals of the Paris Commune or with their professors.90 
87McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times, IV, 291. 
· 88Annual Register (London: Rivingtons, 1872), p. 102. 
89.nu.g. ' p. 48. 
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Mr. Bruce, the Home Secretary, in a letter to Queen Victoria, assured 
her that the HYde Park meeting of April 16 was "utterly insignificant 
both with regard to the numbers and the character of those who took 
part in it.•91 These views are substantiated by editorials on April 
17 in the Time§ and Daily News.92 
No segment of English radicalism endorsed the Commune more 
whole-heartedly than the "International." The International 
Workingmen's Association, commonly called the "International," was 
formed in 1864 by English, French and other workers under the theoreti-
cal guidance of Karl Marx. While the General Council of the 
"International" maintained its headquarters in London, most of its early 
membership was derived from French Proudhonians. The majority of the 
British unions and large sections of the continental labor movement, 
such as the Lassalleans and Blanquists, remained aloof. Even so, by the 
~utbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, the Paris section of the 
"International" possessed considerable numerical strength and prestige. 
Following the suppression of the Commune, there was a decided 
tendency on the part of the forces of social order in France to at-
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tribute the revolution of March 18 to the Paris bloc of the "International," 
whose members were manipulated by the General Council in London. The fact 
that adherents to the •International" were frequently assigned responsible 
positions in the Paris govenment, and that the Commune attracted a large 
number of foreigners undoubtedly contributed to the belief that the 
"International" was the secret force behind the insurrection. The official 
9~he Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 1,30. 
92Editorial in Times (London), April 16, 1871; Editorial in pailz 
News ·(London), Aprill6, 1871. 
inquiry conducted by the Versailles government, despite overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, concluded that the "International• had played 
a leading part in the bloody uprising. No doubt Marx's pamphlet, 
written on behalf of the "International," entitled The Civil War in 
France, which interpreted the Paris revolutionary government's policy 
as identical with his own, lent weight to the view that the "International" 
had been linked with the insurrection. However, there is little question 
but that the role of the "International" was greatly exaggerated as to 
number and finances. Not only was the Paris branch lacking in cohesive-
ness, but it was handicapped by a shortage of money. Although individual 
members took part in the proceedings, there is no satisfactory evidence 
to the effect that the "International," as a party, either began the 
Commune or significantly shaped its policy. 
English opinion, as we have seen, showed a tendency to accept 
the exaggerated estimate of the Commune, to attack it as a Communist 
conspiracy, and to charge that the plans of the "Reds" went far beyond 
ideas of self-governing cities to a denial of private property, and to 
the fulfillment of the dreams of a socialist state. It was quite natural, 
then, as the "International" was in the forefront of the socialist agita-
tion, to see a relation between it and the Commune. The Times noted that 
public opinion held such a view. 
It has been a current belief that this society succeeded by virtue 
of its organization and activity in determining, as far as Paris 
was concerned, the election to the National Assembly and in seiz-
ing afterwards, under the title of the Commune, supreme power in 
the capital.9.'3 
The Times itself was convinced that the workers of Paris were fighting 
93F,ditorial in Times (London), May 5, 1871. 
not for any Republican forms or religious freedom known to the world, 
but simply and solely for the chance of adapting capital to tho~' 
'nobler uses' which they conceived in their distempered brains.~4 
The Quarterly Review rejected the theory that the Commune had nothing to 
do with the "International," and that it was simply an attempt to recover 
municipal liberties. It was, according to this journal, not only linked 
with the theories of the "International," but controlled by Marx and his 
companions from England. It asserted the extreme position that "the 
movement of the Paris Socialists, as of the whole International, was 
governed by a committee sitting in London.n95 Questioning the accuracy 
of those observers of the Commune under the general name of Communists, 
an Anglican clergyman admitted: 
Five-sixths of us think they are the same as Communists, forgetting 
that the one purpose that all should share and share alike in the 
world's wealth, the others merely claim for the chief city in France 
its municipal rights.96 
The Suppression 
The armies of Thiers entered Paris on May 21 through an unguarded 
breach in the wall. For the next seven days the Communards and the 
government's troops waged the most bloody street fighting that the world 
had ever seen. Compared to the fury of the Commune, the terror of the 
"June Days" was pale. Women and children took their places behind the 
barricades with the men and fought with passion. When Thiers took to 
carrying out violent reprisals, they fought all the harder. Horror was 
returned with horror. Driven to desperation and maddened by the 
94lJ2!g. 
95nThe Commune and the International," London Quarterly Revier, 
LXXXI (October, 1871), 290. 
96nA Clergyman in Paris,• Spectator, XLIII, 608. 
injustices of the invading forces, the Communards seized the Archbishop 
and eleven other clerics and, without a trial, executed them. Then, 
seeking to postpone the inevitable defeat, they set fire to several 
buildings, such as the Tuileries and City Hall. The restoration of 
order was carried out with seant attempt to temper justice with mercy. 
With a cavalier disregard for human rights, the government butchered 
hundreds of prisoners and sentenced others to long confinement. 
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The last week of the Commune saw the revolutionaries retreat 
from barricade to barricade before the disciplined troops of Versailles. 
Thanks to Napoleon III, who had rebuilt Paris with broad boulevards, the 
soldiers were able to outflank rather than storm the barricades and thus 
suffer a minimum of casualties. As the Communards withdrew before the 
invaders, it became necessary to burn a number of houses in order to 
strategically defend the city. The razing of public buildings and 
private houses, a dastardly practice in any era, leq many observers to 
assert that the burning represented pure vindictiveness and a wanton 
disregard of private property. Others, generally those seeking to foster 
a more favorable view of the Commune, attributed the incendiarism to 
accident, to the cannon of Thiers, and to military necessity. 
English public opinion, which had already condemned the Commune, 
regarded the burning of Paris and the slaughtering of priests as deeds 
of horror. Englishmen were too indignant at the loss to consider how 
much of it was necessary, how much of it was stimulated by the atrocities 
of the invading army, or the stern proclamations of Thiers. On receiving 
the news that many public buildings had been razed by the frenzied leaders 
of the Commune, the Times called the destruction greater than that wrought 
by the Huns -- "an act of deliberate and demoniacal malice. n97 The Daily 
!m for several days was reluctant to affix the blame for the de-
struction; finally they agreed with the Times that nothing short or a 
widely executed plan could have secured the simultaneous firing of 
buildings so far separated from each other.98 The Standard, which never 
paused to flail away at the Commune, maintained that these crimes were 
no accident, but a logical result of communist philosophy. The perpe-
trators were enemies of mankind and beyond the pale of civilization. 99 
The Morning Post asserted that the last spark of British sympathy for 
the Commune vanished with the desecration of the buildings.lOO In the 
House of Commons, Lord Elcho accused the Communards of committing "the 
greatest crime on record.•lOl 
The artent of English outrage may be gauged by the willingness 
of the conservative press to condone stern measures against the 
insurgents. The Daily Telemph declared that for such a crime no re-
taliation can be too cruel or ex:treme.l02 For these acts or pillage 
and incendiarism, the Stand&~d called for "some signal and striking 
reparation.nl03 The I1lustrated Lqndon News editorialized: 
97Editorial in Times (London), May 25, 1871. 
98&litorial in Dailv News (London), May 27, 1871. 
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The crime which is at this hour flagrant in the eyes of Europe must 
meet with a punishment which, however fearful it may be, cannot be 
adequate to the offense against the glory or France and the history 
or civilization.l04 
On the other hand, a small section or English opinion was 
reluctant to accept the view that in desperation the Communards had 
l45 
determined to seek vengeance on their enemies by the wholesale destruction 
of historic monuments. A remnant of liberals maintained that there were 
extenuating cireumstances and charged that the English press had charac-
teristically exaggerated the situation. For example, Sir Charles Dilke, 
who spent considerable time in Paris during the Commune, noted that much 
of the damage in Paris had been caused by the guns of Thiers, and that 
the Commune was unfairly blamed for the destruction.l05 Humphrey 
Sandwith remarked that the burning of Paris "was simply an act of war-
fare. ttl06 Frederic Harrison received many first hand accounts of the 
last days of the Commune and denied that there bad been a systematic 
design to burn Paris.l07 William Simpson, who sketched for the 
I1lustrated Lopdon News, declared: 
5]4. 
That some excited Communard may have set fire to some of the public 
buildings is probably enough, but there is no evidence on the 
subject except the assertions of the Versailles partisans. The 
accounts of the Petrolese are equally untrue; in fact, nothing 
could have been more w~ked, for it caused a few poor helpless 
creatures to be shot.l 
104nEditorials," Illustrated L9ndon Nus, LVIII (May 25, 1871), 
l05nilke, Nineteenth Century, LXXV, 589. 
106Sandwi th, Fortnightly Review, XVI, 36. 
107Barrison, "The Fall of the Commune," Fgrtnightlx Reyier, 
XVI, 1.32. 
108The Autobiompb.v of William Simpson·, ed. George E,re-Todd 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 190.3), p. 267. 
The EXaminer, an organ sympathetic to radical causes, could not help but 
deplore the incendiarism during the closing weeks of the Commune, be-
lieving it to be a wicked destruction or the center or European civili-
zation. Yet it did not b~me the radicals of Paris. The catastrophe was, 
after all, proper retribution for the oppression and vice of royalty.l09 
Remold's argued that Thiers was well aware that the Communards planned 
to set the city on fire, but he stubbornly refused to make any con-
cessions to the beleaguered defenders.llO Professor Beesly, the editor 
or the Beehive, who was an ardent Positivist and trade unionist, adopted 
a similar line.1ll Karl Marx, writing in the name or the •International, • 
declared: 
The Commune used fire strictly as a means of defense. They used it 
to stop up to the Versailles troops those long straight avenues 
which Haussmann bad expressly opened to artillery fire; they used 
it to cov~r their retreat in the same way as the Versaillese, in 
their advance, used their shells which destroyed at least as many 
buildings as the fire of the Commune. • • • And, the defense re• 
sorted to fire only when the Versaillese troops had already commenced 
their wholesale murdering of prisoners. • • • And, Thiers on the 
other handil2had given them notice that he would be implacable in his 
vengeance. 
The last few days of the revolution witnessed the bitter climax 
of anti-clericalism. The hostages seized by the Communards, which in• 
cluded several priests and the archbishop, Darboy, were executed by order 
of the Commune. Already outraged by the burning of public monuments, 
English opinion regarded these events with horror. The execution of the 
109.r.ditorial in Examiner (London), June 24, 1871. 
llO&li torial in Reynold 1 s Newspaper, May 28, 1871. 
lllJellinek, 412. 
112Marx:, The Civil War in France (New York: International 
Publishers, 1940), pp. 77-78. 
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clerical hostages could be explained as little more than the savage 
butchery of diseased minds. The Morning Post maintained that the shooting 
of the hostages was an act of inexcusable atrocity, which revealed the 
true character of those who committed it.113 The moderate liberal view-
point reflected in the Daily News was that no words could express the 
horror and detestation with which the world viewed the shooting of the 
hostages.114 The Saturday Review accused the Communards of plotting the 
death of innocent families, of murdering the Archbishop of Paris and 
other hostages in cold blood, and of planning to blow up most of Paris.115 
According to Fraser's Magazine, the leading English papers showed marked 
partisanship in stigmatizing the shooting of the hostages.ll6 While 
visiting England, Taine wrote: 
The English papers speak pityingly of our calamities but severely 
criticize our national character and fear for our future. In 
this outbreak they read a desire for effect; a revolutionary ex-
travagance with a fiendish delight in winding up things generally 
with a pantomimic flourish. They say that there is a certain 
ferocity at the back of our nature and that the Paris massacres 
show the monkey turning into the tiger.117 
As in the case of the destruction of Paris, the extreme left 
wing found extenuating circumstances and proceeded to accuse Thiers of 
provoking the anti-clerical outrages. Thiers had been given a chance 
to free the hostages by releasing Blanqui, but he had stubbornly refused 
113:Editorial in Morning Post (London), May 29, 1871. 
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to bargain with the "Reds.• Furthermore, when the government troops 
renewed their inhuman policy of shooting captured insurrectionists, there 
was lacking neither ample precedent nor encouragement for the shooting of 
prisoners. Dr. Sandwith, who sympathized with the measure of the 
revolutionary pirty, began by declaring that the execution of the 
hostages, which he was careful not to classify as murder, was a barbarous 
act of warfare; and he then proceeded to excuse, or rather to justify 
those measures with a zeal exceeded only by Karl Marx. 
If M. Thiers had chosen to exchange Blanqui for half a dozen or a 
dozen of these priests, or if he had simply refrained from 
butchery, these prisoners, the Archbishop and the rest of them, 
would have been alive at this moment, ready to launch French grm-
shot and bayonets on Rome on behalf of their infallible master. . 
Karl Marx maintained that the Commune had been forced to take hostages in 
order to prevent the murder of Communard prisoners and that the carnage 
of MacMahon's army on entering Paris had led to the execution of the 
sixty-four hostages and the Archbishop. He reached the startling con-
elusion "that the real murderer of Archbishop Darboy is Thiers.nll9 
William Simpson of the Illustrated London Newp asserted that the 
Versailles pirty had received warning from the Communards that the 
shooting of 0 Red" prisoners would meet with retaliation, and since they 
had begun to shoot prisoners on entering Paris, they were responsible 
for the execution of Darboy.l20 Reynold's Newspaper contended that the 
execution of the hostages followed after the government had committed 
brutal massacres, and that, however grievous an act, the cireUJnstanees 
ll8Sandwith, Fortnightly Revip, XVI, 33. 
ll<JMarx, p. 79. 
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ameliorated the situation.121 Frederic Harrison, agreeing with this 
journal, asserted that the English press had misrepresented the execution 
of hostages.l22 The Fortnightly's John Morley agreed with Harrison's 
general conclusions. Regarding Harrison's article, he wrote: "I go with 
you in every word and cannot say how grateful I am to you for so humane 
a deliverance.•l23 
The execution of Communard soldiers, the gutting or Paris, and 
the murder or the hostages culminated in a bloody repression. The troops 
or the National Assembly, dominated by the spirit or revenge, were de-
termined to track down the last sympathizer of the Commune. The 
revolutionaries, hemmed in by the Prussians and MacMahon's army, and 
fearing that the government stood ready to avenge themselves, fought on 
with wild fury. In this frenzied city, burning and sickened by the 
bloodletting, the government troops meted out a horrible revenge. Men 
and women who had resisted the armies of Thiers along with many who were 
innocent of any involvement were rounded up and, after a summary investi-
gation, were executed. It is difficult to estimate the number shot, but 
in all probability they ran into the thousands. 
The cruelty of the repression led the English press, not noted 
for its radical sympathies, nor hitherto friendly towards the Commune, 
to view with horror the fierce reaction. The Times was most outspoken 
in its comments on the suppression or the insurgents. 
121Editorial in Remold's Newspaper, June 4, 1871. 
133. 
122Harrison, 8 The Fall of the Commune," FortnightlY Revig, XVI, 
123Hirst, I, 198. 
The laws of war! They -are mild and Christian compared with the 
inhuman laws of revenge under which the Versailles troops have 
been shooting, bayonetting, rip~g up prisoners, women and 
children, during the last six days. So far as we can recollect, 
there has been nothing like it in history .124 
As the executions continued, the Times became increasingly hostile. 
The French are filling up the darkest page in the book of their 
own or the world's history. The charge of ruthless cruelty is 
no longer limited to one party or to one class of persons. The 
Versailles troops seemed inclined to outdo the communists in 
their lavishness of human blood.l25 
The Pall Mall Gazette was shocked by the savagery. It declared: 
The crimes of the insurgents are enormous; but if it is the crimes 
that we hate, political sympathy will not deter us from condemning 
with like fervor the more deliberate, more numerous ang more · 
wanton atrocities of what are called loyal soldiers.l2 
The DaiJ.y Neys was at a loss in choosing between the combatants. If 
on one hand there was the wanton burning of Paris, there was also the 
indiscriminate massacre of persons. The editorial concluded by calling 
on Thiers to use moderation.127 The Saturday Review severely censured 
the government of Thiers for permitting the wholesale execution of 
Parisians. 
But the butchery, the cold-blooded, indiscriminate, unsparing 
butchery of thousands of persons after all resistance on the 
part of all of them had long ceased, was so revolting that it 
is even said to have aroused the indignation of many of those 
who had at fi~st welcomed the Versailles troops as their 
deliverers.l2 
The Spectator likewise denounced the horrors of the suppression and 
~itorial in Times (London), May 29, 1871. 
125:Editorial in Times (London), May 31, 1871. 
12~itorial in Pall Mall Gfaette (London), May 29, 1871. 
127Editorial in Daily News (London), May 30, 1871. 
128nParis," Saturday Review, mi (June 3, 1871), 681. 
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condemned Thiers for his policy or removal.l29 Also, the Annual Register, 
which was noted for its impartial reporting, censured the government or 
Thiers for allowing the executions of the Communards; it described in 
detail the suffering of the populace before the fierce vengeance of the 
troops of Versailles.l30 Fraser's, commenting on the attitude of the 
working-classes, declared: 
If the feeling of the working classes of Paris upon this latter point 
may be judged by that of the working classes of this country, it may 
be safely said that the deaths or those prisoners will never be either 
forgotten or forgiven until they are avenged.l31 
A modern enthusiast for the Commune, after making an intensive study of 
the insurrection, concluded that the British bourgeois press gave to 
their readers surprisingly fair reports of the repression or the Commune 
and that, as a consequence, this publicity did much to offset British 
enthusiasm for a return to law and order.132 
The testimony of many leading Englishmen substantiated the 
position of the press. Lord Lytton, in a letter to John Morley on 
June 8, 1871, noted that the 
miserable Versaillais have (as I expected} contrived to nearly 
efface the effect of the crimes they profess to punish by their 
own excesses and atrocities, which are quite as bad as those of 
the Commune.l33 
129nNews of the Week,• Spectator, XLIII (June 3, 1871), 681. 
1.30Annyl Register (London: Rivingtons, 1872), p. 200. 
13l"The English Working Classes and the Paris Commune," Fraser'g 
MJgazine, LXXXIV, 67. 
132Jellinek, p. 411. 
1.3.3Personal and Literary Letters of R9bert. Fi.z:st Ea.I:l of 
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John Morley agreed with these remarks, referring to Thiers as a •vile 
politician" and Gallifet, who commanded the troops which reeked with 
vengeance, as "inlmman.n134 Former Ambassador to Paris, Lord Crowley, 
was appalled by the execution of the priests, but he refused to applaud 
the practices of the French military, which were "almost as bad as 
those committed by the Communists themselves."l35 Frederic Harrison 
called on the British people to applaud the righteous stand taken by 
the Communards against the dastardly and cruel butchering of the 
Versailles vendetta, 
who had introduced into regular warfare the savage practices of 
murdering disarmed men and who, for the first time in modern 
_political strife, had determined that their victory should mean 
not so much their own restoration to power as the butchery of 
" their opponents .l3o 
He found it difficult to understand why the persecution or the 
Communards, which was so closely associated with popery had failed to 
arouse greater indignation. After all, the Roman priesthood, instead 
of restraining the slaughter, had fanned the flames of fanaticism and 
had spread vicious lies about the true character of the Commune.l37 
Many others, like Bradlaugh, Sir William Butler, Wemyss Reid, Benjamin 
Jowett, John Stuart Mill, and William Simp~on were struck by the re• 
prisals of the soldiery, and argued that the captured Communards should 
134Hirst, I, 198. 
135A Great IB.dy1 s Friendships, pp. 338-39. 
136Harrison, "The Fall of the Commune," FortnightlY Reyier, 
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137~.' p. 147. 
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have been treated as prisoners of war.1.38 
On the other hand, there were others, especially men of conserva• 
tive sentiments, who approved the harsh measures taken by the government. 
The most noteworthy periodicals condoning the summary execution of the 
prisoners were the London Quarterly Review and the Standard, both organs 
of conservative views. The former classed the prisoners taken by Thiers 
as no better than outlaws, deserving of their severe punishment. Indeed, 
it claimed that 
public opinion, both in this country and abroad, has refused to 
condemn the severities of the French Government against men whose 
brief success has been stained with innocent blood and whose 
permanent triumph would have been the death-blow of civilization.l.39 
The Standard maintained that "the fiends who deliberately conceived the 
burning of Paris and did their best to carry out the hellish design, were 
as little deserving of compassion as human creatures ever were. al40 An-
other conservative organ, Blackwood's MagaziJ:!e, likewise vindicated the 
reprisals of Thiers. In an article, which was endorsed by the owners, 
this periodical stated that the people of Paris 
were justified in calling for strong measures and the Government 
was equally justified in applying them. All the spectators of 
those sights will say that sympathy for such fiends is totally 
misplaced and that th~ir immediate destruction • • • was abso-
lutely indispensible.~ 
1.3~onner, p • .327; Butler, p. 124; Memoirs of Sir Wemyss Rei§, 
p. 187; Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell, Life and Letters of' Benjam1n 
Jowett (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1879), II, 19; 8 English 
Anarchists and Their Teachers," Saturd.a:Y Rertew, XXXI (June 10, 1871), 
716; The Autobiomph:y of' WiJJ,sm Simpsop, p. 266. 
1.39"The Commune and the Internationals,• Lgndop QuarterlY 
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A unique proposition was set forth by the Naval and Military Gazette. 
According to this journal, the medical doctors should be allowed to 
experiment upon the Communards. 
We are deliberately of the opinion that hanging is too good a 
death for such villains to die and if medical science could be 
advanced by operating upon the living bodies of the malefactors 
who have crucified their country, we, at least, could find no 
fault with the experiment.l42 , 
Frederic Harrison quoted one journal as saying •forty thousand 
Communists only have been killed; why have the other 60,000 escaped 
military justice?al43 The Il1ustrated Lgpdon News, observing that 
Englishmen were opposed to Thiers' fierce vengeance, reminded them 
that their "reluctance to shed blood, after the conflict is over, is 
as proverbial as their unhesitating vengeance while it lasts.•144 As 
for this journal, though it was critical of the lack of judicial in-
quiry and the execution, it maintained: •For the survivors of the 
Commune, if there are any, we desire no mercy; and we desire the 
reverse of mercy for the hordes of ruffians •••• Let crime receive 
its fearful lesson.n145 Lord Redesdale believed that, on the whole, 
the reprisals were conducted with fairness and that Gallifet 1 s methods, 
which had been exaggerated by his enemies, were just. Thiers lmew, 
according to Redesdale, "that the crimes with which he bad to deal could 
not be prevented in the future by the sprinklings of rose water. n146 
538. 
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Henry Reeve, editor of the Edinburgh Review, believed that punishment 
of the insurgents was not only deserved but proof of the vengeance of 
God.147 English Ambassador to Berlin, Lord Augustus Loftus, recalling 
the firmness of Thiers in the last days of the second siege of Paris, 
believed that the suppression "was a severe, but a salutary lesson to 
the Parisian populations.nl48 That men of conservative persuasions 
were willing to acquiese in the violent reprisals is indicative of the 
shock with which English conservatives accepted the onslaught of French 
radicalism. 
There were some Communards who escaped the wrath of the •party 
of order" by fleeing to Switzerland, Belgium, and England. The French 
government requested Belgium and England to extradite the escaped 
refugees, but there was little support in England for such a move. As 
England, by tradition, was a haven for political refugees, the English 
government, supported by the press, refused to comply with the French 
request. Instead, England, believing that the Communards had suffered 
enough from the harsh repression, made available its traditional rights 
of asylum. Despite its general hostility towards the Communards, the 
Saturday Review concurred with a statement by Mr. Bruce, the Home 
Secretary, that extreme care should be taken in examining all demands of 
155 
extradition in order to distinguish between crimes and acts of civil war. 
Before any French refugee is surrendered it will be necessary under 
the Extradition Act to require the strictest proof, not only that 
he has committed a crime within the terms of the treaty of extra-
dition, but that his guilt was not in any degree of a political 
147neeve, II, 322. 
148Augustus Loftus, The Diplomatic Reminiscepees of LoJd 
Augustus Loftus. 1862-1879 (London: Cassell & Co., Ltd., 189£, 350. 
character. It is necessary to maintain sound principles even when 
they coincide with the demands of the International Association.l49 
Although in sympathy with the general aims of the Commune, the Exam1~r 
thoroughly agreed with the decision of the English government. 
The extradition of the Communist leaders would be a precedent of the 
worst possible kind. We should never in the fUture be able to boast 
that England is the safest of all political asylums; and we should 
have put it in the power of any despotic State to demand, with some 
colour of plausibility, the extradition of any political offe~dgr 
who has, in any way whatever, had recourse to overt violence. 5 
Likewise, the Economist, which felt only horror at the deeds of the 
Communards, believed, nevertheless, that their crimes were excepted from 
the operation of the Extradition Act.151 
The English people not only refUsed to comply with the French 
request, but, outraged by the harslmess of Thiers, they rendered a 
surprising amount of assistance to the refugees. Although a few ideal-
ists and radical sympathizers organized the most effective help, there 
is evidence that even a few of the wealthy contributed to their mainte-
nance• John Morley, feeling deeply touched by their suffering, offered 
to subscribe to a fund for their relief and to use his pen and oratory 
in any way for their benefit.l52 Bradlaugh gave a lecture on their be-
half, with the proceeds going to the refugees.l53 Frederic Harrison 
reported that Englishmen who had no political sympathy with the 
149"The Commune and Its English Sympathizers," Saturd.a:y Review, 
XXXI (June 3, 1871), 683. 
150mitorial in Examiner (London), June 3, 1871. 
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152 Hirst, I, 195. 
153Bonner, p. 325. 
156 
157 
insurgents were willing to help the refugees. 
The public in England was so deeply disgusted by the horrors in the 
punishment of the insurrection that in response to letters in the 
press an adequate sum was placed in my hands. The brother of a well-
known peer sent me 100 pounds.l54 
Harrison himself was very active in aiding the Communards to escape Paris 
and made his home available to refugees, secured employment for many, 
and, in order to relieve their immediate distress, distributed a fund to 
them for necessities.l55 Charles Dilke, who was causing a sensation in 
England by his anti-monarchial pronouncements, helped several French 
Communards escape France, in spite of the fact that the French government 
had spies watching him.l56 Charles Gavard, a French diplomat in London, 
remarked: 
La Commune at an end, I felt public opinion fall away from us, at 
least that expressed by the press. • • • It was the moment when 
sympathy was taking a turn in favor of the Communists, whom every 
tide scattered on the English coast. • • • It was the fashion to 
bewail their miserable fate. Lady Burdett-Coutt s [heiress of 
Coutts, the great banker) gave the signal, and at her own expense 
took charge of one of the first bands of the disembarked; she 
even had one day the hardihood to ask me to take charge of them 
myself. Subscriptions were opened for them in the newspapers.l57 
Even the British government, while not permitting itself to lodge an 
official protest with Thiers, reflected the changed attitude. Gavard 
noted that the sympathy for the persecuted radicals led Lord Granville 
to redouble his diplomatic reserve with French authorities.l58 
In spite of England's criticism of Thiers 1 harsh reprisals, and 
154Harrison, Autobiographical Memoirl, II, 32. 
155Ibid., II, 19. 
156Gwynn and Tuckwell, The Life of Dilke, I, 114. 
l57Gavard, p. 45. 
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its unwillingness to return Communard refugees to France, the English 
did not alter their general estimate of the Commune. It was a bad night-
mare, an unwarranted and untimely scar upon a France still suffering from 
the wounds of war. With the exception of the radical journals, like the 
Fortnightly Revier, which still accepted articles ~pathizing with the 
Commune,159 the English press continued to regard it with disfavor. The 
T:}Jnes, for example, editorialized: "The struggle in Paris seems all but 
over and the most wicked band of conspirators the world has ever seen 
have met their final doom in the world.al60 On June 5, this same journal, 
which was very depressed by the inhpman tactics of the government, 
claimed that public opinion still held the Commune in horror. 
That the tendency of opinion should be strongly against the 
Communists is natural, for the justification of their revolt appear{! 
difficult, while their last acts have excited universal abhorrence.l61 
Ernest Vizetelly, who sketched in Paris for the IJlustrated Lond.onN.ews, 
expressed this view very well when he said that "there were faults on the 
side of Thiers and the National Assembly as well as on that of the 
Commune. But if I have to give a verdict, it must be against the 
insurrection.ul62 
Indeed, following Marx's address to the General Council of the 
"International" on May 30, 1871, a great cry was raised against all 
159Auguste Desmoulins, "The Paris Workman and the Commune," 
Fortnightly Review, XVI (September, 1871), 308-20; Jules Andrieu, "The 
Paris Commune," Fortnightly Reyig, XVI (November, 1871), 571-98. 
16~itorial in Times (London), May 29, 1871. 
161Editorial in Times (London), June 5, 1871. 
162Ernest Vizetelly, My Adventures in the Cogune (London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1914), p. 357. 
partisans of the Commune. Both the conservative and the liberal presses 
pursued the "International" with zest. The Daily Telegraph called 
Marx's manifesto, "an apology for the assassination of the Archbishop or 
Paris.•l63 The Spectator, which believed that both combatants were 
equally responsible for the terrible events, objected to Marx's thorough 
justification of the massacre of the hostages and his firm conviction 
that the workingman is forever locked in a struggle with all c18sses.l64 
The London Observer, closely associated with Gladstone's Government, 
urged the prosecution of Marx for his glorification of the Parisian 
violence.l65 The Peppy I1lustrated Paper openly attacked the 
"International" for its defense of the Commune. 
Such men are just now not only excusing and defending the crimes of 
the rabid horde which has tried to destroy Paris and to ruin 
France -- to murder their afflicted mother that they might scramble 
and fight among themselves for what has been left of her belongings 
-- but have gloried in these shameful deeds and held them up to 
Englishmen as an example to be imitated. It is tim4}~ that these men 
were known for what they are, Relentless Vampires.loo 
As further indication of the actual state of English opinion, 
George Odger and Benjamin Lucrart, who, as members of the General 
Council, had signed Marx's address, were compelled by public opinion, 
after a short delay, to explain their signatures and to withdraw from 
the General Council.l67 In addition, Marx's forthright vindication of 
the insurrection and its course aroused the ire of British.labor 
163:Editorial in Daily Telegraph (London), June 16, 1871. 
164"The English Communists on Paris, • Spectator, XLIII 
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unions.168 
In conclusion, for many a year after the Commune, the majority 
of Englishmen regarded the Communards as if they had been a gang of 
scoundrels and incendiaries with scarcely a redeeming quality, while a 
small minority of radicals naturally enough turned their backs on this 
abuse of men who they believed were inspired by high idealism. 
168sau1 Rose, •The International,• EpCyelopedia Britannica, 
14th ed., XII (1958), 509. 
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CIUPTD V 
THB RBPUBLIC VBBSUS TBB llOIARCBY 
In the f'irst years attar the lranco-Prussian War, the French laid 
aside their traditional role in foreign af'f'airs and focused attention up-
on economic and political reconstruction. With France busy seeking to 
~~eet reparation p81J1ents, to rebuild its shattered econoJV and e.rmy, and 
to establish a definitive f'ora of' government, Inglish interest in France 
during the early years of' the Republic was centered primarily upon domes-
tic af'f'airs, especially upon the political strife between republicans 
and royalists. 
The larlY Rewblic. 1871•1872 
It appeared to ·~ obsel"Yers in 1871 that France was destined 
f'or a monarchical restoration. For 110re than tweDty years the monarchical 
parties in France had been pushed aside by Napoleon. The Bourbons were 
;' 
too proud to sel"Ye under the banner of' an upstart lmperor; the Orleanists, 
who were outraged by Napoleon 1 s disregard f'or the constitution, had waged 
unceasing war against the lllpire. Their one weakness and chief anxiety 
was lest their opportunity escape thea through family feuds. When the 
lmpire f'ell and the Republic was dragged through the ordeal or war, the 
monarchist parties, Orleanists and Legitilldsts, still unreconciled, were 
taken by surprise, With the Bllperor discredited and the republicans coa-
' mitted to war 1 outrpce,· their opportunity came sooner than they had 
expected. Thus, when it was agreed at Versailles, on January 28, that 
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an Assembly should be immediately coDYoted to decide the question of peace 
or war, the monarchists came forward as the advocates of peace. From this 
Assembly the Bonapartists were al.ast completely excluded, and the re-
publicans were handicapped by Gabetta, who advocated the continuance of 
the war. As a consequence, two-thirds of the members of the National 
Assembly at Bordeau were monarchists, wealthy •n, known to be adherents 
to a policy of peace and order and regarded as peculiarly suited to nego-
tiate a peace treaty with a monarchy like Ge1'118l'J1'• 
While Thiers, who was co.U.ssioned by the Assembly as Chief of 
the Bxecutive Power, was occupied with the task of pqiDg ott the iDde.,. 
nity and reconstructing the fabric of govermaent which had been shattered 
by war and revolution, the majority in the Assembly were vainly endeavor-
ing to bring the Count of Chubord to some declaration which would enable 
them to present him to France as a constitutional aonarch. But HeDr1 V 
thwarted their efforts by refusing to consent to the substitution of the 
Tricolour for the White llag. By the end of the year, the prospects for 
a restoration. aeaaed as remote as ever. The failure of the Bourbons to 
resolve their differences proved to be a blessing to the opposition. 
The Bonapartists emerged from their tempora1"1 obscurity, and the by• 
elections indicated that the tide of popular opinion had turned in favor 
of the Republicans. For the tiae being, however, the chief beneficiary 
was Thiers. 
In the meantiae, the legacy of miseries lett by the Geman inva-
sion and the civil war insured Thiers' tempora1"1 ascendancy, but his dis-
position to separate himself from the conservative majority, to uphold 
the 4,e facto NatioDal. Assembly against the blows from the Right, and his 
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declaration that only a conservative Republic could •aintain peace and 
tranquility became increasingly apparent even before the July elections 
ot 1871. 
BngliaDen were depressed b;y the prospect or a JIOn&rehical restora-
tion. Such an event would Man a return of the priestly influence, which 
would add to political disturbances, with the result that it would soon 
perish before another revolution and, in the meantime, would disturb 
neighboring states. The Tiaea, discussing .Inglish opinion, wrotea 
The Liberal party in Bngland 110\ll.d certainly have no great satis-
faction in witnessing a restoration or political auperatitions to-
gether with the Princes whose title represents the•. Though regret-
ting the follies and U.s of the French Revolution, we have, as a 
nation, believed that the old authority justly tell, and we have 
hoped that liberty might be securely founded under one or another 
ot the new constitutions. We C8Dil0t help tearing that however bono-
eat the intentions or the 110re large-minded •n who would bring back 
Henry V, the inveterate traditions ot1tbe Bourbon lonarch;y will be against poll tical and •ntal treedoa. 
ObYiously the Times felt that the restoration of the Count of Chambord 
would ••an a revival or the civil, llilita.r;y, and religious principles or 
Charles X. This attitude towards Chubord's return was reinforced b;y the 
turn of events in Rome during the war. With the overthrow or Napoleon 
c.-e the news or the loss of the pope's te-mporal power. Unwilling to ac-
cept the action or the Italian govel'IUient, Pius IX now called upon the 
faithful or the world to assist hill. The French Right, which had tradi• 
tionall;y upheld the altar and the throne, related the cause or Henry V 
with the reconstitution or the Papal states. Prayers tor the Hol;y See, 
indiscreet talk of the new French .bba88ador to Italy, an increase of 
~itorial in Tilles (London}, June 6, 1871. 
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pilgrimages to Lourdes, and a good deal of irresponsible grumbling, not 
only irritated the Italian govermaent, but was used by the French Lett 
to discredit the opposition in the eyes of the peace-loving peasantr.y, 
who could not be persuaded that the defense of the pope's temporal power 
was essential to the welfare of the Catholic religion. Under the circum-
stances, France, faced with a hUIIillating defeat, an 8.1"1117 of occupation, 
and political isolation, was in no position to undertake a struggle with 
Italy. In time, the danger of war was made aore imminent by Bismarck's 
quarrel with the papacy. To help the pope would not only arouse the en-
mity of Italy, but would possibly provoke Bismarck into another iuvasion. 
The loose language of the extrne u1 tr8lBOntane party led the 
Bngllsh, who did not feel that French national interest was directly iDVolved 
in the restoration of the temporal power, and who were anxious to see French 
recover,, to look kindly towards the liberal camp. Thus, on June 1, the 
St&Ddl£4, in spite of traditional s.ympathy with conservative causes, noted 
that a restoration of the Bourbons would lead to a resurrection of papal 
claims and trouble with Italy.2 The S&turd&Y Review agreed that a restora• 
tion certainly did not inspire confidence in foreigners asked to make loans 
to the French government when, in all likelihood, the regime would not be 
permanent and would embark up~n a crusade on behalf of Pius II) The Times, 
anticipating future difficulties between Italy and France under a Bourbon 
regime, hoped that France would postpone such a fatal decision.4 Although 
2Editorial in Standl£4 (London), June 1, 1S'71. 
l•France, • Saturday Reyiet, Imi (June 10, 1871), 5. 
4Editorial in Times (London), June 2, 1871. 
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the Legitimists were accepted b.1 Fraser's as the preferable party in the 
French situation, it admitted that a royalist restoration possessed dis-
tinct dangers. One of the most formidable dangers was the possibility 
of war with Italy for the restoration of the pope's temporal power.5 
While there can be little doubt that Englishmen, wishing to see 
a restoration of order in France, welcomed the advent of liberal institu-
tiona, there was a general belief that the Third Republic would soon be a 
matter of history. That many Englishmen despaired of the Republic's sue• 
cess should come as no surprise. It was popularly believed before the war 
that Frenchmen, who were regarded as a fickle and excitable people, were 
incapable of the self-discipline and restraint necessary for a stable 
6 ~ 
regime. Henry Labouchere, returning from Paris, was convinced that the 
French people were not ready for a republican form of government. Until 
they had gained sufficient common sense and were better educated, the 
lrench would only be fit for a constitutional monarch1• •A Republic would 
soon result in anarch1 or despotism, and without ~ great love for kings of 
any kind, I prefer a Constitutional Monarch to either Anarchy or a Cae~ar.•7 
Lord Lytton argued that the Great Revolution had undermined the foundations 
of good government in France -- religion and aristocracy -- and that France 
still suffered from it. A republic or even a constitutional monarchy was 
8 impossible there; only Henry V could succeed. 
5Gregg, Fraser's Magazine, LIIIIV, 130. 
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When the tall ot Paris discredited the Governaent ot National De-
tense and gave birth to an Assembly ot rurals and clericals, it appeared 
that nothing could prevent the conservatives from restoring to the throne 
one ot their pretenders. Then, when the suppression ot the Co.mune dis-
armed the only ene111 the royalists teared, observers simply awaited the 
restoration. Indeed, m&DY~Bnglishmen believed that the insurrection or 
Paris had made a monarchy a strong possibility. The Daily leg, tor 
example, maintained that a durable republic was rendered indefinitely 
more remote by these deplorable disturbances in Par1s.9 The Timea be-
lieved that France, moved br the terror ot the Commune, was ready to ac-
cept a restoration ot royalty; however, it preferred a prolongation ot 
the government ot Thiers, believing that it alone was capable ot under-
taking recovery and, at the saae time, UDl.ikely to go to the same extremes 
as a Bourbon. 10 According to the Spectator, halt ot Burope expected a 
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in lrance.11 Jo~ Morley, who was not 
entirely unsJJIPathetic to the c~, declared that the revolt had 
wrecked the chances tor republicaniD.l2 Lord Acton, speald.ng on April 
25, 1871, observed that the civil war was undermining the Republic and 
that France was again heading toward a restoration ot monarchy.13 Denis 
Bingham, a correspondent in Paris tor the Pall lall Gazette, was convinced 
9Bd1torial in DailY leg (London), April 24, 1871. 
l~itorial in Times (London), June 7, 1871. 
11
•The Count de Chambord, 1 Spectator, ILIII (June 10, 1871), 695. 
12-a:irst, I, 181. 
13 Acton, p. 271. 
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that the Republic •would have but a brief e:xistence.•14 lrnest Vi:aetell:r, 
a close observer ot events across the Channel, contended that the upris-
ing •was a crime against the Republic, tor it tilled all sober-minded citi-
:aens in France with horror and alara, disposing them more and more to seek 
the help ot some Providential savior.•15 
While most Bnglishmen viewd the tendenc:r or French political at-
fairs towards a restoration with misgivings, others were not adverse to the 
prospects of the Bourbons. The Dailv Telegraph believed that the restora-
tion of Henry V would give birth in :rrance to a broad national part:y, which 
would be tar less interested in the assertion of abstract ideas than in 
the introduction of good govermaent.16 Fraser's Maga:aine regarded the 
prospects tor a stable governaent as very doubtful; either a republic or a 
restoration of monarch:ywould have to face treEndous difficulties. How-
ever, the eatablishaent of a republic was to be teared more than the Legi-
timists, who would be able to attract the majorit:r of the populace. The 
greatest dangers to look for froa the Right were war with Ital;r and a resto-
ration of priestly pretensions and powers, both of which would prove fatal 
17 to the regime of Henry V. The Spectator portra:yed the Count ot Chambord 
as a peace-loving, tolerant, and benevolent gentleman, who would most like-
l:r reconcile the divergent interests within :rrance and exercise a stead;ring 
l..4aingba, I, vii. 
: Her President 
Small, Maynard & 
1871. 
17•The Inglish Working Classes and the Paris Commune,• Fraser's 
Magazine, LIXIIV, 63. 
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influence on the ship of state.18 The strongly pro-Catholic Dublin Review 
hopefully awaited the restoration of the Bourbons.19 
A few Britishers, while acquiescing in the cause of Thiers, were 
not ready to overthrow the cause of Napoleon, who, after all, had been a 
good friend to England and had made Paris available to vacationing Bnglish-
men. The Spectator described this segment of English opiniona 
Their views are readily received here, for in London, and especially 
&Jiong its middle class, the hatred of disorder amounts to a mania, 
and b,y some inexplicable ingenuity of error, the cause of order is 
presumed to be the cause or the expelled Sovereign, who maintained 
order by a system which, with its repressions, its corruption, and 
its failure, maJnly produced the deplorable collapse in France.20 
Later on, this organ, again rerlewing Bnglish opinions, reported that 
Knglishmen who had welcomed the overthrow of Napoleon 
now that the Republic in its turn is showing weakness and incapacity, 
are more than half-inclined to wish that the lllperor were back again 
on his throne and are readnd2fl each other that while he ruled Paris 
was, or seeaed to be, great. 
/ . . 
The French attache to London obserYed that during the CODUilUlle Bnglishmen 
frequently expressed regret for the lapire, because •they did not deem us 
worthy of liberty nor capable of bearing the weight of it.tt22 This sym-
pathy became evident when Napoleon III arrived in England following his 
imprisonment in Germ&Qf. August Filon, a well-known French man-of-letters 
18•The Count de Chambord,• Spectator, XLIII, 695. 
19•Paris and France, • Jlublin BeYiew, LXVIII (April, 18'71), 447. 
20
•The Chances of a Napoleonic Restoration, • Spectator, XLIII 
(Kay 13, 1871), 564. 
21
•The Fruits of Imperialism,• Spectator, JLIII (April, 18'71), 
372-73. 
22 . 8 Gavard, PP• 27•2 • 
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as well as an intimate acquaintance or the lllperor and Balpresa, reported 
that the 
English showed great sympathy towards their old ally. He had been 
loudly cheered at Dover as soon as he set toot on English soil, and 
he was cheered again in London when he attended the thanksgiving 
service for re;overy ot the Prince ot Wales, whose life had been 
despaired or.2J . 
Gavard, always sensitive to Inglish opinion, noted with considerable mis-
giving the popularity of Napoleon III in l:ngland. 
The crowd pressed about his path to give him an ovation; the police 
had been obliged to step in to protect the railings about his resi-
dence at Chislehurst against the invasion of his enthusiastic parti-
sans •••• The Bnglish princes, the diplomatic corps vied with one 
another in external evidences or respect and deference. or course, 
the favour with which he was received was not all intended for the 
Emperor personally, nor as approval ot his admild.stration; to a 
great many naive people, he still stood tor Prance, and they 
thought they were pqing homage to our misfortunes, by saluting 
the author or thea •••• I received the proof ot it subsequently, 
when the more or less official bands played the 1Jeune at 'b!•u 
Duuois 1 as an honour to the representative of the Republic.24 
It is, of course, true that Inglish society was easily infatuated with 
notoriety of any kind, and its interest in the Bm.peror should not be con-
strued to mean that they looked forward to his restoration. 25 As tor 
governDlent circles, they remained aloof from the social aaeDi ties showered 
upon the exiled couple.26 
Amidst this collection of parties stood Thiers 1 government, sup-
ported heartily by none but accepted by all. His government was avowedly 
23J.ugustine Filonf .Recollections of the Impress Bugenie (Londona 
Cassell &: Co., Ltd., 1920}, pp. 239-40. 
24Gavard, PP• 28-29. 
25rilon, P• 240. 
26xw. 
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a tempor&l'1 expedient, resting upon a comprollise between all parties, or 
rather upon the adjournment of all constitutional questions. To the 
monarchial factions, which formed the majority of the Assembly, Thiers' 
apparent adoption ot the Republic rendered hill especially obnoxious. On 
the other hand, the republicans were dissatisfied because the whole wight 
ot the government was not used tor the purpose of establishing a peraanent 
republican regiae, with or without the consent of the people. On ail.it&r7 
organisation, on finance, on the centralisation of the administration, and 
on other matters, Thiers' private views nre widely different from those 
generally prevalent in the Assembly, and there was considerable criticism 
ot him in private; but no one party saw ita wq to ensuring its own 
triumph, and all were obliged by the force of events to maintain endurable 
relations with Germ&D1• 
Notwithwtanding the provisional status of this regime, the Bngliah 
were prepared to accept the govern.ent of Thiera as long as it steered a 
reasonable course, avoiding the extre•s of Right and Lett. Although 
lnglishllen had no real fondness tor Thiers, he was acceptable under the 
circuaatancea. The alternative involftd too many risks. The Time1, in a 
' 
leading editorial, argued that the extension of the existing government 
was most desirable. A monarchical constitution, established during a 
fever ot reaction and w1. th an ene111 at the gates ot Paris, would scarce-
ly result in a settled govel"DDl8nt.27 A month later it frankly admitted 
that Thiera was indispensable. 1It is, ot course, easy to ridicule the 
notion that &D1 ruler, being mortal, should be indispensable; but for the 
271ditorial in Times (London), June 9, 18'71. 
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time, at least, this not untrequentl7 occurs.•28 The Pa11 1a11 Gazette 
summed up the position ot public opinian. 
When the Government ot I. Thiers waa established nobod7 supposed 
it was destined to last long, it was on all hands accepted as the 
beSt available machine17 tor bringing the count17 into order and 
tor preparing a resettlement ot the foundations ot Governaent. 
Nevertheless, there was a time when that which was adopted aa a 
temporaey expedient seemed to have a good chance or establishing 
i tselt for at least as lo:Q& u M. 'fhiers should live; and not onl7 
so, but there was a desire in the minds of most men, not partisans, 
that the prolongation or his GoYera.ent should put as long a dis-
tance as possible between the inevitable outbreak or rivalries and 
the disasters that followed the Prussian invasion.29 
Another segaent or opinion believed that the sentiment or the 
National Assembl.7 represented the popular will and held that French re-
publicanism was incompatible with stable government; the7 urged the French 
to dismiss Thiers. The Stand.ard, for example, maintained that it was a 
llistake to prolong the power ot Thiers, as a Republic did not represent 
the French people. This consel"V'ative journal asserted that Bngland 
wanted to do business with a government which represented the national 
will, and only a monarch7 could meet this condition. 30 'fhe Tablet, which 
was an obstinate partisan ot the Count ot Chambord, declared that Thiers 
was not to be the deliverer ot France. It would take somebod1 who was 
willing to invoke the name of God in his enactments and who surrounded 
himself with men or sound Catholic pr1Dciples.31 The Spectator, frequent-
ly an exponent of liberal sentiments, could not forget that Thiers was the 
2~torial in 'fimes (London), July 9, 1871. 
29Bditorial in Pall Mall Ggette (London), December 8, 1871. 
30xdttorial in Stgdard (London), June 12, 1871. 
3l•Thiers, tt 'fablet, V (June 24, 1871), 451. 
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advocate of a protective economic policy, and that he had been particular-
ly harsh on the Commune. lot only was he lacking in popular support, 
but he was dishonest to the principles or the Republic and dependent up-
on the bayonets of a repressive &l'lll7• France seemed destined to accept 
a royalist regime, and the sooner it happened, the sooner France could 
concentrate on binding up its wounds.32 
On July 2, by-elections were held for 112 vacancies in the National 
Assembly. lrOil eveey part of France, even in the most priest-ridden and 
reactionar,y provinces, the people elected republicans as well as a few 
Bonapartists. It was obvious that the royalist majority of the National 
Assembly did not reflect popular sentiaent. France had openly reversed 
its attitude of February, and with this change, Kngl.ishllen, Jll8D1 of whoa 
had questioned the chances of the Republic, began to doubt the possibility 
of a lasting restoration; regarding the disunity of the royalist opposi• 
tion as only another favorable sign, they saw hope for the Republic. The 
Ii!!J, for example, asserted that the French elections were a victor,y for 
Thiers and a triumph for JIOderate republicanism. Until France had re-
stored order, it needed the neutral pernment or Thiers. In tille, with 
good management, France would be ready for selt-govermaent.3.3 The 
Spectator had been urging France to put aside Thiers for a real monarchy 
and bellend that the election results, especially the return or the i.,. 
pul.sive and courageous leader or the Lett, Gambetta, would strengthen the 
chances or the Republic. 
32ttThe Crisis at Versailles," @pectatgr, XLIII (June 10, 1871), 
692. 
3~torial in times (London), July 7, 1871. 
This, the possibilit7 of pett7 proprietors to acquiesce patientl)" 
in a Republic, is a revelation in lrench politics, and dll defi-
ni tel)" strengthen 1. Thiers 1 hands. StUl as long as the ruling 
Assembl7 did not command the refplct and lo7altr of Frenchmen, the 
Republic was not out of danger. Jlt. 
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The DailY lew1 was gratified b)" the news of the republican · victorr and 
the return of Gambetta and regarded the elections as a defeat for the 
Right.35 Likewise, the Pall 1•1] Gaat;te .... maintained that the return of 
Gabetta was a welcome addition to the French govermtent, and that the 
fears of Englishmen as to his attitude towards private propert7 were 
exaggerated efforts to discredit a pertectl)" sate leader.36 
On the other hand, conservative opinion continued to express some 
doubts as to the prospects of the Republic. The Standard maintained that 
Gambetta1s presence in the National A88eabl7 sounded the death-knell of 
Thiers 1 moderate republican! sa. His untortunate entrance would aake a 
IIIOderate governaent impossible.37 The Tablet, which equated Gambetta 
with the devil, admitted some dissatisfaction with the elections, but 
continued to anticipate a restoration of the Bourbons.38 Notwithstanding 
these fears, the majoritr of lnglishaen regarded the July elections as 
an indication that France preferred Thiers, with his program of peace and 
order, to the machinations of the Right and the extreme Lett. The Time!, 
for example, declared that the elections of July refiected the peaceful 
wishes of the countey and aeant that Thiers was preferable to a war with 
34wThe French nections, 1 Spectator XLIV (July 8, 1871) 1 820. 
35xditorial in De:lly Neg (London), Jul7 4, 1871. 
~torial in lAll laJ.l Gasette (London), July 8, 1871. 
371ditorial in Standard (London), Jul.)" 5, 1871. 
38tChronic1e ot the leek, • Tablet, VI (Jul)" S, 1871), 35. 
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Italy on behalf of the papacy. 
The priests especially have disclosed the spirit of the Bourbonists 
faction and filled all classes with alarm. To the priests it is 
due that not even in the most rural and Conservative districts have 
the Legitimists been successful. No sooner was it found that the 
National Assembly was anti-Republican, with the Legitimists its 
leading party, than a clerical agitation began for the restoration 
of the temporal power of the Pope. In ennumerable parishes the 
people have been called upon to maintain the cause of the Holy 
Father. • • • The common sense of the people, and even of the 
peasantry, has told them that this means war • .39 
The Tablet, however, refused to admit this interpretation of the elections 
and could discover no 
more recondite reason for it than the fact that the chief :municipal 
appointments are still in the hands of the Government, and that, 
however scrupulously careful 11. Thiers may be to put no pressure on 
the constituencies, the subordinate officials invariably do exercise 
an important influence in favour of the Government of the day.40 
In spite of a few negative sentiments, it is apparent that most 
Englishmen were not only pleased with the victory of moderate republican-
ism, but believed that the Assembly existed under false pretenses and had 
no warrant to deal with the constitutional question. They were prepared 
to accept the dissolution of the whole Assembly as a prelude to new elec-
tions. In order to make known French opinion of the governmental issue, 
the Assembly should vote to dissolve itself and go to the people. As early 
as May 16, 1871, the Times, fearing that Ohambord would prolong the insta-
bili ty of France and reproduce the errors of Charles X, advocated the sum-
moning of another Assembly, as th~ Versailles Assembly was without juris-
diction to deal with the constitutional problem.41 The Morning Post 
.39Ed.itorial in Times (London), July 10, 1871. 
40nchronicle of the Week," Tablet, VI, 35. 
41Ed.itorial in Times (London), llq 16, 1871. 
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contended that the Assembly had no power to settle definitively the future 
form of government as it had been elected solely for the ratification of 
peace terms.42 Even the conservative Standard realized the folly of de• 
nying to the French people the right to decide for itself its form of 
government. The Versailles Assembly had finished the work for which it 
was convoked, and it should now prepare the way for the election to a 
constituent assembly.43 The Daily Telegraph agreed that the Assembly 
did not represent France. Indeed, it charged: 
It is absurd to imagine that in February the Republican Government 
invited France to elect a Constituent Assembly charged with the 
duty of destroying that very de facto power which called it into 
existence.44 · 
While Thiers was occupied with the task of paying off the indem-
nity and of reconstructing the fabric of government shattered b,y war and 
revolution, the majority in the Assembly were vainly endeavoring to bring 
the Count of Chambord to some declaration which would enable them to pre-
sent him to France as a constitutional monarch. But Henry V opposed these 
efforts until the by-elections finally compelled him to make known his posi .. 
tion. On July 6, he issued a manifesto to the French people declaring his 
willingness to uphold public liberties, universal suffrage, and religious 
toleration, but he insisted that he would be unable to return unless they 
were willing to accept the White Flag. The resolution to insist on the 
restoration of the White Flag was taken in the teeth of the majority of 
his own party, who realized that it would alienate the majority of the 
42Kditorial in Morning Post (London), June 5, 1871. 
43Edi torial in Standard (London), June 7, 1871. 
4.4zditorial. in pailx Telegraph (London), August 2!J, 1871. 
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citizenry. The decision to unfurl the Bourbon standard gave hope to :the 
opposition. The restoration or monarchy, which seemed so probable, suf-
fered another serious blow. The English press, already opposed to the 
pretension or the Legitimists, was convinced that the cause ot a moderate 
republic, confirmed in the by-elections, had been decidedly strengthened 
by the blindness or the Count or Chambord. The DailY News, tor example, 
declared that hia pronouncement ought to be worth a good many elections 
to the cause ot the Republic; this journal observed that phrase-turning 
was a dangerous art in unskilled hands and that the Count ot Chambord 
was anything but a master ot the cratt.45 The Times, discussing his 
statement, contended that the bubble ot a Legitimist restoration had burst. 
The French, craving peace and order, were unwilling to tie themselves to 
a regime which threatened to draw them into war on behalf ot the tempor-
al power.46 Accordingly, the Saturda.y Review indicated that the Bourbons 
had made a terrible blunder and that monarchy had been discredited by his 
tolly.47 The chief beneficiary of Chambord's circular was, in the eyes 
ot Englishmen, the Republic rather than the Legitimists. 
At the end or the year, the prospects for a restoration seemed as 
remote as ever. Although the Bonapartists emerged from their temporary 
obscurity, the b,ywelections indicated that the tide or popular opinion 
had turned in tavor of the republicans. In the meantime, Thiers had cor-
rectly gauged the course or events at home and showed a disposition to 
45Ecfitorial in Daib' Bewa (London), July 10, 1871. 
46Ed.itorial in Times (London), July 10, 1871. 
47"The White Flag,"' §atwj.v Review, XXXII (July 15, 1871), 68-
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separate himself from the conservati'Ve majority. He lost little time in 
declaring that the Republic was the only al ternati Te to war, and b;r the 
end of the ;rear, he announced without any equiTocation for the Republic. 
British opinion concluded that the monarchists had weakened be-
fore the vigorous upsurge of republicanism and tended to agree more and 
more with the position of Thiers. The Inglish maintained that a repu'boot 
lie of the moderate type, pro'Viding it could find enough republicans to 
uphold it, would be the best goYermaent for France. A republic would 
least likel;r push France into ciTU war and, at the same time, would 
develop in Frenchmen those political qualities which are neceaaar;r to 
sound gOTernm.ent. John Stuart 11111, observing with delight the electoral 
returns from the French provinces, concluded that th~ peasantry of France 
were becoming republican out of the dislike of clerical education. 48 The 
The lconomist editor, Walter Bagehat, declared that "•· Thiers is not 
only the best choice but the onl:r choice.a49 The Times, observing how 
the French electorate was choosing republicans to fill vacancies, contin-
ued to call for the dissolution or the National Aaseabl;r.5° The ~ 
!!!I predicted that a restoration would lead to civil war; it contended 
that the moderate republic advocated by' Gambetta would be a happy solu-
tion in commemoration of the fall of the Bastille.51 While admitting 
that the Republic faced grave difficulties, the Westminster Re'View 
4\etters of John Richard Qr!en, P• .349. 
49 2l St. John-stevas, p. 9. 
~itorial in Iie.! (London), July 3, 1872. 
51Editorial in DailY News (Lcmdon, Jul;r 16, 1872. 
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believed with Thiers that the Republic was the form of government which 
least divided the countr.y. Until the dissolution of the National Assem-
bly brought about the definitive establishment of the Republic; the rule 
of Thiera was a necessity.52 Likewise, another liberal organ, the 
'Jpminer, observed with pleasure the development of republicanism in the 
face of aristocratic and clerical reaction. The Republic was daily gain-
ing more acceptance by the masses of the peasantry, who, at last, had 
come to recognize their true interest. The suppre•aion of. the Commune 
and Thiers' success in pqing the indemnity had given prestige to the 
Republic. 53 Impressed by the growing popularity of the Republic, the 
Saturday Rertew observed that the wise and temperate leadership of 
Thiera, with his support of moderate republicanism, was more representa-
tive of the countey than was the National Assembly.54 The ultimate form 
ot government for France, monarchy or republic, according to the Spectator, 
was good or bad only as it refiected the will of the majority. As the 
people accepted the Republic, this journal cautiously followed suit.55 
Regardless of the turn of events in France, the Right continued 
to work for a restoration. Under these circumstances and as long as the 
monarchists still held the upper hand in the National Assembly, there 
could be no certainty that the Republic would more than fill a gap until 
52trrance: Her Position and Prospects,• Westminster Beview, XCVIII 
(October 1, 1872), 414. 
53tThe Democratic Revival in France,• 'J!udner quoted in Littell's 
Living Age, CIVI (August 24, 1872), 510. 
394. 
54trrance, • SaturdaY Review, IIXIV (September 14, 1872), 331. 
5511)(. Thiers' Fordgn Policy,• Spectator, :n.v (March 30, 1872), 
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the forces on the Right tused their interest and restored the old order. 
With the resurgence in 1872 or the Bou.partist part7, together with the 
traditional French disposition to endorse strong leadership, there were 
I 
serious obstacles in the path of the onward march of the Lett. As long 
as there remained these difficulties in the path of the Republic, the 
Inglish could not but regard the seeming spasmodic efforts of the fol-
lowers or Gambetta with considerable pessimism. In the absence ot &n1 
historical precedent, tew Bnglishmen ware able to toresee the progressive 
development ot democracy. Philip Haaerton, a close student ot French 
affairs, speaking ot the Bngliah treatment of the French passage from 
absolutism to liberty, observed a 
They refused to see anything natural or regular in the remarkable 
process that was going on before their eyes, and perceived onl7 a 
series of accidents combined with spasmodic human efforts in one 
direction or another. The7 did not discern that through the acci-
dents and the effects, a great natural force was acting with real 
though not alwqs visible constancy, the same force which had 
abolished absolutism in lngland itaelt~6and produced the great e~ periment in representative gover.ament.~ 
John Morley, while vowing his love ot the French people and his faith in 
popular institutions, had little hope in French political maturity. On 
January 10, 1872, he predicted that the Assembly at Versailles would 
"vote a rotten monarchy betore the year is out.tt5.7 'lUter Bagehot, an 
authority on constitutional histo17, realized that the success or a re-
public in France was complicated by' peculiar circumstances. 
First the -trial or a speciall7 Parliamentary Republic is made in a 
56philip G. Hamerton, French end lndiaha A Compvison (Londona 
Macmillan & Co., 1889), p. 104. 
57Hirst, I, 209. 
nation which has, to the least or it, no peculiar aptitude tor 
ParliameBtary Government; which haa possibly a peculiar inaptitude 
tor it.5 
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A rational and coapromising approach was necessary in order to make a re-
public work, and these conditions were lacking in France. 
The Assembly now sitting at Versailles is undoubtedly, at times, most 
tu.multous, and a Parli81D8ntary gcmtmment in which it governs must be 
under a peculiar difficulty, because as a sovereign it is unstable, 
capricious, and unru1r. S9 · 
In addition, there were other difficulties which made one pessimistic about 
the future ot the Republic. 
The French, as a nation, do not care tor or appreciate Parliamentary 
goYernment •••• How mch more easy to uneducated men is loyalty to 
a monarch. • • • The French peasant cares more tor standi~g well with 
his present pretet than tor a.D1'"thing else whateYer; he is tar too ig-
norant to check and watch his Parliament, and tar too timid to think 
ot doing either it the executiYe authority nearest to him does not 
like it. The experiment or a Strictly Parli81D8ntary Republic ·- ot 
a Republic where the Parliament appoints the executiYe -- is being 
tried in France at an extreme disadvantage, because in France a 
Parliament is unusually likelr to be bad, and unusually likely also 
to be tree enough to show its badaess.60 
These pessimistic assertions on the complications besetting the Republic 
were reflected in a study by Henry Reeve, the editor or the ldinburgh 
Re'Yiew. The book, entitled Ronl and R!oublican France, saw little hope 
tor a settled government in France. -rothing has occurred,• he wrote in 
March, 1872, •to give stability or legal authority to the institutions or 
France. The future form ot those institutions is itself completely dart.w61 
Blackwood' 1 noted that the chances tor a republic were improYed, but had 
58st. J ohn-stevas, p. 217. 
59nM. 
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little tai th in the permanent success ot the Republic; it believed 
that should the Assembly respond in that direction, the chances tor a 
rO)"al restoration would be increased. Once the republicans had attained 
power, they would proceed to suppress each other. Then would come the 
inevitable monarchical reaction, the consequence or all republican ex-
cesses.62 In another article, it blamed the situation in France on the 
intellectural malady or the time, which ignored historical :usages., habit~ 
and sentiments in favor ot new ideas and theories. The departure from 
established practice and precedent, like French republicanism, was ua-
natural and inconsistent with progressive national development.63 
On the other hand, there were some Englishmen, especially conserva-
tives and Catholics, who, in spite ot the. tendency or Frenchmen to return 
republicans to the National Assembly, continued to regard a restoration 
as the best answer to the constitutional issue. The cause or religion, ot 
law, and or orderly government could never be secure under a government 
which was swayed by the passionate oratory ot Gambetta and the unruly mobs 
ot Paris. Only a monarchy, rooted in the history ot the nation, could pro-
vide the direction needed to keep France tree from the temptation or radi• 
calism and anti-clericalism. The Dublin Review, tor instance, argued that 
the mass ot the nation yearned tor a just and firm monarchy, instead or a 
disorderly assembly in which •the minority governs the majority.•64 It 
62
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called upon the Count of Chambord to put aside philosophical reservations, 
such as the demand that he must return with the White Flag. Rather, he 
should take advantage of his opportunity, adopting as his policy the 
Jesuit maxim to •pray as if everything depended on prayer, and act as if 
everything depended on action. u65 After all, his enemies were 
only the purblind rabble of two or three towns suffering from con-
gestion and corruption of modern civilization, led by a crew of 
black-leg ggrristers, lewd public writers, and cosmopolitan con-
spirators. 
In reply to the ~' which declared the National Assembly to be decrepit, 
the Tablet asserted that justice was on the side of the Right, and that 
Englishmen were blinded by their hatred of Catholicism. 
We do not profess to know all that the Right may look forward to in 
the end. All that is necessary to know at present is, that the Right 
is struggling for constitutional government, for ministerial responsi-
bility, for religious liberty, for public decency and order. And how-
ever a wild prejudice against everything that is associated with the 
reputation of Catholic faith may continue to blind the eyes of ~ 
of our country men, we believe that no small proportion of English-
men already see what are the great issues at stake in the contest at 
Versailles. The Right has only beWfl its work. It has conquered so 
far, and will conquer yet further. 
Even the Paris correspondent for the Times, Blowitz, who had earlier favored 
Thiers, began in November of 1S72 to mdertake a vigorous campaign on be-
half of a royalist restoration. His monarchist sympathies, however, did 
not meet with the approval of the editorialists of the Times. 68 Also, 
65Ibid., p. 175. 
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Affairs, lS'll-1903" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, 
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British novelist, Lord Lytton, in December, 1871, expressed his prefer-
ence f'or a constitutional monarchJ. 
I believe that, like the Romans, the onlJ thing lef't f'or the French 
is .autocracJ in some shape or other. It is laughable to imagine 
either a Republic or a Constitutional KonarchJ taking root in the 
shallow layer of' hothouse dr.y le~ and f'ine loam and the refuse 
of' the stables. I know a little of' the Due d 1Aumale and the Count 
de Paris. The last is, to rq mind, the beau-ideal of' a popular 
Constitutional Monarch. • • • It is idle to talk of' anyone being 
President of' a Republic in which there are no republicans, except 
prigs and favorites. 69 
Although the Prince of' Wales promoted Anglo-French friendship and poe-
sessed a deep attachment f'or many Frenchmen, he was only able to recon• 
cile himself' to republicanism •atter a severe inward struggle.•7° As 
his social attachments were with the Legitimists and Bonapartist pretend-
ers, it is not surprising that he looked forward to the time when the 
monarch1 would be reinstated. On a visit to Paris in March, 1872, he 
was requested by Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, to pay Thiers a 
formal call. Although he assented to the visit, he noted that it lt:nnt 
ver.r much against the grain.•71 The meeting went of'f' well, but it was 
onl1 af'ter the failure of' llacJiahon in 1877 that he became reconciled to 
the Republic.72 
Amidst the struggle f'or power between the Right and the Lef't, 
the Bonapartists gradually emerged f'roa obscuritJ. Indeed, in 1872, 
there were active plans to smuggle Napoleon into France. So advanced 
was this scheme that plans for a shadow cabinet were drawn up and rumors 
69Lytton, Lite of' Edward Bu1nr, II, 480. 
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spread of a plot to seize Thiers.73 Although the Imperialists were 
scarcely represented in the attempt to promote political liberty, they 
held out the hope ot public order and tranquil! ty. Under the circum-
stances, they were willing to excuse Napoleon's role in the debacle of 
Sedan and to sacrifice much in order- tO. acllieve the vigorous maintenance 
of stability. 
These events led many EngliShmen to despair tor the safety or 
the Republic. Seemingly, it was only a matter of time before Frenchmen 
would rally behind the ex-lmperor and resume their traditional form of 
government. lor example, John Morley, who was deeply concerned with the 
seemingly futile struggle between the Right and the Lett, observed, in 
a letter to Frederic Harrison, on January 5, 1872, following a visit to 
France, that he had looked in vain tor a sign ot political stability 
among the people. 
They are children, children, children -- as graceful and full ot de-
light, and as little sensible. At this moment they would accept a 
monster like Bonaparte I, it such a creature should get his toot on 
them. However, you insist they are the great organ or progress 1Q 
the universe -- so I'll not go on in a vein that displeases you.74 
In another letter later in the year, this champion ot British liberty 
passed strictures upon Thiers, believing that he would have to move 
quickly to avert the abandomaent of republicanism. 75 According to Lord 
Lyons, the acute British Ambassador to France, it the Imperialists could 
by any means have seized upon the executive government and so directed 
73 David Thompson, Democr c Fr ce: the Third and Fourth 
Republica (3d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 84. 
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the operations of a plebiscite, there was little doubt as to their se-
curing the usual victory. "Many people," he noted, "expect to hear any 
morning of a coup by which Thiers and the Assembly will be deposed, and 
an appel au peuple, made to end in a restoration of the Empire.tt76 On 
March 5, 1872, he wrote to Lord Granville: "The present Government ot 
France does not gain strength; far from it. The Imperialists are gaining 
strength, as people become more and more afraid of the Reds.tt77 In spite 
ot the vacillation and weakness of Thiers 1 government, the Spectator did 
, 
not believe in the real possibility ot a coup d'etat; it maintained, 
nevertheless, that Inglish opinion had resigned itself to a Bonapartist 
coup. 
The National Assembly is given to 'rows.' Consequently, personal 
government will, within a month or so, be re-established in France. 
That seems to be the general conclusion or the British public as to 
the state of affairs across the Channel, and it is worth while to 
inquire for a moment if it rests upon any ground more solid than 
the ex;Seme English dislike for exhibitions of temper by politi-
cians. 
The Times agreed with this estimate and declared: 
The Republic is taking no root in the land. It does not grow in 
strength of favor, for of all parties or shades of parties in 
France the very weakest is that which professes Republicanism. • • • 
Sooner or later, according to the convictions of all, a change must 
come, and then what will be the chance of the young Na~gleon, whose 
birthd81 was celebrated last Saturdar on English soil?79 
While on the whole English opinion remained faithful to the Re-
public, the French government was nevertheless concerned with the atten-
tion bestowed upon the exiled ruler at Chislehurst. Thiers, who was 
7~ewton, II, 21. 
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fearful of the Bonapartist threat in late 1871 and 1872, intimated that 
British consideration for Napoleon III should be tempered b,y a due re• 
spect for the recognized government of France. Lord Lrons reported to 
Lord Granville on Februar,y 9, 1872, that "Thiers had censured the visit 
of General Wood with 600 troops to Chislehurst to be reviewed br the 
Emperor Napoleon.n80 On another occasion, Broglie, French Ambassador to 
England, made a protest to Lord Granville with regard to the attendance 
of the Emperor and Empress at Buckingham Palace. He felt that the pres-
ence or the Emperor on so public an occasion "would produce considerable 
effect, not upon Statesmen, but upon the press in France.n81 Aside from 
these social amenities due to a person of Napoleon's fame, English opinion 
remained indifferent to his political cause. Ladr Eastlake told her 
French friends, who believed Napoleon was a great political favorite in 
England, that it was "tout au contraire.n82 
On the other hand, on the death of Napoleon in January, 1873, 
the English public was nearly unanimous in its sorrow. The Daily News, 
in appraising English opinion, declared: "Apart altogether from his poli-
tical position and his relation to French politics, the late Emperor was 
of late rears exceedingly popular in England.n83 Speaking of the depth 
of English feeling, the Times asserteds "Since the death of the Prince 
Consort no event has produced so pro£ound a feeling of sorrow in the citr 
~ewton, n' 21-22. 
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ot London. tt84 Albert Dicey, who was distraught with the gushing emotion 
of the press, maintained that ingenuous eulogies over Napoleon were 
equally apparent in the conservative and liberal organs. 85 To be sure, 
much of this s.ympathy was not merely the public condolence for a fallen 
hero, but extended considerable praise on the fallen leader's beneficent 
rule. The DailY Telegraph, for example, eulogized: 
To others he was, perhaps, perjurer, usurper, despot -- what-
ever Paris, in her suffering, bitterly says; but to us he was guest 
and rural gentleman in these latter days -- placid, grateful, and 
fairminded in his prodigious adversity. • • • Let us recall the 
many testimonies of his fidelity to friends, his kindness of heart 
his dignity, his patience, and his silence under unjust calumnies. A6 
The Morp1ng Post credited him not only with friendly feeling for England, 
but, also, with bestowing on France proaperity and a cultural nourishing.~ 
The Tilles was equally generous in its appraisal of his career, praising 
. 88 his enlightened commercial ideas, his foreign policy, and his courage. 
While practically all England paid tribute to the ex-Emperor, the 
Fortnightly Review published an article in protest of this moral weakness, 
claiming that the praise of Napoleon was unjust and contemptible. 
We now show our love for truth b.Y heaping eulogies on a despot whose 
career we have ourselves, time after time, pronounced utterly base, 
and b.f fearing to utter a word which may cast a slur upon a dead 
Emperor. • • • I have written to protest the sentiments of the liv-
ing rather than to revile the character of the dead. But if I am 
to think de mortuis at all, my thoughts turn, not to the dead Emperor, 
84Editorial in Times (London), January 10, 1873. 
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but to his dead 'Victims .... to the 'lmarmed citizens massacred at 
Paris, to the hundreds who rotted away at Cayenne, to the 
thousands of Germans and Frenchmen who perished on the battle-
fields of France and to the _great countr.r which he has brought 
to the 'Ver.r brink of death.~ 
Dicey explained these sentiments for Napoleon on the basis of the 
lSS 
Emperor's diplomacy, his hospitality to Englishmen, and his Treaty ot 
Commerce with Britain. 90 Yet basically lngland' s affections were guided 
b.f rather sordid moti'Ves and material interests. -rhe whole and sole 
cause of our admiration for Louis Napoleon is that the Stock Exchange 
and cockneys consider him to ha'Ve been their friend.n9l These 'View• 
were supported by an article by Edward Freeman, who, like Dicey, was 
disturbed with the public acquiescence in praise or Napoleon III. 
The fact which shows that we are less keen than we ought to be in 
taking in the moral wickedness or public crimes is that the great• 
eat public criminals of our age, one of the greatest public crimi-
nals of any age, has bci>th in our own countr.r and elsewhere, met 
with far more honor than of moral reprobation. • • • Unless history 
is to become a record of lies, unless the 'Voice or God within us is 
to pass unheard, our rule must be, not 1De mortuia nil nisi bonum;' 
but 'De 'Vinntibus et de morty!s nil nisi Terwa. •92 
Regardless of the friendly position ot the English press in regards to 
the death or Napoleon, one should not attach to it 'Ver,y much political 
significance.93 
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The Overthrow of Thiers and the Establishment of the Septennate 
The pretense of collaboration between Thiers and the Assembly 
deteriorated rapidly throughout 1872. With nearly all the b,y-elections 
going in favor of the Lett, and with the opposition bent on regulating 
the President's right to debate, Thiers declared that the restoration 
ot national vigor, order, and cont1dence was complete, as the success 
of the loan had proved; he called upon Franca to set aside the Pact of 
Bordeaux and to give France a definitive form of government. The con-
viction arose that it the monarchy was to be restored, it would be in 
spite of, and not with the aid or, the President. It was evident to 
the monarchists-that Thiers must either be subjugated or driven from 
power. So, attar two fears of halt-concealed strife, the majority in 
the Assembly determined to measure its strength with Thiers. The declara-
tions of the latter in favor of the Republic, together with the electoral 
victories of the Lett, admonished· the royalists that they had no time to 
lose. Unprepared as ·they were w1 th any definite scheme which would satis-
, 
ty at once the Legitimists and Orleanists, they hoped so to retard the 
progress of events that, once Thiers was driven from power, to safely 
and quietly arrange a restoration. In May, 1873, Thiers was defeated 
upon a vote of no confidence; he resigned his office of President, and 
MacMahon, an avowed royalist, was immediately appointed his successor. 
Marshal MacMahon, being unfit himself to exercise political power, 
the greatest influence in the state fell to the liberal monarchist, the 
Due de Broglie. The monarchist coalition had gained their first point. 
They had the command of the army, the civil bureaucracy, the magistracy, 
and the Assembly. With such means, a restoration might be implemented. 
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No opposition was to be teared from the Marshal, who had long sened an 
Empire, and who was an ardent Catholic. The officers or the army, the 
judges, and the civil senants were "secured" by a rapid process ef 
purgation. Scarcely a single person holding republican opinions was 
retained in the serYice or the state three months after the eventfUl 
coup of May. 
England regarded the resignation or Thiers and the ascendancy of 
MacMahon with great interest. In spite or France's defeat and exhaustion, 
its attraction remained undiminished. The Kulturkampf and the general 
shift in the political gravity of Europe to Berlin rivaled but did not 
equal the unceasing interest of Englishmen in the political history of 
France.94 The~ remarked that France would learn without surprise 
that the substitution of Maclahon for Thiers had stirred both the politi-
cal sense and the moral sentiments or England. 95 Indeed, the Saturda:r 
Review maintained that domestic politics in England would be affected by 
the ouster of Thiers. 
Nothing could be more unfortunate for Liberal candidates in England 
than any sudden change of things in France which should bring the 
extreme section of Radical politicians into power •••• On the 
other hand, it during the next twelve months the French consena-
tives abuse their power, and are guilty or glaring acts or tyr&nn1, 
or copy the worst acts of the Old Imperial Government, the effect 
may be to produce a reaction in England and to awaken a ~athy 
tor French Liber8l.s which will aid the Liberal party here. 9 
94"France and Its Government," Westminster Review, C (July 1, 
18'73), 174. 
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Bng1ish public opinion was cast into deep gloom by the downfall 
of Thiers. It seemed obvious that reactionaries were about to thrust 
France into a civil war. Only trouble and chaos awaited the French • 
., 
Charles Gavard, the French Attache to England, for example, wrote on 
May 26: "I have just returned from the levee. Every one is surprised 
that Paris has not been sacked.tt97 According to Blackwood's, the news 
of the establishment of MacMahon's government "provoked such a chorus of 
forebodings that it is difficult to look back to them now without a 
smile.•98 Lady William Russell, surveying the confused political hori-
zona, was unable to chart a future course for France. 
Aggrieved at the Blood she has shed these last years 
See France in the Broglie and now dropping Thiers. 
Will she wipe her wet eyes with red Liberty's Cap? 
Or bow her neck low and again 'take a Nap?' 
By an Orleans Prince could her downfall be staged 
As it was in Times past by the Orleans maid? 
Will she add to the list of Bourbons once more? 
And encircle with Lilies the throne for Chambord? 
Meanwhile .... till she settles what fiddle to play on 
Vive 1 1Arme~! et vive Daddy llacllahon!1!99 
Aside from the original shock and the attending uncertainty and 
foreboding, English opinion, which had looked with favor on Thiers, ac-
cused the new regime or undertaking to war on freedom and democracy in 
the race or a hostile country. The French Republic represented the 
national will, and the elevation of llacllahon foreshadowed a return to 
despotism. The vote or the French Assembly on May 24 was nothing less 
97 Gavard, p. 132 
98nRepublic or Monarchy in France," Blackwood's Magazine, CIIV 
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than a monarchical conspiracy, which was unlikely to succeed because of 
the hostility of the country and the jealousy of the pretenders. The 
Times, for instance, contended that the question was not between con-
servatives and radicals, but a monarchy and a republic, and that experi-
ments in monarchy in France had proved a failure and so would another. 
The only sate course was for France to embrace a republic, as the Right 
had long lost the respect or the nation.l00 The Daily News asserted 
that it would be difficult to condemn too severely the selfishness of 
the faction which had engineered the attack on the Republic, long ac• 
cepted by the country. The aim of the junta was to restore a reaction• 
ary monarchy which had brought so much disaster already, and which had 
been repeatedly repudiated.lOl The parliamentary coup d t etat, in the 
estimation of the Westminster Review, was a plot to extirpate radical-
ism and to dictate, despite a trend in the opposite direction, a con• 
servative program. •we have seen that their avowed object is not to 
train France to govern herself, but to impress upon the French people 
that they must do as they are bid.nl02 The Saturdar Review, which had 
accepted Thiers' program or conservative republicanism, believed that 
the ouster of Thiers was more than a conservative reaction. It was an 
unwise monarchical conspiracy, which would alienate the republicans 
without e~fecting a royalist restoration.103 Gladstone called the ef-
forts or the Count or Chambord to effect a restoration of monarchy •a 
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grand conspiracy against liberty. •104 Mrs. Augustus Craven, an English-
woman living in France, found that several of her English acquaintances 
held a similar view. 
I dined at the English Embassy on Tuesday, and met a number of 
acquaintances of whose presence in Paris I was ignorant - Mr. and 
Mrs. Ellis, Lady K. Beaumont, Lady Louisa Mills, Lady Wharncliffe, 
Mr. French, and manr others, not one of them seemingly having got 
hold of any other view than that of our ingratitude to Mr. Thiers1 
I hate his being held cheap now, and turned into ridicule, but if 
what the Assembly has done is ungratetul, then it is ungrateful t8 jump out of a carriage that is being pulled towards a precipice. 5 
The schemings of the Right were obnoxious to Bri tishers for sever-
a1 reasons. Englishmen, as we have already seen, had come to belien, aa 
a result of the by-elections, that French opinion favored the Republic, 
and that a dissolution would substantiate the liberal tendencies of the 
French electorate. According to the Westminster Review, the mission to 
convert France to conservatism, which resulted in the resignation of Thiers, 
could never surmount the obstacles of' internal division within the con-
servative camp, the honesty of' llaollahon, and, most important, the avowed 
preference of the French people for republican government. Without the 
abandonment of all moral scruples, it would be unable to establish a 
definitive monarchy.106 The Spectator declared that under a divine right 
monarchy France could not enjoy stability or good government. Not only 
was the coup contrary to French public opinion, but it was fraught with 
10"-
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danger to public order.l07 The French, according to the Fortnightl:r, 
were prepared to set aside law and justice, to disregard political 
morality, to use the army to maintain their despotism, and, if neces-
sary, to plunge France into civil war. 
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They intend to force themselves upon the nation, they believe they 
can keep themselves upon the nation, they believe they can keep 
themselves seated on its neck, they avow no interest but those of 
themselves and their order, and they exult in the hope of revolts 
and massacres. There is no fo~ of lying, treachery, and fraud 
which they have not mastered.10 
It was not only the threat that France would suffer the blood-
letting of internal strife that led Englishmen to condemn the Right, 
but also, the good sense and moderation of the Left in the face of at-
tack. Britishers were pleased to see the rise of a liberal opposition 
led by statesmen urging patience and order and the rejection of the 
barricades. The self-restraint and caution urged by Gambetta on his 
followers was regarded as a healthy novelty. The !!!!J, for example, 
declared that the radical leaders proposed to their followers a parlia-
mentary victory to be won by parliamentary methods. If the Gambettists 
adhered to their opportunistic and cautious policy, they would not fail 
to be justified in the eyes of world opinion.l09 The Saturdv Review, 
likewise, advised the Left to continue to use caution so as not to pro-
vide a pretext for a military dictatorship.110 
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Further reason for England's criticism or the French royalists 
was the belief that a restoration would produce complications in 
European affairs. As France had historically befriended the papacy, 
and as the reactionary regime or MacMahon was supported by the Church, 
there loomed the possibility or a rupture in the relations between 
France and Italy, and possibly, France and Germany. The Italian govern-
ment had not normalized relations with the Roman Church, and as it was 
eagaged in a crucial battle with its clergy, any impulsive and irritat• 
ing move by a restored monarchy would shatter the peace or Europe. On 
the other hand, the German Empire, at the time, was carrying on a deter--
mined struggle with the Catholic Church, and Bismarck's animosity was 
assured for any French government which was controlled b.1 the ultramon-
tanes. 
Meanwhile, France was the scene or extraordinary religious en-
thusiasm. Stories or religious miracles and visitations to the most 
holy shrines were increased many times. This outburst was not confined 
to the masses, for the French Assembly voted to permit the erection of 
a church in Paris for the expiation or the sins of the Commune, and it 
solemnly consecrated France to the •Most Sacred Heart of Jesus.• The 
French clericals, encouraged by the revival of Catholicism after the 
war, had been urging a more adventurous policy. Calling attention to 
France's historical protection of the secular power of the papacy, the 
clergy demanded a crusade oD behalf or the pope. 
, 
Abbe Michaud, writing 
in the Contemporary Review, declaredJ 
At the present day when a priest ascends the pulpit it is neither 
to teach dogma nor morality but to speak politics. The bishops 
scarcely use the pen except to write pamphlets filled with 
allusions and intentions of a political nature. It is known by 
all the world that ultramontanism in reality is but an electoral 
maneuver; that the miracles of these last months were only means 
to bring the Count de Chambord to the throne; that the public 
prayers in the ultramontane churches were only imprecations 
against the Revolution and the Republic; that the altar as well 
as the vestry was only a ballot-box tor political elections,lll 
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In spite of the clerical slant of the new government, France's 
foreign policy remained unchanged. To do otherwise would have meant to 
antagonize not only Italy, but Germany as well. To please Bismarck was 
not a great political asset in France, but to irritate the Iron Chancel-
lor was, indeed, a great handicap. Yet the fall of Thiers proved an un• 
welcome move to Italy and Germamy, Despite a few disagreements, the 
former had reached an uaderstanding with Thiers, but the accession of 
llacMahoa, who openly avowed his monarchical sympathies, seriously strained 
Franco-Italian relations. Bismarck clearly was opposed to the planned 
restoration ot a monarchy in France, because he teared it would be best 
able to conduct a revanche policy, Also, he teared that the Marshal, a 
captive to the forces ot militarism and clericalism, would be led to sup-
port the papacy against Italy and the forces resisting the Kulturkampt. 
Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador to Berlin, observed: 
In short, he views with apprehension the clearing of the horizon in 
favor of a probable return of the Monarchy in France; and, thanks 
to the gossip of the Press, to the inopportune and indiscreet com-
ments • • • he is under the impression that the Comte de Chambord, 
it he did ascend the throne, would before all adopt a Pope-ridden 
and religious policy of reaction, etc,ll2 
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The fears of Europe of the consequences of a monarchical restoration 
were given credence b,y Thiers when he expressed alarm at the indiscre-
tiona of the reactionary press. Broglie declared: 
But how could people, nay, the best disposed, help being seriously 
alarmed at the rumour of that Clerical peril, re-echoed as it was 
on every side; how could they help being alarmed when they beheld 
one or the principle authors of the Education Bill of 1850, and 
the erstwhile accredited champion of the temporal power of the 
Papacy, namely, M. Thiers, profess to share the general emotion 
to such an extent, as to promise in an open letter to resume his 
seat in the Assembly, in order to defend threatened religious 
freedom; how could they help being alarmed, when the most in-
telligent women belonging to the immediate circle of Thiers' 
friends repaired to the public places in the South of France, 
in order to persuade the peasantry that the first act of a re-
stored Monarchy would be the reviving of titles accompanied by 
a law of enforced monthly confession? Finally, in common candor, 
as well as fairness, we are bound to admit that our own monarchi-
cal, but above all our religiout Press caused every now and again 
a good deal of embarrassment.llJ 
The English public, which was desirous to see Europe free from 
war and the speedy recovery of France, echoed the fears of Bismarck and 
Thiers. The Times, for example, thought it easy to understand that the 
accession of a new government in France should be watched attentively 
at Berlin. There was the good possibility that with the ultramontanes 
in power France would not be content to neglect Rome. It refused to 
believe, however, that France would embark on such a suicidal policy.114 
The SaturdaY Review expressed alarm that the cause of Henry V, uniting 
the pretensions of the ultramontanes and the monarchists, would disrupt 
relations between France and Italy and Germany.ll5 A restoration, if 
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possible at all, would, according to the Spectator, not only plunge 
France into civil war but Europe into chaos. The struggle against the 
Republic, in the eyes of Englishmen, was really an ecclesiastical one 
more than a secular one.116 The Fortnightly Review contended: 
It is 'the black International,' the forty thousand priests 
through France, who are moving heaven and earth for the heir 
ot St. Louis, and that not tor the sake of the French throne, 
but rather for the sake of the French Church; not, indeed, tor 
the sake of anything French, but mainly tor the sake of the 
Syllabus, of the prisoner of the Vatican and Obscurantism.ll7 
This clericalism, which would be unable to swa:y the solid mass of 
French laity, many of whom were at heart Voltaireans, was "robbing them 
of sympathy from England, and pledging them to run a sort of devils 
muck against reason and progress everywhere."118 
Not everyone, however, looked with gloom towards the efforts of 
the Right to restore monarchy. Englishmen of a conservative bent or 
sympathetic to the Roman Church were frank in their praise of MacMahon. 
Blackwood's, for example, accused Thiers of destroying the Pact of 
Bordeaux, of leaning toward the Lett and of employing intrigue iJI. order 
to prolong his own rule. The honest, frank, and conservative government 
of MacMahon furnished a great contrast to the slippery and subtle program 
ot its predecessor. The movement of Ma:y 24 served as an effective bar to 
the further progress of radicalism.ll9 The equally conservative Standard 
ll6"Is a Restoration Possible in France?" Spectator, XLVII 
(August 16, 1873), 1031. 
117Frederic Harrison, "Public Affairs," Fortnightly Review, II 
(October 1, 1873), 551. 
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maintained that if the victors were prepared with a definite, intelli· 
gible, and courageous policy, France had been saved from a great danger. 
It only hoped that it was not too late to undo Thierst mischief,l20 The 
Tablet, reflecting Catholic sentiment, contended that under the leader-
ship of Thiers, the situation in France had gradually deteriorated into 
anarchy, Thiers had been elected because of his believed sympathy for 
monarchy, but he had betrayed the trust by facilitating the resurrection 
of the Republic. The Assembly had no recourse but to dismiss him.121 
There is no doubt that the tree trade principles of MacMahon 
softened the impact of the fall of Thiers. The English government at 
the time was engaged in protracted trade negotiations with Thiers, who 
was resisting the free trade stand of his predecessors; therefore, from 
the economic point of view, it was not especially unhappy at Thiers' 
resignation. Robert, Earl of Lytton, Secretary to the British Embassy 
at Paris, observed that he could regret the fall of Thiers, but that •so 
far as English interests were concerned in his fate, Thiers has been be• 
havin.g to us abominably. •122 Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secre-
tary, in a letter to Odo Russell of June 4, 187.3, wrote: "I do not know 
that we have any great cause to regret Thiers. If the present Government 
does not become too clerical, I believe the change will be advantageous 
for France."l2.3 The Saturd&Y Review, although not pleased with the 
12~itorlal in Standard (London), May 26, 187.3. 
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political consequences or Maclahon1s accession, showed considerable enthu-
siasm tor the possible economic advantages accruing from the Broglie min-
istry. As most indications were strong that the new government would 
scrap the protectionist heresy of Thiers, it applauded the triumph of 
a more sensible financial policy.l24 
In spite of elaborate preparations, the intrigue of the Right tell 
asunder. During the summer or 187.3, a committee or nine members or the 
Assembly, representing the monarchist parties, negotiated with the Count 
ot Chambord. Unable to reach an agreement, the monarchist parties 
joined to extend, b,- a narrow margin, MacMahon's authority tor a period 
or seven ,-ears. This decision, arrived at slowly and unwillingly in 
November, 187.3, meant that at least the executive authorit,- would remain 
in the hands or a staunch conservative. It the Right could not restore 
the monarch,- in 187.3, the,- could at least.control the presidenc,- and 
thus prepare an easy transition to the new system at the opportune mo-
ment. 
English public opinion was not happ,- with this maneuver. In 
general, the leading organs or opinion contended that the Septennate 
was an unjustifiable prolongation or the President's term or office, 
and that since the National Assembly did not represent the true senti-
ment of the people, the reactionaries were guilt,- or seeking to make a 
monarch,- without a king. MacMahon was playing the role or a monk tor 
the Count of Chambord. The decision to prolong the authority of MacMahon 
was, according to the Times, an attempt to govern France in the interest 
of a minori t,-. The narrow vote in favor or the Septennate would have 
124ttFrench Finance, • Saturday Review, XXXV (June 14, 187.3), 767. 
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been the other w~ if the vacant seats in the Assembly had been filled.125 
The Daily News labeled the Septennate as a scheme to prepare for an ab-
solute monarchy at a time when the constituencies were pronouncing one 
after the other for the Republic.l26 The Morning Post feared that the 
narrow victory boded ill for the tranquillity of the country. "The Dic-
tator will be the object of conspiracies -- intrigues followed by in-
trigues.nl27 The Septennate, according to the Saturdgy Review, was the 
decree of an unrepresentative Assembly, differing only in degree from 
the des~gn of making France a monarchy.l2S The Pall la11 Gazette, with 
its lofty liberal attitude, took the view that the Assembly was lacking 
in common decency. 
Even as it is presented to the world tod~, it is neither more nor 
less than a demand on the part of a doubtful majority, in an As• 
sembly opposed to the feeling of the country •••• It comes from 
a party still staggering from the overthrow of a baseless intrigue, 
supported by a shameless exertion of arbitrary power. It is ad-
dressed to a powerful minority, threatened not only with parlia-
mentary defeat, ,but with legalized proscription. The possible 
majority that makes this demand enjoys very little public sym-
pathy; the possible minority - which is only rendered a minority 
by the suppression of the elections -- reckons with well-grounded 
confidence on the support of the nation at large.l29 
The Tablet, still unable to rise above the religious implications, pre-
dieted that sooner or later France would come to its senses and restore 
12~itorial in I!m!! (London}, November 7, 1873. 
12~itorial in DailY News (London), November 5, 187.3. 
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Henry V. Unable to hide its disappointment, it acquiesced, like French 
conservatives, in the Septennate, but it remarked somewhat bitterly: 
"The National Assembly has made llarshalllacMahon and can unmake him. The 
Parliamentarians have made nothing secure. They have merely established 
uncertainty and may be preparing anarchy. ttl30 
The Republic had survived this attack of the Bourbons, but it 
still was threatened by the Bonapartists. The elections in the summer 
of 1874, which returned several Bonapartists, led Englishmen, once again, 
to moderate their enthusiasm for the Republic. The uninterrupted repub-
lican victories up to May, 1874, had encouraged confident assertions 
that even the peasants had accepted republicanism, but the elections of 
1874 caused many to declare again that the Republic rested on a weak 
foundation. The Times drew the conclusion that Frenchmen were not pre-
pared for the burden of self-government, and that they were anxious to 
be ruled.131 The Standard, not without some satisfaction, believed that 
the Bonapartist victory was a manifestation of a desire to return to the . 
Empire "as Republicanism was too risky, Henri Cinq impossible, and the 
OrlE(anists without a part,-.•132 J. Cotter Morrison, writing in the 
Fortnightly Review, drew together many of the arguments used to discredit 
belief in the ultimate triumph of the Republic. The divisions in the 
liberal camp, for example, were immense, ranging from conservative re-
publlcanism to the radicalism of the defiant Communards. The notion that 
l3°•The Uncertainty in France," Tablet, X (December 6, 18?3), ?09; 
see also "The Situation in France," Dublin Review, LXXIV (January 18, 18?4), 
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a common ground could be found between the two was too visionary to be 
entertained. 
It seems difficult even to imagine a policy which would satisfy on 
the one hand the rich capitalists of Lyons, Roubaix, Marseilles, 
Lille, and Paris, and on the other hand their more or less social-
ist workmen who regard them as so many robbers fattened on the 
spoilation of the poor.l33 
A further impediment to the success of the Republic was the temperament 
of the people. The volatile and passionate French character made govern-
ment by discussion practically impossible. The bright vivacity and bril-
;' . 
liancy were fine in the cafe, but patience and coolness were required in 
political debate.l34 Another defect in the French character which hindered 
the movement toward democracy was their impatience under a liberal regime 
and their submissiveness under a tyranny. This rendered the leaders, who 
are accused of delaying tactics and deceiving the people, incapable of 
energetic leadership.135 However, the greatest impediment to the consoli-
dation of a French Republic was the breach between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie.136 In addition to the factors already referred to, much was 
made of France's inability to compromise. This characteristic of French 
politics, part of the legacy of the Revolution of 1789, had become roote~ 
in the French mind. The French were not prone to improve the actual sys-
tem, but to replace it entirely with a new one. They distrusted reform; 
they preferred revolution.137 In conclusion, Morrison believed that the 
lllJ. Cotter Morrison, "Is a Republic Possible in France?" 
Fortnightly Review, LXXXIV (July 1, 1874), 3. 
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chances of French republicanism were slim, while the possibilities of a 
dictator were becoming clearer · eveey day. France was still unable to 
-dispense with a strong man.138 Blackwood's Magazine, already convinced 
that the French Republic was an anachronism, frankly acclaimed the vic-
tories of the Imperialists, believing that such a restoration would pro-
vide •those trembling politicians a greater and more solid peace of mind 
than Septennates or Republics can bestow upon them.nl39 The Spectator 
regarded the constant wrangling in the Assembly as presenting an oppor-
tunity for a despot. 
Judge rightly that all delay in settling constitutional principles. 
is telling in favour of the party which places all Constitutions 
at the mercy of a ruler elect~d by a mass vote. It is for Caesarism 
that the Legitimists, the Orleanists, and, we rear, some of the Con-
servative Republicanst.af8• consciously or unconsciously, striving 
with all their might.~ 
Individual testimony supports these pessimistic tones. Lord 
Lytton, who represented England in the Paris Embassy, found French poli-
tics deplorable. The Legitimists lacked initiative and political sense, 
and the Assembly was unpopular and despised. France seemed to be ready 
for a strong man.141 George Eliot believed that a Bonapartist restoration 
was a degrading prospeQt for France and declared that "some form of mili• 
tary despotism must be, as you say, the only solution where no one 
138Ibid., p. 25. 
139"The French Chamber and the Septennate,• Blackwood's Magazine, 
CXVI (December, 1874), 712. 
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political party knows how to behave itself. ttl42 .As late as January 26, 
1875, Lord Lyons, in a letter to his chief, Lord Derby, wrote: 
Bonapartism is still 1n the ascendent, and certainly the Assembly 
is doing everything to give weight to the assertion that France is 
unfit for Parliamentary Government. • • • As I have said all along, 
the dispute is between a very advanced Republic and the Empire. 
In short France is at this moment in a fear of Bonapartism.143 
The hasty assumption that the Republic was headed towards a die-
tatorship was amended somewhat when the Bonapartists failed to maintain 
their electoral triumphs of 1874. English_ opinion, reversing itself, 
pronounced that republicanism had made and was still making steady prog-
ress. For example, the !!!!§ repeated its ott heard contention that a 
dissolution or the Assembly would return a victory for the Republic.144 
The DailY News declared that, if such an election were held, very few or 
the men in power would return.145 After reviewing the history of repub-
licanism in France, the Fortnightt,y Review came to the conclusion that 
republicanism was a very definite possibility as France was blessed with 
a majority of republican sentiment.146 
The Constitution or 1875 
It has been said that the Republic was founded by its enemies. 
14211iot, II, 620. 
14~ewton, II, 66-67. 
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Certainly the continuing inability of the royalists to resolve their dis• 
cords led indirectly to the de jure establishment of the Republic. As 
more and more people abandoned the obstinate Count of Chambord, and as 
Gambetta reassured the middle class with his generous tributes to Thiers, 
the liberal wing of the royalists decided that the only practicable 
course was to collaborate with the republicans. Hence, in early 1875, 
the Right Center, comprising the more advanced and opportunistic of the 
Orleanists and Bonapartists, joined with the Lett Center to make the 
Constitution. The Assembly did not, as in the past, draw up a single 
constitution, declaring the rights of the citizens and defining the fUnc-
tions of the various governmental organizations. The Constitution was 
not one of those logical and precise documents, ringing with general 
principles and absolute arrangements that had so frequently captured 
the French imagination, but was the result of a series of enactments. 
It was the outcome of constant compromises, reluctantly accepted by an 
Assembly that lacked faith in the longevity of their own work. It was 
the handiwork of a disheartened monarchical majority, inspired by a fear 
of urban masses and distrust of the chief executive, who might travel 
the road of Napoleon III. Even then, it satisfied few of its creators. 
It was still a republic without republicans, who accepted it out of 
necessity, not of love. Lord Lyons, speaking of the contradictory deci-
sions and parliamentary confusion leading to the Constitution of 1875, 
wrote on February 26: 
I have spent three afternoons at Versailles and have seen a 
Constitution made there. I have seen also such confusion of parties 
and principles as I hope never to witness again. I found Deeazes,, 
Broglie, and a great number of Right Centre deputies at the 
MacMahons' last evening. They all, and particularly Deeazes, 
looked to me very unhappy, and indeed they did not affect to be 
at all satisfied with the occurrences in the Assembly. Like the 
horse in the fable who invited the man to get on his back, the 
Right Centre have let the Left get on their backs to attack 
Bonapartism, and do not know how to shake them off again.l47 
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The first constitutional enactment came in Januaey in the form 
of the memorable Wallon .Amendment. By the narrowest of margins, 35.3 to 
.352, the Assembly reaffirmed the Republic. In retrospect, the Wallon 
Amendment, which ended the provisional status of the French government, 
appears paradoxical. 
The Republic was founded by a Monarchist assembly with a Right-wing 
President and Government in power, on the motion of a Catholic law-
yer who insisted that he was not asking for the Republic -- and it 
was passed by a majority of one vote, a deadlock being avoided only 
by the late ~ival of one deputy who would have voted against the 
amendment.l4 
Several other separate laws in the spring of 1875 completed the Constitu-
tion. By these measures a congress was established, consisting of two 
chambers, a Senate, comprising .300 members elected by indirect suffrage, 
and a Chamber of Deputies, elected by direct universal suffrage. These 
two bodies, sitting jointly, constituted the National Assembly, which 
elected the President of the Republic. The President, in turn, delegated 
the executive power to a Cabinet, which was responsible to the National 
Assembly. It was virtually the English system of parliamentaey government 
with its ministerial responsibility. The President had almost exactly 
the powers and position of the King in Great Britain. Yet, as the Consti-
tution worked out, it was apparent that the essential feature of the 
British system was lacking. Whereas in England the cabinet generally 
147 Newton, II, 67. 
148rhompson, p. 90. 
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orders a dissolution when there is a disagreement between the executive 
and legislature, in France it was the cabinet that was dissolved. 
In spite of the similarity between the French and the English 
constitutions, Englishmen showed little enthusiasm for the atop-gap 
arrangements of the National Assembly. Like the moderate republicans 
in France, whose cause they most admired, the English generally resigned 
themselves to necessity and awaited the next move. After all, a repu.b-
lic without republicans, while preferable to a monarchy, was not much to 
brag about. It was apparent that Frenchmen themselves were unenthusias-
tic with their projects. The Left and the Right had been forced to coop-
erate out of tear ot the Iuq)erialists, and they were not averse to revis-
ing it at the first opportunity. Considering the circumstances of its 
origin and its conservative nature, it is not surprising that Englishmen 
withheld their unqualified approval. And, as long as the Constitution 
had not b$en tried, practical Bnglisbmen, knowing the deep-rooted feel-
ings of French parties, were willing to await the election results. 
In an article entitled 1English Public Opinion and the French 
!'! ~ Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century, tt llie Halevy wrote that the English 
were indifferent to the evolution of French constitutional forms. 
You expect England to take some interest in so--English, so 1un-French1 
an experiment. In fact it took none at all. Very few we~ those 
who sympathized with the work accomplished b.1 the Assemb1ee Nationa1e.l49 
This assertion, drawn to support his conclusion that British public opin-
ion in regard to French revolutionar,y experiments followed a course ot 
increasing insularity, reveals little except that English opinion, like 
149In Coville, Studies in Ando-lrench History: During the 
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French opinion, accepted it with resignation rather than applause. 
Again, one must repeat the warning not to ascribe too much sig-
nificance to the Constitution. Although the Republic had been given 
legal status, many problems loomed on the horizon. A survey of the 
, 
English press reveals, contrary to Halevy, that, though lacking in en-
thUsiasm for the Constitution, the major organs of opinion continued 
their close observation of the constitutional struggle and believed 
the modus vivendi to be an improvement over the previous situation. 
Liberal and conservative journalists found little difficulty in ac-
quiescing in the latest French developments. The Constitution appealed 
to the latter because in m~ respects it revealed a conscious imitation 
of the British experience of ministerial responsibility and, in other 
respects, a practical compromise between the extreme Right and Left; in 
addition, of course, the ship of state was still piloted by MacMahon and 
his conse1"9'ative friends. The Constitution appealed to liberals because 
it was an obstacle to the Imperialists, and because it ended the provi-
sional character of the government in favor of a legalized regime based 
on a broad suffrage. A.s soon as the National Assembly became republican 
in spirit as well as in name, the whole regime could be overhauled. But, 
as long as the Republic still stood in the shadow of Bonapartism, English 
liberals could not rest assured that their hopes would come to pass.15° 
The liberal Daily News declared that a constitution which would give 
France even a temporary habitation would be better than the vascillator,y 
position she was then in.151 On February 25, the same organ gave due 
l5°Betham-Edwards, Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 25; Evans, p. 91; 
Hamerton, Round MI House, p. 195. · 
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praise to those deputies who showed themselves ready to accept any fair 
and practicable compromise, and it observed that for the time being the 
Constitution had crushed all hopes for a restoration.l52 It was apparent, 
the Times declared, that the fear of the Empire had consolidated the Re-
public, but it felt that it was wise to withhold applause until experience 
had confirmed the promise.l53 Likewise, the Spectator was not enthusiastic 
over the constitutional enactments, but it welcomed these changes as better 
than the previous uncertainty. While criticizing some aspects of the Con-
stitution, they preferred to accept what was obtainable and to point to 
the sacrifice and statesmanship which both parties made for their country. 
However, the dangers confronting France were not yet past. 
There is hope in moderation such as this, and though the danger of 
Bonapartism still remains, and is for the moment very serious, its 
future effect may be like its present - just sufficient to steady 
the march of the founders of the Republic.l54 
The Pall llall Gazette was not as optimistic. It could detect no real 
spirit of compromise among the creators of the Constitution, and, thus, 
it viewed the decision of the Assembly as only a means to check the 
progress of Bonapartism. Until the elections were held, one would be 
wise to accept it as just a piece of paper.l55 The Saturd&Y Review, 
which had tired of the provisional status of the French government, did 
not object to the turn of events which created the Wallon Constitution. 
Not only had the Imperialists suffered a set back, but the disposition 
152Ibid., February 25, 1875. 
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of the National Assembly had taken on a more wholesome aspect.156 From 
the point of' view of' liberal opinion, then, the Constitution was by no 
means perfect, but it was better than a return to monarchy, as it made 
provisions for change. 
The conservative press, headed by Blackwood 1 s and the Standard, 
which had long opposed the definitive establishment of' the Republic, ac-
cepted the consequences of the Constitution or 1S75 because the Republic 
showed indication or following a moderate course. Blackwood's regarded 
the Constitution as a step along the path to conservative democracy and 
wished this compromise solution well.l57 The Standard, with many mis-
givings, saw it as better than a regime led by Gambetta.l5S On the other 
hand, the Dublin Review regretted the fact that French royalists had 
bungled things so badly. Consequently, it leveled a stern rebuke to the 
Bourbons for allowing authority to slip from their hands. The only con• 
solation was that MacMahon was the President of the newly formed govern• 
ment.l59 
English faith in the prospects of the new Constitution was 
strengthened when, in April, 1S75, Gambetta made a conciliatory and mod-
erate speech to his followers in Belleville. This speech was intended 
to show that the Constitution with which the country was legally endowed 
156"The Birth of a Republic," Saturda,y Review, XXXIX (February 27, 
1S75), 265. 
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was consistent with liberal principles and that he would support it. 
He called on his listeners, moat of whom were advanced republicans, to 
acquiesce in the order of things and to give the new Constitution a 
trial. The British press took these remarks up as an indication of the 
republicans. The I!m!§ declared that public opinion liked a moderate 
Republic and that Gambetta'a speech showed that the Republic had no de-
sign to overthrow the Constitution.160 Gambetta's speech, according to 
the Daily News, which hopefully awaited the ascendancy of the republicans, 
merited praise for its forthright acceptance of the Constitution, and for 
its urging the electorate to accept compromise.l61 In the estimation of 
the DailY Telegraph, his language, which was unusual in an address to the 
Belleville radicals, was a statesmanlike and very sensible appeal in favor 
of making the best of the regime.l62 The SaturdaY Rei!!! agreed that 
Gambetta 1s speech showed great foresight and gave hope to the great forces 
of moderation in France.l63 Not satisfied with this cautious appraisal, 
the Spectator, outspoken in its frank liberal position, held that scarce-
ly had they heard a speech uttered in Paris so adroit as that delivered 
by Gambetta. It reflected the changed tone of the republicans and showed 
that even the most extreme elements would listen to common sense.l64 
At last, in early 1S76, the moment arrived when the French people, 
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according to constitutional procedure, made known their will. For five 
years France had been governed by a National Assembly, which had been 
elected in an hour of misfortune to negotiate peace with Germany. Now, 
in 1876, a significant move was made to determine the sentiments of the 
electorate and, at the same time, to implement the Constitution of 1S75. 
As English opinion had been in favor of new elections ever since 
1S71, and as this was the first real opportunity for the Left to grasp 
power since the Government of National Defense, it was natural for the 
press to follow closely the balloting for senators and deputies. The 
~ News noted that the great interest in England in the French elections 
of March 5 was that they were regarded as a final struggle between the Re-
public and its opposition.165 
The elections for the Senate were held on January 20. As the fate 
of the new institutions depended upon a majority in the Senate, the results, 
which proved to be indecisive, were awaited with great impatience. The 
elections gave a slight majority to the Right, but the Left had picked up 
many seats. The !!!!! claimed that the elections were a defeat for the 
Right as the majority of the Senators were men willing to acquiesce in a 
moderate Republic.l66 The DailY News gave the republicans more than their 
due and announced that Gambetta had secured a major victor,r.167 Not going 
quite so far, but obviously pleased with the results, the Spectator main-
tained that the elections indicated that the moderate republicans were the 
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strongest party in the country.168 On the other hand, the more cautious 
and conservative Morning ~ declared the elections to be a plebiscite 
for :UacJ4ahon.169 
In the Chamber of Deputies, where elections were based on univer-
sal suffrage, the outcome was a major victory for the Left. Gambetta's 
policy of moderation won the day against Buffet, the official leader of 
the royalists. English opinion, which long had asserted that France was 
at heart sympathetic to the Republic, declared that the Republic had 
triumphed throughout .the country and that the Marshal should accept the 
decision of the general will. The Daily News was exuberant over the vic-
tory, cautioned the Marshal not to govern without a majority in either 
' Chamber, and called on Buffet to vacate his office in favor of Dul'aure, 
a moderate republican.l70 Unwilling to accept Dufaure, the Spectator 
called on MacMahon to allow Gambetta to form a ministr,y .171 The !!!!!!.! 
was equally pleased and declared that the Republic, in spite of vast 
pressure by the Septennate, had won a complete victory, and that the 
elections proved that the peasants and artisans were without doubt hoe-
tile to any other form of government.l72 The enthusiasm of the pro-
Gambetta Fortnightly exceeded all others. 
The electoral campaign in France, ending in the repulse of 11. Buffet 
and the return of a decisive republican majority, is the most 
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thoroughly s~tisfactory event in Europe since the ruin of the Empire 
at Sedan. It is perhaps the most hopetu.l incident for social prog-
ress ~ince the victory of democraa,r in the United States ten years 
ago.l73 
It is not very surprising to learn that the Standard still backed 
the losing side. Unable to take defeat without scorning the opposition, 
it maintained that, while the conservative Republic had been badly beaten 
all along the line, it was only a temporary victory. There was no funda-
mental shirt in France's capacity for self-government. Gambetta and his 
crew of radicals would soon drag the country into ruin; it had been a 
Republic that had precipitated a Bonapartist restoration.l74 Lord 
, 
Salisbury, writing after the election to Gavard, the French Attache' to 
England, observed: 
You must not judge from the newapapers here, and in especial not 
from the Times, of what British opinion really is on affairs in 
France. There is a lively sympathy felt here for the efforts and 
desperate struggles of the conservatives.l75 
As for Catholic opinion, it took its characteristic stand, which 
meant shutting its eyes to all that displeased it, rationalizing the loss 
of the Right, and vilifying the victors. The Dublin Review expressed 
consternation at the republican ascendancy- in the Chamber of Deputies and 
described with power the terrible consequences which awaited the eldest 
daughter of the Church from •the branded ranks of Liberalism, Socialism 
and Infidelity, against Religion and Society.•l76 The only refuge for 
173"Home and Foreign Affairs," Fortnightly Review, XXV (Febl"U.8.r1, 
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the French ship of state before the hideous storm of atheism was in the 
harbor of Catholicism, the protector of "hearth and altar, the nation 
and the family, society and civilisation and the legitimate rights and 
the prosperity of every Frenchman.•l77 Also, the Month and Catholic Review 
refused to believe that the Assembly returned was representative of the 
true feelings of the nation. France had wrongly believed that the issue 
was to choose between the Marshal and the Republic on one side and a res-
toration of the Bourbons on the other.17S 
The Crisis of 1S77 
The shift in power in the National Assembly from the Right to the 
Left, which was marked by the defeat of Buffet in the elections of 1S76, 
was a source of distress to the Marshal, who owed his position to the con-
servative majority of the defunct National Assembly. MacMahon regarded 
seriously the commission he had received from the Assembly, believing that 
it was his function to postpone the ascendancy of the supposedly dangerous 
spokesman for the Left, Gambetta. Unwilling to accept either Gambetta or 
Thiers, he summoned Du:f'aure to form a ministry. Although the latter, an 
old politician from the Louis-Philippe era, was a man of moderate politi-
cal views, belonging to the bourgeoisie, MacMahon regarded the forming of 
Dufaure's ministry as a significant concession to the opposition. For him 
to accept a ministry headed by a politician of more advanced radicalism 
would be a blow to his pride. 
177 ~., P• 212. 
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Yet before the year was out, the Dufaure ministry, which was much 
occupied with the question of amnesty for the Comnnmards, with the per-
sonnel of the administration, and, especially, with questions respecting 
the privileges of Catholic universities, gave way to a cabinet headed by 
Jules Simon. Simon was a distinguished orator and writer on natural reli-
gion, as well as one of those responsible for the revolution of September 
4. For a time Simon placated MacMahon by promising him control over the 
army, and he conciliated the Church by his ingratiating and diplomatic 
manner. So adroit and smooth was Simon that his opponent, Monseigneur 
Dupanloup, the vigorous Bishop of Orleans, remarked: MHe will beat me 
to a Cardinal's hat. 11 However, looks were deceiving. It was not long 
before France was in the throes of another crisis. 
The crisis developed over the perennial religious issue. Pius II, 
still protesting the unification of Italy, was irritated by the indif-
ference of the rulers of the Eldest Daughter of the Church towards the 
Holy See. In particular, the papacy had been annoyed by the elevation 
ot the French representative to Italy from the level of minister to am-
bassador, and by a vacation taken by Jules Simon in Italy during which 
he accepted the hospitality of the Italian government. Shortly thereafter, 
Pius protested against the Manani Bill, which placed a ban on offensive 
papal propaganda in Italy; he called on the Catholics of the world to urge 
their respective governments to obstruct the passage of the controversial 
legislation. 
Militant French Catholics, already in a state of religious frenzy, 
claiming visions and prophecies and establishing new devotions, rushed in-
to the fray. They circulated a monster petition calling on the President 
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to defend the integrity of the Holy Father. The French clergy, encourag-
ing the agitation, called on mayors to assist the effort. The Left had 
long looked with disfavor on the intervention of the clergy in politics 
and now urged Jules Simon to repel the assault of the ultramontanes. 
When the issue came before the National Assembly, Simon defended the 
action of the Italian government. At the height of the storm, Gambetta 
denounced the intrigues or the prelates in the celebrated words: "Cleri-
calism -- that is the enemy! 11 The Prime Minister felt compelled to re-
buke the bishops, and, when the Chamber passed a resolution condemning 
their "ultramontane activities, tt he accepted it. The Marshal, who had 
been getting more and more uncomfortable concerning Jules Simon's giving 
way in the Chamber of Deputies to the more advanced Left, bided his time 
until May 16, lS'n. Then, taking advantage of several minor pretexts, 
he arbitrarily dismissed Simon and his cabinet, adjourned the Chamber of 
Deputies for a month, and formed a new cabinet under the reactionary Due 
de Broglie. When the Chamber followed this dictatorial action by refus-
ing the new Prime Minister a vote of confidence on June 19, by 363 votes 
to 158, the Marshal thereupon dissolved the Chamber and ordered that new 
elections be held. 
The English, in spite of the growing tension in the Near East, 
maintained a keen interest in French domestic affairs. According to a 
leading editorial writer of the Times, the quarrels between the Fusion-
ists and Thiers, and the struggle between llacMahon and Gambetta, were re-
ported in·English periodicals 
with as much minuteness as the less exciting narrative of our own 
domestic history. Even the danger and excitement or the war be-
tween Russia and Turkey failed to draw English eyes away from the 
battle in France. 14. Thiers, Marshal MacMahon, Due de Broglie, 
M. de Fourtou, M. Buffet, and M. Gambetta are at least as vivid 
figures to ~~lishmen as the secondary personages of our own 
Parliament. I 
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The FortnigAtly Review compared English attention to the electoral cam-
paign of 1877 with the excitement awakened by the Franco-Prussian War.l80 
Reviewing the domestic and foreign events of the year, the Times observed 
that the French crisis, next to the crisis in the East, had occupied sec-
ond place in the thoughts of English poll ticians.181 The Fortnightly, 
commenting early in the agitation, observed that the political crisis of 
1877 overshadowed the events in the East. 
It sounds almost incredible that the outbreak of a war in Europe 
should not be the most absorbing event of the month in which it took 
place. Yet, the incredible is true, and for a week men almost for-
got the conflict in the east, in their amazement and distress at 
what at first seemed to mean the unexpected provocation to new and 
deeper conflicts in the west •••• Yet it is felt, and rightly 
felt, that even with so momentous a crisis as this coming so swift-
ly upon Europe, the sudden throwing aside of the mask by the con-
spirators of reaction in France is an event of the very first im-
portance.l82 
George Eliot, who was accustomed to watching closely affairs across the 
Channel, wrote in a similar vein: 
All France is a subject of grief now, is it not? One reads the 
'Times' with more anxiety about the French question than about the 
Russo-Turkish War. The prospects of our Western civilization seems 
more critically involved in the maintenance of the French Republic 
than in the result of the Bulgarian atruggle.l83 
l79Macdonell, p. 3. 
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Five weeks later, on November 27, she asserted, "Yes! the state of at• 
fairs in France is a grief for all Europe, and many or us here are more 
deeply concerned about it than about the Eastern question.•184 John St. 
Loe Strachey, Who later became the editor of the Spectator, and who was 
a staunch adherent of Gambetta, wrote: "I still remember the excitement 
we all felt over Marshal MacMahon's rather halfwhearted efforts to play 
the part of a General Konk."l85 
There is no doubt that the leaders of advanced liberalism in 
England took a keen interest in the state of affairs in France. As suth, 
they were in frequent communication with the leaders of the Republic. 
Frederic Harrison, always quick to follow French affairs at their source, 
journeyed throughout all part's or the Republic and held frequent converw 
sations with Gambetta and other republicana.l86 Sir Sidney Colvin, who 
habitually took a lively interest in the course of French republicanism,187 
was in communication with Gambetta in his efforts to prevent a monarchi-
cal restoration.188 Joseph Chamberlain, a steady friend of the Republic, 
called upon Gambetta several weeks before the election and was assured 
that unless the Marshal was particularly sanguine that he must "sumettre 
ou s'en aller. 11189 A perennial visitor to France, Grant Duff, watched 
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closely the political crisis through his friendship with Gambetta, Jules 
Simon, and Renan.19° 
The English, viewing the membership of Broglie's cabinet and the 
aggressive attack on republican publications, concluded that the new re-
gime was an attempt to undermine the Republic with a royalist and cleri-
cal policy. While a few Englishmen thought of it as simply a preposter-
ous adventure of a small number of bigoted politicians who would soon 
come to their senses, most people realized that it involved momentous 
issues. They were witnessing the movement which began with 1789. It is 
clear that British opinion believed that the "party of order," represent• 
.,. 
ing Orleanists, Bonapartists, and Bourbonists, and bound together by 
clericalism, had precipitated a crisis in order to smother French demo-
cracy and freedom. The clericals came in for particular abuse. The 
Spectator, for example, linked the clericals with the MacMahonists 1n a 
scheme to slander the republican leaders, to muzzle the press, and to 
intimidate the provinces. "In some of the country districts, the priests 
have told the peasants that their children would be excluded from their 
first communion if they voted forM. Paul de Remusat.nl9l The Contemporary 
aeview saw in the dismissal of Jules Simon 1the aggressive policy of the 
Ultramontane party.ul92 That clericalism was the common bond between the 
diversified candidates sponsored by the "government of combat" is attested 
19<14ountstuart Grant Duff, Notes From a Dim. 187J-18Sl (London: 
John Murray, 1898), I, 261•.3.34; Bishop, II, 15. 
l9lMThe Conservatives in France," Spectator, LVI (October 27, 1877), 
1.324. 
192James Stuart, "The Tuileries and the Vatican," Contemporary 
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to by the Fortnightly Review, which referred to them as 
that strange and motley band of Clericals and Bonapartists, 
Orleanists and partisans of divine right, the collection of hon-
est blockheads of Jesuits, of Cassagnacs, of dupes, who call them-
selves the party of order.l93 
The Times, seeking to portray English opinion, indicated that in Bngland, 
as in France, the change of government was believed to have been brought 
about by the clerical party.l94 
Irrespective of the connection between ultramontanism and the 
forces of MacMahon, Englishmen felt that Broglie and Fourtou intended to 
break the back of republicanism and to substitute a despotic regime. 
France was faced with a bitter struggle between the Republic and im-
perialism, which aimed at the restoration of French military prestige, 
the glorification of the Church, and the triumph of refinement and taste. 
The Saturdar Review stated: 
The Imperialists have for the moment possession of the field. Their 
representatives do not call themselves Imperialists; but that is a 
mere question of name. • • • But the programme of the Government is 
in all essential points thoroughly Imperialist. It proposes to man-
age elections, to let loose Imperialist prefects and sub-prefects 
on the departments, to call the clergy to its aid, to make all its 
adversaries feel that it has the army at its back, to give order 
instead of liberty, and to let polite society and fashionable poli-
ticians distribute the prizes of ambition. This is Imperialism 
pure and simple, and it makes no difference whether evening recep-
tions are given by a lad and his mother, or by a most respectable 
soldier and his wife.l95 
~' in a caricature entitled "The 'French Horse•,• which represented 
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La Republigue, showed MacMahon holding the horse while three jocks, 
,. 
representing Orleanism, imperialism and the Church, stood ready to 
mount the unhappy nag.l96 The Times, agreeing with this appraisal, 
asserted that it was not merely a contest between Broglie and Simon or 
conservative and liberal parties, but "a contest between despotic and 
parliamentary principles.nl97 
Personal testimony corroborates the view that English opinion 
regarded the crisis as a clerical and a monarchical intrigue. Eustace 
Murray, a Paris correspondent for the Daily News, declared: 
The crisis in which France was pl1mged on 16th May, 1877, was, to a 
large extent, the work of two or three Jesuits whose influence in 
politics was exercised under the modest title of •spiritual direc-
tors to lfies and gentlemen or high station, 1 but chiefly to 
ladies.l9 
T.he famed art critic, Philip Hamerton, accused the Catholic Church of 
leading the plot against representative government in France. The cleri-
cal party had substituted for free institutions 
an incredibly vexatious form of personal tyranny which brought the 
country to the brink of civil war, and persecuted free speech with 
relentless jealousy, from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, and 
from Belgium to the Pyrenees.l99 
Illustrator Ernest Vizetelly of the Illustrated London News, wrote con-
cerning the agitation in 1877: 
Never, in all the history of Christianity has any regime been attacked 
1878), 
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so unremittingly by the Church, as the Third French R8public has 
been. But even the worm will turn, and those who sow the storm 
may reap the whirlwind. 200 
James Macdonell, who wrote editorials for the Times during the crisis, 
believed that the clerical party, headed by Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop 
.. 
of Orleans, was chiefly responsible for the combination on May 16 against 
the Republic. Under an autocratic government, the Bishop expected to 
see education securely in the hands of the priesthood, the ultimate 
restoration of the Pope, and an unremitting struggle against republican 
principles.201 Lord Derby, the British Foreign Minister, believed that 
it would be a great misfortune for France, as well as Europe, for France 
to go back to a •government of adventurers, adventuresses, and priests," 
and he was quick to let it be known that England had no sympathy for such 
a conspiracy. 202 
English public opinion, which had welcomed the failure of Broglie 
to effect a restoration in 1873, and which applauded the victory of 
Gambettists in the elections of 1876, was obviously shocked by MacMahon's 
action. It maintained that the Marshal had violated all the most vene~ 
able traditions of parliamentary government; that he had meddled with the 
delicate mechanism of ministerial responsibility; that he had descended 
from the responsible position in which the law had placed him, in order 
to engineer a coup d'etat in the interest of unpopular party principles; 
and, that his behavior had violated the spirit of the Constitution. He 
2~rnest Vizetelly, Republican France, p. 200. 
2°1Macdonell, pp. 73•74. 
202Newton, II, P• 112. 
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had not exceeded his prerogatives as President, but, if the Constitution 
remained intact in form, he had strained it to the limit by his arbitrary 
and oppressive action. In a word, though all might be legal, it was foolw 
ish and unjustifiable. The DailY News, for example, contended that, 
though MacMahon was not open to reproach as having violated the Constitu~ 
tion, he was censurable for having strained, for purposes other than 
those for which they were intended, the powers confided to him.20J The 
Morning Post maintained that outside France the only impression was that 
although France had the semblance of parliamentary government, it was 
still far removed from a constitutional one.204 Disraeli wrote that the 
, 
Marshal's action was 11almost as much a coup d t etat on the part of the 
President as if he had gone down to the Chamber with a file of soldiers 
205 
and turned the majority out of doors.• The Spectator compared the ac-
tion of MacMahon to the Polignac Ministry of 18JO. 
Marshal MacMahon, in dismissing a Ministry supported by a majority, 
and appointing a Cabinet rejected in advance by nearly two-thirds of 
the Chamber, has, no doubt, violated the spirit of the Constitution, 
which accords him immense executive authority, but requires him to 
govern in accord with the Assembly, to whom, as well as to himself 
the Ministers are responsible, but he has not violated the letter.~06 
However, the Dublin Review, always a defender of conservative government, 
declared, that it was "a comparatively simple, straightforward and 
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strictly constitutional act. 207 
Not only did English opinion regard MacMahon 1s action as unneces-
sary and close to being unconstitutional, but it believed the move was 
foolhardy. Without the slightest chance of success, he had threatened 
France with national disaster, even ruin. His action, aside from being 
contrary to public opinion, was based an the erroneous assumption that 
a dissolution would result in the return of a conservative majority. 
His mistake was that he had shown himself capable of defying the Consti-
tution without daring to risk extreme measures. This ill-advised course, 
rather than obtaining a conservative Chamber, would result in certain 
defeat for his policy. In effect, after a prolonged crisis, he would be 
face to face with a situation before which he must perforce either submit, 
resign, or rely upon force. The Daily News contended that in spite of 
Fortou, the constituencies would prove themselves even more leftist than 
before.208 According to the Standard, which was always prepared to make 
excuses for the Right, the experiment of MacMahon was too rash and too in-
discreet to do the job.209 The Daily Telegraph observed that unless some-
thing unexpected happened, the party of MacMahon, despite coercion, cajol• 
ing, or threat, could not anticipate success.210 The Spectator, the 
~8Y Review, and the Fortnightly Review agreed that a dissolution 
under Broglie, as previously under Buffet, would result in a defeat for 
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2~itorial in Daily News (London), May 21, 1877. 
209Editorial in Standard (London), June 26, 1877. 
21~itorial in paily Telegraph (London), June 11, 1877. 
the Right. 211 A. long-time friend of the Republic, Eustace Murray, de-
clared: "It was a desperate adventure to attempt, and it is one which 
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will fail signally, as it deserves to do, if the Republicans are only 
prudent."212 Disraeli predicted that the confusion in France was "the 
Marshal's second march to Sedan.•213 Only Catholic sentiment could pre-
dict victory for the Marshal. The Tablet concluded that the vote would 
vindicate the necessary precautions which the Marshal had been compelled 
to take.214 The Dublin Review also believed that the balance of politi-
cal force had shifted in France, and it assured its readers that the 
Marshal's policy would soon be vindicated. 
We have a very strong conviction ••• that the majority for the 
Government at the coming general election will not fall below 50, 
and may, if all the sections of the Right co-operate with the har-
mony and energy they owe to their country, exceed 80.215 
Undoubtedly the reader has gathered from the foregoing that 
English opinion, believing that the Marshal had undertaken a legal coup 
~ d'etat, an assumption of personal government for the furtherance of poli-
tical projects hostile to the existing regime, and convinced that the 
royalists and the clerics were behind this supreme act of despair, was, 
in general, unsympathetic towards the forces of the Right. Several 
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sources took note of the unanimity of feeling in England towards the 
events across the Channel. The Fortnightly Review, for example, ob-
served "the absolute unanimity with which Englishmen of all parties and 
newspapers of all shades, save the Catholic, regard the result of the 
French elections.n216 This article went on to remark that the division 
produced in England by the "Eastern Question" did not have its counter-
part in the events in France. The English conservative was as much op-
posed as the liberal to the policy of official coercion.217 The Dublin 
fleview could not remember any incident related with foreign affairs upon 
which the newspapers and periodicals had been so unanimous as their con-
demnation of the events of May 16.218 The French Ambassador to London, 
Harcourt, wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs: 
Only one journal, the Morning Post, makes some effort to understand 
and interpret, with some fairness, the conduct of our Government. 
All the other journals believe in his defeat and desire the triumph 
of that which they call liberal ideas; they vary only by the degree 
of the noise or rather disdain.219 
The Gambettists, faced with a fierce attack by MacMahon upon the 
Republic, kept their heads. Instead of frightening the country with 
threats of barricades and war, they united behind the leadership of 
Gambetta and Thiers, and proceeded to outmaneuver the opposition. Equal 
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to every challenge thrust in their direction, they fought back with words 
rather than violence. While the •party of order" alarmed the country 
with deeds of terror and repression, they pointed to their record of 
moderation and self-restraint during the last few years and, in order to 
appeal to the electorate, contended that their defeat would usher in the 
rule of priests and foreign war. 
That part of English opinion opposed to the schemes of the Right 
agreed with the republicans that the greatest of all dangers in France 
was a sensationalistic policy from the Left. Such a policy would alienate 
French opinion which accepted the Republic not out of enthusiasm, but be· 
cause, in the words of Thiers, it "least divided France." The Spectator 
counseled that only with continued moderation would it be possible to 
capitalise on the mistakes of the ill-advised MacMahon and to secure vic-
tory. 
The Marshal had made the great blunder of so using his constitutional 
powers and has produced a general reeling or disgust thereby. But 
the Republican party may undo the effect of what he has done, if they 
imitate, much more if they overpass him, in attempting to counteract 
his aims. It will not do to refuse the supplies. It will be still 
worse to give any sort of encouragement to civil war. The Constitu-
tional weapons must be used soberly and warily. The President must 
be beaten not by enthusiasm, but by frigid! ty - by being shown that 
he has been guilty of a sensational mistake hazardous to the quie~8r 
France, and entirely unjustified b.y any great political emerging. 
The Times also advised the Republic to moderate their language and be 
patient. 221 The DailY Telegraph declared that the republicans started with 
an advantage and that this advantage would remain, providing that legality 
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and tranquility guided their policy. 222 Eustace Murray said: 
It is for the Republicans to prevent the raising of 8Il1 such dis- · 
ingenuous and preposterous issue b.r maintaining the discipline which 
ha8 just goaded their opponents to fury, and the moderation which 
will make the recent coup d 1lt1t manque recoil on the heads of those 
who counselled it for the ~~t selfish aims which ever disgraced a 
faction at its wits' ends. J 
Gambetta's policy or moderation and opportunism not only made the 
Right look bad in the eyes of the British, but undoubted!,- accounts for 
the all but unanimity of sympath7 felt for the Lett. Most would•be 
critics, who generally found fault with the Republic, were checked by 
Gambetta's agreeable and conciliatory policy. Instead, violence and fa-
naticism were identified with Broglie, Fourtou, and MacMahon. The pro-
posals of the radical parties in France, according to the FortnightlY 
Heview, were little different from those which English parties took for 
granted. The parties of the Lett desired to provide for a representative 
body, freedom of' speech and press, lq education, judicial reform, a fair 
income tax, and religious freedom. 224 The Contem-porary ReTiew applauded 
the self-control and steadiness of purpose shown by the masses in the 
crisis with the Right. Such restraint on the part of' the Lett augered 
well f'or the success of' the Republic.225 Eustace Murray had no fear of 
the Lett. 
Well, the Bxtreme Lett are agitating -- firstly, f'or a free Press; 
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secondly, ror the right or public meeting; thirdly, ror a three 
years' militar:r service ror all instead or rive years ror some and 
one year ror others who can arrord 60 to purchase exemption; 
fourthly, they desire the separation or Church and State; and, 
rirthly, the reform or the judicature and or procedure, so as to 
protect men trom arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, and also to 
put judges on such a rooting that they shall not be liable to 
degradation and virtual dismissal ror administering justice im-
partially in political cases; sixthly, the Radicals want the town 
councils to elect their own mqors and to manage the business or 
their municipalities without being dictated to by the prefects • 
• • • Let an Endish Tory who would not ask as much throw the 
stone at themt226 
Mrs. Augustus Craven, a devout Catholic and a keen observer or English 
opinion or France, found that 11the whole weight or Bnglish public opinion 
is given to support the man who is the personification or revolution in 
this its worst aspect.•227 
Although most Bnglish conserYatives, like the liberals, lamented 
the violent and unconstitutional behavior or the MacMahonists in France, 
the Standard indicated that it objected less to the aim or the coup, to 
its illegality, and its proscription or the opposition, than to the ract 
that the crisis was poorly conceived and timed. It would gladly have 
justified MacMahon's sudden interruption or tranquility, but it obserYed 
that he had acted with unaccountable raShness and passion. He should have 
allowed public opinion to become alarmed by the rears or the excesses or 
radicalism. Ir the Marshal had summoned Gambetta to form a ministry, the 
latter surely would have discredited himself and his party. Under these 
circumstances, with the provocation coming from the Lert, the Marshal 
could have appealed to the country with hope or success. 228 Also, the 
22~urray, Round About France, p. 261. 
227Bishop, II, 16. 
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other leading conservative daily, the Morning Post, made an attempt to 
give its readers a less one-sided view of the conduct of the French 
government than was characteristic of the English press.229 Several 
years after the crisis, an Inglish liberal, who held the view that English 
conservatives invariably favored the heavy-handed rule of the Bonapartes in 
French affairs, concludeda 
They would have commended Marshal llacllahon had his will been more 
resolute and consistent, and his confidants more skillful. They 
view 11. de Freycinet with suspicion and discover, to their own 
satisfaction, the Commune hovering over against the Republic.230 
However, the leaders of conserYative opinion were not hesitant in con-
damning the combination against the Republic. Both Disraeli and Derb,y 
believed that the Marshal was guilty of a great crime against the French 
people.2.31 
Other than Catholic opinion, the only indication that the Marshal 
generated any real enthusiasm from Bnglishmen was the view of Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, who, as a military man, sympathized with MacMahon for non-pollti-
cal reasons. In an article on the French a1"1111, he bestowed curses on the 
French Republic with a free hand. Unless the President hushed the Yoice 
of faction and ruled France without interference, he foresaw republican 
jobbery and revolutions wasting the national energy.2.32 Wolseley compared 
229nocuments diplomatigues fran~ais, 18'71-1914, II, 212. 
2.30ttBngl.ish Liberals and Continent'al Liberals, • Fraser's Magazine, 
ex (February, 1880), 2.3.3. 
23~ewton, II, 112; The Letters of Disraeli to LadY Bradford and 
LadY Chesterfield, II, 120. 
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.32Garnet Wolseley, •France as a Military Power,• Nineteenth 
Century, III (January, 18'7S), 20. 
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the reorganization or the French army with the earlier reorganization of 
the Prussian army, which, like the struggle between the Marshal and the 
Republic, was wrongly condemned by British opinion. ben though the 
Marshal was mistaken in regard to domestic sentiment, he was bent on 
making France a great milita17 power.233 
Inglish Catholics were the one segment of Inglish opinion which 
regarded the contest between MacMahon and Gambetta in a Tery different 
light from the majority of Britishers. They pictured the situation not 
as a struggle between despotism and liberty, but between atheism and 
Catholicism. They could not take lightly the prospect of Gambetta' a 
triumph, as it would mean a blow against existing religious and social 
institutions. The Tablet portrayed the royalists as defenders of law 
and order, religion, and national integrity, while the opposition was ac-
cused of a desire to banish religion from the schools, expel the Jesuits, 
and adopt a graduated income tax.234 As for MacMahon's action, it was an 
act of self-defense. His continued association with a ministry of the 
Left would have led to fUrther anarchy. 
ben in England, we suspect that, were the House of Comons to fall 
into the hands of a majority of men pledged to abolish the Throne, 
to confiscate property, and persecute religion, it would be dis-
covered that self-preserYation is the first law of nature, and,_ 
therefore, of human society, be it never so 1 constitutional.•2~5 
The Month and Catholic ReTiew also belieTed that the action of MacMahon 
233Ibid. 
234"The Crisis in France," Tablet, XVII (J1me 30, 1877), 805. 
235"The Re-opening of the French Chambers," Tablet, XLIX (June 
16, 1877), 741. 
was inevitable under the existing circumstances. Faced with a reckless 
and intolerant Assembly, which was elected under a misconception as to 
the issues, the Marshal, who had honestly endeavored to work with the 
elected representatives, had no other alternative but to save the 
country from the terrible abyss of the Lett. 236 Shortly before the 
elections, in another article, this journal charged that a victory for 
the Republic over the Right would not only lead to a renewal of the 
Committee of Public Safety and a Red Terror, but to international dis-
turbances. 237 Furthermore, it asserted that the driving force behind 
England's misplaced opposition to the program of MacMahon was the violent 
anti-Catholic spirit in England. 
No ordinary Englishman can resist the charm of an adventurer, how-
ever socially and politically furieux, who declares that he wages 
war against Clericalism and Ultramontanism •••• If the prince of 
darkness himself were to become incarnate,· and play a part in for-
eign politics, especially in a Catholic country, he would have the 
sympathies and the support of a large portion of this country if he 
were to assure them • • • that he was above 8all things the enemy of the Papacy and of all clerical influence.23 
The proof of this contention was the attitude of the Anglican clergr, 
which had two standards. In England it opposed the secularization of 
education, while in France, it supported it. The logical answer to this 
seeming inconsistency was that Catholicism suffered under the French 
Republic.239 
236"Postscript on Current Affairs,• Month and Catholic ReView, 
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The crisis of May, like the previous eruptions under the Republic, 
involved more than the course of French domestic history. The shift 
toward ultramontanism in France touched not only the temporal power of 
the papacy, a perennial religious issue, but it also troubled relations 
with Germany and Italy. It became a question not only of civilization, 
another Kulturkampf, but it also involved war and peace. 
Bismarck was anxious to keep France isolated and to draw Italy 
closer to Germany; he asserted that a triumph for the clericals would en-
danger European stability. He urged his ambassador to Paris, Hohenlohe, 
to spread abroad that "ultramontanism means war.•24° He wrote, "I believe 
, 
that our chief problem is to aid in the defeat of MacMahon's coup d'etat. 
It seems possible to do this if the voters are persuaded that the 363 
[!,he Republicans] stand for peace, the reaction for war. tt241 Radowitz, 
~ 
who was very close to Bismarck, told the French charge of the Chancellor's 
fears. "With Gambetta we are sure that the clerical party will be power-
less. With Marshal MacMahon we fear that this party may succeed in domi-
nating him and pushing him into war.•242 
The abrupt dismissal of Jules Simon on May 16 also alarmed Italy, 
which feared a French attack in case of a victory for MacMahon. To pre .. 
vent such a blow to Italian unification, Crispi, the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, made a rather ostentatious trip to the courts of 
24°carroll, p. 68. 
241Ibid. 
Europe in the autumn of 1877. His visit with Bismarck was regarded as a 
tightening of his friendship against France, and, as a matter of fact, 
Crispi received promises of German assistance, under certain conditions, 
in case of the strengthening of ultramontanism at Paris. 243 
The French government, realizing that Crispi' s mission had been 
inspired by the ministerial change of lay 16 and embarrassed by militant 
ultramontane zealots, tried to calm French opinion b.r issuing a series 
of circulars requesting misguided agitators to remain silent. One such 
appeal asserteds 
A rumour is being spread of an offensive and defensive alliance con-
cluded or considered between Germ&ny' and Italy against France, and a 
war with these powers is being spoken of as the possible consequences 
of elections favourable to the governmental candidates. The govern-
ment denies these rumours.244 
However, these pacific assurances were rejected by the republican press, 
which, along with the German and Italian press, continued to spread rumors 
relevant to the disastrous consequences or a clerical victory. 
English opinion, unimpressed b.r MacMahon 1 s denial, especially 
since the appeals of the Vatican and the pastoral letters of French 
clerics spoke openly of the absolute necessity for a royalist victory, 
feared that such a turn of events would endanger the international situa-
tion. For example, the Saturda,y Review, which had come to accept the 
praiseworthy caution of the Lett in the late Assembly, foresaw that the 
success of the Right would lead to hostilities with Germany. 245 Noting 
626. 
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that Italy and Germany were troubled, the DailY News charged that the 
Marshal had "invited danger from abroad in the discharge of his guardian-
ship over France."246 The Times, agreeing with this view, said that it 
would take more than a disclaimer to dissipate the belief that France 
would embark on an aggressive foreign policy following a victory.247 
Never tired of denouncing the French Right, the Fortnightly charged 
Broglie with relying upon the ultramontane party in France. This latter 
party was not going to assist the "government of combat" without an ap-
propriate price. The price, despite evasive assurances to the contrary 
by Broglie, would be a policy to restore the temporal power of the papacy. 
His own sympathies, though policy mq repress them, are with the 
priestly party; and they only need opportunity and the hope of suc-
cess to be transferred from the recesses of secret diplomacy to the 
open air of public policy. His ministry is, therefore, a danger 
not only to the international tranquility of France but to the peace 
of Europe. French opinion might perhaps be defied with impunity. 
But, as the miller of San Souci has it, 'there are judges in Berlin. t248 
In another notice, the FortnightlY expressed its fear that with the triumph 
of Brogliei which only appeared possible with clerical assistance, France 
would be honor bound to liberate the prisoner of Rome. 
But what is certain is that such a government, as it is the ultimate 
object of the Broglie Cabinet to set up, can only subsist by leaning 
on the clerical party; and the clerical party will demand a price 
for their support; and everybody lm.ows that this price can only be 
a policy that will gi2!e Germany a fair excuse, and Italy a solid 
reason for a breach. 9 
On the other hand, the defenders of MacMahon denied that a victory 
246:Editorial in DailY News (London), May 19, 1877. 
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for the Right in France would result in an Dbitious foreign policy. 
Catholic opinion, refiecting the Tiew ot Jlacllahon, denied that his suc-
cess would plunge France into foreign adnntures. 250 The pro-Rightest 
St8Qdard argued that there was nothing in the recent acts or MacMahon 
to excite the fears ot Italy or to arouse the jealousy of Germany. The 
affair was wholly domestic and France was bent on maintaining the most 
friendly relations with eTer,y court in Europe.251 
Englishmen, who were used to fair play in politics, were startled 
and frightened by the repressiye tactics of Fortou, the Minister ot Inter-
ior. In order to hamper the opposition, official pressure was used to 
curb the republican press, circulars were multiplied, and dangerous 
critics were sent ott to jail. Meetings were forbidden; thousands ot 
schoolmasters, inspectors, and mayors were dismissed; and in some Toting 
places, soldiers were used to oTerawe the electors. It looked to the 
British Tery much like the tactics of the Bonapartes. The Fortnightly 
declared: 
He has outdone the Empire itself in measures· ot coercion, in act's ot 
seTerity towards the newspapers, in shameful pressure on the magis-
tracy, and in the use of Bonapartist methods or administration •••• 
For Liberal we now hear or a ConserYatiTe union; for a policy ot con-
ciliation, a policy of combat; tor individual freedom and the inde-
pendence of local authorities, repression of the rights or public 
conversations, the control or the magistracy by the central Govern-
ment, and the prohibition or scientific and philosophic discussions 
are substituted.252 
250"Postscript on Current Affairs," Month apd Catholic J1@y.ie.w, 
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In another notice, it accused the "government of combat"·of 
perversions of public duties, cabals, prevarication, misrepresenta-
tion, dissimulation, mendacity of every kind, • • • government op-
pressions, official terrorism, the d~~osal of the public revenues, 
and the corruption of the tribunals. 
The Nineteenth Century scorned the unscrupulous methods and bureaucratic 
procedure of Fourtou,254 and the Contemporary Review professed to have a 
low opinion of the schemes of Broglie and Fourtou, reasoning that con-
spiracy and insurrection had passed from the Left to the Right. 255 The 
Illustrated London News also upheld these charges, claiming that the tac-
tics resorted to by the authorities were unconstitutional.256 Unlike 
English critics, who complained about Fourtou's displacement of a con-
siderable proportion of the civil administration and the use of official 
pressure on the electorate, the Dublin Review, which was ready to go to 
any extreme to enhance Catholicia, viewed this action as perfectly legi-
timate and in harmony with French histo:r;r, as well as American histo:r,r. 
It was only 11blind prejudice or inexcusable ignorance" which allowed 
British journalists·to denounce a procedure so typical of French his-
tory.257 
The height of official pressure was the arrest of Gambetta for in-
sulting MacMahon in a speech in which he called on the Marshal either to 
25Jrrederic Harrison, "The Republic and· the Marshal," Fortnightly 
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submit or resign. However, as Gambetta had been released and was at liber-
ty during the ensuing elections, the government looked foolish. To the 
English, these acts seemed the height of stup~dity. The pro-Gambettist 
Daily News held that the prosecution of Gambetta for his speech at Lille 
was an abuse of authority, as there was nothing in the speech that trans-
greased the bounds of ordinary political discussion. "It is," declared 
the Daily News, •more like the freak of some stupid tyrant suddenly 
awakened from· sleep than like the act of a set of statesmen.~258 The 
Daily Telegraph asserted that this act was devoid of all common sense and 
was an indication of the waning judgment and self-possession.of MacMahon's 
conspiracy.259 The Morning Post, which frequently made sincere attempts to 
understand the Marshal's plans, spoke of it as a blunder.260 The Standard 
believed that France needed a conservative government but accused the 
"government of combat" of making another miscalculation. The Marshal's 
only course, it editorialized, was to give Gambetta power in order that he 
would destroy his own reputation. 26l Writing in October, 1898, Frederick 
Conybeare recalled how in 1Pf77 Englishmen, both liberals and conservatives, 
had sympathized with Gambetta in his struggle with MacMahon, and how he him-
self had contributed his bit to the Manchester papers which had begun a sub-
scription to pay Gambetta t s fine. 262 
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Several weeks before the decisive elections, the royalists were 
the recipients of a stroke or luck. Thiers, the symbol or moderation, 
the reconciliator of progress with order, and or liberty established with 
rights, died unexpectedly on September 3. His death struck fear into 
the hearts of Gambetta and his party. With Thiers as President, the 
timorous bourgeois had little to fear, but his passing removed the last 
obstacle to the complete triumph of Gambetta. Thus, it is not surprising 
that English opinion, which echoed the sentiments or the Left throughout 
the crisis, was disheartened by news of Thiers' death. The I.!!!!! asserted 
that the death of Thiers was not only the loss or a great statesman, but, 
also, a blow to the cause or the Republic.263 The Daily News remarked 
that 
many a Frenchman, who would not have hesitated a moment about de-
claring for the policy of Thiers in preference to that of MacMahon, 
may begin to waver and shrink back when he is invited to follow 
Gambetta.204 
The Morning Post thought there could be no question but that the republi-
cans had lost in Thiers a tower of strength as a President in the appeals 
they were on the point of making to the electoral body. 265 The Standard 
contended that the Marshal would be the chief beneficiary and Gambetta 
the chief loser in the forthcoming elections. 266 All were agreed that 
Thiers' death was a serious loss to France and that it would have an im-
manse influence on the impending elections. 
26~itorial in l'.!!u (London), September 5, 1S77. 
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The republicans parried the blow of September 3 by nominating 
, 
Jules Grevy, a moderate, to succeed Thiers in his Parisian constituency. 
If the Left proved victorious, it was supposed that he was destined to 
, ~ 
replace MacMahon in the Elysee. Consequently, Grevy's nomination re-
stored the waning confidence of the English press. According to the 
,. 
Times, Gambet ta had acted very wisely in selecting Grevy to be the rival 
of MacMahon. 267 On the other hand, the Dail:r News was disappointed that 
Gambetta had not stepped forward, but still the cause of the Republic 
was not lost. 268 
On September 19, MacMahon's Manifesto to the French people was 
circulated throughout France. In this document he in part declared: 
I shall never become the instrument of Radicalism, nor shall I 
abandon the post in which the constitution has placed me. With the 
support of the Senate, I shall remain to defend conservat~ve inter-
ests and to protect with energy all loyal functionaries.2 9 
Here was an answer to Gambetta 1 s charge that in the event of a republican 
victory, the Marshal must either submit or resign. Apparently he meant 
, 
to do neither. The only alternative was a coup d'etat. The Spectator 
expressed alarm over the future course of the Republic, realizing that 
,. 
a coup d'etat was·a distinct possibility. 
He has deliberately told France that if it will send up such a 
Chamber of Deputies as he likes, than all will be well; but if not, 
then it must be content to be ruled by him and the Senate, without 
the Chamber of Deputies.270 
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The Examiner, which was prone to exaggerate the sins of the Right, argued 
that the Marshal was arrogating to himself the position or dictator. 271 
Yet even the conservative Morning Post declared that the Marshal's lan-
guage made plausible the speculation that he intended to provoke violence 
in order to justify a coup d 1etat.272 As for the Daily News, it called 
MacMahon an unsuccessful general who was not only ignorant of politics, 
but speaking like a soldier. 273 The Daily Telegraph compared the Mani-
festo to the July Ordinances of 1830.274 The sentiments of the English 
were best summed up by the wit of ~. 
Plain speaking? Yes; perhaps a thought too plain: 
Imperial phrase could scarce sound more imperious. 
Yet, Marshal, in my mind some doubts remain. 
How fair a front m~ cover the mysterious! 
You woo me, as the Conqueror wooed his wife, 
With a most autocratic assiduity; 
But as to clearness, well, upon my lire, 
You do not 'dissipate all ambiguity.• 
You say, most fairly, 1tis for me to choose, 
But whatsoever my choice you still mean staying. 
The game of 'heads I win and tails you lose, 1 
Would seem a parallel to that you are pl~ng. 
'J'y suis, j 1y reate,• sounds soldierly, but still 
Your post is not a conquered post, at present. 
If Marshal law means simply Marshal's will, 
The prospect's more despotic for than pleasan~. 
You tell me proudly you decline to be 
Radicalism's instrument. I'd ask you 
From other factions will you keep us free? 
Soldier, the warring 'isms 1 well m~ task you. 
Blunt egoist of honour, in your rear 
Crouch thrice-tried and ricksters. Free from Party leaning 
2711ditorial in Examiner (London), September 22, 1877. 
272Editorial in Morning Post (London), September 20, 1877. 
27~itorial in DailY News (London), September 20, 1877. 
27~itorial in Daily Telegraph (London), September 20, 1877. 
You may be, but while they are lurking near, 
Marshal, I still must ask, 'What is your meaning? t275 
On the eve of the elections, in spite of the death of Thiers and 
the acts of coercion against the press and the magistracy, the English 
predicted with the greatest confidence the defeat of the Marshal and his 
government. The Saturday Review foresaw that the bullying would not pre-
vent ultimate success to the Republic. The tyranny of Fortou, the humil-
iation of Sedan, the distrust of priests, and the threat of civil war and 
personal insecurity, as well as the peaceful and orderly resistance of the 
Left, were too potent to expect the electorate to favor the forces of re-
action.276 The Pa11 Ma11 Gazette anticipated a victory for the republi-
cans, but it maintained that the majority in the Chamber would be less 
than Gambetta 1s forecasts. 277 BYen the Tablet, though still hoping for 
a monarchical restoration, had to admit that the Gambettists were likely 
to win a majority. 278 
The French went to the polls during the week of October 14-18. 
In spite of searches and repressions, the "government of combat" failed 
to persuade the country that the Gambettists were dangerous revolutiona-
ries. The Left lost thirty-six seats but still commanded a clear majori• 
ty. On November 19, Broglie met with a hostile chamber which forced him 
to withdraw by 312 votes to 202. 
138. 
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The English interpreted the results as a total defeat for MacMahon 
and as a clear sign that the country preferred a Republic. The Times 
expressed no regrets at the outcome of MacMahon's efforts. His regime 
had been condemned and the country had decisively ranged itself on the 
side of the Republic. He no longer had any excuse for disregarding the 
votes of the Chamber of Deputies. 'Z79 On the same day, ·the DailY News as-
serted that, reduced though Gambetta's majority was, the Marshal should 
realize that France had given its answer and that in no sense was he justi-
fied in continuing his obstinate policy.280 These sentiments were repeated 
in varying ways by the leading journals. The Saturda,y Review had the high-
est praise for the victory of the Republic. Not only were the new members 
"of ability, high character, and good social standing," but the triumph 
was of more special significance because it was won, "not in a fair fight, 
but in spite of the meanest, most wholesale, and most unsparing bullying 
that the authorities could exercise.n281 Noailles, the French Ambassador 
to Rome, wrote to Decazes on October 18, 1877, that he had learned that 
the Italian Ambassador to England had informed his government that 
the elections had been favorably received by the English press and by 
public opinion. Lord Derby had always predicted an electoral victory 
of the Left. They hope ardently that the crisis in France will be 
ended by accommodation.282 
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English Catholic opinion was disappointed with the results of the general 
election. According to the Tablet, France had forsaken the path of free-
dom and justice for a radical tyranny. 283 The Dublin Review refused to 
believe that France had permanently forsaken justice and order, and it 
presented an elaborate apology to prove •the growing force of the reaction 
against radicalism.n284 
For a time the English allowed themselves to be carried away ~ 
the rumors emanating from France to the effect that the Marshal intended 
to carry through his program to the bitter end, even if force was required. 
The English, recalling his Manifesto of September 19, realized that the 
Republic still faced danger. The Pall Mall Gazette found it difficult to 
predict the course of MacMahon, but it felt that it was not beyond the 
scope of possibility that he would resort to the use of force.285 The 
I!m!!, likewise, realized that until Macllahon took the advice of Gambetta 
either to submit or resign that it would be difficult to speak confidently 
concerning the destiny of the Republic.286 On November 10, George Meredith 
admit ted that he was anxious for the Republic. If the •Marshal Donkey" 
and Broglie refused to accept the will of the people, it was very likely 
that in a war "the Republican section would be beaten; the country thrown 
283"After the French Elections,• Dublin Review, L (October 20, 
1877), 485. 
284"The French President and the New Chamber of Deputies," Dublin 
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back for ten years."287 Disraeli told Lady Bradford on November 7: 
Affairs in France are grave. There will be no visit, but the Marshal 
must resign; people laugh at hia and that is fatal in Paris. Playing 
at being a hero and not doing it does not answer. _Not~~ justified 
his conduct but the pre-determination of a coup d 1 etat. 2 
Under the circumstances, the Marshal would do well to quell the 
mischievous gossip by accepting Gambetta1 s dictum. The Morning Post, 
which had not found the crisis as objectionable as most other journals, 
' stated that "resistance a outrance may be very creditable on the battle-
field, but it is entirely out of place in the conduct of civil government, 
and the sooner the President recognizes this fact the better."289 The 
Times asserted that the Marshal should accept the position of a constitu• 
tional President or make way for Gre.,-.290 ~ revealed its view 
towards the Marshal's obstinacy when it put the following words into the 
mouth of France: 
You've made your appeal, and I've answered it plainly; 
There must be one rule in this house, and that's mine. 
If you hope to resist my coJIIDlands, you hope vainly --
Your alternatives are to submit or resign.291 
The Standard, which was not noted for its friendship towards the Republic, 
believed the situation was very plain. Either the Marshal would allow 
himself to glide into a foolish and ill-considered coup d 1&tat or he 
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would admit his mistake and resign, which was the logical termination of 
the crisis. 292 Interestingly enough, the Dublin Review urged the Presi-
dent to hold his ground. The crux or its argument was that the French Re-
public was not a parliamentary government, but a system like that in the 
United States where the executive power was strictly separated from the 
legislative power. Thus, MacMahon would be within his constitutional 
rights if he refused to submit to the Chamber or Deputies, which en-
dangered the delicate constitutional balance by attempting to assume the 
authority of the English House of Commons and insisting on the exercise 
of the executive power through ministers of its selection. 
We do not see how it [Chamber of Deputies) can compel the person to 
whom the executive power is alone confided to exercise his executive 
functions through Ministers in whom he cannot himself confide, but 
who mq happen to have the confidence or the legislative power. This 
cannot possibly have been contemplated.293 
On November 24, nearly a week atter the resignation or Broglie, 
MacMahon made a last gesture of resistance. He summoned General de 
Rochebouet, a soldier, to form a cabinet. The !!m!J held that the new 
French government did not suggest to anyone acquainted with the course of 
French politics a solution to the question, and it declared that the Left 
was entitled to real power, for it represented the sobriety and the good 
sense or the nation.294 The Daily News asserted that the appointment of 
the new Cabinet was the work of a desperate minority bent on risking all 
292Edi torial in Standard (London) , November 7, 1877. 
293"The French President and the New Chamber of Deputies," Dublin 
Review, LXXXI, 509. · 
29~itorial in Times (London), November 24, 1~7. 
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that France had gained in six years of peace. 295 Likewise, the Daily 
Telegraph passed off the new ministr,y as "a new device for evading or 
deterring submission to the popular will."296 Even the Standard, which 
was never too particular about the use or forceful methods, especially 
when they were directed against radicalism, maintained that the Chamber 
was acting within its constitutional rights in refusing its confidence 
to the new ministr,y. 297 
This new threat of personal government merely evaded the day of 
reckoning for MacMahon. Shortly thereafter, the Marshal, breaking awq 
from the advice· of his immediate circle, gave in and summoned Dutaure, 
who formed a republican ministr.r. This long awaited decision met the 
approval of English opinion. The Ii!!!J, for instance, observed that by 
summoning Duf'aure, the Marshal had improved France's political prospects. 
It only hoped that his submission was real and complete.298 The ~ 
!!!! regarded MacMahon's latest move 
as practically a confession of wrongdoing and a provision of amend-
ment, bringing to an end a period of contusion and illegality which 
is almost withou-t; parallel in the history or parliamentar,y govern .. 
ment.299 
The editorial went on to congratulate the Republic on the great victor,y 
over personal government.300 Even the Standard said that the Marshal 
29~itorial in DailY News (London), November 24, 1877. 
29~itorial in Daily Telegraph (London), November 24, 1877. 
297Editorial in Standard (London), November 24, 1877. 
298:Editorial in Times (London), December 14, 1877. 
299Editorial in Daily News {London), December 15, 1877. 
300Ibid. 
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had done what he ought to have done months before. 30l 
The Republic, however, was still insecure. As long as MacMahon 
was President and as long as the Right was in command of the Senate, 
there was still a possibility that the crisis would be renewed. On 
January 5, 18'79, elections were held for the renewal of a portion of 
the Senate. As that assembly was considerably more conservative than 
the lower house, the republicans looked forward to these elections with 
much interest. Upon the results depended the future course of the Re· 
public. Of the eighty-two seats at stake in the elections, the monarch-
ists won only sixteen. Thenceforth, the Republic had in the upper cham-
ber a majority of sixty votes. The elections had definitely established 
the Republic. 
English public opinion welcomed the decision of the French elec-
tors, but expressed the hope that the victorious Left would not depart 
from its opportunistic and legalistic course. Accordingly, the Times 
applauded the triumph of Gambetta and predicted that the defeat or the 
Right would open a bright future fo~ the Republic as long as it avoided 
extremes. 3°2 The Dail.y News claimed that while the Republic had achieTed 
another victory, the republican leaders should adhere to their moderate 
policy.3°3 The Standard and the Manchester Guardian, conservatiTe and 
liberal respectively, agreed that the defeat of the projects for dynastic 
restoration offered the prospect or stable political institutions, and 
3°1Editorial in Standard (London), December 15, lfr77. 
302Editorial in .Times (London), January 6, 18'79. 
30~itorial in Daily News (London), January 6, 1879. 
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they advised the Gambettists to stick to their present course.304 
The ~publican leaders, bent on consolidating their victpry, re-
solved to insist upon extensive changes in the personnel or the cabinet, 
the judiciary, and the army. The threat or changes in the army, which 
was the one remaining prerogative at which the President grasped, led 
the Marshal, foreseeing the difficulty of maintaining harmonious rela-
tiona with his cabinet, to take these new measures as a pretext; on 
January 30, 18'79, he resigned from office. On the same day, the Senate 
and the Chamber or Deputies elected Jules Grtvy as his successor. 
As expected, the English took a keen interest in the quarrel 
leading to the resignation of MacMahon. Disraeli, on learning of the 
Marshal's act, wrote: "Nobod1 thinks or anything, or rather talks or 
anything, but France; the quiet revolution which I daresay will be turbu-
lent enough in good time.n305 The I!!!! was reassured by MacMahon's 
~ -
resignation and told its readers there was no cause to worry as Grevy was 
well-suited tor the role or a constitutional ruler.306 The Daily News 
was even more emphatic than the Times. It could not regret the resigna-
tion or a President who was unwilling to give his signature to the dis-
missal or servants, when his cabinet, backed by a majority in both hous~s, 
deemed their dismissal necessary to the security or the general weltare.307 
3~itorial in Standard {London), January 7, 18'79; Editorial in 
Manchester Guardian, January 7, 18'79. 
30~he Letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, 
II, 205. 
306Editorial in~ (London), January 31, 18'79. 
307Editorial in Daily News (London), January 31, 18'79. 
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As for Grevy, the Daily News believed that he was deserving of the honor 
and that one could expect him to discharge his duties well.3°8 The Pall 
Mall Gazette observed that from December 13, 1877 to January 30, 1879, 
Frenchmen lived under the threat that the Marshal might try again. It 
was the relief from this uneasiness which made the resignation so welcome 
to Englishmen. 309 The Standard remarked that MacMahon had showed a lack 
of political sense in refusing to sign the decrees. As for the ease and 
regularity with which Grevy succeeded to the vacated office, it believed 
it was an excellent augury for France.310 Only the conservative daily, 
the Morning Post, expressed any real regrets. While wishing well to the 
Republic, it viewed with alarm the loss of the Marshal, who had provided a 
stabilizing influence on the Lert.3ll The Spectator noted the unity of 
opinion in England towards the liquidation of France's momentous crisis. 
"Tories, as well as Liberals," it asserted, "welcomed the resignation of 
Marshal MacMahon." 312 
After nine years the republicans had captured the Third Republic. 
The resignation of the Marshal removed the last obstacle to victory. With 
Gambetta as President of the Chamber and a republican majority in both 
Senate and Chamber, the Republic of the Left really began. In 1880, the 
republicans returned the capital to Paris and proclaimed July 14 a 
3°8Ibid. 
· 309Ed.itorial in Pall Mall Gazette (London), January 31, 1879. 
3lOEditorial in Standard (London), January 31, 1879. 
3llEditorial in Morning Post (London), January 31, 1879. 
3l2"English Republicans," Spectator, LXI (July 24, 1880), 933. 
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national holiday. Not until a decade later, when Boulangism arose, was 
there a serious threat to the Constitution. 
From across the Channel, England observed with interest the 
struggle in French domestic politics. Over the last century the 
British had learned that the course of French affairs not only had a 
bearing on England's political and economic fortunes, but affected the 
general international situation. England had a vital interest in France 
lest it should cast Europe into another war by its ultramontane policy. 
As long as the ultramontanes were identified with the Right, England 
was bound to look askance at the repeated monarchical intrigues. 
Eustace Murray, correspondent for the DailY News, observed: 
Now the men who ousted the Liberals from office in 1'?!17 are repre-
sentatives of regimes who have kept England on the qui vive not 
for years but for centuries •••• The Republicans are the only 
party in France who have laid it down as a part of their doctrine 
that to be strong France needs not be battlesome; consequently, 
Englishmen who desire neither a second Hastings nor a second 
Waterloo, must wish well to a political sect under whose rule 
there would be a cessation from international quarrels.313 · 
In addition to these material motives, which led Englishmen to 
favor the Republic over a monarchy, there was the feeling that most 
Frenchmen desired a Republic and that only a selfish minority stood in 
the way of real representative government. As long as the French were 
to be prevented from expressing their political sentiments, the domestic 
scene would be uneasy. And, as long as liberty and freedom were yet to 
be realized, the British felt justified in condemning the efforts to 
establish a monarchy. 
It is also of some interest to note that English opinion in 
3l3Murray, Round About France, p. 131. 
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regard to the French political development was watched closely by the 
French government. The contending parties in France found that English 
opinion was of value in supporting their respective aims. A good example 
is that of Frederick Harrison, who spent several months traveling in the 
French provinces during the critical period of 1877 as a Times corres-
pondent. Each day he journeyed from one republican committee to another, 
penned a letter to the Times, and then left without a forwarding address. 
The letters which he sent to the Times were translated and appeared in 
the Telnps.314 
As the de Broglie Ministry kept a tight hand over the French 
Press, and prevented them from publishing news unwelcome to the 
Marshal's party, whilst translations from foreign journals were al-
lowed to pass, the local committee ea;r~ly supplied me with facts 
which they dared not print in France. 
The Pall Mall Qazette also took note of the impact of English criticism 
a 
on the political struggle in France. 
It would probably be acknowledged by all Englishmen that there never 
was a time when their newspapers were so much occupied as they now 
are with reflections on French politics; and it is certainly allowed 
by Frenchmen that foreign opinion never had so much influence on 
their domestic affairs as at the present moment.316 
Mrs. Augustus Craven, who was living in France, was disturbed by what she 
termed the "no-popery" feeling in England towards French politics. She 
explained that "no one can imagine how much wrong and mischief has been 
done to us by the tone of the English press. So thorough a misunderstand-
ing I do not remember ever to have witnessed.n317 The Secretary for War, 
314aarrison, Autobiographical Memoirs, II, 48-51. 
3l5Ibid., p. 48. 
3l~itorial in Pall Mall Gazette (London), November 14, 1877. 
317Bishop, II, 16-17. 
Gathorne Hardy, taking notice in a speech at Edinburgh of the adverse 
criticism of Marshal MacMahon by the English press, charged that the 
hostile spirit of the press alienated the French nation.318 The 
Saturday Review disagreed with Hardy, believing that if the criticism 
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offended the circles of the Elysee, it pleased the followers of Gambetta 
and Gr~VY.319 The importance of the English press in French affairs is 
further verified by the Paris correspondent of the Daily News, Eustace 
Murray. 
If they could have found one London journal of their way of thinking 
they would have consoled themselves·by quoting it wholesale, but it 
was exasperating to behold the Republican Press swelling its columns 
with daily reprints of foreign leaders, while they, the Conserva-
tives, could not quote a single line from any decent paper for 
their encouragement. Still more exasperating was it to perceive 
that the unanimous and hearty reprobation of the English Press 
visibly unnerved the reactionary Cabinet for the unpatriotic task 
which it had undertaken. There was a moment when M. de Broglie and 
de Fourtou so thirsted after a kind word from abroad that on the 
eve of the general election a line was picked out from one of the 
London journals, reprinted without its context in the 'Bulletin des 
Communes,' and circulated all over France as an opinion adverse to 
the Republicans. At the same time the 'Daily News,' was seized at 
the railway station; the strong arm of the police swooped down upon 
'Punch.' The Home Office betook itself to stopping telegrams dis-
patched by correspondents; and it was announced that the Government 
would revive to the full its power of interdict if foreign papers 
continued to be 'aggressive,' and Government dropped its bluster; 
but then the Conservative 1 s journals demanded that there should be 
a raid against correspondents who had the presumption to go about 
discovering abuses and reporting them. The favorite organ of the 
Boulevards declared it was a breach of international courtesy and 
an abuse of hospitality for an Ene-ishman residing in France to 
take a side in party struggles.32 
318"Engl.ish Criticism on Foreign Affairs," Saturda..y Review, 
XLIV (December 15, 1877), 733. 
3l9Ibid. 
32'1furray, Round About France, pp. 128-29. 
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Moreover, the work or Harrison in the~ on behalf of French republi-
cans did not go unnoticed by the Broglie ministcy. Harrison related: 
"As soon as the Times letters began to appear in the French Press, the 
Government sent down orders to arrest me and to have me expelled."321 
So outraged were French royalists that when Jules Fercy prepared to read 
the Times of November 21, 1877 to the Chamber, a deputy exclaimed: "We 
know very well who pays for these articles.•322 All in all, according 
to Frederic Harrison, the English influence was instrumental in the 
struggle for freedom in France. He concluded that the triumph of 
Gambetta "was in no slight degree promoted by' English opinion and by 
the English Press, in which the Times led the way."323 
321Harrison, Autobiographical Memoirs, II, 51. 
322
•Chronicle of the Week," Tablet, L (November 24, 1877), 642. 
321ffarrison, Autobiographical Memoirs, II, 4S. 
CHAP'l'ER VI 
THE LIBERAL ALLIANCE 
England and French Recovery, 1871-74 
Both England and France were politically isolated following the 
Franco-Prussian War. Yet the reasons for such a state or affairs in 
the two countries were very different, as were their respective positions 
in international relations. England was free from European entanglements 
because or her self-confidence, her traditional national purpose, and her 
preoccupation with domestic affairs. On the other hand, France's iso-
lation was part or the aftermath or the continental struggle, rather than 
a policy or her own choosing. It stemmed from the prolonged weakness or 
a country battered into submission and forced to endure terrible civil 
strife. France, after the annee terrible, had to liberate itself from 
the German army of occupation, to find money to pay Germany the huge in-
demnity, and to rebuild the shattered prestige and striking power or her 
army. Another prerequisite for a strong foreign policy was a definitive 
form or government. Until the country decided upon a monarchy or a 
republic, and until it repaired the damages or the war, there was great 
risk in adopting an aggressive foreign policy. Meanwhile, in spite or 
the adherents or revanche and the temporal power or the pope who espoused 
an active policy, the French government pursued a cautious and passive 
policy. 
The French, although compelled by circumstances to assume a 
defensive rather than an offensive diplomatic posture, were disturbed 
by rumors that Germany planned another invasion. As long as France 
was subject to political division, this ominous prospect could only be 
averted through foreign assistance. As it was obvious that any further 
German aggression would not only weaken France the more but fUrther 
upset the European equilibrium, France became the object of European 
solicitude. 
Yet wherever France turned for friendship, it was met with 
unfriendly combinations or a considerable amount of indifference. 
Italy, Russia, and Austria were inclined to lean towards Germany, which 
had now replaced France as the leader on the Continent. The Italian 
government, which had only recently seized Rome from the papacy, re-
garded the early French Republic with suspicion. It was believed in 
Italy that the royalists, now predominant in the National Assembly, 
and by tradition the defenders of the papacy, would intervene in order 
to restore the pope's temporal power. Under these circumstances the 
Italian government turned to Germany, which, unlike the government of 
France, was quarreling with the papacy. Austria, under the direction 
of the Germanophile Count Andrassy, turned towards Germany for support 
in its expansionist policy in the Balkans. Russia, under Tsar 
Alexander II, was likewise inclined towards co-operation with Germany 
rather than France. The Tsar remembered how Bismarck had extended his 
benevolent approval to the remilitarization of the Black Sea in 1870, 
and he foresaw the need of German support to complete the domination 
of the Balkans, and to realize Russian ambitions for expansion in the 
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Far East. 
Meanwhile, until 1873 the English were enjoying a period of great 
prosperity and political stability and immersed themselves in internal 
affairs. The peaceful development of democratic institutions, the in-
dustrial leadership and commercial superiority, and the possession of a 
vast overseas empire gave Britishers a fierce pride in their country and 
led them to trust in their own power rather than in alliances. This 
passive tendency in foreign affairs was re-enforced by the insular views 
of Gladstone, who directed English policy from 1868 to 1874. By nature, 
the Prime Minister was inclined to be pacifistic, and, ever anxious to 
reduce expenditures on armaments, he saw little to gain from an active 
policy. 
The English government, preoccupied with domestic affairs, turned 
away from any involvement in the European situation. According to 
Langer, 
England came to be looked upon as a power of secondary importance in 
international affairs, especially after her acceptance of a very 
unfavorable award in the arbitration of the 'Alabama Claims.' To the 
military states of Europe, that submissiveness was looked upon as the 
most eloquent proof Ihat England was no longer a factor to be seri-
ously reckoned with. 
The French, faced with diplomatic isolation, could only look on 
England's diplomatic position with disfavor. As long as England neglected 
continental developments and its military potential, France would be un-
able to reassert its traditional voice in world affairs. Jules Favre, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, lamented on August 27, 1871, that 
Gladstone's democratic policies, especially the military reforms, had 
ltanger, European Alliances and Alignments. 1871-l89Q, p. 18. 
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weakened British power, neutralizing any hope of future intervention in 
Europe~2 This view was shared by the first Ambassador of the French 
Republic to England, Broglie, who frankly anticipated the return of the 
Conservative Party to reverse the indifferent foreign policy of 
Gladstone.3 Even more outspoken in his views was Charles Gavard, the 
French charged' affaires in London from 1871 to 18'77. Not only did he 
reproach the neglect of military preparations of England, but he pre-
dieted that France could not expect a more forceful policy from the 
return of the Tories.4 These circumstances led the French government 
to turn away from England and to look towards Russia, awaiting an oppor-
tunity to effect a rapprochement with Moscow at the first sign of Russo-
German estrangement.5 Thiers, as President, openly looked to Moscow for 
an alliance, realizing that British friendship might be of some use as a 
balance against the Three Emperors' League, but doubting that England 
would render any real support for France. 6 
Regardless of French suspicions of Gladstone's policy in the 
first years following the war of 1870-71, England was quite concerned 
about the French position regarding Germany. The latter, in the eyes of 
numerous Englishmen, appeared to be menacing the peace by its excessive 
greed. 
Germany had shown herself not to be what the English believed, a 
2B1ock, p. 16. 
3Ibid. 
4Gavard, p. 4• 
5tanger, Europegn A1Jiances and Alignments, 1871-1890, p. 22. 
6Alan John Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 223. 
land of professors -- the word professor signifying a very learned 
but slightly ridiculous and completely ineffectual person. • • • 
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To a large and vocal number of Englishmen, Germany was a poor re-
lation who had suddenly acquired wealth and influence by very shady 
methods; it was hard to believe the change was permanent, and it 
was necessary to assert firmly that changed fortunes did not in-
volve changed status •••• Ridicule was more noisy than general, 
but inability to recognize the ascendancy of Germany, or resentment 
at that ascendancy, were very general in England •••• Englishmen, 
not merely the man on the street, but men of education and position, 
including statesmen, were rarely able to see Germany with the 
steady, detached view so many could attain of France or even Russia. 7 
Numerous excerpts testify to the magnitude of Anglo-German ani-
mosity following the war. Although peace had been concluded, the English 
realized that dangers lurked. on the horizon, that Germany, under the 
influence of the Prussian nobility, threatened British freedom and securi-
ty. The Quarterly Review feared that Germany would be unable to halt its 
thirst for fUrther conquest and that it would very likely turn its armies 
loose upon its defenseless neighbors. In order to prevent the revival of 
despotism from Germany upon the smaller liberal states of Switzerland, 
Holland, Belgium and Denmark, as well as upon France, it called for a 
league of liberal powers to resist these encroachments. England, then, 
should 
enter into close relationship with the independent states of Europe, 
that if the autocrats of the North persist in indulging their old 
freak of enriching themselves at their neighbors expense, they may 
not find us unprepared to maintain the power and greatness of this 
country.S 
The Edinburgh Review, believing in the ultimate triumph of democracy, 
hoped for a more liberal Germany within a few generations, but it ad• 
mitted that the immediate future was dim. "We are at a loss whom we can 
7Raymond Sontag, Germany and Englapd: Background of Conflict, 
1848-1894 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1938), p. 95. 
S"The Future of Europe," Quarterly Review, LIII (April, 1871), 
545. 
trust and with whom we can act, because, in a word, the system of 
European policy has been destroyed, and as yet we see no approach to a 
reconstruction of it.•9 
No article made a deeper impression upon England than "The Fall 
of England or the Battle of Dorking," published in Blackwood' s.lo This 
article, written in a reminiscing fashion, tells the story of ·England's 
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failure to maintain her military strength and the successful invasion of 
England by Germany. Sir George Chesney, the author of this sensational 
item, wrote to the editor of Blackwood's, John Blackwood, on March ll, 
1871, a revealing letter concerning the proposed article: 
We have the quarrel with America and Russia, dispersion of all· our 
forces, followed by a rising in India. Sudden appearance of 
Germany on the scene, Sentimental platitudes of Messrs. Gladstone 
& Co., Trimming leaders in the "Times", Destruction of our "Field 
Line" by new torpedoes. Arsenal of 100,000 sanscrit-speaking 
Junkers brimming over with 'Geist' and strategy, Hurried defense 
of the chalk-range by the volunteers and militia, no commissariat, 
line turned, total defeat, rnreat on London, occupation of that 
place, and general smash up. · 
"The Battle of Dorking" was reprinted in sixpenny pamphlet form when the 
magazine was out of print. So successful was the venture that John 
Blackwood and his circle referred to 1871. for long afterwards as the year 
of the "Battle of Dorking."l2 Alexander Kinglake, author of the History 
of the Crimean W§r, wrote of the article: 
The 'Battle of Dorking' is capitally done, and one may venture to 
9"The German Empire," Edinburgh Revier, CIXXIII (April, 1871), 
265. 
10 (George Chesney 1, "The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscenses of 
a Volunteer," Blackwood's Magazine, CII (May, 1871), 539-72. 
llPorter, III, 300. 
12~., 298. 
hope that it will prove a really effective mode of conveying a 
much-needed warning. Throughout the imaginary record such an 
art of probability, and in that sense of truth, is so ski11fully 
and so firmly maintained.l3 
Even Lord Dunsany, who was an outspoken critic of France, noted as late 
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as 1874 that Englishmen who had taken seriously the "Battle of Dorking" 
had not abandoned their effort. While ignoring the military preparations 
of France, they persisted in their attack on Prussia.14 
The testimony of the growing anti-German feeling goes on indefi-
nitely. When Morier, Secretary of the Legation in Darmstadt, returned to 
England in the spring of 1871, he wrote: 
The anti-English violence I have had to contend against in Germany 
was bad enough, but nothing to the violence of Englishmen against 
Germany •••• The knowledge that I have been on the German side 
during the war ha§ caused me to be looked upon by many persons as 
a kind of fiend..l5 
Charles Gavard, the astute charg{ d'affaires, described English senti-
ments following the war. 
Fear of Germany ruled the situation; people lowered their voices 
when they spoke Bismarck's name, and they had even gone the 
length of convincing themselves by the logic of hope that he 
would re-establish the equilibrium of Europe.l6 
Edward Freeman unhappily observed that the British were in the midst of 
a panic 
directed, not against the power whic.h has so long threatened the 
peace and freedom of Europe, (i.e., France], but against the power 
which has given Europe at least a moment of peace in which it may 
13 JJ2!S.' 301. 
Ur>unsany, p. 14. 
15wemyss, II, 246. 
16Gavard, p. 6. 
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breathe freely.17 
In 1871, two books, George Meredith 1 s Harry Richmond and Matthew Arnold' s 
Friendship's Garland, pointed to the danger of future rivalry with 
Germany.18 A study of the English press reveals the same fear of Germany.l9 
The uneasiness in England towards the ascendency of Germany led 
to considerable concern for France. England, hoping to see the balance 
of power restored on the Continent, viewed with considerable satisfaction 
the remarkable speed with which France liquidated the German occupation, 
and it applauded the moderate regime of Thiers which, while opposed to 
the demands of the Left and the Right, called for the rapid payment of 
the indemnity and resisted the demands of the ultramontanes. Until the 
French had regained their financial solvency and restored their military 
power, an active foreign policy would be disastrous. The nation was in 
need of rest, not revolution, of recuperation rather than exertion. 
Although the English were not likely to make an alliance with 
France against Germany, they looked on French recovery as a prerequisite 
to the establishment of a balance of power. Lord Dunsany, who saw danger 
to Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium in a restoration of French 
supremacy, admitted: 
There lurks in the minds of many Englishmen a conviction that in 
some way or other, either by treaty, by some moral obligation, or 
by some paramount consideration of general interest, England is 
17Edward Freeman, •The Panic and Its Lessons," Macmi11•p's 
Magazine, XXIV {May, 1871), 2. 
18George Meredith, Harry Richmond (London: Constable & Co., 
Ltd., 1914), 310-19; Arnold, Friendship's GarJ.and, passim. 
l~itorial in Morni~g Post (London), June 19, 1871; Editorial 
in P:;: Mat£ Gazette (London , July 1, 1871; Editorial in Dail;r 
Telegraph London), June 19, 1871. 
bound to assist France to regain her former position.20 
The Times, for example, made no secret of its sympathy for France. 
''What M. Thiers wishes, what every one of his countrymen ought to aim 
at, is the final withdrawal of the Germans across the frontier.•21 
Thiers was well aware of British concern for France's welfare. 
In England, the nation, just and friendly, would not have liked to 
see Prussia so great, nor France, so weakened; it watched our re-
generation with deep interest; and if Mr. Gladstone and Lord 
Granville had no great leanings towards us, they were none the less 
determined not to allow any fresh violence in Europe on the part of 
the Prussians.22 
Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador to Germany, wrote on March 14, 
1873, to Lord Lyons: 
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It appears to me that the re-establishment of the future balance of 
power in Europe on a general peace footing, is the thing Diplomacy 
should work for, and that nothing can be done so long as the Germans 
have not their French gold and the French got rid of German 
soldiers.23 
Lord Lyons replied April 8, 1873. 
I entirely agree with you that the one object of diplomacy should 
be to re-establish the balance of power in Europe on a peace 
footing. The payment of the indemnity and departure of the German 
troops from France are of course necessary to the commencement of 
anything like a normal state of things.24 
Lord Salisbury, who had taken the side of France during the Franco-
Prussian War, hoped that France would recover its former position in 
20nunsany, pp. 225-26. 
21Editoria1 in Times (London), October 30, 1871. 
22Memoirs of M. Thiers, trans. F. M. Atkinson (New York: James 
Pott & Co., 1916), p. 168. 
23Newton, II, 41. 
24Ibid.' p. 42. 
order to act as a counter-weight to the German :Empire.25 Disraeli, at 
the Lord Mayor's banquet of 1874, expressed similar admiration for "the 
energy, the nerve and the resourcefulness, which have enabled France to 
overcome apparently insuperable difficulties after such unprecedented 
disaster.n26 
Another official indication of English sympathy towards France 
came during the diplomatic negotiations between England and France for 
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a Commercial Treaty. The British, in spite of their traditional love of 
free trade, made concessions to the French with the avowed purpose of 
facilitating the economic and financial recovery of France.27 
Meanwhile, the Germans who desired to consolidate their recent 
unification were seemingly bent on keeping the French in perpetual sub-
servience, looking with growing disfavor, as early as 1872, on the 
military reforms of Thiers. In the spring of 1872, the German General 
Staff called for a preventive war against France, but Bismarck, whose 
influence was paramount, urged the Emperor to fight France morally 
through the quarrel with Rome.28 Odo Russell wrote to Lord Granville 
on November .3, 1872: "A second war with France would almost be popular 
at this moment, -- but why -- I cannot tell you. -- The Prussians seem 
to think France is still too strong for the future peace of Germany.•29 
25cecil, II, 129-.30. 
26catherine Gavin, 
Century Relations (London: 
27Block, p. 28. 
28Newton, II, 29. 
Britain and Frapce: a Study of Twentieth 
Jonathan Cope, 1941), p. 17. 
29tetters from the Berlin Embassy. 1871-1874· 1880-1885, p. 73. 
The force of English opinion was openly revealed when in 
September, 1872 the British received news of the conclusion of the 
League of the Three Emperors. The general public knew nothing of the 
details of the negotiations between the powers, but the numerous inter-
views between the heads of state were sufficient to indicate a drawing 
together of the Central European Powers. Also, certain German news-
papers gave an exaggerated account of its importance, claiming that it 
was an event of world-shattering significance.30 We know now, however, 
that these estimates were far from the actual conclusions reached at 
the meetings. Their agreements did not extend to the re-establishment 
of French military prestige. Gorchakov, at the same time, assured 
Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador at Berlin, that Russia's European 
policy was based on a strong France.31 Nevertheless, the English 
accused the Germans of intending to,exercise a diplomatic preponderance 
on the Continent to the disadvantage of France and European peace. The 
Times, for example, declared that as long as the •Three Emperors' 
League" was responsible for continuing the peace, it was in England's 
interest. There was no certainty, however, that Bismarck did not have 
other motives in drawing together these powers.32 The Pall Mall 
Gazette, speaking less cautiously, warned: "The probability of war 
breaking out in 1873 or 1874 is far greater now than it was six months 
ago, and it is the meeting of the Emperors which has increased it.n33 
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England, the article continued, should meet this threat to the balance 
of power by strengthening its military forces.34 On the other hand, the 
Tablet, which fully recognized the aggressiveness of Prussian policy, 
believed that for the present Bismarck was too busy digesting his recent 
conquests to begin a new war.35 The Spectator, however, regarded the 
meeting of the Emperors with suspicion, intimating that Bismarck was too 
energetic and that his policy was an offense to France.36 In a cartoon 
entitled "The Three Imperial Witches," ?unch pictured the Three Emperors 
meeting with MacBeth. The latter was exclaiming, "Now, then; you secret, 
black and midnight wags! What's your little game?" Especially charac-
teristic of the caricature was the presentation of the Kaiser sitting on 
a chair on which was written "Holy Alliance.n37 The Morning Post was led 
by the interview to remark: 
At present, at any rate, France and England are very necessary to 
each other. The internecine rivalry of the two great Western 
Powers has gradually given place to ~he expediency of union be-
tween the two great western powers.3 
It is clear that English public opinion was unwilling to permit 
a further weakening of France by Germany, and the importance of the 
English press, in this situation, especially as it affected governmental 
/ policy, is revealed by the memoirs of the French attache in London, 
Charles Gavard. 
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I insisted at some length to Lord Granville that the absentees 
should profit by the occasion to come to an understanding with 
one another, and should unite the two nations on the basis of 
material interest as a parallel to the embraces the three poten-
tates were exchanging behind closed doors. I caused this thesis 
to be developed also in the newspapers, which bore their part in 
the negotiation. I was and I am convinced that, if one wants to 
manage any business properly in England, he must, at the same 
time that he addresses the government, negotiate directly with 
public opinion through the press and through members of 
Parliament or of the Chambers of Commerce, if there be at issue 
any question which concerns them. I have never neglected this 
device, and have always found the good of it, both in 1872 and 
later in 1875, with the Conservative Cabinet • .39 
The British government was openly disturbed by the negotiations 
between Austria, Russia, and Germany. Bismarck, who was aware of 
British suspicions, assured the English Ambassador, Odo Russell, that 
the meeting of the emperors was pacific and that no agreements were 
reached,40 and Andrassy, the Austrian Foreign Minister, seeking to re-
move all fears from the minds of the English, told Russell that he had 
the highest regard for England, and that he regretted English neutrali-
ty prevented it from intimate co-operation with Auatria.41 
In spite of these assurances, considerable uneasiness was felt, 
not only in Fleet Street but by the government towards these meetings. 
Indeed, on September 18, a British naval squadron was ordered to 
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Le Havre to greet Thiers. The latter accepted the British courtesy, but, 
anxious lest the Russians misinterpret this friendly move, the President 
assured the Russians that an alliance with Moscow would be more bene-
ficial than one with England.42 These civilities by the British at 
.39Gavard, p. 125. 
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Le Havre, however, did not go unnoticed by the French press, which looked 
"upon these courtesies as a kind of counterpoise to the Berlin inter-
view.•43 Charles Gavard took credit for managing this demonstration of 
English friendship, and he maintained that England's intervention er-
fectively checked German aggression. 
I certainly had my day with M. Thiers during his sojourn at Trouville; 
rumors or it reached me from all sides; it was I who prevented the 
Emperor's descending upon France; it was I who hurried off Her 
Majesty's ship of war to the coast or the British channel to salute 
the president.44 
Another occasion for expressing the growing cordiality between 
England and France came later in the fall when the Prince of Wales visited 
with Thiers at Trouville. At this meeting, the Prince confided to Thiers 
his fears or German expansion. The President, playing upon the Prince's 
concern for France, urged him to impress upon Bismarck the resolve of the 
French to maintain the peace.45 Their conversation was watched by a 
German spy, who reported the meeting to Bismarck. The Chancellor, who 
detected in the interview the signs of a rapprochement, affected con-
siderable alarm. 46 
On the other hand, there were limits to British concern for 
French difficulties. Not only were the English unwilling to seek an 
alliance with the French, but many Englishmen expressed fear lest the 
French desire for revenge, coupled with France's military r~forms, pro-
voke Bismarck into a preventive action. If France were to take revenge 
43nchronicle of the Week,• Tablet, VIII (September 21, 1872), 356. 
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prematurely against Germany, England and France would both suf'fer. 
While the English desired France to recover from the war and to act as 
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a counter-poise to Germany, they did not welcome any abrupt changes in 
France's military position. In appraising the work of Thiers, the Times 
noted that the military reforms of Thiers had led to uneasiness in 
European cabinets, especially in Germany, and it frankly wondered if 
France could be really bent on maintaining peace by its war-like prepa-
ration. 
Whatev.er France may do towards the extension of her national arma-
ment can have no other object than to stimulate Germany to equal 
or even greater exertions •••• M. Thiers may well proclaim before 
the world that he is 1 only arming for peace'. The world knows that 
the proof of an armament is war.47 
The Spectator was of the opinion that the real danger of war in Europe 
arose from the character and history of Thiers, and not from any policy 
of the German leaders. It characterized Thiers as a profound egoist, 
and an ardent patriot, nursing personal grudges against Bismarck and 
preparing for war.48 The DailY Telegraph believed that the French army 
reorganization imperilled the peace and that France should seek to con-
ciliate rather than to antagonize Germany.49 The French, according to 
the Saturday Review, should think twice before embarking upon a milita-
ristic policy, as they were in no position to undertake a war of 
revenge.50 British officials in diplomatic circles shared with public 
opinion the view that France should avoid giving any offense to Germany. 
47E.:Utorial in Times (London, April .3, 1872. 
48nThiers," Spectator, XLIII (April 1.3, 1872), 270. 
49Jditorial in Daily Telegraph (London), April 24, 1872. 
50"France," SaturdayReview, XXXIII (Aprill.3, 1S'72), 421. 
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The British Ambassador to Germany, Lard Odo Russell, observed that France 
should extricate itself from German occupation and meet the indemnity be-
fore it took any overt move against Germany. 51 This opinion was held by 
Lord Lyons, Ambassador to France, who considered France's chief interest 
to be a policy of friendship towards all powera.52 
Furthermore, the English government viewed with considerable 
alarm the French attempt to seek an understanding with Russia. Such an 
agreement, rather than giving security to the French would, like the 
military reforms of Thiers, give offense to Bismarck. Lord Lyons was 
suspicious of the proposed accord between France and Russia lest it cast 
France into an unprepared war with Germany; he declared that Thiers 1 
efforts to effect this alliance were very unwise.53 Lord Granville, the 
Foreign Secretary, sent a personal message to Thiers through the 
Princess of Galliera, in which he warned the President of a too close 
rapporochement with Russia.54 And, again, when Thiers suggested to Lord 
Lyons that England, Russia, and France should act together to prevent a 
German attempt to place a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne, the British 
Ambassador advised Thiers that such a move would unnecessarily provoke 
Germany and postpone the evacuation of French territory.55 
Another aspect of English opinion was the minority which out• 
rightly advocated an anti-French policy. Lard John Russell, the elder 
5~ewton, II, 41. 
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statesman, as well as those who agreed with him, turned to Germany because 
of the religious question. As MacMahon's regime was clerical, this group 
looked towards Germany during the Kulturkampf as the defender of European 
religious liberty.56 English Protestants, led by representatives of the 
Carlton, Reform and National Clubs, were greatly disturbed by the recently 
proclaimed doctrine of papal infallibility. In order to express their 
opposition to the menace of Catholicism under its infallible pope and to 
express sympathy for the Kulturkampf in Germany, they held an anti-
Catholic meeting on January 27, 1874. According to Lillian Wallace, the 
general atmosphere of the St. James Hall meeting was very definitely 
opposed to the ultramontanes of France.57 This same anti-French policy 
was espoused by Lord Dunsany, the author of a book entitled Gaul or 
Teuton? which in nearly three hundred pages called .for co-operation be-
tween England and Germany. He devotes much space to raising the specter 
of old Napoleon, depicts Germany as a traditional bulwark against Russia, 
and even resorts to the argument of common ancestry. He suspected that 
Thiers dreamed of a League of Latins, and that England would have no 
place in such a reactionary undertaking. 
Dismissing altogether as out of place here the purely religious 
part of the question, a Liberal Government in England can hardly 
desire the prevalence of that Ultramontanism which all over the 
Continent is considered directly antagonistic to Liberalism. 
But should France uniting Roman Catholic Europe under the banners 
of religion, seek to overwhelm the Protestant States of Germany, 
whatever were the Government of England, her place could not be 
in that alliance.58 
Hence, it was mischievous to assert the duty of the French nation to 
~loch, p. 29. 
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recover its military position. Instead, 
the safest and most natural alliance for this country would seem 
to be with the kindred race of the sober and steady Teuton, rather 
than the bright and amiable but too volatile and vainglorious Gaul. 59 
Numerous developments in 1S73 and 1874 led the governments of 
Europe to more sharply define their policies. Bismarck was distressed 
by the summoning of a conservative ministry in France under MacMahon, a 
convinced royalist. Awed by the rapid recovery of France, which by 
September 1S73 succeeded in regaining authority from the departing 
Germans, Bismarck made moves in the spring and summer of 1S73 to complete 
the diplomatic isolation of France. To effect this end, he furthered 
negotiations with Austria and Russia; later in the year, he drew Italy, 
alarmed by the course of French politics, into this association of 
powers in the north of Europe. His most effective weapon, however, was 
a struggle with the Roman Catholic party of Germany. This step was in-
tended to further the isolation of France and to enlist greater support 
for the new German Empire. Odo Russell reported to Granville: 
The generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight France 
before she is ready than after, but Bismarck, who scorns the 
generals, advises the Emperor to fight France morally tgoough 
Rome and the Catholic alliances against united Germany. 
Then, to appease the English, who continued to regard with distrust the 
designs of Bismarck,61 the Chancellor assured them that the combination 
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of powers offered no threat to England. 62 
Yet Bismarck's elaborate edifice began to crumble when there-
lations between Germany and France entered upon a new period of crisis. 
The clerical regime of MacMahon, looking askance at the Kulturkampf, and, 
growing more confident, especially after the evacuation of France by the 
last of the German soldiers, began to take a stronger line in its dealings 
with Germany. A number of French prelates responded to the attack upon 
the Holy See by offering prayers for the return of Alsace and Lorraine 
and by protesting Bismarck's anti-Catholic program. The resulting polemi-
cal violenee, which c-aused the Bishop of Ntnes to refer to the German 
tradition o£ "baseness and immorality,n63 went beyond the mark, causing 
Bismarck to make renewed demands on the French government. The 
Chancellor insisted that MaCMahon renounce those utterances and take the 
necessary steps to check any fUture incidents. He told Gontaut-Biron, 
the French Ambassador, that such slanders rendered war more likely. 
If you permit these things to go on it is you who will have rendered 
war inevitable, and we shall wage it before the clerical party, 
returning to power, declares it in the name of the persecuted 
Catholic religion. That is why your projects of monarchical resto-
ration have not pleased me. I mistrust the influencg which your 
clericals would exercise over the Count of Chambord. 4 
Meanwhile, the official German press took a very aggressive tone, and, 
by January, 1874, Europe was confronted with a fUll scale war scare. 
Bismarck discovered, however, that the other powers were unwilling 
to allow France to be further humiliated. Decazes, the French Foreign 
Minister, who was anxious to alert European opinion, appealed to Russia 
62Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 34. 
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and Austria and received assurances that they would not allow Bismarck 
to make war on France. Even the Italians, whom Bismarck was counting on, 
held back and pursued a cautious policy. As the threat of a royalist 
coup passed in France, the Italians saw less need of a closer alliance. 
England, which had never committed herself to the Continental 
grouping, did not remain indifferent to the new developments in Europe. 
In spite of their sympathy for the Kulturkampf, the English were unready 
to accept the permanent weakening of France and dreaded the prospect of 
a new war. While there was considerable sympathy, especially among the 
ardent Protestant faction, for Bismarck's policy, others feared that the 
Chancellor might use the new agitation as a pretext for a new attack 
against France. In the latter case the balance of power would compel 
England to side with the French. Thus, when Bismarck carried the 
campaign against Catholicism beyond his borders, English sympathy, which 
at first was favorable to the Kulturkampf, went out to France.65 
It is not difficult to discover the origin of English suspicions. 
Following the Peace of Frankfort, public opinion, on the whole, desired 
to see France recover from the war and re-establish a new equilibrium 
on the Continent. Indeed, much of England's attitude toward France was 
in part a consequence of the growing mistrust of Germany. Odo Russell, 
writing on March 14, 1873, to Lord Lyons from Berlin, asserted that the 
object of Bismarck's policy was 
the neutralization of the influence and power of the Latin race in 
France and elsewhere. To obtain these objects he will go any lengths 
while he lives, so that we must be prepared for surprises in the 
future. • •• The Germans, as you know, look upon the war of revenge 
65wallace, p. 259. 
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as unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it. Germany 
is in reality a great camp ready to break up for any war at a week's 
notice with a million of men. We are out of favor with the Germans 
for preferring the old French alliagge to a new German one, as our 
commercial policy is said to prove. 
These sentiments were re-enforced by Victoria's daughter, the German 
Crown Princess, who had little respect for Realpolitik.67 Also, it is 
known that the Austrian Ambassador to London, Count Beust, an old foe of 
Bismarck, actively encouraged this distrust of German policy.68 
By early 1874, when Franco-German rivalry reached its climax, 
England was definitely uneasy. Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Granville on 
January 17, 1874: 
But may not his [Bismarck's) eagerness in his contest with the 
Ultramontanes continue and carry him on to language and even to 
measures against France from which it may be difficult to draw 
back? and of course there is a limit to the submission of the 
French Government, however disastrous it may know the conse-
quences of resistance to be. It is difficult to persecute any 
religion in these days, but it is impossible for the French 
Government to set itself in violent opposition to the predominant 
religion in France •••• It may be very easy to bully and to 
crush France, but will it be possible to do this without raising 
a storm in other quarters?69 
On February 24, in a letter to Lord Derby, Lyons again forcefully 
indicated his fear of Bismarck's policy. 
I am afraid the peace of Europe depends entirely upon the view 
Bismarck may take of the easiest means of bringing all German-
speaking nations under one rule. The wolf can always find 
reasons for quarreling with the lamb.70 
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Actually, Lyons was well informed; Odo Russell had written four days 
previously: 
Now, his policy, as you know, is to mediatize the minor States of 
Germany and to annex the German Provinces of Austria, so as to 
make one great centralized Power of the German-speaking portions 
of Europe. To accomplish this he may require another war. • • • 
His anti-Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with any 
Power he pleases by declaring that he has discovered an anti-
German conspiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to 
fight.71 
Lord Granville admitted that the situation in France and the 
schemes of the clerical party constituted a threat, but he believed a 
greater danger lurked at Berlin.72 Gladstone, who was anxious to keep 
the peace, thought that England might do something to calm Bismarck. 
On January 24, 1874, he wrote to Lord Granville: 
Might we not do the F (French] G [Government) a good turn by 
stating at Berlin, in view of the late declaration of Due de 
Decazes about Italy, that we are impressed with the belief that 
they are endeavoring in good faith to extricate themselves from 
the trammels in which they were involved by the prior and 
continuous policy of France from 1849 onwards respecting Rome, 
and that we hoped Germany would do everything to help and en-
courage them so to extricate themselves, and to secure a firmer 
position in the face of the Pope and ClergyA in the manner least 
likely to arouse national susceptibilities.r3 
Sir Henry Hoare, M. P., a very popular English politician, 
criticized the Gladstone administration in a speech at Chelsea on 
February 2, 1874, for their neglect of foreign affairs. He declared: 
Yes, gentlemen, I am for France, because she has been brutally dis-
membered; I am against those who have wrenched Alsace and Lorraine 
from her. I am against the man who wishes to hinder that great 
country from taking her place again among nations; and against him 
71 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
72Fitzmaurice, II, 14. 
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who wishe~ to lay down the law for the press even beyond the German 
frontier. 4 
English suspicions were so intense that Queen Victoria on February 10, 
1874, wrote to the German Emperor declaring her sympathy for Protestant 
Germany in any misunderstanding with Catholic France, unless, of course, 
Germany was using the religious issue to blast a weakened foe. She also 
reminded him of the efforts made by the French government to curb its 
press and of France's lack of military preparation. 
Notwithstanding an active and restless minority, the English nation, 
as a whole, is essentially Protestant, and its sympathies would be 
entirely with Germany in any difference with France, unless there 
was an appearance of a disposition on the part of Germany to avail 
herself of her greatly superior force to crush and annihilate a 
beaten foe, and thus to engender the belief that a strong and united 
Germany was not, after all, the expected mainstay of European peace. 
I need hardly say that for myself I do not share such apprehensions, 
but if Germany, through incessant provocations of a fanatical Press 
and priesthood in France (where, however, the Government do all in 
their power to keep both under control), were at last to resort to 
renewed war with France, this might lead to lamentable consequences, 
although there is nobody in doubt as to the issue, in a military 
sense, of such a struggle. Being sensible that the fate of Europe 
rests in your hands, after such unparalleled successes, I venture 
to express my hope that you have the power and -- no doubt -- also 
the will to be magnanimous. 75 
The French government was well informed of Britain's concern for 
its fate. Odo Russell told his French counter-part at Berline, Gontaut-
Biron: 
One cannot tell how far this man rBismarck] may go in his pre-
tentions. It might be necessary ~or the EUropean powers to come to 
an understanding to stop his encroachments on the rights of liberty.76 
Several days later the British told the French of the Queen's letter.77 
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The French, of course, were pleased that England, as well as Italy, 
Russia, and Austria, seemed to be unwilling to surrender to the demands 
of Germany. Decazes, who was encouraged by England 1 s friendship, even 
spoke of a league of neutrals to defend France in its rivalry with 
Germany.78 
Internal circumstances in England in early 1874 served to 
promote closer relations between England and France. A new current of 
opinion, partly in protest to English passivity and partly a resUlt of 
the European situation, had captured the imagination of Englishmen. 
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The gradual veering of English opinion in favor of a more active foreign 
policy was accelerated by the economic situation. In 1873 there pre-
vailed a serious economic crisis, accompanied by much discontent, and 
Englishmen, seeking a remedy, called for a more vigorous policy. As a 
consequence, in February, 1874, Benjamin Disraeli became Prime Minister 
and, unlike Gladstone, took a keen interest in continental and colonial 
affairs; he hoped thereby to reassert England's prestige and power. 
Obviously this change in the state of affairs in England was welcomed by 
the French. Disraeli not only stood for a less passive foreign policy, 
but also mistrusted Bismarck. Under his leadership, England and France 
drew closer together. Decazes declared: 
The accession to power of the Tory cabinet has caused us great satis-
faction; not that we believe much in the enterprise and initiative of 
Lord Derby, not even that we suppose him disposed to react very ener-
getically against the Queen's tendencies; but because, carried to 
power as it has been by a current of opinion relatively hostile to the 
systematic abstention of England in continental affairs, presided over 
by Mr. Disraeli, who dreams of Palmerstonian fame, this Cabinet must 
inevitably be influenced by the consequences of the situation, which 
78r.anger, European Alliances and Alignments,· p. 41. 
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will develop under the pressure or circumstances.79 
.. 
Disraeli, on returning to power, was quick to realize that German 
ascendancy had revolutionized the European situation. On November 9, 
1874, Disraeli, with the French Ambassador in attendance, spoke with great 
admiration for France at the Lord Mayor's banquet. He asserted, 
Without entering into further details, I can but express my astonish-
ment and my admiration for the nerve and elasticity thanks to which 
France has come out or apparently inextricable difficulties and un-
precedented disasters, as well as my sympathy for the magnanimity and 
prudence of her present rulers.BO 
As he continued, his comments assumed a marked anti-Bismarckian flavor.81 
These words caused Decazes to write to Jarnac, the French Ambassador to 
England, on November 11, 1874: 
The expressions of the Prime Minister are the most favorable that 
have been uttered for five years about our poor France and her 
Government; they will §o round the world, leaving everywhere a 
beneficial impression. 2 
In addition to the foregoing amenities, the Prince of Wales paid 
a visit to MaCMahon in the fall of 1874, during which he assured the 
President or England's concern for France before the manacing attitude or 
Germany.83 Decazes communicated the Prince's remarks to the major 
embassies and added that London frequently made known rumors or German 
aggression to the Paris government.84 France, seeking to exploit England's 
79Hanotaux, II, 413. 
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solicitude, encouraged the English rapprochement with France in 1874 b,y 
calling attention to German naval construction.85 
The War Scare 
28.3 
By 1875, Bismarck's enemies had recovered from their humiliation 
and, so Bismarck charged, were seeking to undermine triumphant Germany. 
He was particularly apprehensive of ultramontanism in Belgium, Italy, and 
France. Furthermore, Russia, hitherto aligned with Germany in the Three 
Emperor's League, was showing an inclination to seek the friendship of 
France. To counteract this latter development, Radowitz, head of the 
Department for Eastern Affairs at the Foreign Office, was sent to restore 
Russia's role in the League of the Three Emperors. 
While Radowitz was busy in St. Petersburg, Bismarck was alarming 
Europe by pursuing an energetic policy against Belgium and France, whom 
he imagined were evolving an ultramontane plot against Germany. The 
Chancellor showed his irritation, first of all, against Belgium. On 
February .3, he demanded that the Belgian government, which he strongly 
suspected of ultramontanism, take action against three archbishops who 
had sympathized with Bismarck's enemies in Germany, and against a 
Belgian subject, a certain Duchesne, who had made known to the Archbishop 
of Paris his offer to assassinate Bismarck for a fee. The German 
Chancellor, already irritated with the Church, called on Belgium to modi-
fy its legislation so that neighboring states would not be disturbed by 
Belgian subjects. 
Realizing the seriousness of the German charge, the Belgian govern-
ment ordered Count Borchgrave, the chief of the Foreign Office, to Berlin 
85Editorial in Pall Mall Gazette (London), January 7, 1875. 
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in order to present Belgium's official explanations. The Belgians replied, 
in effect, that they maintained such laws as were necessary to fulfill 
their international obligations. Such evasive endeavors failed to satisfy 
the German government. 
The French government expressed its uneasiness regarding recent 
international affairs when, on March 11, Decazes drew the attention of 
Lord Lyons to Germany's recent bullying tactics. These included Bismarck's 
notes to Belgium and the publication of a decree prohibiting the export of 
horses from Germany;86 the latter situation bad come about as a result of 
rumors that France was seeking to purchase horses in Germany for its army. 
Soon, however, France aroused a storm with the passage of the 
-
military "Law of the Fourth Battalions." Bismarck, acting from either 
fear or calculation, expressed alarm towards the latest law, as German 
military authorities estimated that the new legislation would increase 
the size of the French army by 144,000 men. While the French press main-
tained that this was a purely defensive measure, the German press 
attributed to France aggressive intentions. Near the end of March, the 
Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitune, hearing that a French artillery com-
mittee had called on several arms factories in Switzerland and Austria, 
accused the French of preparing to make war within two years.87 
On the other hand, London had become more or less accustomed to 
the frequent aggravation of affairs and there was little alarm. Most 
English statesmen did not believe that Germany actually contemplated a 
war. Disraeli even seemed to be looking for a rapprochement with 
8~ewton, II, 68. 
87winifred Taffs, "The War Scare of 1875," Slavonic Review, 
II (December, 1930), 342. 
Bismarck. He told the German envoy, Count Miinster, that 
he had never believed even in Napoleon III's time that France was, 
or even could be, a sincere ally of England. The only people who 
could go hand in han~A as must ever appear more plainly, were 
Germany and England. 
These remarks of Disraeli indicate, if nothing more, that he did not 
foresee any difficulty with Germany. Furthermore, Lord Odo Russell re-
fused to accept the contention that the peace of Europe was threatened. 
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He asserted that Bismarck was anxious to carry through his plans without 
resorting to war and, anyway, that Austria was in greater danger than 
France.89 Regardless of these assurances, Lord Derby, uneasy at so many 
disturbing symptoms, approached Count Munster in order to determine his 
attitude toward the war rumors. MUnster assured Lord Derby that France 
had nothing to fear from Germany as long as it did not seek revenge. 
Germany was required to take certain measures, such as the prohibition 
against the exportation of horses, as a defense against possible 
attack.9° Derby was satisfied with this confirmation of Odo Russell's 
estimate; he assured Munster of England's friendly attitude toward 
Germany and resolved not to press Germany for explanations of the Belgian 
note.91 Moreover, the interdict on the exportation of horses, which led 
to considerable tension in France, did not ruffle the English. When 
Gavard, who was in charge of the French Embassy, referred in a conver-
sation with Lord Derby to the threats of Bismarck, he found Derby without 
any anxiety. The latter declared: 
88 Ibid., p. 341. 
89Ibid., p. 343. 
90Ibid. 
9loavard, p. 244. 
No news, good news. I see nothing on the Continent to alarm us for 
the preservation of peace. I repeat what I said to you a year ago; 
I have no anxiety about this year •••• He [Bismarck) is credited 
often enough nowadays with calculations and combinations when he is 
merely yielding to an outbreak of temper; such for example is the 
interdict put upon the exportation of horses: a measure conceived 
in a moment of passion, which harms nobody but the German producers. 
Don't fancy it an indication of extraordinary preparations ~f an 
immediate establishment of the German army on a war basis.9 
On March 16, in a note to Lyons, Derby wrote: 
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I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Decazes' anxiety. 
Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to justify 
alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace •••• Until we 
hear more, I shall be inclined to set down all these rumors of war 
to the time of year, and to the absence of any exciting questions 
(so far as foreign relations are concerned) to occupy men's minds.93 
Lord Lyons wrote to Derby on the same day, saying: "I saw Decazes last 
night and found him in a greater state of alarm about the intentions of 
Germany than anything specific he told me.seemed to warrant.n94 Conse-
quently, he went home on leave at the beginning of April. On April 10, 
Odo Russell likewise observed in a note .to Derby that the diplomatic 
representatives in Berlin foolishly anticipated war and accused him of 
being misled by Bismarck.95 
Meanwhile, these diplomatic maneuvers were paralleled by 
sparrings in the German press. On March 31, the National Zeitypg charged 
that the expansion of the French army was a threat to Germany. Europe 
scarcely had absorbed this bit of disturbing journaliBm, when there 
appeared in the Berlin Post, on April 8, an article entitled "Is War In 
92Ibid., p. 234. 
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Sight?" The article, written in the most authoritative terms, was received 
with alarm both inside and outside Germany, as it was attributed to the in• 
spiration of the German government. 
Coming at a time when Franco-German relations were already tense, 
these news items aroused serious concern. The British press, both Liberal 
and Tory, were inclined to back France. The liberal Daily News took 
Germany to task for her belligerent reaction to French rearmament. 
The French army is being reorganized, but Germany knew when it named 
the conditions of peace that France would endeavor to build up her 
military force at the first opportunity •••• But the German minis-
terial journals do not stop here. They represent the French 
Government as actually contemplating war and preparing for it. • • • 
But, in the contrary case, -- that of the continuation of the publi-
cation of articles like that we have discussed -- the only conclusion 
to which Europe could come would be that a resolution had been de-
liberately_formed at Berlin to force a war upon an unprepared 
neighbor.96 
Five days later, the conservative Morning Post observed: 
Whatever may happen between Germany and France, the latter country 
will have the sympathies of the world in general. • • • The world 
cannot think that France is to blame when, left without any defensi-
ble frontiers, she seeks to provide against attacks from without • 
• • • Of course the master of many legions, trained deliberately for 
immediate action, may at his sole will attack a neighbor and plunge 
Europe into war, but he ought not to be able to do so without in-
curring the profoundest reprehensions, at the very least, of the 
whole civilized world.97 
The Standard believed that the language of the Berlin article was calcu-
lated to excite apprehension and that there was reason to feel that 
Bismarck desired a struggle with the French.98 
Under the circumstances, the English press also took the 
~itorial in Dailx News (London), April 10, 1875. 
97Editorial in Morning Post (London), April 15, 1875. 
98Editorial in Standard (London), April 10, 1875. 
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opportunity to denounce Bismarck's demands on Belgium. It could find no 
excuse for Bismarck's defiance of Belgian neutrality. His demands that 
Belgium alter its laws so as to accommodate Germany were without any pre-
tense of justification. The Times asserted that it was impossible that 
Germany contemplated monstrous designs against Belgium, but let it be 
known that Germany had no right to lecture to Belgium in that overbearing 
fashion.99 The Daily Telegraph observed that the harshness of Bismarck's 
Belgian policy was out of all proportion to the alleged offense. Belgium 
had not departed from her neutrality; rather, Bismarck had acted in an 
unmannerly way •100 The Pall Mall Gazette, following a thorough analysis 
of Bismarck's Belgian demands and the recent article in the Post, asserted 
that Bismarck's threats imperiled the peace of Europe in a way not unlike 
that of the first Napoleon.lOl Gavard, speaking of the latest note 
delivered to Belgium and the article which appeared in the Berlin Post, 
wrote to Decazes on April 10: 
The blame is universal. The Times speaks only of the note and enters 
into the views which seem to be those of the English government. It 
recommends to the Cabinet in Brussells to prepare to make some 
arrangement for the Duschesne affair •••• It ended in expressing 
the hope that Germany would not persevere in a doctrine so untenable. 
The Standard, the Telegraph, and, what is noticeable, the Daily News 
have a great deal more life in the expression of their reprobation; 
they all attempt to refute the article of the Berlin journal, and 
demonstrate, in the future, the absurdities of the accusations directed 
against the French gover.nment.l02 
On the diplomatic front, Lord Odo Russell, who had sought to play 
down the previous rumors, and, who had assured the English government of 
99uitorial in Times (London), April 8, 1875. 
lO~itorial in Daily Telegraph (London), April 8, 1875. 
101Editorial in Pall Mall Gazette (London), April 9, 1875. 
102Dogument diplomatigues fran;aise, I, 397. 
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Bismarck's desire for peace, admitted that the representatives of the 
other powers at Berlin actually believed that war was imminent. While he 
indicated his distaste for the German saber-rattling very clearly to Lord 
Derby, he still refused to accept the inevitability of war.103 Count 
Munster wrote to Bismarck on April 13, that he had visited Lord Derb,y on 
the afternoon that the article in the ~ became known and that he found 
"the Minister, usually so calm, in a somewhat excited state of mind. He 
said that it almost seemed as though the fears in Paris of an attack by 
Germany were not altogether unfounded.nl04 He went on to say that Derby 
possessed a strong belief in France's unreadiness for war for another ten 
years and of her strong desire for peace.105 There is no doubt that 
Disraeli was greatly concerned with the threats of Bismarck,106 and that 
the Prince of Wales was of the French view. The latter told Count 
Shuvalov, the Russian Ambassador, that the English regarded German policy 
with such distaste "that, if need, this country would be ready to take up 
arms for the defense of Belgium's rights.•l07 
In spite of the urgings of Decazes upon the English to take an 
active part in protesting against the Germans, the English statesmen, 
though concerned for the peace of Europe, were unwilling to use force. 
Disraeli wished to cultivate friendship with France but believed that 
103Newton, II, 72. 
104German Diplomatic Documents. 1871-1214, ed. and trans. Edgar 
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any special understanding between the two powers would arouse the wrath 
of Bismarck.108 Lord Lyons, still on leave, accused Decazes or perpetu-
ally crying "wolr.nl09 Derby, on April 19, gave assurance to the House 
of Lords that he perceived no reason to think that the freedom or the 
independence of Belgium was in danger.llO Gavard rather despairingly 
admitted: urn effect in the month of April the Tory ministry regarded 
the state of Europe with the same optimism and quite as little foresight 
as the ministry that preceeded it.~ 
The British press, on the whole, accepted the stand of the Tory. 
government. The Times acknowledged that pu.blic opinion was right to 
protest German action in reference to Belgium, but it held that public 
opinion had exaggerated the German threat. England should draw from 
these events a determination to play a greater roll in continental ar-
fairs, but there was no need to watch events with alarm, or to look for 
sinister designs.112 The Daily Telegraph expressed a willingness to 
accept the friendly character assigned to German-Belgian relations, but 
it lectured Germany upon the fact that freedom of the press involved a 
certain amount of license.ll.3 The Daily News, at first, had displayed 
considerable alarm; it now expressed relief to hear that English opinion 
had exaggerated the tenor of the German note to Belgium, and that the 
l~ewton, II, 7.3. 
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matter was at an end.114 Like most critics, the Standard was reassured 
to a certain extent by Derby's speech, but it still regarded Germany with 
suspicion.ll5 On the other hand, the Morning Post refused to dismiss the 
Belgian case as quickly as the Ii!!!u or Derby did. As long as Germany 
arrogated to itself a special license in lecturing and dictating to the 
world, the peace would be in jeopardy.ll6 
The French Ambassador to Berlin, Gontaut-Biron, returning to his 
post after a vacation, faced a very delicate situation. As the French 
government was in no position to go to war, the Ambassador assumed a con• 
ciliatory tone without, however, actually retracting any of the French 
legislation. Thus, he was well received by the German government, which 
assured him that the fear of war was the work of an irresponsible press. 
It appeared, at least for the moment, that the danger had passed.ll7 
The most significant phase of the "scare" stemmed from a conver-
sation on April 21, 1875, between the French Ambassador, Gontaut-Biron, 
and Radowitz, one of Bismarck's confidential agents. As reported by 
Gontaut-Biron, Radowitz discussed the very objectionable preventive war 
theories of Moltke and maintained that Germany would have to undertake 
a preventive war against France if it became obvious that the latter was 
determined to seek revenge. 
Decazes saw in the report great possibilities. His plan was to 
utilize the information in such a way that France would be placed under 
l14zditorial in Daily News (London), April 20, 1875. 
ll~itorial in Standard (London), April 20, 1875. 
ll~itorial in Morning Post (London), April 20, 1875. 
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the protection of England and Russia, while Bismarck, who would be nearly 
isolated, would be forced to back down. In addition to the diplomatic 
triumph, France would be assured the freedom to rearm and regain, if 
possible, its historic role in European international affairs. Consequent-
ly, Decazes, desiring to place Germany before Europe as a warmonger, was 
not slow to take advantage of the opportunity. He at once dispatched 
copies of Gontau-Biron's communiqulto the capitals of Europe with in• 
structions to communicate the contents to the foreign courts as evidence 
of Germany1s determination to resort to a preventive war. 
A week later Count KGrolyi told Odo Russell of a similar conver-
sation in which the Chancellor said, as reported by Lord Russell to Lord 
Derby: 
If the French continued their preparations on the present scale, and 
their intentions for attacking Germany admitted no further doubt --
it would be manifestly the duty of the German Government to take the 
initiative so as to put a stop to war by energetic measures.llS 
Meanwhile, the English government was receiving disquieting reports 
from Odo Russell in Berlin, which recapitulated a conversation between the 
Belgian Ambassador to Germany and Moltke. According to these reports, 
Moltke was determined on war within a year if the powers did not get to-
gether and persuade France to reduce its armaments, and he intimated that 
Belgium had best take military precautions, as it might have to defend its 
neutrality sooner than it expected.ll9 These unsettling reports were con-
firmed on May 2, when Moltke, in an.interview with Russell, said that 
France's military reorganization would necessitate a preventive war.120 
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These dispatches from France and Lord Russell tended to shatter 
Derby's complacency. Although he still refused to believe there was any 
real danger of a war, he expressed the hope on May 3, that the Tsar's 
attitude would check Germany's war threat. He predicted that the English, 
notwithstanding their sympathy for the Protestant German Empire, would 
never accept Bismarck's terms.l2l 
Decazes continued to make efforts to alert England to the machi-
nations of Bismarck. The French Foreign Minister hoped to use the Times, 
with its wide reputation, as an instrument to awaken all Europe to the 
German menace. With this end in view, as far back as April 15, he urged 
the Times' Paris correspondent, Blowitz, to undertake this matter. After 
viewing numerous reports of French plans for aggression against Germany, 
Blowitz sent a letter to that effect to London. After a delay of several 
days, during which the editor of the Times, Mr. Delane, made inquiries, 
Blowitz 1 s letter was printed. The letter, appearing on May 6 under the 
heading, "A French Scare," caused an immediate sensation. The author 
alleged that in writing it he hoped to bring out into the open the menac-
ing situation on the Continent. In his estimation, Germany, considerably 
taken aback by Frence's rapid recovery, had decided to undertake a pre-
ventive war in order to seize Belfort, to compel the French to accept 
limitations on its military establishment, and to demand an extraordinary 
indemnity. The time had come for the truth to be known. German milita-
rism was clearly responsible for the threat to European stability, and 
only the Tsar was capable of thwarting the execution of Bismarck's schemes.122 
l2ltrewton, II, 75. 
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Accompanying Blowitz 1s famous letter was a leading editorial apologizing 
for its publication. The Times could not believe that any responsible 
official in Germany was capable of entertaining such notions.l23 
British public opinion indicated more concern for the welfare of 
294 
France and the general peace in the "war scare" of May than it did during 
the similar crisis of April. Even the Times, which had originally ex-
pressed disbelief of any German plan to attack, was led to shift its 
attitude. By May 10, the Times admitted that Blowitz had 
truly described the temper of the Military Party, although he mis-
calculated its influence, ••• that we could not have done a better 
service to the cause of International Peace than by sharply stating 
the hidden fears on the eve of the meeting between the two Emperors.124 
By June 2, the Times had completely altered its view. Indeed, there was 
little difference between this organ's remarks and Blowitz 1 s original 
letter. 
Whether the intention was that of Prince Bismarck or of others ef 
the Government in the strict sense of the term, or of those who 
have the power to bend the Government to their wishes, there can 
be no doubt that on the eve of the Emperor of Russia's visit to 
Berlin the German and French states were on the brink of War. 
There was a conviction in Germany that the French had ultimate 
hostilities in view, and that it might be the duty of the German 
Government not to wait until France had made her preparation 
but the Government might feel itself called upon to take the in-
itiative. On the other hand, the French earnestly disclaimed 
the intentions imputed to them, and were disposed to believe that 
the alleged preparations were merely put forward as a pretext for 
aggression on a country which had given unexpected proofs of 
vitality and strength. When such a feeling existed on either side 
a friendly interposition was difficult, but it was made, and, 
whatever its actual effect, we have at least the satisfaction of 
lmowing that we have received the polite aclmowledgments of both 
Governments without in any way departing from the principles to 
123r.ditorial in Tiples (London), May 6, 1875. 
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which the present generation of Englishmen is attached.l25 
On the same day, the Daily Telegraph maintained that the situation was 
grave and that Englishmen regarded Germany's claim to insure her security 
by crushing France as inequitable and immoral. It concluded by expressing 
the hope that the Russian Emperor would utter such words as would deter 
Bismarck.l26 The Morning Post, agreeing that the fate of Europe was in 
the hands of the Emperor of Russia, stated that it would regard the 
prohibition by Tsar Alexander of the scheme for crushing France with 
intense satisfaction.127 According to Blackwood's, Germany's war party 
was bent on destroying a militarily inferior power. 
Kicking an opponent when he is down is, according to our ideas, a 
dirty act; jumping on him when he is prostrate and panting ~8cruelty; but the longing to do both incontestably exists in Prussia. 
So serious was the crisis that the English press began to discuss 
the possibility of conscription. For example, the Tablet urged England 
to undertake a considerable expansion of her military forces in order to 
play a more authoritative role in Continental affairs.l29 Even the 
Beehive, a spokesman for labor interests, admitted the possibility of a 
complete overhaul of British institutions, including the question of 
conscription, if Prussia was to establish its hegemony over Europe.130 
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It was Charles Gavard, however, who gave the clearest indication of the 
state of English opinion. "The general disapproval excited by the 
maneuvers of Prince Bismarck was not less marked than the general alarm.nl3l 
He wrote to Decazes on May 12: '~hat is certain is the general repro-
bation that has been provoked by the projects attributed to Prince 
Bismarck and the serious fear they have inspiTed.nl32 
Lord Derby did not conceal his indignation at these provocations 
of Bismarck toward France, and informed the Queen that French recovery 
did not constitute a menace to Germany. He wrote to Queen Victoria: 
If France is to be attacked without provocation, merely in order 
that she may not have an opportunity of making herself trouble-
some hereafter, there will be in all countries, and in no country 
more strongly than in England, a protest against the abuse of 
force, and a common jealousy, inspired by the sense of common 
danger.l33 
Disraeli was even more alarmed, declaring that "Bismarck is another Old 
Bonaparte again, and he must be bridled.nl34 On May 6, he wrote to Lord 
·Derby: 
My own impression is that we should construct some concerted move-
ment to preserve the peace of Europe, like Pam did when he baffled 
France and expelled the Egyptians from Syria. There might be an 
alliance between Russia and ourself for this special purpose; and 
other powers, as Austria, and perhaps Italy, might be invited to 
accede.l35 
Sir Robert Morier, Charge'd 1affaires at Munich, was well aware of the 
serious nature of the "war scare" of 1875. Several seeks before Blowitz 1 s 
13laavard, p. 248. 
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article in the Times, he had received similar information from German 
sources, and, without any hesitation, he used his friendship with the 
Crown Prince to impress upon him the consequences of such an under-
taking.136 Shortly after the article by Blowitz was published, in a 
note to the Crown Prince, he accused Germany of a methodical plot to 
pick a quarrel with a defenseless neighbor.l37 Meanwhile, the Queen, 
informed of these rumors, echoed the sentiments of the Prime Minister. 
She wrote in her journal a report of a conversation with Mr. Disraeli. 
I said this was intolerable, that France could not for years make 
war, and that I thought we ought, in concert with other Powers, 
to hold the strongest language to both Powers, declarin~ ~hey must 
~ fight, for that Europe would ~ stand another war. 3 
As for the Prince of Wales, he identified himself completely with the 
French view of the situation. He realized that France, following the 
ordeal of 1870-71, required peace in order to restore its prestige, 
and he was ready to use his influence to ward off any German aggression. 
In a conversation with Count Munster, the Prince related how MacMahon in 
an earlier conversation in November had denied the German charges about 
the importation of horses from Germany. Although Mttbster tried to calm 
the Prince's mind, the latter did not trust these assurances.l39 
Derby, realizing that something had to be done, instructed Lord 
Odo Russell on May 9, to co-operate with the Russian Ambassador to 
Germany in efforts to lessen the tension between Germany and France; he 
also urged the Austrian and Italian governments to join in this peaceful 
136wemyss, II, 335-38. 
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venture.140 Russell hastened to inform Bismarck that England feared that 
German alarm over French armaments was unjustified and that England would 
be glad to eo-operate with Germany in order to clarify the situation.141 
The Queen, too, wrote to the Tsar urging him to use his "great influence 
to maintain peace and dissipate the profound alarm aroused throughout 
Europe by the language.of Berlin.•142 
Thus the Tsar and his Chancellor, Prince Gorchakov, who in early 
May came to Berlin, on the way to an annual cure at Ems, threw their 
weight behind the efforts of the English. Bismarck, while obviously 
enraged by the joint action of Britain and Russia, gave assurances that 
he wanted peace, and that the press and speculators had exploited the 
natural fear of the military circles, especially Moltke.143 Meanwhile, 
to Count MUnster, Bismarck asserted that "Lord Lyons, who seems to live 
entirely in the Catholic and French atmosphere, and to pursue the policy 
of Norfolk House rather than that of the British Government,nl44 was 
responsible for the statements abounding in London of Germany1 s intent 
on renewed aggression. 
English suspicions did not immediately abate with the reassuring 
platitudes of Bismarck. The "war scare" had made the English more aware 
than ever of the precarious equilibrium in Europe. As long as France 
remained weak, and, as long as Bismarck looked with disfavor on French 
14°Newton, II, 43. 
14laerman Diplgmatic Documents. 1871-1914, I, 5. 
142the Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 396. 
143wemyss, II, 343. 
144aerman Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, I, 9. 
299 
rearmament, England would have to be prepared to play an important role. 
Hence, Lord Lyons, following the "scare," encouraged the French to 
maintain their guard, as Bismarck was always capable of renewing his 
demands.145 Also, Lord Derby remained leery of Bismarck and the German 
war party, writing to General Ponsonby on June 14 that he wasn't sure 
that England was through with Bismarck for the remainder of the year.146 
The events of May had so affected the Queen that in a letter to the Crown 
Princess on June 8, she wrote: 
No one wishes more than I do for England and Germany to go together: 
but Bismarck is so overbearing, violent and unprincipled, that nQ 
one can stand it, and Jll agreed he was becoming like the first 
Napoleon, when Europe had to join in putting down.147 
All England applauded Derby's policy of intervention against 
Bismarck and seemed to share his extreme suspicion and reserve toward 
Berlin. For instance, Disraeli wrote Derby on May 18: "Your policy 
seems to be very popular, and very successful -- I congratulate you 
heartily. It is encouraging. We must not be afraid of saying 1Boo 
to a goose 1 • •148 Gavard maintained that English sentiment was 
expressed by the Spectator, which asserted that until France had revived, 
England would have to maintain the balance of power on the continent.149 
The Standard, which always bent over backward to help the French, noted 
that, while public men had evidently convinced themselves that all danger 
p. 258. 
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of Franco-German hostility had passed away, Gerrns.n threats were not un-
likely to be renewed and that Europe was at the mercy of Bismarck.l50 
The Morning Post agreed with this estimation, holding that, as a conse-
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quence of the "scare," it was impossible to place confidence in Germany, 
Germany was intent on crippling France in one way or another and would 
stop at nothing to accomplish it.151 The Pall Mgll Gazette, agreeing 
with Lord Derby that French rearmament was not a just cause for a German 
attack, maintained that French recovery was essential to the peace of 
Europe, as well as a natural right of every country,l52 
England's role in the recent crisis did not go unnoticed by the 
French. Gavard, for example, hoping to capitalize on England's sympa-
thetic interest in French recovery and the balance of power, wrote on 
May 14 to Decazes: 
In any event, I believe that it is generally to our interest to take 
account of what England has done for the maintenance of peace; we 
should perhaps do well to encourage her by expressing our recognition 
of the course she has pursued. The Cabinet has showed itself very 
sensible of the notices of the press, on its firm attitude in this 
affair. • • • It would be well if the French press would not forget 
to mention England's share in the results obtained.l53 
Consequently, Decazes on May 14, sent dispatches to Delane and Derby, 
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and, when Lyons returned to Paris, he wrote: "I must confess that the 
gratitude towards England, which I hear expressed by men of all parties, 
far exceeds anything that I could have expected, ttl54 
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Yet, while obviously pleased with English assistance, the French 
were well aware that they could not count on England in all eventualities. 
Following the crisis, Decazes wrote to Harcourt, the French Ambassador to 
England, that France was pleased with England's role in the recent 
"scare," but that he counted on Russia more than England and hoped to 
draw these two powers together rather than choosing between them,l55 
France, Germany and Russia. 1875-78 
The English remained suspicious of Germany and solicitous of 
France for several years. Though, from 1875 to 1878, the "Eastern 
Question" captured the greater part of public attention, France still 
received much of it. As long as France was at the mercy of Bismarck, 
England could not ignore conditions in Europe, The imbalance of power 
on the Continent caused Disraeli to write on September 6, 1875: 
It is curious, but since the fall of France, who used to give us 
so much alarm and so much trouble, the conduct of foreign affairs 
for England has become infinitely more difficult. There is no 
balance, and unless we go out of our way to act with the three 
northern Powers, they can act without us, which is not agreeable 
for a State like England; nor do I see, as I have told you g~fore, 
any prospect of the revival of France as a military power,l50 
l54Newton, II, 84, 
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The Fortnightly Review, which was well aware of the delicate equilibrium 
in Europe, observed with approval England's concern for France, remarking 
that "At this moment the friendliness between France and England is 
closer than it ever was.al57 The Times, over a year later, declared: 
"Of Republican France Europe has nothing to complain, and her influence, 
indeed, is a necessary equipose to that other gigantic rival.nl58 
On the diplomatic level, the crisis in the East presented an 
opportunity once again for the western statesmen to assert their con-
tinuing suspicions of Bismarck. Early in 1876, the German Chancellor 
foresaw that, if Russia and Austria were to abandon their conciliatory 
attitude, France would join with the former. He, therefore, made known 
to Odo Russell his desire to co-operate in any dificulties in Turkey. 
English statesmen, however, hesitated to take up the German offer because 
they felt that it was contemplating action against France. Lord Derby, 
under these circumstances, declared: 
More may be intended by this communication than meets the eye • 
• • • cannot possess implicit confidence in Prince Bismarck's 
desire for peace, remembering the events of last spring. And 
he would like to see more clearly than he does what assistance 
England is expected to give in return for that which is offered.l59 
William Langer, summing up the English attitude, observed: "In the 
spring of 1876 it was still generally believed that Bismarck was a wolf 
in sheep's clothing, and that to deal with him meant to be duped by 
him.nl60 
157nThe European Situation," Fortnightly Review, XXV (July 1, 
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Again, early in 1877, Franco-German relations became strained. 
Shortly after the closing of the unsuccessful conference at Constantinople 
on January 20, 1877, there arose a •war scare" not unlike that of 1875. 
On this occasion, as before, Germany expressed alarm at the French mili-
tary build-up and accused France of strengthening its flanks by negoti-
ations with Russia and England. During the conference France worked 
intimately with Russia and England, and Decazes, ever watchful for German 
schemes, told Lyons that Bismarck was attempting to undermine the friendly 
understanding between Russia, England and France in order that he might 
pounce unexpectedly upon the latter.l61 Before long the newspapers joined 
in accusing Bismarck of thwarting the peaceful efforts of other powers. 
So uneasy was the situation that troop movements were reported on the 
French and Russian borders of Germany. In spite of the pacific assurances 
of both powers, diplomatic relations, accompanied by the bitter recrimi-
nations in the press, remained strained until March. 
As in the previous crisis of 1875, many Englishmen seemed to think 
Germany was readying to attack France. Salisbury, who evidently believed 
that Bismarck would spring on France with Russia preoccupied in the East, 
wrote to Lytton: 
The object most of all desirable is, if possible, to keep Russia out 
of war for the present. If it can be done for twelve months more, 
France's preparations will be sufficiently complete to make a coup 
de main from Berlin impossible. Till that time the danger is serious. 
Nothing but the counter-weight of Russia prevented it in 1875, and if 
the counter-weight is removed the6~olicy of the terrors of Bismarck may again become uncontrollable.l 
161 .. ~ewton, II, 107. 
162cecil, II, 129. 
The Prince of Wales, who was always sensitive to rumors of German 
aggression, tried unsuccessfully, on a trip to Paris, to convince his 
friends of the need for a closer understanding in order to offset 
Bismarck's menacing policy.l63 At the behest of the Prince, Alphonse 
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de Rothschild furthered the project with Decazes, but nothing came of it 
because of the unconfirmed report of a Franco-Russian alliance.164 On 
returning to England, he reported to Disraeli: •I arrived here this 
morning from Paris. • • • Everybody there was in a great agitation about 
the attitude of Germany and Moltke's speeches.165 Shortly thereafter, 
the Queen wrote to the Prime Minister: •she thinks Bismarck is making 
much mischief. We may be driven to draw closer to France.•166 Lord 
Lyons kept the English government well-informed concerning French fears. 
It is believed here that Bismarck is determined to produce at least 
such a scare as he did two years ago, if not to do more. The idea 
provokes some anger, but more fear. Nevertheless, the danger is 
greater now than it was last time; for although France is very far 
from being ready for even a defensive war, she does feel so much 
stronger than she did in 1875, as not to be willing to bear quite 
as much from Germany as she would have borne then •••• I do agree 
with the conclusion which the greater and wiser part of the French 
nation draw from them: namely that it behooves France to be more 
than ever prudent and cautious, and mor!6than ever careful not to give Germany any pretext for a quarrel. 7 
Soon the entire cabinet came to share the alarm. Sir Arthur Hardinge, 
in a study of Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, recalled: 
Lord Salisbury's view of the Franco-German danger was confirmed by 
163Hanotaux, IV, 310. 
164Ibid. 
165tee, I, 353. 
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a letter from Lord Odo Russell to the Foreign Secretary which came 
before the Cabinet a few days later. The. French military prepa-
rations were very advanced; Bismarck suspected that France was aim-
ing at an alliance with Russia, and was disappointed and vexed that 
England made no response to his overtures for a hearty German and 
English alliance. The anxiety felt by Lord Salisbury and Lord 
Carnarvon with regard to a possible Western war side by side with 
the Eastern one was gsw shared by their colleagues, including even 
the Prime Minister.l 
English statesmen were not alone in their fears. For example, 
Benjamin Jowett, speculating on the English reaction to a renewal of 
the Franco-German struggle, declared that such a conflict would draw 
England into war on the side of France. 
Scotland and Ireland would be ready to join as one man for France, 
and the High Church party and the upper classes of society have 
also a strong sympathy with the French. On the other hand, the 
Germans are disliked partly for their bad manners, and also by 
the middle classes, because they compete with us in trade; nor do 
we much like Germany taking the position in
6
Europe which England 
had for ten years after the peace of 181;.1 9 
As early as February 26, 1S76 the Daily News expressed the fear 
that Germany was only waiting the opportunity to attack France. "Once 
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let England and Russia engage in Eastern War and all Western Europe lies 
prostrate before the feet of Germany.al70 Professor Beesly, writing in 
the Weekly Dispatch on March 17, 1S77, declared that in view of the 
German determination to attack France, the English ministry was quite 
right in making great peace efforts.l71 
The symptoms of a desire on the part of Germany to pick a quarrel 
168Hardinge, II, 350.51. 
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with France caused Englishmen to take stock of the state of preparedness 
of the French army. After an analysis of the manpower and equipment of 
the French forces, English critics generally concluded that France had 
made remarkable progress and that,one no longer had to fear that France 
would be crushed by Germany. Blackwood's, for example, was impressed 
with the advances that the Republic bad brought about since the "war 
scare" of 1875. France had so strengthened its army that it would be 
able to repulse any German invasion without depending on European inter-
vention to maintain its existence. Any advantage possessed by the German 
military party, such as it had in 1875, had been lost. 
If Germany again proclaimed the wish to crush up France for good, 
before she is fit to fight, France would, this time, look her 
calmly in the face, and would say to hel,2in the consciousness of sufficient strength, -- It is too late. 
The Spectator concurred with B1ackwood 1 s article concerning the prepared-
ness of the French army and predicted that the revival of the French army 
would check German militarism and produce security for the rest of Europe. 
On the whole, then, we doubt whether Europe is likely to arise at 
a more perfect condition of stable equilibrium than the new organi-
zation of the French Army would have secured for her. • • • With 
France and Germany each powerful enough to render attack on the 
other probably disastrous, and an an attack on any smaller Power 
defended by the other, a matter of great danger and risk, there 
would be little to fear for Western Europe -- which means that the 
burden of great terror is really removed from France, and from all 
who know that the independence for France is essential to European 
civilization and prosperity.l7.3 
The Saturday Reyiew reckoned the revival of France's military as one of 
the wholesome surprises of contemporary history, and it asserted that if 
172"The French Army in 1877, • Blackwood 1 s Magazine, CXXI 
{April·, 1877), 409. 
17.3"The New French Army,• Spectator, LV (April 7, 1877), 4.3.3. 
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France was attacked by Germany, it could defend itself with fair prospects 
of success.l74 These sentiments were summed up very nicely by the Tablet. 
That France should not be able to attack Germany is a fact which few 
Englishmen will regret; that Germany is quite unable to crush France 
is a still more welcome truth. The best promise of the moment is 
that France is so strong that she could resist any attack made by 
Germany.l75 
In summary, English opinion, as late as JJ!f17, was still concerned 
lest Germany renew its aggression against France. In the event of such 
an unprovoked offensive, England's sympathies would be with the French. 
Meanwhile, France was once again assuming its legitimate position in 
European affairs. 
At the same time, England was somewhat uneasy in regard to the 
•Eastern Question." Historically, France was opposed to Russian control 
of the Near East, but France's defeat in 1870-71 led it to adopt a more 
reserved policy. Although Decazes was inclined to regard Russia as a 
more dependable ally than Britain,l76 he was conciliatory towards the 
English in economic matters, because he realized the importance of co-
operating with the English in order to assure for France a partnership 
in the administration of Egyptian finances. Moreover, following the 
"war scare• of 1875, he made efforts to lessen tension between England 
and Russia in order to draw them together into a permanent combination 
against German threats to the balance of power.l77 With the reopening 
of the 11Eastern Question," which threatened to find England and France 
l7411The French Army," Saturday Review, XLIII (April 14, 1877), 446. 
17511The French Army in 1877," Tablet, XVII (April 7, 1877), 1;26. 
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on opposite sides, France increased its efforts to maintain harmony with 
the English.l78 The French made no secret of their fear that, if 
England became involved with Russia, Germany would make aggressive moves 
towards France. Decazes in May, 1877, suggested that England join with 
France in a secret alliance in order to guarantee the independence of 
Belgium and Holland.179 Later on, Waddington told Lord Lyons of his un-
easiness regarding Bismarck and his hope that England would not become 
involved in hostilities with Russia.l80 
The English were aware of France's preoccupation with Germany; 
nevertheless, they were suspicious of what they believed to be France's 
pro-Russian policy. Lord Lyons was particularly unhappy with Decazes' 
policy, which seemed to him to embroil England and Germany and to lean 
towards Russia. He even noted that he would welcome a change in the 
French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.l81 Also, the Prince of Wales, on a 
visit to Paris, tried unsuccessfully to convince his French friends of 
the need for a closer alliance, but he discovered that France was 
currying favor with Russia.l82 While in Paris again in 1878, the Prince 
made great efforts to prevent France from seeking friendship with 
Russia.l83 
The English press, though primarily concerned with the threat of 
178Ibid _., p. 97. 
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a Russo-Turkish War, echoed the uneasiness af the diplomats towards the 
seeming friendship of France and Russia. For example, the Fortnightly 
Review, which was generally pro-French, admitted that there were grounds 
for doubting the willingness of France to co-operate with England in the 
East.l84 The SR§ctator openly scorned French policy •. 
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She [Germany) has the great advantage of being a looker-on, and while 
Germany is a looker-on, it is essential to France to be a looker-on 
too, -- nay, more, to restrain, if she can, those Powers which might 
in the end become her allies from wasting their resources on the 
settlement of a question in which it would have been the highest im~ 
prudence for her to concern herself directly. France looks to the 
help of Russia, and hence, instead of expending on Russia the accumu-
lated wrath poured on her by the English pro-Turkish journals, her 
politicians have been almost lost in ecstasy at the wisdom and temper-
ateness of the Czar, while lamenting the difficulties in which popular 
feeling has involved him.l85 
The pro-French Standard was discouraged by France's seeming inactivity 
towards the fate of Eastern Europe. 
France sends nothing, does nothing,·propounds nothing, save her un-
qualified unconcern for the Salina mouth, for the Balkan Range, for 
the Bosporus, for Russian conquests for Turkey's independence, for 
Europe' s philanthropy. France, the land of ideas, France of the 
revolutionary Gospel, France that had a mission to conquer the world, 
like Mahomet, with a sword in one hand and a body of dotrine in the 
other, turns her back formally upon the trepidation of the Ottoman 
Empire, on the advancing legions of the Czar, on the Parliamentary 
debates of her old ally, and contemplates her maimed territory and 
ameliorated army with mingled ~gelings. Her inactivity is as 
complete as it is 1masterly1 .1 
The~ was even less circumspect in its estimation of French influence. 
France cannot be congratulated as having done her utmost to ward off 
the calamities by which Europe's now threatened. It may be urged that 
she is not at present in a position to lecture other powers; but no 
184"Home and Foreign Affairs,• Fortnightly Review, XXV (February, 
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one would have wished for anything like forward action. All that was 
necessary was that she should discountenance rather than encourage 
ambitious designs. Had she done so, the result would have been very 
considerable; but she chose never to make a sign that would excite 
even momentary displeasure in the Winter Palace,l87 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that, while England was unwilling to see 
France weakened through a renewed German aggression, it nevertheless was 
disappointed with the French tendency to seek friendship with Russia. 
England, France, and the Suez Canal 
The "war scare" of 1875 scarcely had abated when Disraeli, acting 
on his own authority, concluded the purchase of the Suez shares in the 
name of Great Britain, In order to understand the situation leading to 
the increase of British influence in Egypt and the resulting recriminations 
from Paris, a survey of previous developments is necessary. The occupation 
of Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and British reactions to it was the beginning 
of Anglo-French rivalry there. The struggle between England and France, 
varying in intensity from time to time, lasted until Fashoda, when it 
ceased to be an international problem. 
The defeat of Napoleon's blow at English domination in the East, 
especially India, was not at once followed by British occupation or annex-
ation of Egypt, Indeed, the British government did not aspire to interfere 
in the internal affairs of Egypt. Its goal was merely to exclude any other 
power from securing ascendancy in Egypt. This objective was pursued by 
maintaining such friendly relations with the Khedive of Egypt that he would 
maintain open access to Egypt and thus prevent the exclusive influence of 
any other power. Yet, Napoleon's failure did not mean the end of French 
187Editorial in Globe (London), May 2, 11377. 
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influence there after his seizure of Egypt in 1805. Mehemet All began to 
modernize Egypt and entrusted most of its westernization to France. 
French officers were invited to reorganize the Egyptian army and navy; 
French civil servants lent their assistance in the reconstruction of the 
country; and French religious orders provided education for the children 
of well-to-do Egyptians. Thus France attained an early ascendancy in 
Egyptian affairs without, however, in any sense, establishing a colony. 
At mid-century, French interest in Egyptian affairs was quickened 
when Ferdinand de Lesseps acquired from Said Pasha the right to construct 
a canal through the Isthmus of Suez. The English feared that if France 
built the Canal, French influence would inevitably increase and possibly 
take a political turn. Moreover, in case of war, England would be at a 
decided disadvantage. France would be able to close the Canal to English 
shipping, while occupying Egypt. In the face of British opposition and 
numerous financial problems, however, the French completed the Canal in 
1869. 
After the disastrous struggle of 1870-71, it was obvious that 
France had to maintain friendly relations with England in the event of 
renewed difficulties with Bismarck. Thus, any serious disturbance in 
Anglo-French relations arising out of Egypt was averted by France's pre-
occupation with Continental affairs, and for a·few more years.after the 
opening of the Canal, the British could maintain their negative policy. 
Even so the growth of British trade via the Canal, together with the 
financial uncertainty in Egypt, led Disraeli to realize that the protection 
of the Suez Canal was of vital necessity and that Egypt should be con-
sidered a British sphere in case of the partition of the Sultan's Empire. 
The opportunity to purchase the shares of the Canal stock was 
presented by Ismail, the Khedive, whose orgy of spending necessitated 
reckless borrowing. Soon the financial situation became acute, and only 
by paying exorbitant interest rates could he negotiate further credit. 
The Egyptian people, already burdened down, were unable to bear further 
taxation. Ismail, in his desperation, decided to sell his stock in the 
Canal. Offers were made through a French banking firm to dispose of the 
shares early in November, 1875. Meanwhile, Frederick Greenwood, editor 
of the Pall Mall Gazette, heard of the offer and informed the Foreign 
Secretary. Lord Derby, in order to verify this rumor, cabled to h~jor-
General Stanton, the Consul-General in Egypt. Under these circumstances, 
the Khedive admitted the truth of the rumor and offered to make a similar 
proposal to the English. Derby was reluctant to make a decision, as he 
believed the acquisition was bad financially and disagreeable to the 
French, but he acknowledged that there was "a strong feeling here about 
not letting the Canal go still more exclusively into French hands.nl88 
Charles Gavard, on November 20, wrote to Decazes concerning a recent 
conversation with Derby. The Foreign Secretary was reported as saying: 
You know my opinion of the French Company. It has borne the risks 
of the enterprise; the honor of the achievement belongs to it, and 
I do not contest one of its titles to recognition, but our interest 
in the Canal is greater than that of anybody else; we use it more 
than any other country. Keeping that passage open has become for 
us a point of capital importance.l89 
In the same letter, Gavard wrote that Derby insisted in closing off the 
conversation with a friendly warning that the sale of the titles to a 
188Newton, II, 87. 
l89Gavard, p. 277. 
.312 
French company would produce a bad effect in England.l90 While Der~ 
shied away from large projects and was seemingly unenthusiastic, 
Disraeli 1 s imagination saw in the Khedive's offer a great success for 
England. Not wishing to give away his project and realizing that time 
was of great importance, Disraeli, working through the London firm of 
Rothschild, completed the transaction in late November. 
The English public, hearing of the news of the purchase on 
November 25, 1875, via the Times, responded with enthusiasm to the bold 
stroke of the Prime Minister. The purchase of the Khedive's shares in 
the Suez Canal appeared to be more than a financial transaction; it 
initiated a new policy, with political ramifications, in the eastern 
Mediterranean. The Times maintained that the transaction had materially 
changed England's role in the East. 
It is impossible to separate in our thoughts the purchase of the 
Suez Canal from the question of England's future relations with 
Egypt. • • • To this country will belong the decision on every 
question, whether scientific, financial, or political; adminis-
tration and negotiation will be in our hands, and as we have the 
power, so shall we have the responsibility before the world.l91 
Likewise, the Daily News regarded it as a bold and timely acquisition, 
which was destined to extend the political influence of Great Britain. 
"The public knows that this purchase is not to be regarded from a narrow 
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commercial point of view, but to be looked at in the light of the politi-
cal cireumstances of the time.nl92 The Scotsman foresaw not only the 
future security of British trade with the East, but believed that England 
190Ibid., p. 278. 
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was bound to occup,y Egypt in the event the Suez Canal were ever 
threatened.193 
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On the other hand, some Englishmen were over-cautious of the 
transaction, especially the leadership of the Liberal party.l94 Gladstone, 
for example, wrote: 
If the thing has been done in concert with other powers, it is an 
act of folly, fraught with future embarrassment. .If without such 
concert, it is an act of folly fraught also with personal danger.l~; 
However, its widely acclaimed acceptance gave assurance to those who 
originally considered it a risky step.l96 
With the public prepared to give its hearty approval not only to 
this purchase but to the acquisition of Egypt, it soon became a matter of 
general speculation as to when England would complete the transaction by 
taking Egypt. Even Bismarck, who was pleased with Disraeli 1 s purchase, 
would have welcomed England' s acquisition of Egypt. On November 12, Lord 
Odo Russell wrote to Lord Derby: 
Anything calculated to break the influence of France in the East, 
which is thought to be too great, would be popular in Germany. 
• • • England may have Egypt if she likes. Germany will graciously 
not object.l97 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that a number of Englishmen 
declared their determination to follow up the purchase with an annex-
ation. Lady Gwendolyn Cecil relates that her father, Lord Salisbury, 
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"from the first occupation with the question, seems to have had no doubt 
as to what must be its ultimate issue, and at the outset was prepared 
actively to promote it.nl98 Further, Lord Esher, a British politician 
and writer, was very pleased with Disraeli's bold venture in Egypt and 
awaited a further step. He wrote in his journal on August 2.3, 1876: 
That England will assure the protectorate of Egypt; and that the 
Greeks in Asia Minor will be rid of the Turks, I look upon as the 
inevitable result of all Eastern troubles of the last 40 years; 
and all that an English Minister can g2 is to neglect it, for I 
don't believe he can delay it a day.l~ 
The English press was not slow to join in the agitation for a 
more forward policy. Blackwood's, for example, applauded the 
government's policy and asserted that England should not. hesitate taking 
any step necessary to the strengthening of its position.200 The 
Fortnightly observed that so unanimous was English opinion that the 
French interpreted it as an indication of English readiness to seize 
Egypt.201 The Standard, which frequently acted as a spokesman for the 
Conservative government, remarked that it was a commercial transaction, 
but it could become more if anyone sought to meddle with the British 
investment. By acquiring an interest in the Canal, England practically 
had made itself responsible for the independence of Egypt.202 
Public opinion, however, was in advance of diplomatic circles. 
Lord Derby declared in December, 1875, that England did not anticipate 
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establishing a protectorate over Egypt, and that it had merely desired 
to secure a free passageway to India.203 Disraeli, too, indicated that 
he was unwilling to follow a more adventurous course.204 Fraser's summed 
up the disappointment regarding the cautious policy of the government. 
There was a cap-throwing and hussaing over it the land through, as an 
indication that the Tories had at last given the challenge direct to 
Russia and Austria to count with England in their projects for 
dividing the carcass of Turkey between them •••• What then has 
England come to, that she should incontinent~05slap faces all around, and say with a light laugh, 'It is nothing?' 
Thus, while the English press was preparing public opinion for the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire, and the occupation of Egypt, the govern-
ment, out of deference for France, and Derby's traditional policy 
regarding Turkey, moved at a slower pace. 
French reaction to these forward movements of English policy was 
surprisingly moderate. Thomas Barclay, who was associated with the Time§ 
in Paris, claimed that the purchase had excited the deepest distrust in 
France and that "attention became concentrated on the activity of the 
perfide Albio:p in the Near Ea.st. 11206 Most evidence, however, indicates 
that the French reaction was quite subdued. For example; Blowitz, the 
Paris correspondent of the Times, noted: 
In the middle and even in the lower classes it has produced a kind 
of melancholy admiration. In the higher classes, that of thinkers 
free from political passion, people are chiefly struck with the care 
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taken ~ the English government in acquir~ an interest in the 
canal by the agency of an intermediary.207 
Lord Lyons remarked that the dispatches in the English press calling for 
the acquitition of Egypt by England 
have not provoked in France the storm of indignation which would 
have burst forth had the slightest hint of anything of this kind 
been six years ago. • • • It must not, however, be supposed that 
the old French feeling about Egypt has so far subsided, that 
France would not strenuously resent not only the occupation of 
Egypt by England, but any increase of English influence there, if 
she were in a position to do so •••• It is a sense of want of 
power which is the real cause of the apparent calmness with which 
the question has recently been regarded. The disposition of 
France to acquiesce will certainly decline in exact proportion to 
her recovery from tHe state of prostration to which she was re-
duced ~ the war.20 
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The French were, however, justly suspicious that England meant to establish 
its pre-eminence in the gateway to the East, and, hence, Decazes was the 
object of reproach by French public opinion. He was accused of political 
blindness, and there were suggestions in the press that he resign.209 
France, however, swallowed its pride. It was in no position to vigorously 
object to the English policy, as England a few months previously had, to-
gether with Russia, saved France from the designs of Bismarck. Lyons 
reported that Decazes did not express any strong resentment to the measure 
itself. 
They feel, however, that France cannot undo what has been done and 
that she has no means of effectually resenting it; they think there-
fore that it is better to put up with2i8eir annoyance than to place themselves on bad terms with England. 
207Editorial in Times (London), November 29, 1875. 
208Lucien Roberts, "Egypt as a Factor in European Politics, 1875-
1878," Power Public 0 inion and Di lo c : Essa s in H nor of Ebe Mal co 
Carroll, ed. Lillian Wallace and William Askew Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1959), p. 52. 
209Hanotaux, III, 391. 
21DRoberts, Power, Public Opinion and Diplomaci, p. 52. 
With France annoyed at English plans, the British press made 
efforts to appease the French by saying that England did not regard 
the transaction as designed to hurt the French position in the Near 
East. The French were reminded by the Times that the venture was pure-
ly commercial, and, as England desired to maintain perfect commercial 
and political freedom in that area, France would not suffer from the 
stroke.211 The Morning Post saw no reason why France should be angry, 
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as her material interests were not touched, only her sentimental ones.212 
Blackwood's, while aware that England had taken a major step towards 
securing its trade with India, assured the French that they had nothing 
to fear.21~ In addition, several journals reminded their readers, and, 
indirectly, the French, that the transaction merely meant that England 
held stock in a French company.214 
Anglo-French Friendship 
The excitement aroused by Disraeli 1 s coup hardly had abated when 
the world was faced with a new development in Egyptian affairs. The 
Khedive's shaky financial situation, which had led him to part with his 
shares in November, worsened to such an extent by the end or the year 
that bankruptcy was within sight. In order to avert a crisis the Khedive 
asked Britain to send out two officials to help in financial matters. In 
211zditorial in Times (London), November 29, 1875. 
212Editorial in Morning Post (London), November 29, 1875. 
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compliance with this request, Mr. Stephen Cave was sent forth to make a 
thorough investigation of the country's financial situation. 
Meanwhile, on February 14, 1876, Decazes, realizing that ob-
struction was out of the question, approached Lyons with the suggestion 
that England and France should seek a close understanding in regard to 
policy in Egypt, and he set forth the advantages to be gained from an 
abatement of Anglo-French rivalry. 
Politically as well as financially the only remedy for the evils of 
the present condition of Egyptian finances would be found in a 
close understanding between the English and French government.215 
French interest in Egypt in 1876, was based principally on its desire 
to uphold the solvency of the Egyptian bondholders against the ever-
present danger of bankruptcy. In order to implement this goal, it was 
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necessary to exercise direct control over Egyptian finance. Derby replied 
that England, while appreciating the French desire to work with England, 
had no intention of exercising control over Egyptian finances.216 
Cave's report scarcely was presented, when, on April 8, 1876, the 
Khedive suspended payment of treasury bills and proceeded to unify the 
entire national debt. As these events were of a serious nature, Goschen, 
representing the English interests, and Joubert, representing the French 
interests, joined together to impose upon the helpless Khedive the so-
called "Goschen Decree" by which the Egyptian government agreed to accept 
a number of recommendations for the supervision of its finances. Under 
this arrangement in November 1876, the Khedive accepted the Goschen-
Joubert suggestions for the establishment of European controllers-general, 
21~oberts, Power, Public Opinion and Diplgmacy, p. 57. 
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one to be in charge of income and the other to supervise expenditures. 
Freycinet, in La Question d 1Egypte, called this settlement the beginning 
of the Anglo-French entente in Egypt. 217 Goschen declared: 
When we went to Egypt we found France and England not united, but 
struggling for different financial schemes. We have left English 
influence and French influence both working together to support 
the scheme which we have propounded.218 
The negotiations establishing the Anglo-French concominium of 
1876 revealed the differences of opinion between England and France in 
regard to their Egyptian policy. Disraeli and Derby, who were hesitant 
to undertake any move which might weaken the Ottoman Empire, felt that 
forceful intervention in Egypt would imperil international tranquillity 
by undermining the strength of Turkey. 219 France, regarding Egypt as 
vital because of tradition and prestige and seeking to uphold the rights 
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of the bondholders, desired to assume greater responsibility. Lord Derby, 
while asserting that Egyptian autonomy was essential to imperial strategy, 
cautiously went along with French efforts to establish a parity of 
interest which was destined to co-ordinate the interests of the two 
countries. The refusal to co-operate might have resulted in French inter-
vention and the establishment of foreign control in Egypt. 220 Lord 
Salisbury, a few years later, explained English policy. 
When you have got a neighbor and faithful ally who is bent on meddling 
in a country in which you are deeply interested -- you have three 
217charles Freycinet, La Question d'Egypte (Paris, 1905) 
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courses open to you. You may renounce -- or monopolise -- or share. 
Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to 
India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So 
we resolved to share.221 
The shift in British policy towards Egypt stemmed not only fr.om 
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French policy, but from tne flow of events in Egypt. The security gained 
by the purchase of the Canal depended upon the orderly course of events 
along the Nile. However, as long as there was hope in the· finances of 
Egypt, the English government refused to directly interfere in the in-
ternal affairs of Egypt. 
In essence, neither nation was really satisfied with the "Dual 
Control," but, during the succeeding years, Britain and France found in 
Egypt a common basis for co-operation. Until the bombardment of the 
forts of Alexandria in 1882, which saw the interested parties pursuing 
divergent policies, Anglo-French relations were determined in part b.1 
their mutual involvement in Egypt. 
The "Dual Control," attractive as it was to English and French 
investors, did not relieve the extreme financial obligations of the 
Khedive's government. The latter was only able to meet payments at the 
cost of oppressive taxation. So exorbitant had foreign demands become 
on the Egyptian government that little over one million pounds, out of 
nine and a half million pounds, remained for the administration of the 
state.222 
Then, on top of these developments, Russia declared war against 
the Ottoman Empire in April, 1877. These events, so threatening to 
22lcecil, II, 331-32. 
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imperial interests in the Eastern Meditteranean, led to considerable 
discussion in the English press, as well as in diplomatic circles, on 
England's fUture relations with Egypt. 
The discussion began with the arrival in England of Nuba Pasha, 
Ismail's former minister to London. Nuba was on a private mission to 
induce England to intervene in Egypt, and, if possible, to arrange for 
a British protectorate in order to offset the Russian expansion into the 
Balkans. He was well received in some official circles, especially in 
the India Office and the Treasury.223 The cabinet ministers, however, 
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with the exception of Lord Salisbury, who was known to be a warm advocate 
for the acquisition of either Crete or Egypt,224 were unimpressed with 
his schemes.225 Lord Derby was very reluctant to assume greater re-
sponsibilities in Egypt for fear that Russia might be induced to under-
take a similar move against the Ottoman Empire.226 The Queen, on 
receiving news from the Crown Princess of Germany that Germans were 
sympathetic to the acquisition of Egypt, asked her daughter why England 
should "make wanton aggression, such as the taking of Egypt would be.n227 
Nuba informed the German Ambassador that the British ministry was 
reserved, but that much sympathy existed outside of the cabinet,228 
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The major source of Nuba 1s propaganda was an agitation begun in the 
Nineteenth Century for the annexation of Egypt. Edward Dicey, who was 
furnished with information by Nuba, argued that the threat of Russian 
penetration of the Ottoman Empire, springing out of the Russo-Turkish 
War, necessitated the immediate occupation of Egypt in order to insure 
the security of India. With Europe preoccupied with Eastern affairs, 
and France still fearful of Germany, few, if any, international compli-
cations would arise. 229 Speaking of his article of June, 1877, "Our 
Route to India," Dicey wrote that it 
has met with a more favorable reception, in as far as public opinion 
is concerned, than I could reasonably have expected. • • • Indeed, 
there seems to be a general acknowledgment both at home and abroad, 
that the occupation of Egypt by England is only a matter of time; 
and the point on which my critics mainly disagree with me is that 
they do not recognize as fully as I do the urgent necessity for im-
mediate action in order to accelerate what they regard as a foregone 
conclusion.230 
In the fall of 1877, shortly after Nuba put forth his advances 
to Derby, two Englishmen, a Levantine Englishman named Bright and Colonel 
Gordon in the War Office, acting as intermediaries for the Sultan, 
approached the British government with a similar plan to buy either Crete 
or Egypt in order that Turkey might be able to defeat Russia. These 
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plans, like Nuba • s, were not well received by the government. The leaders 
of the Liberals objected to an imperialistic policy, whereas the 
Conservatives were pledged to protect the Ottoman Empire. Aware of French 
anxiety, Lord Derby instructed Lord Lyons to reassure the French to the 
229r.dward Dicey, "Our Route to India," Nineteenth Century, I 
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effect: 
We want nothing and will take nothing from Egypt, except what we have 
already and what other Powers share equally with us. We shall con-
tinue to work in harmony with the French, and hope and expect the 
same from them,231 
Gladstone, suspicious lest Disraeli might act on these offers, wrote: 
"I am afraid, not of any majority for war, but of a majority for getting 
hold of Egypt by giving ten millions to Turkey for the suzerainty of 
Egypt •••• It will embroil us with France.n232 He particularly was 
concerned that English action might arouse French wrath. "My belief is 
that the day which witnesses our occupation of Egypt will bid a long fare-
well to all cordiality of political relations between France and 
England,n233 Ragatz, who has made a study of Anglo-French relations in 
Egypt, noted that Gladstone's view "expressed the opinion of the greater 
number of British citizens.•234 
The majority of the English newspapers, in answer to the agitation 
that England should assume the suzerainty of Egypt, denied any intention 
of wishing to occupy or annex Egypt. For example, the Daily Telegraph 
noted that such an acquisition would prove expensive, with England getting 
little in return for its effort. 
Egypt is only useful to us from its connection with the Suez Canal, 
but the latter we can guard, so long as our naval power is intact 
against all comers •••• It is, in short, not the possession of the 
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land, but the control of the sea, which is necessary to the guardi-
anship of the Canal; and the latter qualification we are not unlikely 
to want, nor, did we lose it, would all the treasures of Egypt 
suffice for compensation.235 
The Saturday Review, commenting on the proposals of Mr. Dicey, declared 
that it was difficult to see what could be gained by antagonizing France. 
"It may be doubted whether Egypt would be worth having at the cost of pro-
voking animosity which would be awakened in France by our taking what 
would appear an unhandsome advantage of its calamities.•236 The Times 
agreed that the consent of France would be necessary. Under the circum-
stances, England would do well to uphold the status quo. 
An English occupation or protectorate of Egypt would destroy the 
friendship between England and France, and revive much of the un-
happy feeling which was the heritage of the long war. The alliance 
of the Western Powers which has been, and may be again, of the 
highest importance to Europe, would be no more •••• We should lose 
our last political friend in Europe •••• We shall not annex Egypt 
or occupy it, but neither shall we permit any other power to do so. 
An attempt to seize either end of the Canal, or, indeed, any part of 
Egyptian territory, would be resisted with all the strength.of this 
country. 237 
Odo Russell warned that Bismarck's 5,1mpathetic attitude toward Britain's 
seizure of Egypt stemmed from a desire to undermine the Anglo-French 
alliance. 23S 
In summary, England 1 s action in regard to Egypt during the Russo-
Turkish War was, in part, an indication of its friendly attitude towards 
France. In spite of Dicey's tempting suggestion, England passed up an 
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opportunity to acquire a territorial foothold in Egypt. Yet the English 
fully realized the importance of the Canal. If they were unwilling to 
absorb Egypt at the risk of alienating their partner, neither were they 
prepared to allow it to slip into the hands of France. 
The republican victory of 1877 provided-another reason, like the 
Egyptian condominium, for Anglo-French friendship. The defeat of Marshal 
MacMahon, who was regarded by the English as a troublemaker, prepared the 
way for an improvement in relations between Paris and London. Unlike the 
royalists, whose program was centered in opposition to Germany and in 
friendship with Russia, the leaders of the Left held a more flexible 
position. Although Germany was still to be distrusted, the followers of 
Gambetta believed that this fear had been exaggerated. Indeed, Bismarck 
had applauded their recent victory over MacMahon. 
In addition, Waddington, who replaced Decazes as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in December 1877, was a Protestant of English extraction, 
as well as education. Under his tutelage French policy in the "Eastern 
Question," which had given England some concern during 1876 and 1877, 
when Paris seemed to be unduly friendly with Russia, became noticeably 
pro-English. Suspicious as to Russian intentions in the Mediterranean, 
the French government was determined to act with Great Britain.239 With 
the value of Russian friendship weakened by the ill-success of its armies 
against the Turks, it was apparent that the Russian army could not be 
counted on in any future struggle with Germany.24° Consequently, 
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Waddington told his friends, "If I do not represent an alliance with 
England, I represent nothing.n241 Lord Lyons, in a note to Lord Salisbury 
on April 26, 1878, confirmed this view. 
On the other hand, they have given up counting upon Russia as an ally 
against Germany, and have abandoned Decazes' policy of courting her 
and espousing her interest. • • • They wish to exclude Russia from 
the Mediterranean, and they are very willing that the dang~r and the 
burthen of effecting this should be incurred by England.2~ 
Blackwood's, reflecting these sentiments, asserted that one of the basic 
reasons for England's civility towards France was Waddington's promotion 
to the Quai d'Orsay, where he turned his back upon Decazes' scheme for a 
Russian alliance and promoted the good will of England.243 
Furthermore, Gambetta, the leader of the dominant party, urged as 
a theme of his foreign policy a friendly understanding with England. His 
conciliatory attitude emerged not only in his Egyptian and economic 
policies, but in his friendship with many British leaders in both parties. 
He not only was on the best of terms with the chieftains of the Liberal 
party, but, also, with Disraeli. In spite of Gambetta's liberal and 
republican sympathies, he found the leaders of the British Conservative 
party more to his liking than the leaders of the Liberal party. The active 
foreign policy of Salisbury and Disraeli appealed particularly to a man of 
his temperament. In addition, an aggressive and confident English govern-
ment was more likely to serve as an effective check to the vigorous and 
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boastful Bismarck.244 
Even the Prince of Wales, who had looked with favor on the schemes 
of French monarchists, fell under Gambetta's spell. At a meeting in the 
spring of 1878, in Paris, they found a common ground of agreement in their 
desire to further Anglo-French relations and in their distrust of Bismarck's 
policy. After a lengthy conversation, during which Gambetta, in the words 
of the Prince, "expressed his hearty approval of every step taken by Lord 
Beaconsfield in connection with the Eastern Question,n245 the Prince pressed 
on Gambetta an invitation to visit him in England.246 
Yet another reason for partnership between England and France was 
that both governments espoused liberal ideals. From the outset of the 
struggle between the friends and foes of the Third Republic, England had 
heaped praises on the moderate republicans and had encouraged the definitive 
establishment of democratic institutions in France. The attraction of the 
Republic was not only determined by the necessity to co-operate in Egypt 
and the Near East, but also by the triumph of freedom and the middle class 
in 1877. Thus, in part, British policy was conditioned not only by material 
interests, but by sentiment based on the similarity of institutions and 
ideas between England and France.247 The Times, after speaking of the 
effect of France's artistic, literary and social qualities on England's 
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foreign sentiments, offered the explanation that the Republic was highly 
regarded by England because of its recent avoidance of political extremism. 
But nothing has done so much to win their respect for that country 
as the political qualities which it has displayed since the fall of 
the Empire •••• In spite of dynastic, parliamentary, and military 
plots against a cherished form of Government, they have never broken 
the peace. Instead of 'descending into the streets,' they have 
trusted in the effect of public discussion, parliamentary debate, 
and the ballot-box.248 
However, it is interesting to note that these liberal sentiments did not 
prevent the disruption of the Anglo-French entente when imperial interests 
were at stake in Tunis and Egypt. 
The Paris Exhibition of 1878, which served to dramatize the 
resplendent vitality and the remarkable recovery of France from the War of 
1870-71, also served to strengthen Anglo-French relations. The Prince of 
Wales learned with pleasure in April, 1876, that the French government 
desired him to be President of the British section of the approaching Paris 
International Exhibition. With the Queen's blessing, he threw himself 
wholeheartedly into the enterprise, giving much of his time and energy in 
order to make the British share an outstanding success.249 His interest in 
France's great celebration, together with his friendly collaboration with 
French authorities, proved to be of considerable political significance. 
On May 3, 1878, the Prince publicly saluted the new Republic and spoke of 
his great faith in Anglo-French friendship. He declared: 
The jealousy which was never the cause of the animosity has now, I 
feel sure, ceased forever, and I am convinced that the entente cordiale 
which exists between this country and our own is one not likely to 
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Thus, Lord Lyons, in a note of May 11, to Lord Salisbury, took cognizance 
of the good results stemming from the Prince's role. "England is very 
popular here at this moment, and the Prince of Wales' visit has been a 
principle cause of this.n251 Lord Newton, recollecting the events in Paris, 
wrote: 
It was universally acknowledged that nothing had contributed more to 
the success of the Exhibition than the hearty co-operation given from 
first to last by England, and in this connection ~~~ services rendered 
by the Prince of Wales were of conspicuous value. 
Not only were the Prince's efforts an indication of his love for France, 
but, considering the fact that royalty was conspicuous for its absence, 
they testified to his acquiescence in the Republic. 
Nor did he conceal from himself the aim of its foremost promoters to 
make of it a victorious rally of the republican forces -- a cele-
bration of the republicans' triumph over monarchist rivalries. Few 
royalists or imperialists accorded the Exhibition much countenance.253 
The Prince of Wales further identified himself with France by his 
frank and open sympathy with another victim of Bismarck's ruthlessness, 
the former King of Hanover, George V. When the latter died in June, 1878, 
in Paris, the Prince made such an open display of his sympathy that Prussia 
became unduly suspicious.254 
The English press observed with satisfaction the friendly reception 
of the Prince of Wales, and it saw in this event an enhancement of 
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Anglo-French harmony. The Spectator, for example, expressed a desire to 
strengthen the entente cordiale, as it was obvious from the reception 
given to a friendly speech by the Prince of Wales and from British restraint 
in Egypt, that both nations were of a similar feeling. 
There are few Englishmen with a right to a political opinion who do 
not believe that the cordial and permanent alliance of England and 
France is of the first importance to the future of Europe, and if 
Frenchmen are of the same mind, there is at least one political 
arrangement which is efficacious and which will stand.255 
The Tablet, commenting on the political importance of the Exhibition, 
remarked: 
The Exhibition of 1878 has happily been the occasion of renewed proofs 
of the cordial friendship which unites France and England. In no 
other country of Europe was there a more sincere desire for the entire 
success of the undertaking, or more genuine satisfaction at the 
brilliant result than in England. • • • From first to last there has 
been a constant interchange of courtesies and goodwill, which, far' 
more than any formal communications between Governments, have drawn 
closer the6ties which unite the two friendly and sympathizing peoples.25 
The Times likewise was impressed by the obvious intimacy between England 
and France at the Exhibition. 
The friendship between the nations is now so close that we are entitled 
to believe it would be impossible to stir up the ignorant jealousies 
and antipathies that so long made each regard the other as its natural 
enemy.257 · 
The Congress of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention 
Anglo-French friendship, which was manifested by the success of the 
Paris Exhibition and the advent of Gambetta and Waddington, was dealt a 
blow by French suspicions of Disraeli 1 s foreign policy at the Congress of 
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Berlin. 
The statesmen of Europe gathered in Berlin on June 1.3, 1878 in 
order to discuss the Treaty of San Stefano, which had been dictated by 
Russia to the Turks earlier in the year. There is no need in this 
study to deal extensively with the background of this meeting apart from 
the bearing of the agreement reached at the Congress upon Anglo-French 
relations. 
The French were represented at the Congress by Waddington and 
their Ambassador to Berlin, Count Saint-Vallier. During the ''Eastern 
Crisis" the French had generally pursued a neutral course, and they were 
. . 
prepared to hold to this position. In addition, the French government, 
suspicious of the territorial ambitions of the other powers, insisted on 
the exclusion of all topics foreign to the Russo-Turkish War. These 
French reservations, which included Egypt, Lebanon, and the Holy Places, 
met with the general approval of Europe. The Times, remarking on the 
stipulations of Waddington, asserted: 
Nothing could be more disadvantageous either to the welfare of those 
provinces or to our own interests than that anything like political 
rivalry should arise respecting them between ourselves and the 
French. We are both alike interested in securing their gond govern-
mentA and our only object is to work in harmony with France for that end.~58 · 
Yet much to their surprise, the French were soon to discover that 
England had already signed an agreement extending British influence in 
the Mediterranean. Many of the crucial decisions affecting the pow:er 
status of the great states of Europe had been reached prior to the of-
ficial convening or the Congress. England, in order to offset the 
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territorial gains of Russia, had, unbeknown to France, compensated itself 
by securing, through the Cyprus Convention of June 4, 1878, the right to 
occupy and administer Cyprus. In making this agreement, British states-
men were aware that France had important interests in the East, and they 
realized that Paris would not be easily reconciled to this maneuver. 
Thus, Lord Lyons, anticipating trouble, wrote on June 4 to Lord Salisbury 
that public opinion in France would prevent Waddington from acquiescing 
in any territorial changes in favor of England in the East.259 Salisbury, 
more hopef\11, wrote back on June 5: 
I am sorry that your impressions of the mood in which the French are 
likely to receive the news when published, are still so gloomy. How-
ever, we must hope for the best •• ~6 • I hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram. 0 
The next day Lord Salisbury told Waddington of the secret Cyprus 
Convention. He explained that England, which had been left alone to 
maintain the status quo in the East, had no other choice but to provide 
against future Russian aggression. As France and Austria were unwilling 
to make committments to cheek the Czar, Great Britain had been obliged to 
negotiate a defensive alliance with Turkey and to provide for themselves 
a naval base. He went on to say that England, out of consideration for 
France, had not taken as much as she was offered. 
We have been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no mean authority, 
to occupy Egypt -- or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal. 
Such an operation might have been very suitable for our interests and 
would have presented no material difficulties. No policy of this kind 
however was entertained by Her Majesty's Government. We have received 
an intimation from the French Government that any such proceeding 
would be very unwelcome to the French people, and we could not but feel 
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the reasonableness of their objection under existing circumstances. 
We hav~ therefore turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that 
kind.26l 
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The French Foreign Minister, despite Salisbury's assurances, appeared to 
be upset. Indeed, he made preparations to leave the Congress as a sign of 
protest.262 
When, two days later, this exclusive information became public 
knowledge, the French press, reacted strongly to this news. They charged 
that the occupation of Cyprus menaced French interest i~ Egypt.26.3 
Frenchmen of opposite shades of political opinion united in condemning the-
seeming effacement of France. Gambetta charged that Waddington had made a 
serious blunder in surrendering to England, and the royalists used the 
situation to attack the Republic.264 Lord Lyons was so uneasy that he 
telegraphed Lord Salisbury on July 10 to move quickly to complete the 
settlement at Berlin for fear that French opinion would demand Waddington's 
return.265 The general feeling in Paris was described by Lyons in a note 
to Salisbury on July 12. 
I am happy to find that Gambetta and the Ministerial Parties, who 
are violent on the subject of the Convention, are not having things 
all their own way in the press. No newspaper can be said to defend 
England altogether, but the more sensible papers are against any 
active opposition on the part of France. • • • It is no use to shut 
one's eyes to the fact that at this moment, there is a great and 
general irritation in France against England. It is too soan to 
foresee what turn public opinion will take eventually, but at the 
present moment, we must not forget to take this irritation into 
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On July 16, Lyons intimated to Salisbury the possibility of Waddington's 
fall and his replacement by someone less friendly to the English, and he 
predicted that France would be difficult to deal with in the future in 
Egypt.267 
The situation was so unsatisfactory that the British Ambassador 
advised the Prince of Wales, who was intending to visit Paris in mid-
July in order to attend to business in connection with the Exhibition, 
to postpone his visit. 268 Regardless of these warnings, the Prince went 
to Paris on July 18, intent on using his influence to calm French 
suspicions. On arriving in France, he soon discovered that Waddington 
was not unduly angry with the English, but that there did exist the 
danger of an unfavorable motion in the Chamber of Deputies. He also 
learned that Gambetta, who previously had sympathized with England in 
the East, was visibly shaken b,y the news of the Convention.~69 Thus, 
the Prince, realizing_ that Gambetta was the real power in France, invited 
him to lunch at the Cafe des Anglais, where the opportunity was taken to 
thoroughly discuss the whole question. The Prince sought to appease 
Gambetta by assuring him that the acquisition of Cyprus did not endanger 
French interests in the Mediterranean, and that England desired to 
continue to work harmoniously with France.270 Apparently Gambetta was 
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satisfied. The Prince told Lord Lyons, in the latter 1s-words, that 
Gambetta appears to have spoken strongly in favor of an alliance 
between France and England -- declared himself more or less recon-
ciled to the Convention of the 4th of June -- and spoke in the most 
disparaging terms, not so much of the Foreign Policy of Russia, as 
the institutions, the Government and the administration of that 
country •••• I hear from other quarters that Gambetta was ex-
tremely pleased with the interview. I am assured also that the 
Prince of Wales acquitted himself with great skill.271 
The English Ambassador then saw Waddington and informed him of Gambetta's 
view, thus relieving the Foreign Minister of any immediate anxiety that 
Gambetta intended to overthrow the ministry •. 272 On arriving in London, 
the Prince received a note from Lord Salisbury acknowledging the success 
of his mission. 
I trust your Royal Highness will not think I am guilty of an in-
trusion if I venture, on the score of my official position, to 
thank your Royal Highness very earnestly for what you have done 
in Paris. The crisis has been one of no little delicacy; and if 
leaders of French opinion had definitely turned against us, a 
disagreeable and even hazardous condition of estrangement between 
the two countries might have grown up, which would have been much 
to be regretted. Your Royal Highness' influence over Monsieur 
Gambetta, and the skill with which that influence has been exerted, 
have averted a danger, which was not inconsiderable. It has been 
necessarily my duty to watch anxiously the movement of feeling in 
France at this moment.273 
Like the Prince and the other leading statesmen, the English press hoped 
that France would accept the situation. Instead of assuming a hostile 
attitude toward French resentment, the press assured the French of their 
high regard for them and expressed the hope that the Convention would not 
impair friendly relations. The Times, for example, declared: 
It would have been a great misfortune if the treaty had cooled the 
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growing friendship of the two Governments and the two peoples. 
Happily, the French will see, like M. Gambetta, that an English 
Cyprus is no more a menace to their country than an English Malta. 
France may be assured that in the Mediterranean our interests 
will, in the long run, be found nearly the same as her own.274 
According to Blackwood 1 s, England had selected Cyprus because France had 
made no reservations concerning it, and the editors expected that France 
would eventually approve British action.275 
Furthermore, during the parliamentary debates on the Cyprus 
Convention, it was admitted that there were other areas more adapted to 
British ends, but which had been set aside out of consideration for 
Franee.276 Disraeli, in speaking of British concern for the French in 
the negotiations at the Congress of Berlin, explained to Parliament: 
We avoided Egypt, knowing how susceptible France is with regard to 
Egypt; we avoided Syria, knowing how susceptible France is on the 
subject of Syria; and we avoided availing ourselves of any part of 
the terra firma, because we would not hurt the feelings or excite 
the suspicions of France. France knows that for the last two or 
three years we have listened to no appeal which involved anything 
like an acquisition of territory, because the territory which might 
have come to us would have been terr~1ory which France would see in 
our hand with suspicion and dislike. 7 
However, he reminded his listeners that though England and France were 
acting together with confidence and trust, we must remember that 
our connection with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment 
and tradition, but that we have urgent an~ substantial and enormous 
interests which we must guard and keep.27 
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Meanwhile, on the diplomatic level, the English government sought to 
appease the French by acquiesing in French plans for Tunis. 
The consideration shown toward France by the Prince, Disraeli, 
and the English press was not lost upon the French, who soon adopted a 
more conciliatory tone. By the end of July, Gambetta was again 
expressing his admiration for England's re-entry into European affairs, 
remarking: 
The interests of France and England, the two most liberal, most 
industrious, most productive and most wealthy countries of Europe, 
are so closely bound up together that the return of England to a 
less narrow policy brings both states at once out of the temporary 
isolation in which they are situated.279 
George Sala, Paris correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, wrote on 
August 9, 1878: 
All this badinage, however, is essentially good-natured. One reads 
no words of abuse against 'Perfidious Albion' whom 'French commerce 
would destroy, and monopolise to herself the Empire of the Seas.' 
I have scanned a dozen papers this morning without finding any in-
dignant protest against the Mediterranean being turned 'an English 
lake'; nor have I been able to meet with any reference to the 
contingency of Lord Sandon's steam plough interfering with the vested 
interests of France in the Holy Places.280 
The crisis of 1878 terminated with the two powers still working together 
in the Mediterranean. 
Anglo-French Tensions in 1879 
After 1878, the English government gradually found itself more 
and more at odds with the French. While they continued to talk of their 
close friendship with France, new developments slowly undermined the 
entente. In the first place, the possibility of a German attack against 
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France, which initially had drawn the two powers together, no longer seemed 
so likely now that France had rebuilt her army and checked the schemes of 
the Right. Also, with England assuming a more aggressive role across the 
seas at the same time as France launched out on imperialistic adventures, 
there was bound to be many misunderstandings. Yet, in spite of the 
emerging rivalry, efforts were made by the English to work out these con-
flicts in a conciliatory and friendly way. 
In late 1877, British official policy awoke to the realization 
that a more active imperial policy was desirable in Egypt. During 1877-78, 
the course of events in Egypt seemed nearly hopeless, causing the British 
government to abandon their traditional policy of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of that country. From these beginnings in financial 
interference, it was only a matter of time before the British would go 
to the root of the problem -- the reform of the Egyptian government. 
In April, 1878, the French government informed the English that 
it believed that the Khedive could no longer meet his payments, and it 
called upon the English to join with them in exerting pressure for payment. 
The English, who previously had not espoused the cause of the bondholders 
as strongly as the French, departed from their traditional policy in 
accepting the French viewpoint. Thus, in May, Salisbury, pushing aside the 
more cautious approach to Egyptian affairs of Derby, formally instructed 
the British consul-general to co-operate with French representatives in 
demanding payment on the bonds.281 One should not be misled by Salisbury's 
policy towards Egypt. He never regarded the condominium as something 
worthwhile in itself. It was an expedient essential for the time being. 
281Roberts, Power. Public Opinion and Diplomacx, p. 59. 
Thus, Salisbury wrote to Lyons on August 10, 1878: 
I told Goschen that we were very anxious to work with the French, 
and that we intend to take no violent means of placing ourselves 
in a position which would make them subordinate. But I told him 
I nevertheless had faith in the English influence in Egypt drawing 
ahead; a result which in my belief depended, not on any formal 
acts, but on the natural superiority which a good Englishman in 
such a position was pretty sure to show.282 
It is clear that he was looking ahead to the day that England would exer-
cise responsibility for the political affairs of Egypt. While he was 
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willing to assure France of England's desire to co-operate at the moment, 
especially in view of the forthcoming Cyprus Convention,283 he was unwilling 
to make any long range commitments. In a letter to Disraeli on September 
;, 1878, he wrote: 
It does not seem to me expedient to bind ourselves formally in this 
matter. As matters now stand, we have no choice but to admit in 
some sort of parity of influence between England and France. But 
the state of affairs may change and it may suit us at some future 
period to push ahead2 and then any oQligatory engagement would be highly inconvenient. 84 
Disraeli, however, having secured British control of the Canal, was 
always considerate of French interests in Egypt. Hence, in his adminis-
tration, he never went beyond the stage of the "Dual Control," and he with-
stood all suggestions to exclude France from its share.285 
In the spring of 1879, Ismail, identifying himself with native 
elements, broke from European control. He put forth his own financial 
plan and dismissed Sir Rivers Wilson and Blignier~s, replacing them with 
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a native cabinet under Sherif Pasha. Before England and France could 
decide upon the course of action, Bismarck, always ready to go fishing 
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in troubled waters, surprised Europe by a vigorous note protesting 
Ismail's action. The motives behind Bismarck's move have been the subject 
of much conjecture, 286 but it had the effect of forcing England and France 
to demonstrate their primary interest by joining together to force Ismail 
to abdicate. 
Before the powers finally agreed upon a course of joint action, 
England's unwillingness to vigorously work on behalf of the bondholders 
nearly resulted in a rupture of the Anglo-French condominium. This im-
passe stemmed from the fact that England and France were pursuing a 
different course in regard to Egypt. To the British the reform of the 
Egyptian government overshadowed the purely financial problem. The 
establishment of an honest and efficient government was their primary 
object. In this endeavor they received little encouragement from the 
French, who, doubting the inability of the Egyptians to meet their obli-
gations, insisted on payment. Lord Salisbury, complaining of these 
complications, wrote to Lord Lyons in April, 1879: 
It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French Government 
to go into partnership with the bondholders; or rather, to act as 
Sherif's officer for them, but to us it is a new and embarrassing sen-
sation. Egypt never can prosper as long as some 85 per cent of her 
revenue goes in paying interest on her debt. We have no wish to part 
company with France; still less do we mean that France should acquire 
in Egypt any special ascendency; but, subject to these two consider-
ations, I should be glad to be free of the companionship of the 
bondholders.287 
Evelyn Baring, later the Earl of Cromer, who was a financial controller in 
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Egypt, explained the nature of the disagreement in similar words. 
We should have preferred to allow the financial collapse, which was 
manifestly inevitable to come at once as a preliminary to the 
establishment of a better order of things. We were aware that the 
money could not be paid without taking the taxes in advance, a course 
to which we were opposed as being oppressive to the peasantry, and 
also contrary to the true interests of the bondholders. Not only, 
therefore, did we abstain from putting any pressure on the Khedive 
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to pay, but we even dismissed the desirability of protesting against 
payment. Unfortunately, the French Government did not share this 
view. French public opinion held that the Khedive could pay his 
debts if he chose to do so, that the distress alleged to exist in 
Egypt was fictitious, and that the arguments based on the impoverish-
ment of the country were fabricated in order to throw dust in the 
eyes of the public and to excite humanitarian sympathy was deserved.288 
The French press, believed that they had been abandoned by the 
English, began a stormy campaign against the English. Salisbury in a 
dispatch to Lyons on May 21, took notice of these unfriendly articles. 
We are utterly unable to understand on what foundation the reproaches 
rest that we have shown reserves and hesitations in the pursuit of 
the joint Egyptian policy. On the contrary, if we had occupied 
towards France the position which Serbia occupies toward Russia, our 
compliance could hardly have been more exact. But this outbreak of 
causeless wrath justifies us in asking what France wants, and what 
she complains of.289 
These attacks upon the English press were not, as Salisbury believed, in-
spired by Waddington, but by Gambetta, who favored a more aggressive 
policy towards the Khedive.290 Salisbury, finding these French attacks 
annoying, and, suspecting that they were meant to operate on internal 
politics, wrote to Lord Lyons: •rrf, however, Gambetta means mischief, it 
may be wise for us to seek the protection of English interests only, and 
leave the French to take care of themselves.n291 
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Then, on top of this impasse, there was the fact that at the 
Congress of Berlin a vague agreement was reached by the Powers to mediate 
a boundary adjustment between Greece and Turkey in the event that they 
could not reach a decision. To Gambetta it seemed that not enough was 
being done by the British on behalf of Greece. However, this was a matter 
of sentiment with France, and Salisbury, though perturbed by French 
pressure, admitted: •Greece is a less important and more transitory 
affair. n292 
The English press, which was anxious to maintain the entente, was 
led to believe that England had endangered the understanding by its over-
cautious policy. As public opinion prized French friendship, it berated 
the government for its failure to co-operate with the French. The liberal 
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press showed particular concern for France's goodwill and urged the govern-
ment to show it forebearance. For example, the Saturday Review, speaking 
of France's annoyance, declared: "It must be owned that this irritation 
is not altogether without good ground.•293 As for the Pall Mall Gazette, 
referring to the coolness which had arisen in relations between England 
and France, it took the British government to task for its failure to act 
in concert with France in Egypt. The British government had acted with 
the French in the past, and now it left them in an embarrassing position. 
Anything, except forthright action with France, would endanger the Anglo-
French alliance.294 Again, noting French criticism of England, it declared: 
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To most Englishmen we suppose it will be a matter of sincere regret 
that this should be so: to ourselves it is a matter of the deepest 
concern. We have long been convinced of the profound importance, 
not only to France and England themselves, but to European liberty 
and civilization, of a good understanding between the two countries: 
and we have lost no opportunity of expressing that conviction. • • • 
The cordial understanding which they succeeded in establishing with 
the French Government was not, indeed, to be had for nothing: on 
the contrary the price paid for it was a heavy one. It was the 
virtual, indeed we believe it to have been the formal abandonment 
of our claim to independent control over Egypt; and a recognition 
of the French claim to a joint influence with ourselves in Egyptian 
affairs.295 
The Globe editorialized eloquently on the desirability of continued Anglo-
French co-operation. 
The feelings of genuine concern that were aroused by the appearance 
of a coolness between England and France afforded the best proof 
now that, as we may hope, the danger to the entente cordiale has 
passed -- of the value attached to the Western Alliance by both. 
Any interruption or abatement of the friendly relations between the 
two Governments would be a misfortune for Europe, and, indeed, for 
the general cause of civilization •••• It may be admitted that 
there has been a degree of hesitation in taking prompt action re-
garding the ratification of the Greek frontier on the part of the 
English Cabinet, but any offense that could have been conceived from 
that cause must have more than condoned now that it has been made 
plain that in this matter English popular opinion is fully in accord 
with French, and Her Majesty'~~inisters will, without doubt, ac-
commodate themselves to both. 
In regards to Egypt, the journal observed: 
There is no divergence of interests between the two countries as to 
this or any other matter of moment; and therefore, when the trifling 
ebulition of feeling has blown over, we are convinced the relations 
of the two will be as cordial as ever.297 
The Daily Telegraph passed off the disagreements as of little conse-
quence,298 while the Times affirmed its abiding friendship, recalling the 
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intimacy of past years and calling on France to see England's position.299 
As for the Greek boundary question, it declared: 
Public opinion in England has decidedly pronounced in favor of in-
sisting that the frontier line between Greece and Turkey ought to 
be drawn according to the delimitations suggested by M. Waddington· 
and it may be taken for granted that our Government, however re- ' 
luctant to press hard upon the Porte at the present crisis, will 
not fail henceforth in its duty.300 
The conservative press, though at a loss how to explain French 
criticism, also looked forward to continued cordial relations with France. 
The Standard, referring to the complaints made against England by the 
Republigue Franjaise and the Debates, was unable to understand the justi-
fication for the reproaches addressed to England, but it assured the French 
that England desired to maintain friendly relations and hoped that the 
feeling of irritation would soon subside. Indeed, it was out of friend-
ship for France that England was reluctant to take a strong stand against 
the Khedive. There was reason to feel that a joint intervention would 
certainly lead to a break-down in Anglo-French friendship. 
The French people could commit no greater mistake than to suppose that 
the English politicians who have strongly discountenanced Anglo-French 
intervention in Egypt are jealous of France, or hostile to the es-
tablishment of the most intimate relations possible between France and 
England. On the contrary, it is precisely because they attach the 
utmost value to the existence of a good understanding between the two 
countries that they have protested against the insane proposal to ex-
pose it to such risks as it would unquestionably have to encounter if 
the two Governments embarked on so vague and uncertain an enterprise 
as the coercion or supression of the Khedive. • •• If you want to 
lose your best friend -- says the proverb -- travel with him •••• If 
we interfered in Egypt along with France in the same sense we could 
not afford to retire, whether we continued to agree with France or 
began to differ with her. We cannot regard the condition of Egypt with 
satisfaction; but we are thankful that it is not in the Khedive• s power 
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to set France and England by the ears.301 
The Morning Post, another conservative journal, assured the French of 
England's desire to be considerate of their interests in the Mediterranean, 
but it clearly warned France against adopting an anti-English policy in 
the Mediterranean in the hope of achieving friendship with Russia.302 By 
May 29, this organ concluded that the agitation in France was "merely an 
expression of individual opinion on the part of some sentimental or 
aspiring politicians •••• France has everything to lose and nothing to 
gain by coolness towards England's policy.n303 
This misunderstanding soon passed over when, on June 26, 1879, 
the Sultan intervened to depose Ismail. The new Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, 
made no effort to resist European interference, and, by September, the 
controllers-general were restored, and the Khedive was informed that 
these officials could not be dismissed without the consent of England 
and France. 
The foreign influence had been established on an even firmer 
basis than before. The two powers, in harmony with each other, had, 
through united effort, deposed the Egyptian ruler and had virtually 
named his successor. Yet within •Dual Control" lay inherent dangers. 
French and British interests were not identical. In view of the un-
certain situation within Egypt, the latter might foster a policy en-
tirely at variance with that urged by the former, and the Anglo-French 
entente, heretofore existent in connection with affairs in the 
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Mediterranean, might easily lead to violent recriminations. For the 
time being England and France found it necessary to co-operate, but that 
such a real danger existed soon became apparent. 
In spite of the different approaches to the Egyptian problem 
and occasional disagreements, there was considerable harmony between 
England and France. This was reflected in their representatives in 
Cairo.3°4 That the English press was determined to co-operate with 
France in the Mediterranean was clear from the English notices during 
the Egyptian agitation. In addition, England found satisfaction in 
Waddington's cordiality, the momentary stability of the Republic, and 
the pro-British policy of Gambetta. In the words of Blackwood's, 
Gambetta had enhanced the esteem of France by the British by his •warm 
friendship towards England, courteous cordiality towards Germany, liber-
al tariffs, and resolute opposition to the Roman Curia.n305 
Further indication of England's concern for France can be seen 
from the character of negotiations between Germany and England in the 
fall of 1879. Count MUnster, speaking with Disraeli on September 26, 
proposed an alliance between Austria, Germany, and England to serve as 
a counter-weight to Russian pretensions in the East. Disraeli received 
these overtures sympathetically, but he was disturbed over the possible 
French reaction, especially as the French regarded the Austro-German 
understanding as unpalatable.306 He admitted in a letter to the Queen 
on September 27, 1879, that, 
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tho' himself favorable, and always favorable, to an understanding 
with Germany, he could not conceal from himself that any step on 
the part of Great Britain that would seem hostile to France might 
now be viewed with suspicion and dislike by the people of England, 
the commercial and social, and, in some degree, the_political 
relations of the two countries being so intimate.307-
The Queen agreed with Disraeli 1 s determination not to provoke the French. 
"If we ally ourselves with Germany and Austria, France might join with 
Russia and Italy, which would be very serious."308 Salisbury was equally 
hesitant to take any step which would disturb relations with France.309 
Furthermore, when Bismarck complained to Odo Russell of the suspicion 
with which he was looked on by English statesmen and charged the govern-
ment of consistently avoiding his advances, Lord Salisbury denied the 
charge, telling Odo Russell: "Of course we have to pick our steps so as 
not to seem to err from the straight path in France's eyes; for France 
is capable of giving us a great deal of trouble.n310 
The events of 1879 foreshadowed the grave difficulties which 
were to lead to the decisive rupture three years later. Although the 
English still spoke of an Anglo-French partnership in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and avoided giving France offense by reaching an under-
standing with Bismarck, there is no escaping the fact that there was 
more mistrust and suspicion between the partners than before the 
emergence of rivalry in Egypt in 1879. The entente, though still capable 
of maintaining outward cordiality, had cooled, while serious storms 
loomed on the horizon in Tunisia and Egypt. 
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Tunisia 
From 1871 to 1880 there was little serious tension between 
England and France in the colonial area. Though France possessed 
considerable overseas influence, it was unable for a time to undertake 
any imperialistic initiative. With Alsace-Lorraine in the hands or the 
enemy and Germany threatening to renew war, France was not likely to 
dissipate its influence outside or Europe. Not only would renewed im-
perialism weaken home defenses, but it would alienate the other leading 
colonial power, Great Britain. As the latter was needed to offset 
349 
German hegemony, the French, without altogether abandoning interest out-
side or their country, co-operated with Great Britain in the Mediterranean. 
This policy, however, was tempered with a certain mistrust, as England 
frequently pursued an independent course, such as in purchasing the shares 
in the Suez Canal. 
The friendly relations between England and France in the period 
up to 1880, were gravely affected by France's outburst or colonial activi-
ty in the next half decade. While Bismarck, desiring to preoccupy France 
outside or Europe, encouraged French adventures overseas, the English took 
a very different view. Whether conservatives or liberals, they set the~ 
selves against this revived competition in the colonial sphere. 
The powers of EUrope had long shown an interest in Tunisia. France, 
following her conquest or Algieria, and England, shortly thereafter, be-
came particularly concerned with the rate or Tunisia. However, the French 
seemed to have had considerably more success in Tunisia than the English, 
who seemed to limit their activities to checking the French. Then, in 
the sixties, Anglo-French rivalry for Tunisia was complicated by the entry 
of Italy. Indeed, by 1870, many Italians had settled in the Carthage 
of old, far outnumbering French immigrants. 
After the Franco-Prussian War the struggle for concessions eon-
tinued in Tunisia. France and Italy, however, were too preoccupied with 
internal difficulties to devote much of their energy to the problem. 
Meanwhile, the English were content to uphold the sovereignty of the 
Porte and to work to defeat any schemes for.annexation. 
Not until 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, did the question of 
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Tunisia assume renewed importance in the diplomatic world. At that time, 
Bismarck hoped to maintain peace in Europe by satisfying the colonial 
ambitions of the European Powers. Although he realized that France would 
object to any increase of English influence in the Mediterranean, Bismarck, 
as early as February, 1878, intimated to the Prince of Wales that England 
should take Egypt. When the Prince replied that France would object to 
such a solution, the Chancellor indicated that France could be satisfied 
as well.3ll That the English would have to make some concessions to 
French interests is apparent from the letters of Lyons,312 who was pre-
paring Salisbury for the possible reaction in France in view of England's 
expansion in the Mediterranean. Hence, before the Congress of Berlin was 
very far underway, England and Germany determined to placate the French by 
offering them Tunisia in return for English aseendeney in Cyprus. 
The plans of England and Germany worked very well. Waddington, 
irritated on hearing the news of the Cyprus Convention, was promised that 
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England would acquiesce in any decision by France in regard to Tunisia.3l3 
Thus, on returning from the Congress, he remarked with considerable 
satisfaction that he was bringing back Tunisia in his pocket. Shortly 
thereafter, he began to make diplomatic preparations for the implemen-
tation of Salisbury's promises made to him at Berlin. On July 16, he 
approached Lord Lyons and made known his determination to get a further 
guarantee from England, and he received in writing from Salisbury confir-
mation of their previous ·conversation.314 Regardless of these assurances 
from London, the French government was .still not ready to launch out on 
an imperialistic adventure. Indeed, the scheme seemed to meet greater 
opposition in Paris than in London. The French hesitated a good deal over 
the expense involved in taking Tunisia, and, quite naturally, they were 
leery of any suggestion coming from Berlin. Gambetta, in particular, was 
not ready to abandon the idea of revenge, nor was he convinced that 
Bismarck did not intend France to weaken itself abroad prior to a renewal 
of German aggression.315 
Meanwhile, the Italians, who had been all but ignored at Berlin, 
began to take steps to avert the disposition of Tunisia. In the fall of 
1878, Signor Maccio, an energetic imperialist, was sent to Tunisia as the 
Italian consul. The French were not slow to counter Italian intrigue. 
They informed the Italian government that they would not be outmaneuvered, 
and they warned the Italians that they were risking a conflict if they 
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were preparing to conquer Tunisia.316 To these diplomatic pressures the 
English offered no resistance when Sir Richard Wood, the English consul 
in Tunis, proceeded to co-operate with the Italians to check the French. 
Bismarck, however, reminded England of its promises at Berlin, and Wood 
was recalled.317 
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The need for international prestige and the continued animosity 
between Italy and France finally convinced the latter that it was time 
for firm and vigorous action. So, after three years of diplomatic prepa-
ration, one of the innumerable raids of Tunisian tribesmen into Algeria 
on March 30, 1881, was used as a pretext for establishing a protectorate 
in Tunisia. 
Faced with direct French interference in Tunisia, the Italian 
government sought to secure English assistance, and Granville was tempted 
to act on these suggestions. Fearing that the French acquisition of 
Tunisia would neutralize the British naval station at Malta, the Foreign 
Secretary suggested joint action with Italy.318 Meanwhile, Granville 
wrote to Lyons, on April 5, instructing him to "look as mysterious as you 
can, as to what might be our attitude •••• The French _cannot be aJ.;Lowed 
to seize Tunis without the consent of Turk$1 and communication with the 
rest of Europe.n319 In a move to enlist support against France, he 
prepared a note to Germany and Austria, but Dilke, the Under-Secretary, 
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convinced him that he would be unwise to send it.320 
English press opinion looked askance on France's invasion of 
Tunisia. France was entitled to take punitive measures, but consider-
ations of self-interest, if properly understood, would lead France to 
avoid further involvement in Tunisian politics. French annexation of 
Tunisia would not only touch English interests in the Mediterranean, 
but it would affect the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire and the 
imperialistic ambitions of Italy. The Times, echoing the sentiments 
of Lord Granville, contended: 
England, France, and all the Great Powers stand pledged to maintain 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. • •• From this point of view 
it might become necessary to address objections to the French 
Government in the policy attributed to it •••• In other aspects 
Great Britain has no cause whatever for being jealous either of 
France or any other Power which seeks to make its influence para-
mount in Tunis. Englishmen would rather be disposed to regard with 
favor attempts to develop the resources of the country, p~~vided 
these were not accomplished by unfair or forcible means.3 · 
The Daib Chronicle, referring to the Tunisian difficulty, pointed out 
that no territory could be ceded without international permission.322 
The Morning Post feared that French success in Tunisia would open up 
an era of French annexation in North Africa of serious import.323 The 
Pa11 Mall Gazette could find no excuse for French annexation of Tunisia, 
as England and Italy, which had numerous interests there, found it 
possible to respect the rights of the Bey and the Sultan.324 
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The French authorities were painfully aware of English misgivings. 
In order to deter a possible joint intervention and to set Italy and 
Britain against each other, the French government, on April 11, 1881, re-
leased to Blowitz the papers dealing with the negotiations of 1878. After 
quoting Salisbury's promises to Waddington, Blowitz asserted that English 
opposition was now without any real foundation. 
Successive Cabinets may differ as to the means, but not as to the 
great principles of foreign policy, and loyally abide by their 
predecessors' engagements, especially when no paramount interest 
dictates a change of conduct. The publication of Lord Salisbury's 
dispatch will be sufficient to put an end to the confusion of 
interests thought to be affected in Italy and to show that the 
French action has nothing which can arouse the legitimate suscepti-
bilities of the English people.325 
The publication of Salisbury's dispatch, although of considerable 
importance, did not put an end to the opposition of public opinion to 
French action in Tunisia. It is true that English opinion soon recovered 
its former regard for France, but Langer, in saying that Blowitz 1s publi-
cation •crushed the opposition in England rather effectively;J26 has 
somewhat exaggerated its effect. 
The English government continued to feel uneasy about French 
plans for Tunisia. Lord Granville, though restrained in his original 
plans, was fearful less the French interfere with English commercial 
privileges in Tunisia.327 He wrote to Lord Lyons on April 22, 1881; 
I dislike barking without biting, but if the result of not barking 
• • • is the annexation of Tunis or the creation or the great port 
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of Bizerta impregnable by naval force and neutralizing Malta, we 
should look rather foolish. Notwithstanding the present Chauvinism 
about Tunis, it would not be sweetmeat for the French to have 
England, Italy and the Arabs inside and outside Algeria against her. 
It is well that she should not imagine that this is perfectly im-
possible. 2But, of course, I wish to ruffle her as little as possible.3 
355 
Lord Granville told the French ambassador, Challemel-Lacour, near the end 
of May: "I should lack frankness, if I were to leave you under the im-
pression that the action of France in Tunis has produced a favorable 
impression here.n329 Lord Lyons did little to discourage such utterances. 
He wrote to Lord Granville on May 13: 
The whole affair is of very bad augury. It will inspire the French 
Public with a love of resorting to high-handed proceedings which 
can be indulged in without any real risk. • • • The patient has 
swallowed it [Tunis] so complacently that she may soon wish for an-
other, and perhaps a stronger stimulant. They got Bismarck's leave 
for this, and it will perhaps be a long time before they do any-
thing of the kind without his leave. But then he will be sure to 
push them on to any undertakings which will occupy their minds and 
their forces, and tend to put them on bad terms with other Powers. 
And this is disquieting for there are not wanting all over the 
globe places and questions in which the French might make themselves 
very inconvenient and disagreeable to us, and might, if encouraged 
by Bismarck, come at last to a downright quarrel with us.330 
Later on in June, complaining of the vexatious interference by French 
officials in Tunisia, the English Ambassador wrote: 
I did my best to impress upon B. St. Hilaire yesterday that there 
was real bitterness of feeling among the public in England, and 
that if the French Government and its agents persisted in a series 
of irritatrng measures, the consequences might be very incon-
venient.33 
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In addition, when French troops had to be recalled at the end of June 
to put down a native insurrection, Lord Lyons exhibited no little pleasure. 
In a letter to Lord Granville of July 5, he remarked: 
Retribution has come quickly upon the French for their hypocritical 
seizure of Tunis. The Arabs seem to be upon them in all directions. 
Although this serves them right, it is, I think, much to be regretted 
for p~litical reasons •••• If the rrench have to send a large force 
to Tunis, they will very probably, formally as well as virtually, 
annex the Regency.332 , 
So, in essence, the English government, appealed to by the Turks and the 
Bey, assumed an attitude of sympathetic disinterestedness and contented 
itself with references to the unfavorable effect on English opinion and 
guarantees as to the future use of Bizerta as a military base.333 
Meanwhile English press opinion continued to make known its dis-
pleasure. On the day following Blowitz's dispatch revealing Lord 
Salisbury's admissions in conversations with Waddington at Berlin, the 
Times editorialized: 
The British Government cannot be expected to look with satisfaction 
upon measures the practical result of which may be to detach a 
province from the Ottoman Empire, a precedent of evil and dangerous 
example when brought to pass by force and the will of a single 
power •••• But most of all it will be disquieting to the world to 
learn that the French people, after an interval of peaceful progress, 
have been infected with the fever that has so often wasted their 
powers and drawn them into peril and disaster.334 
The Daily Telegraph maintained that the basic question which remained was 
how far did France plan to go. England, as a power in the Mediterranean, 
whose commerce passed through the waters between Tunisia and Sicily, 
should, in spite of Salisbury's carte blanche, diplomatically uphold 
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Tunisian sovereignity.335 According to the Morning Post, the French 
penetration of Tunisia was not only a violation of international justice, 
but a step towards turning the Mediterranean into a French lake. 
Tunis is denounced as a focus of intrigue against French rule in 
Algeria. Tripoli will be denounced as a focus of intrigue against 
French rule in Tunis. The turn of Egypt will then come, and our 
Cabinet wi116be forced in the end to oppose what they might have prevented.33 
357 
The Daily News, while not going so far as to accuse France of seeking to 
monopolize North Africa, remarked that the action of the French government 
' 
was very high-handed and it indicated its belief that the raid of the 
Tunisian tribesmen was an opportunity and not a cause of French expansion.337 
The Standard, at first, took an indifferent attitude toward the Tunisian 
situation. Unwilling to accuse the French of wishing to make Tunisia a 
protectorate, it referred to the French move as a sop to French vanity, 
unlikely to injure the interests or pride of any other power.338 In 
time, however, as French objectives became more apparent, it asserted: 
11The Republic is simply tread~g with the utmost servility in those foot-
steps of the Empire which led the nation into ambiguous and unwarrantable 
enterprises.n339 
English perplexity and fears concerning the ultimate intentions 
of France in regard to Tunisia were answered on May 12, 1881, when the 
Bey signed the treaty of Bardo, accepting a French protectorate. All the 
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mystery and secrecy surrounding French ventures in Tunisia was removed, 
leaving the other powers to accept a fait accompli. The English people 
had been dissatisfied with the whole operation from the beginning, had 
disapproved·of the lack of straightforwardness, and had feared economic 
and political complications; they now reiterated their sentiments with 
even greater forcefulness. The Times, commenting on French designs in 
Tunisia, observed: 
English disapproval is unanimous. The English people, as the past 
few years have shown, is not given to habit and agreement in matters 
of foreign politics, but in the matter of M. St. Hilaire's Circular 
the agreement is absolute. Liberals and Conservatives, Radicals and 
Anti-Radicals, 'concur in blaming and regretting the position which 
the French Government has consented to take up. • • • It would be 
idle to pretend that. this action of France will not somehow weaken 
the sympathy and friendship that are entertained towards her in 
England. France has lately been submitting our friendship to tests 
of some severity •••• There is no denying that France has done 
herself harm with English public opinion by the Tunisian affair • .340 
Two days later, speaking specifically of the treaty with the Bey, the 
Timeg declared that it provided not so much for the admission of French 
influence as for the exclusion of all other influence and interest, and 
that it had ruffled Italy, and the Porte, and had shocked English 
opinion • .341 The Daily Telegraph called the French protectorate a step 
in the direction of making Bizerta •a standing menace to the Malta 
Channel, through which pass much of England's Eastern trade.n.342 On 
May 16, this journal compared the annexation of Tunisia to the stock-
jobbery of the Second Empire, and it informed France that England 
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considered its rights paramount in Egypt.343 The Standard, which previ-
ously showed reluctance to condemn the French, admitted "that it is long 
since Europe has been scandalized by an act of such high-handed and flagrant 
deception as the French Republic bas been guilty of in the matter of 
Tunis."344 The establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia produced 
an outburst of Francophobia in the Morning Post. More alarmist than most 
news organs, this conservative journal maintained: 
A crisis has been reached in Tunis, and upon the action which the 
British Government will take in the momentous controversy may depend 
the future of the empire. The unprincipled ambition of the French 
Republic and the permanent interests of the British Empire are face 
to face upon the shores of Tunis, at the port of Bizerta, and on the 
road to Egypt •••• We do not pause to demonstrate the perfidy, the 
unblushing falsehood, the more than Muscovite duplicity of the suc-
cessive protestations and explanations, with which the French Re-
public has apparently deceived and betrayed the ear of our Radical 
Cabinet. • • • Yet nothing is more easy than to clip the wings of 
French usurpers. • • • The French Republic may believe that it can 
scorn the just indignation of solitary Italy. The union of Italy 
and England presents a combination which will shatter the insolence 
of the Palais Bourbon.345 
The liberal Daily News, though not prepared to countenance the use of force 
against France, regarded the French occupation as devious and trouble-
some.346 The Fortnightly Review, which consistently upheld the course of 
the Republic, admitted that •the French Republic has shown a contempt 
for the rights of a minor government which could not have been surpassed 
by a French Empire."347 In essence, the acquisition of Tunisia by France 
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caused resentment on all sides in England. Even after the knowledge of 
Lord Salisbury's approval made such protest worthless, English opinion 
exhibited considerable irritation. Not onl;y were British conservatives 
alarmed by the threat to the road to India, but liberals and republicans 
were dismayed at the Republic's lack of political morality. 
Yet, there was a dissenting opinion which held that English 
interests were not endangered by French annexation of Tunisia and that 
more was to be gained by co-operating with France than by objecting to a 
fait accompli. The Pall Mall Gazette, for example, argued that, while 
France would be weakened by its move, the action would not disturb 
Britain's position in Egypt. "The extension of French authority over 
Tunis, notwithstanding all that is said in some of our newspapers, 
threatens no British interest.n348 The Spectator, seeking to defend the 
French action in Tunisia against the Tory party, which, it asserted, was 
endeavoring to produce a rupture between England and France, admitted 
that the French conduct in North Africa was very similar to that of 
Britain in Afghanistan, but it asserted that England had nothing to fear 
from a conquest which would result in bringing civilization to the world. 
Moreover, the loss of French friendship, which would result from English 
hostility, would be a loss not only to the cause of Great Britain but to 
the cause of world peace.349 
While the •Liberal Alliance" emerged from the Tunisian crisis 
without serious alteration, the bad feeling between England and France 
had alerted the British to the dangers of French colonialism. France 
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had swallowed Tunisia so easily that it might wish to strengthen its 
position in Egypt. Aware that Bismarck was not averse to French 
colonialism, English opinion, while emphasizing the value of Anglo-French 
co-operation, let the French know that England would never tolerate 
French schemes in Egypt. The Times, for example, insisted that English 
interests in Egypt were not only vital to its security, but were superior 
to that of all other powers.350 The Daily Telegraph seized the oppor-
tunity to stress England's paramount role in the "Dual Control." 
If England is not to figure as the senior partner on the Nile, the 
sooner the firm is dissolved the better for the peace of the world. 
There is no safety from day to day for that peace nor, indeed, for 
the security of our Indian Empire, except in the frankest enunci-
ation of the plain fact that none must be allowed to block our 
commercial and political bridge of Egypt.351 
The Standard was even more specific in its position in regard to Egypt. 
The contention that England and France have equal interests in 
Egypt cannot for a moment be maintained. • • • England and France 
have hitherto consented to act in concert in regulating the finances 
of Egypt, so far as it affects international commercial interests. 
Should the question arise of international political relations, the 
whole prospect of the matter would be changed. 1 ~ • If any one nation is to occupy Egypt it must be ourselves. 5 
The suspicions of the English press were paralleled by a certain 
uneasiness in diplomatic circles. On July 5, Lyons, in a dispatch to 
Granville, warned of French ambitions in Egypt and complained of Bismarck's 
willingness to countenance these plans. 
Tripoli will then stand exactly in the same relation to them that 
Tunis did before the assumption of the Protectorate. After Tripoli 
would come Egypt. • • • How great must be the complacency of those 
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who desire to occupy French troops in distant countries, and to involve 
France in difficulties with other Powers.353 
Furthermore, rumors of French interest in 'Egypt came to the attention of 
the Queen, who wrote on June 27, to Granville: 
The Queen heard accidently from a friend of hers that the French were 
talking of Egypt as an ultimate object and that Bismarck encouraged 
it. Lord Granville said the other day to the Queen that this we 
could not tolerate and she trusts he will take ~ that our unfortu-
nate apparent acquiescence in the annexation of Tunis does not lead 
France and Europe to believe we shall stand that.354 
In spite of these disturbing signs and warnings by the leading 
news organs, the hostile tone of publi_c opinion declined quickly. Re-
gardless of the unfortunate misunderstanding over Tunisia, the English 
retained friendly feelings toward the Republic. Even though the "Liber-
al Alliance" had been strained, there was a feeling that it could still 
be useful. That it did not emerge unscathed, and that premonitions of 
Anglo-French rivalry presented an obstacle to its permanency was no 
reason to abandon it. On the contrary, there was a sincere desire to 
continue its operation. The Times, for example, asserted: 
We ourselves greatly prize the French alliance. We regard it as an 
immense aid to the prosperity of the two· countries, a help to civili-
zation, and a strong guarantee of the European peace. We trust it 
may long continue and that it may be cordially supported by the nation-
al feelings on both sides. But the way to make it permanent is for 
neither country to embark upon schemes of aggression and adventure 
which may lead it, in spite of itself, into dangerous collision with 
the sentiments and interests of the other.355 
The Spectator, while noting that England's entente with France was weaker 
than before France invaded Tunisia, maintained that the only development 
which could wreck Anglo-French friendship would be a French attack on 
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The harmony, however, did not last long. For the time being 
England and France continued to work together, but, beneath the surface, 
events were unfolding that were to put the "Dual Control" and the 
"Liberal Alliance" to a test. 
Egypt and the Breakdown of the Liberal Alliance 
The decisive rupture in Anglo-French relations stemmed from 
developments in Egypt. In 1876, both governments, fearing the bankruptcy 
of Egypt, intervened in the interest of the bondholders and imposed their 
control over much of the Khedive's financial administration. Three years 
later, the two powers were compelled to reassert their authority in 
Egyptian affairs. On this occasion the Khedive, Ismail, dismissed his 
European advisors, and England and France induced the Porte to depose 
Ismail in favor of his son, Tewfik. Although the latter did not struggle 
against this European direction, a number of Mohammedan intellectua:I.s and 
army officers, led by Arabi Pasha, launched a nationalist movement, which, 
by the end of 1881, had disrupted the country. It was evident that foreign 
control could only be maintained by direct military intervention against 
Arabi. 
Although the English and French governments desired to work to-
gether to maintain their interests, their policies fell once more into 
confusion. There were two courses open to them. One was Anglo-French 
intervention; the other was a Turkish occupation. The French regarded 
Turkish intervention in Egypt as a precedent which might be used against 
356nTunis," Spectator, LXIV (October 29, 1881), 540. 
Tunisia and, therefore, preferred an Anglo-French occupation. The British 
government, on the other hand, was evasive as to the French suggestion, 
preferring to have the Turks restore order.357 Nevertheless, the English 
government, fully aware of the necessity of maintaining French co-oper-
ation, allowed themselves to follow French suggestions. On January 8, 
1882, the British and French governments, on the initiative of Gambetta, 
delivered to the Egyptian government the so-called Joint Note in which 
they announced their determination to uphold the independence of the 
present regime against all internal and external threats. Such a warning, 
which specifically pointed to the danger of the nationalist party, could 
have been successful only if the two powers had been willing to follow up 
their threats with military operations. Yet, even in deciding to warn 
Arabi, the English government was not as determined as the French to take 
direct action.358 While the French were prepared to go the limit, 
Granville intended to offer little more than moral support.359 The 
difficulty was that within the Liberal cabinet there was a real difference 
of opinion. Gladstone, who had the backing of a large and influential 
section of British opinion, was opposed to the abridgment of national 
freedom anywhere. Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain, on the other side, 
were less hesitant about extending British control in Egypt.360 Hence, 
it is quite understandable why Granville's policy was feeble and evasive. 
On the other hand, English opinion was firm in its determination 
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to maintain the supremacy of English interests in Egypt. For example, 
the Times, while urging the necessity to co-operate with France, main-
tained that England's interests were paramount to those of any other 
country.361 The Standard likewise asserted the primacy of England's 
role in Egypt, and it called upon England, if necessary, to occupy the 
country wi~hout France.362 The Daily Telegraph declared: "If England 
is not to figure as the senior partner on the Nile, the sooner the firm 
is dissolved the better for the peace of the world."363 
As for the Joint Note, which contemplated Anglo-French inter-
vention, public opinion expressed fears lest such action bind England 
to follow French lead and, thus, rupture Anglo-French relations. The 
Spectator declared: 
A protracted joint occupation of Egypt by Great Britain and France 
opens a terrible prospect for both countries. There will never be 
any certainty of peace, any end to the rumors of intrigue, any 
cessation of Chauvinist complaints, either in Paris or London. We 
have no suggestion to offer, save our old and discredited one, that 
France should be compensated for allowing England to garrison Egypt, 
but we cannot believe that joint occupation is a solution which the 
Foreign Office should seek.364 
The Morning Advertiser, while adhering to its previously expressed 
opinion that the language of the Note was prudent, and that the program 
it indicated was inevitable, desired to be assured that British policy 
was not being subordinated to Gambetta.365 The Daily News, realizing 
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the importance of maintaining an understanding between England and France, 
warned that "the benefit of the French alliance, great as it is, must be 
subordinated to the paramount object of upholding our own influence in 
Egypt."366 It is obvious that, regardless of England's hesitancy con-
cerning intervention, British opinion, in case of joint action, foresaw 
difficulty if England did not assume the leading role. 
The issuance of the Joint Note, far from attaining its desired 
ends, served only to further weaken the Khedive's regime. John Morley 
in the Fortnightly Review, described the Egyptian reaction in the 
following words: 
At Cairo, the Note fell like a bombshell. Nobody had expected such 
a declaration, and nobody there was aware of any reason why it 
should have been taken without deliberate calculation nor without 
some grave intention. The Note was, therefore, taken to mean that 
the Sultan was to be thrust still farther in the background; that 
the Khedive was to become more plainly the puppet of England and 
France; and that Egypt would, sooner or later, in some shape or 
other, be made to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. The general 
effect was, therefore, mischievous in the highest degree. The 
Khedive was encouraged in his opposition to the sentiments of the 
Chamber. The military, national, or popular party was alarmed. 
The Sultan was irritated. The other European Powers were made un-
easy. Every element of disturbance was roused into activity.367 
Sir Edward Malet, the English envoy to Egypt, noted that the Egyptians 
looked on the Note as unwarranted interference. He telegraphed home to 
Lord Granville on January 9: 
The communication has, at all events, temporarily alienated from us 
all confidence. Everything was progressing capitally, and England 
was looked on as the sincere wellwisher and protector of the country. 
Now, it is considered that England has definitely thrown in her lot 
with France, and that France, from motives in connection with her 
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Tunisian campaign, is determined ultimately to intervene here.368 
Again, on the following day, Malet wrote: 
It is too soon to judge at present the ultimate result of what has 
taken place; but for the moment it has had the effect to cause a 
more complete union of the national party, the military, and the 
Chamber, to unite these three in a common bond of opposition to 
England and France, and to make them feel more forcibly than they 
did before that the tie which unites Egypt to the Ottoman Empire 
is a guarantee to6which they must strongly adhere to save themselves from aggression.3 9 
367 
Meanwhile, during the spring of 1882, England and France, in spite 
of their unheroic roles, their vacillation, and weakness, continued to 
work together to effect a solution. The English were determined to seek 
the co-operation of France. Thus, Granville wrote to Odo Russell on March 
15, that he was working with the French regardless of French opposition to 
the diplomatic intervention of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.370 As long as 
the situation did not get out of hand, their differences, which were pre-
dieted on forceful intervention, were more or less theoretical. If and 
when the uprising became anti-European, the entente would be put to a 
severe test. For the time being, British opinion remained friendly. 
The working classes are friendly to France; the commercial classes, 
while they dislike French protectionism, are not jealous of France 
and the French as they are, to some extent, of the Germans. In a 
word, the "Anglo-French alliance," which, as far as actual political 
cooperation extends, was the creation of the Palmerstonian eRoeh, 
still survives as strongly as ever in the realm of feeling.371 
By early summer of 1882, the nationalist movement in Egypt began 
to take on a serious aspect. Anti-foreign outbreaks and incidents of 
368Baring, I, 228-29. 
369Ibid.' p. 229. 
370fitzmauriee, II, 149. 
371Editorial in Times (London), March 23, 1882. 
anti-Christian fanaticism, together with the practical paralyzing of the 
Khedive's authority by Arabi, led the English and French governments to 
agree to stage a naval demonstration. As the powers lacked a European 
mandate, it was understood that they would not embark troops. With the 
nationalist riots increasing at Alexandria, the British admiral was 
instructed to bombard the Egyptian fortifications. The French were in-
vited to co-operate, but they declined to incur further responsibility. 
Consequently, on July 11, 1882, Admiral Seymore, without French partici-
pation, destroyed the earthworks and batteries at Alexandria. Meanwhile, 
arrangements were being made to send a military force ashore in order to 
restore order. 
Freycinet had belatedly acquiesced in an Anglo-French occupation 
of Egypt, but on July 29, his ministry was defeated by a striking majority. 
This meant that France was unable to take part in the military operations. 
The recent difficulties encountered in the French occupation of Tunisia, 
the likely expense, and the vague feeling that Bismarck was laying a trap 
for them in order to secure German predominance in Europe paralyzed French 
policy. As it was, however, their unwillingness to join with the English 
did not obstruct the occupation. Indeed, the French offered the English 
every encouragement.372 So, with France's blessing the English landed an 
army under Wolseley in Egypt and at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, they 
defeated the nationalist forces of Arabi. This brought to an end the most 
acute phase of the Egyptian question. The British, who had never intended 
to occupy Egypt, but had favored leaving intervention to the Turks, had 
become masters of the Nile. The French, who had been less hesitant than 
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the English to pressure the Egyptians, especially under Gambetta, did not 
participate in the military operations of July to September 1882. The 
attitude of both powers was the reverse of heroic. The French had not 
been disposed to take any initiative, while the British had been eager to 
leave intervention to the Turks. 
This extraordinary outcome, the fruit of a muddled policy, served 
to destroy the Anglo-French entente. The British government did not 
intend to remain permanently in control of Egypt. Indeed, they recognized 
Turkish suzerainty and publicly announced their determination to withdraw 
as soon as law and order were restored. On November 14, Gladstone declared 
that England considered the occupation as a provisional situation, and on 
January 3, 1883, the Foreign Secretary reaffirmed the sentiments of the 
Prime Minister.373 Before any appreciable steps could be taken, however, 
a religious fanatic named Mohammed Ahmed had seized control of most of the 
Sudan. Thus, the British government felt obliged to put off their de-
parture and to apply their energy to reforming the Egyptian government. 
The result was the rupture of the Anglo-French entente. 
The French, viewing the ease and rapidity with which the British 
conducted the campaign against Arabi, were humiliated by their failure to 
join with the British in a joint occupation. Yet, the French expected 
that their influence would be renewed upon the restoration of peace and 
order. As early as September 20, Duclerc informed the British "that he 
thought it would be in the interest of England to give at an early date 
some notion of what her future intentions were with regard to Egypt.n374 
373Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 281. 
374Baring, I, 339. 
The French were particularly determined to preserve the "Dual Control," 
but, the British resisted French wishes on this point. According to 
Cromer, "Public opinion in England pronounced strongly in favor of its 
abolition.•375 For example, the Fortnightly Review, always a friend of 
France, stated: 
The abolition of the Dual Control seems to be a foregone conclusion. 
It has been tried and failed. Both for the sake of Egypt and for 
our own sake it is most desirable that it should not be tried again. 
Such an arrangement with the French is the old story of two in one 
bed, where sooner or later one wants to kick the other out. But we 
must treat the French delicately and fairly in the matter. As they 
refused to carry out the Control to its logical conclusign, the use 
of force, they have no right to claim its restoration.37 
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Lord Dunsany, who was an arch-imperialist, admitted that the good will of 
France was valuable, but he asserted that England should not pay too much 
for it. He went on to say that a better arrangement than the "Dual 
Control" in Egypt should strengthen the understanding with France.377 
Thus, in October, following some diplomatic skirmishing, Lord Granville 
told the French authorities that the Khedive did not intend to restore 
the condominium.378 To the French, who were not disposed to recognize 
that the situation had changed, came the realization, together with no 
little annoyance, that an evacuation of Egypt was impossible at an early 
date. 
The dissolution of the Anglo-French entente was a fact of great 
significance for the future diplomatic relations of the Great Powers. 
375Ibid., p. 340. 
376George Campbell, "Reconstruction in Egypt,• Fortnightly Review, 
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377Edward Dunsany, "England and the Suez Canal," Nineteenth 
Century, III (December, 1882), 857-58. 
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Up until the Egyptian impasse, England and France had found a common 
interest in their fear of Bismarckian ascendancy. With the French and 
English no longer working together, the way was open for Bismarck to 
make overtures to Paris. So great became the tension between England 
and France over Egypt that Bismarck was able to exploit this difficulty 
by securing an entente with France which allowed both powers to satisfy 
their colonial aspirations. 
The real founder of French overseas expansion was Jules Ferry. 
While he was Prime Minister in 1881, and again from 1883 to 1885, the 
French Republic embarked upon an ambitious colonial program. In ad-
dition to consolidating control over Tunisia the French harassed the 
British in Egypt and sent expeditions to Tonkin, Madagascar, and the 
Congo. Without going into detail concerning the areas of French ex-
pansion, which is a part of the succeeding phase of Anglo-French 
relations, it suffices to note that these events completed the rift 
between France and Britain. Unwilling to accept the fact that France 
had a legitimate claim to these areas, and fearing commercial compe-
tition, the British subjected the French to bold criticism. Even Dilke, 
the Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office and a long-time friend of the 
Republic, denounced French policy. Count Herbert von Bismarck, who was 
in London, wrote to his father concerning Dilke's conversation on 
September 13, 1882. The latter declared: 
I am very much anti-French, for we have so many diverging interests. 
The French are at present very troublesome to us in Madagascar, but 
we cannot yet declare war on them on that account. They are trying 
to squeeze us in other parts as well, e. g., on the Niger and Congo 
they have .made treaties with native chiefs allowing Frenchmen a 
monopoly of trading rights. Also in the Pacific they have done much 
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to hamper and irritate us.379 
That the British Foreign Office and public opinion was irritated 
can be substantiated by the comments of Tissot, the French Ambassador 
in London, who wrote on November 4, 1882, to Duclerc, the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 
The echo of that growing irritation comes back to me from every 
direction, just as from every direction one foresees the compli-
cations to which I have just alluded. English politicians who are 
the most interested in accord between the two nations, do not hide 
their fears from me. The others scarcely cover up their hostile 
feelings. Sir Charles Dilke, whom I shall not try to put in either 
of the two above categories, most certainly represents the thoughts 
of the majority of the Cabinet. Sir Charles Dilke expressed him-
self this very day in the presence of the 1 conseiller 1 of my · 
embassy, in terms which leave no room for doubt that good relations 
between the two nations, according to his views, are about to 
receive a serious setback. Mr. Plunkett, presently on leave, has 
practically the same viewpoint, but with a bit more regret incorpo-
rated into it. I admit that these public opinion tendencies in 
England concern me. In conditions other than those in which we 
presently find ourselves, ·~ would be able, more easily, to take 
sides concerning one of these spells of bad humor to which our over-
seas neighbors have accustomed us. But, it is to be feared that 
this bad intelligence may soon take the form of facts in the 
numerous questions which we have to take up with the London cabinet. 
They are already letting us catch a glimpse of the more or less 
marked hostile attitude which we shall have to deal with in the 
Newfoundland matters, the affairs of Raioteu, of Madagascar, of 
Tunis, and of the Congo. On most of these matters the attitude of 
our former allies is less than friendly.380 
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French antagonism gained such proportions that by 1883 the Prince of Wales 
abandoned his yearly sojourn in France and considered friendship with 
Germany,381 ·In addition, notices in the press revealed a growing tension 
between the two powers. Harold Perry, writing in the National Review, 
held hatred of France, its policy, its ways, and its morals, to be a moral 
379aerman Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, I, 198. 
380oocuments diplomatigues fra~aise, IV, 53. 
381Lee, I, 462-63. 
duty. He called on the defenders of British tradition to "learn, as 
Nelson did, to make a second religion of the hatred of France.n382 The 
Fortnightly, while tending to discount French jealousy, admitted there 
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was an element of genuine French alarm, but believed it would soon abate.383 
French resentment towards English success in Egypt was the pivot 
for an attempt by France, with some encouragement b.1 Bismarck, to join with 
Germany against British colonialism. In spite of Sedan and the loss of 
Alsace and Lorraine, Franco-German conversations at the Berlin Conference 
of 1884 revealed France's interest in German support in Egypt. Bismarck 
was able to exploit this tension between England and France by securing an 
entente with the latter, which permitted both Germany and France to satisfy 
their colonial aspirations. One phase of Anglo-French relations had come 
to an end; for the next twenty years a fierce rivalry was to replace the 
previous amity. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The triumph of Bismarck in the Franco-Prussian War, which shifted 
the balance of European power to Berlin, did not bring with it a lessen-
ing of British interest in French affairs. France, as in the years before 
the outbreak of' the war, was in turn the object of envy, esteem, sympathy, 
and fear, but never of indifference or apathy. In the eyes of' English-
men, France remained one of the more brilliant and troublesome nations in 
Europe. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the English 
public was kept well-informed by the news organs concerning the problems 
and prospects of the Republic. 
England's extraordinary preoccupation with the affairs of' its 
Latin neighbor stemmed from a combination of political, economic, and 
cultural interests: the general fear that Prussia intended to dominate 
the Continent, the challenge to British imperial interests posed by French 
colonial ambitions, the realization that events across the Channel fre-
quently led to serious repercussions on the English political scene, the 
common assumption that the political development of France foreshadowed 
the future political development of England, the expansion of' Anglo-French 
commerce, the cultural and artistic leadership of Paris, the familiarity 
of Englishmen with the French language, the proximity and accessibility 
of France to British travelers, and the popularization of France by a 
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small group of publicists and journalists. In addition, there was an 
intangible predilection, best expressed by Matthew Arnold, who declared 
that the affinity for France resulted from the fact that it cultivated 
an ethical ideal which appealed to the average sensual man. 
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The English attitude towards France was guided, in the main, by 
changes in international power politics and the necessity to maintain the 
security of the British Empire. Yet devotion to democracy, nationalism, 
laissez-faire, and peace, together with the social, religious, and politi-
cal habits of Englishmen, contributed their share to the formation of the 
British image of France. 
England, like the rest of Europe, was unable to escape the impact 
of the Franco-Prussian War. With the balance of power passing from Paris 
to Berlin, real as well as sentimental interests were involved. English 
public opinion, guided by historical trends and contemporary circumstances, 
joined with governmental leaders in condemning the conduct of Napoleon's 
government. While it seemed obvious that Napoleon had precipitated the 
conflict by making mmecessary demands at Ems, there was, prior to 1870, 
a growing mistrust of French policy and a general acceptance of the in-
evitability of the consolidation of Germany. On the other hand, not 
everybody held a pro-German view. A few Englishmen, remembering the 
Prussian attack on Denmark and Austria and fearing that Prussian mili tar-
ism would prove to be a worse curse than Napoleonism, withheld their judg-
ment or condemned both powers. Others openly sided with France. For 
example, the well-to-do of English society felt a certain affinity with 
French culture and perhaps recalled the amenities of Parisian social 
life, while the Catholic minority remembered French assistance to the 
·papacy. Regardless of the relative merits of the case, the English 
people were confident that, in spite of Prussia's recent victories, 
France would soon be laying siege to Berlin. 
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The defeat of the French armies, the capture of Napoleon, the 
proclamation of the Third Republic, and the siege of Paris brought about 
immediate reverberations in England. By early September, public sympathy 
had shifted to France. This transfer of sentiment resulted from the 
realization that Bismarck had passed beyond a defensive move to the ac-
quisition of further military laurels. There also arose apprehensions 
lest the rumored demand for a cession of Alsace and Lorraine would weaken 
international law, undermine the ideals of nationalism, and endanger the 
peaceful development of civilization. Hence, the English people, while 
acclaiming the unification of Germany, fore saw that the permanent weaken-
ing of France would leave Bismarckism dominant in Europe and could easily 
lead to a war of revenge later on. Only a minority, among whom were men 
like Carlyle and Froude, held out against this turning tide of opinion. 
The Commune, coming so soon af'ter the struggle of 18'70..71, moved 
Englishmen to regard with amazement the seeming self-mutilation of France. 
English interest in the Commune, however, did not come from any vain 
curiosity at the occasion of a violent and bloody spectacle, but from 
the fact that it touched on fundamental British interests, notably, the 
balance of power and the eruption of English radicalism. The continuing 
convulsions of France were clearly not in the interest of English securi-
ty, as any delay in re-establishing French law and order would only serve 
to strengthen the grip of Germany on western Europe. Like previous in-
surrections, the Commune was reflected in English politics. To the upper 
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classes it appeared not only as an attack upon religion and property, but 
a warning for them to put their own houses in order. Other elements, es-
pecially the radicals or the working class, considered it as a harbinger 
or social reorganization in Britain. 
The English, on the whole, made little effort to understand the 
nature and goals or the Commune, and in their hostility they generally 
ignored the basic moderation or the leading Communards. This misunder-
standing, which resulted in the indiscriminate acceptance or reports or 
drunkenness, looting, murder, and church pillaging, stemmed from one-
aided reporting; the efforts or Karl Marx, who was then in England, to 
interpret it as a proletarian and co11ll11Wlist uprising; Thiers' deliberate 
misrepresentation or his antagonists; and a thoughtless contusion or the 
Commune with Communism. Only a small, radical clique, comprised mainly 
or trade unionists, radical Liberals, and Positivists, were able to see 
in the Commune an attempt by citizens or Paris to secure municipal liber-
ties and a struggle or urbanism against rural preponderance in French 
political life. It was this group which met the exaggerated accounts or 
the Commune by attacking the brutality and perversity or the governing 
authorities and by finding extenuating circumstances for the violent 
actions of the Commune. The peak or English hostility against the Commune 
came during the final week or the insurrection, which saw the razing or 
public buildings and the shooting of hostages. The cruel repression of 
the Communards by the victorious generals, however, led public opinion to 
condemn Thiers and to extend assistance to escaping ttReds," while the 
English governmental authorities, under the influence or popular criticism, 
treated the French government with diplomatic restraint. 
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During the formative years of the Republic, the English people were 
profoundly interested in the course or the struggle between republicans and 
, 
royalists. There is scant evidence to substantiate the thesis or Elie 
Halevy that English public opinion followed a course of increasing in-
sularity in regard to the constitutional experiments or France. Halevy 
asserted: 
The time had passed when international parties fraternized irrespec-
tive or frontiers; the time had passed when liberal England, proud 
or her liberal institutions, would have rejoiced to see them spread-
ing over the world. Quite indifferent as to the more or less demo-
cratic, more or less military, forms of government l.Dlder which the 
new Europe was choosing to lire, England would have been ready to 
put up with French Caesarism. 
As a matter of fact, the English followed the fortunes of the early Repub-
lic with intense partisanship. 
The procl8J18.tion of the Republic, overshadowed by the collapse or 
the French armies, was regarded as a welcome change by the great majority 
or the English press. British reaction, however, was hardly enthusiastic, 
for, offsetting these sentiments, voices were heard that condemned the un• 
wise timing or the revolution in the presence or an invading army' which 
could only increase the difficulties or attracting allies. It also was 
pointed out that republican experiments had previously proven futile in 
the presence of peasant hostility and that the Republic was likely to be 
burdened with the responsibility or negotiating an unpopular treaty. 
Following the election of a conservative National Assembly and the 
resulting insurrection in Paris, it was widely expected that the Republic 
would soon collapse. This prospect was quite generally viewed with dis-
may, as it was expected to lead to a return or clerical influence, a 
lualev:r, p. 58. 
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restoration or the reactionary political ideals or Charles x, ·another 
revolution, and a war against Italy on behalf or the papacy. Obviously, 
the triumph or the Republic held forth the best chance for the realization 
ot democratic aspirations and the security or Great Britain. Under the 
circumstances, theu, the majority or English people endorsed the regime 
ot Thiers, and, meanwhile, urged the dissolution of the National .Assembly 
and the holding or new elections. When Marshal MacMahon replaced Thiers 
as a result or a constitutional crisis in 1873, English opinion was afraid 
that France might be torn by civil strife and that its relations with 
Italy and Germany would be worsened. The English public, in general, con-
demned the new government as a monarchical conspiracy against freedom, 
democracy, and peace, and it labeled the forthcoming Septennate as still 
another measure to prolong the power or blind reactionaries. Yet there 
was a minority or Englishmen, notably a few conservative journalists, some 
members of the aristocracy, and some leading English Catholics, who viewed 
a restoration of royalty as the only guarantee for the preservation or law, 
orderly government, and religion. 
During these first few years, public opinion in England was sub-
ject to violent oscillations in regard to the prospects of French republi· 
canism. In the first half of 1871, it was generally assumed that republi-
canism had a short life expectancy and that France, except for several 
cities, was overwhelmingly reactionary. These views were modified by the 
elections of July, 1871. The uninterrupted republican victories up to May, 
1874, with the exception or the overthrow or Thiers, encouraged confident 
assertions that even the peasants had accepted the Republic. The elections 
in the summer of 1874, which returned several ultra-conservatives, moderated 
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this elation and led to assertions that the Republic rested on a weak 
foundation and was turning toward Bonapartism. This hasty assumption 
was again amended af'ter the Maine-et-Loire election late in 1974, and 
English opinion recognized the f'act that republicanism was making steady 
gains. 
The f'raming of' the Constitution in 18'75, achieved with an utter 
lack of' enthusiasm b,y the French, was greeted in the same vein b,y the 
English. It was realized that the Republic still lacked republicans, that 
MacMahon was still at the helm, and that many problems still confronted 
the f'inal achievement of' democratic government. Only with the elections 
of' 1876, which returned a majority of' liberal deputies, did most EngliShmen, 
like the followers of' Thiers and Gambetta, break f'orth with rejoicing. The 
applause, however, proved to be premature, f'or on May 17, 1877, the Repub-
lic was again under vigorous attack. 
The English, though confronted with an "Eastern Crisis, tt f'ollowed 
the Seize 14ai and the succeeding agitation with unabated interest, and, as 
in the previous crisis of' 1973, public opinion charged that a reactionary 
and bigoted group of' ultramontanes were scheming to stamp out democracy 
and f'reedom. English liberals and conservatives concluded that Marshal 
MacMahon had little justification f'or his action. Conservatives, however, 
criticized it less as an attack on parliamentary government than on the 
basis that it was foolhardy, untimely in its inception, and unf'air in its 
methods. Almost unique in English criticism was the position of' representa-
tive English Catholics. Like their religious counterparts in France, they 
saw the crisis as a struggle between atheism and Catholicism, rather than 
between f'reedom and despotism. 
With the victory of' the Gambettists in the fall elections, English 
opinion, as would be expected, applauded the outcome, but until the 
Marshal's resignation in 1879, there could be no certainty of' triumph. 
Throughout the contest between the Left and the Right, English 
majority views had remained consistently sympathetic towards the aspira-
tions of' moderate republicanism. As long as the Bourbons and MacMahonists 
were linked with an ultramontane policy, the English people were bound to 
side with the republicans in whom they saw the promoters of' peace and par-
liamentary government. 
Following the Franco-Prussian War, which left France weak and iso-
lated and Gennany the preponderant power on the Continent, English public 
opinion feared that Bismarck might be bent on further conquest and hence 
considered French recovery a prerequisite for the restoration of a more 
stable European equilibrium. Only a small minority, influenced primarily 
by religious considerations, regarded German strength as the best security 
for religious liberty against the clericalism of' France. 
On the whole, France 1 s speedy liquidation of' the German occupa-
tion, its rapid economic recovery, and its resistance to the demands of' 
the ultramontanes, met with English applause. In 1872, when the Three 
· Emperors' League was proposed, British opinion saw in it an offense to 
France and a danger to the peace. Unwilling to permit the further weaken-
ing of' its Latin neighbor, public opinion responded by condemning the 
schemes of' Bismarck; and the British government, following the lead of' 
the press, demonstrated its friendship for France by sending a naval squad-
ron to greet Thiers at Le Havre. 
In 1874 and 1875, when Bismarck carried his campaign against 
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Catholicism beyond the German frontier and made known his opposition to 
French rearmament, the British public felt that France had given him no 
cause for alarm and supported the French position. Indeed, in the "war 
scare" of 18'75 the French government sought to influence the British 
government by working through the British press. 
In the years from 18'7 5 to the Cyprus Convention in 18'78, English 
public opinion, like the Foreign Office, fo1md general satisfaction with 
French statesmanship and policy and achieved a high degree of harmony and 
·friendship with its Latin neighbor. Unwilling to accept any further humil-
iation of France and still suspicious of Germany, the great majority of the 
English press continued to be solicitous of French security. At the same 
time, the British co-operated with Paris by establishing an Anglo-French 
condominium in Egypt. Also, partly out of consideration for French friend-
ship, the British resisted numerous suggestions by Bismarck to annex Egypt. 
The Anglo-French entente was further strengthened by the triumph of liberal 
institutions in France in 1877 and by the accession to power of Gambetta 
and Waddington, who espoused a pro-English policy. Finally, the Paris Ex-
. ',J;t:, 
hibition of 1878 enhanced the friendly feelings between the two nations, 
when the Prince of Wales made several trips to Paris on behaif of the Ex-
hibition and through his personal influence encouraged Anglo-French co-op-
eration against Germany. 
A conspicuous change in Anglo-French relations commenced in 1878 
with the Cyprus Convention, which aroused French suspicions, and in 18'79 
there were press sparrings over their divergent aims in Egypt. Although 
the partnership still existed, the re-establishment or a European equilib-
rium and the simultaneous la1mching of French imperialistic enterprises 
foreshadowed difficulties for the advocates of the entente. The French 
invasion of Tunisia in 1881, touched English interests in the Mediterranean, 
where the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and the colonial ambitions of 
Italy were threatened. Hence, it is not surprising that English opinion, 
accustomed to a free hand in the colonial sphere, looked askance on the 
French attack. Even following the release of the news that Lord Salisbury 
had suggested at the Congress of Berlin the acquisition of Tunisia b,y 
France, the English press continued to make known its objection to the 
French policy. Developments in Egypt in 1882 provided the occasion for 
the decisive break in the Anglo-French entente. So great became the ani-
mosity when England asserted its paramount influence in Egypt that Bismarck 
was able to secure an understanding with France in order to satisfy the 
colonial ambitions of both parties. Under the circumstances, the British, 
with their far-fiung imperial holdings, were bol.Uld to find fault with the 
French. 
English public opinion was not without a significant effect on the 
outcome of historical events. Although it is difficult to determine the 
precise impact of public opinion on Britain's relations with the Republic, 
the successive phases of English governmental policy -- of neutrality in 
the Franco-Prussian War, of co-operation against Germany, of the "Dual 
Control" in Egypt, and of the gradual estrangement following 1880 -- were 
renected in, and sometimes prompted by, the corresponding tendencies in 
the press. A survey of the diplomatic dispatches of French representatives 
to England gives evidence of the importance the governing circles of France 
attached to the infiuence of English opinion in the making of foreign policy. 
In specific instances the French govel"'lJlent used the British press, as in 
1872 at the time of the Three Emperors' League, and again in 1875 during 
the 11war scare, tt to bring public pressure to bear on governmental authori-
ties. Moreover, French party politicians and journalists frequently at-
tempted to strengthen their positions by quoting English editorials, which 
in some instances, notably during the constitutional crisis of 1877, had 
considerable weight in the discussions. Indeed, so anxious were French 
authorities to be judged well by English opinion that they not infrequent-
ly censored English newspapers shipped to Paris. 
In conclusion, English opinion of France changed from one of friend• 
ship in 1871, to offset Germany's threat to the balance of power, to that 
of mistrust in 1882, because of France 1 s renewed imperialism. It is strik-
ing that the English, who in 1866 had· reacted with contempt when Austria 
was defeated by Germany, expressed an entirely different reaction to the 
similar defeat of France in 1870..71. There was no gloating over the weak-
ness of the defeated power but, rather, a feeling of sympathy for France 
and of fear regarding the new Germany. That Disraeli vacillated and made 
overtures to Bismarck should not obscure the fact that English opinion at 
large expressed distrust towards Germany and saw in the speedy recovery of 
France a means of attaining international stability. Although the English 
were slow to appreciate the full implication of German ascendancy, the 
methods by which Bismarck achieved unification led to a revulsion or feel-
ing which the English never completely overcame. In effect, Anglo-
French co-operation against German hegemony, the "Dual Control," and the 
visits of the Prince or Wales to Paris foreshadowed the Anglo-French 
Entente or 1904. While the English, at least in theory, followed after 
1871 a policy of isolation in regard to the Continent, they became 
increasingly aware that this policy was scarcely splendid. Meanwhile, 
the relatively mild French reaction to the English acquisition of the 
Suez Canal shares anticipated the Fashoda decision. In essence, the 
period of the "liberal alliance" was a formative one in Anglo-French 
relations. Both nations attempted to adjust themselves to the changed 
conditions which resulted from German hegemony in Europe and became 
psychologically prepared for the rapprochement or 1904. 
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THE BRITISH IMAGE 
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Major Professor: Professor Herbert Moller 
The purpose of this study is to explain the British reaction to the 
principal events of the French Third Republic from 1870 to 1882, a signif'i-
cant period in Anglo-French relations. Previous historical investigation 
of these years has placed a disproportionate emphasis on diplomatic records, 
whereas the sentiments and views of the British nation have not previously 
been made the subject of a systematic study. 
The material for this research consists primarily of diaries, letters, 
biographies, autobiographies, monthly reviews, and newspapers. Each 
chapter traces the general trend and the variations of public opinion 
during a·particular phase of the Republic1 s history. 
Despite the shift of European power from Paris to Berlin as a result 
of the Franco-Prussian War, the British nation continued its close interest 
in French affairs. In the eyes of Englishmen, France remained one of the 
most brilliant and troublesome nations of Europe. 
Although it is difficult to determine the precise impact of public 
opinion on Britain's relations with the Republic, English governmental 
policy was reflected in, and sometimes prompted by, the corresponding 
tendencies in the press (as in 1872 at the time of the Three Emperors' 
Page 2 
League and in 1875 during the •war scare•) • Likewise, English public 
opinion was a. highly respected factor across the Channel. French poli-
ticians were remarkably sensitive to English judgments, and frequently 
they attempted to strengthen their positions by quoting English editorials, 
which in some instances, particularly during the constitutional crisis of 
1877, carried considerable weight in the discussions. 
When the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, English public opinion 
was nearly unanimous in condemning the conduct of France and in believing 
that Napoleon had wantonly precipitated the struggle in order to re-
establish French hegemony in Europe. With the surrender of the main French 
army at Sedan, the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, and the siege of 
Paris, public sympathy shifted to France. 
The Commune, coming so soon after the struggle of 187o-71, involved 
fundamental British interests, notably the balance of power and the 
eruption of English radicalism. The English, on the whole, made little 
effort to understand the origin and goals of the Commune, and in their 
hostility they generally ignored the basic moderation of the ruling 
Communards. 
Throughout the formative years of the Republic, English opinion, with 
the exception of a few conservative journalists and some leading English 
Catholic reviews, was consistently sympathetic towards the aspirations of 
moderate republicanism, even though there were notable oscillations re-
garding the prospects of the Republic 1 s success. As long as the monarchists 
were linked with an ultramontane policy, the great majority of Englishmen, 
desirous of peace and the triumph of parliamentary government, were bound 
Page 3 
to side with the republicans. 
Following the Franco-Prussian War, which left France weak and isolated 
and Germany dominant on the Continent, English opinion exhibited not only 
considerable concern for French welfare but even a high degree of friend• 
ship. With the re-establishment of a European equilibrium in 1878 and the 
simultaneous launching of French imperialistic enterprises in Tunisia and 
Egypt, English opinion of France changed to mistrust. Yet the period of 
the "liberal alliance" from 1871 to about 1878 marked a formative period in 
Anglo-French relations. Both nations, attempting to adjust themselves to 
the changed conditions which resulted from German hegemony, became psycho-
logically prepared for the rapprochement or 1904. 
Autobiography 
Phillip Albert Cole, born January 9, 1932, in Portland, Maine: 
son of Hiram Spaulding Cole and Lyndell Bailey Cole. Married to the 
former Charlotte Wentworth Clemons and the father of three children, 
Dulcinea, Penelope, and Bertrand. 
Graduate of Fryeburg Academy 1950. B.s. degree from Boston 
University, College of Business Administration, 1954; A.M. degree in 
History from Boston University, Graduate School 1955; Assistant in 
the Department of History, Boston University, 1955-1956; Teaching 
Fellow in History, Boston University, 1956-1957. Instructor in the 
Department of History, University of Maine in Portland, 1957-1961; 
Assistant Professor of History, University of Maine in Portland, 
since 1961. 

